Destroying and Constructing the State from Below: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Conflict, Development and Governance

By

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Dedication

To my grandmother

Faduma Isse who believed that pursuing education was the path to freedom

and to my mothers

Amina Haji-Elmi, Zahra Haji-Elmi, Mariam Haji-Elmi and Muhubo Haji-Elmi who made it possible
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For many scholars and politicians, Somalia is a premier example of anarchy, having been without a central government since 1991 and has been described as “a failure amongst failed states”. Somalia's statelessness and the ongoing conflict has been explained as being due to Somalis' general antipathy towards authority, preference for chaos, history of clan rivalries and Somalia’s Cold War alliances with the USSR and the US and by intervention from neighboring countries. While these are important puzzle pieces, they fail to explain the underlying reality in Somalia today.

Much of the literature on diaspora is focused primarily on their development contributions with a few examining their conflict-perpetuating activities and even less their role in governance. This dissertation seeks to build and expand on this literature by exploring the ways that the diaspora not only engages in development, conflict and politics but also the manner by which they can take part in governance including collapsing the state as well as state-building from below. Using the Somalia case, I ask: What are the ways that the diaspora promotes development, contributes to conflict and engages in governance? How did the Somali diaspora contribute to the collapse of the Somali state? How have their activities contributed to the emergence and destruction of local institutions after the collapse of the central state in Somalia?

In examining their different activities in and towards Somalia, this research finds that the diaspora were an important factor in the collapse of the Somali state through their funding of rebel groups, directing remittances away from state control and their opposition to the state. Secondly, their continuous and constant remittances have
provided a lifeline for Somalis at home, the provision of basic services including security are obtained through the clan, which receives funding from the diaspora. This has strengthened clan identities, undermining national identities, which is critical for the reconstitution of the Somali state. Finally, there has been no consideration by states in how to mitigate the activities of the diaspora while promoting their positive contributions resulting in a diaspora, which has an undue influence in what happens within Somalia.
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Acronyms

AMISOM - African Union forces in Somalia
ARPCT - Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS - Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
AU - African Union
EPLF - Eritrean People's Liberation Front
GECPD - Galkayo Educational Center for Peace and Development
HAG - Hawiye Action Group
HTA - Hometown Association
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority of Development
IMF - International Monetary Foundation
LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NSPU - Northern Somali Peace and Unity
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONLF - Ogaden National Liberation Front
SBIC - Somali Business and Investment Council
SIDD - Somali Institute for Dialogue and Development
SIRC - Somalia International Research Center
SNM - Somali National Movement
SSDF - Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG - Transitional Federal Government
TNG - Transitional National Government
UIC/UCI - Union of Islamic Courts
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USC - United Somali Congress
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Chapter One

Introduction

Transnationalism, defined as relations that cut across societies and states, provides a departure point for this dissertation. Transnationalism provides a framework to connect the multiple and contradictory relationships that diasporas cultivate and maintain with homeland, hostland and other diasporic locations as well as the activities they engage in (Glick-Schiller et al 1992: 8). Transnational diasporas are not only those that are dispersed from single to multiple locations, but those whose realities and practices challenge "the nation-state container view of society [because it] does not adequately capture the complex interconnectedness of contemporary reality" (Ben-Rafael and Sternberg 2009: 5).

The literature on diasporas can be divided into three parts – development, conflict, and politics. The primary focus of most studies is on their activities or potential for the development of their home countries through their financial and other remittances (Orozco 2003; Nyberg-Sorensen 2002; Van Hear et al 2003; Terry 2005). There is an explicit belief with many of these studies that the promotion of diaspora involvement with home is beneficial for the home countries and is an effective way for these countries to underwrite their own development, particularly as foreign aid has dried up. As such, many development and donor institutions commission research that demonstrates that diaspora involvement in development is good because their remittances are immune to political or economic conditions at home (Hammond et al 2010; Sheikh and Healy 2009;
Page and Plaza 2006; Sander and Maimbo 2005). However, there are no substantial studies demonstrating the long-term impact on relying remittances, especially when migration levels cannot be sustained in an era when many countries are combating migration from non-skilled workers. Also understudied is whether remittances adequately compensate developing countries for brain-drain.

The second way that the diaspora interacts with home is through their support for conflict-perpetuation but research on this aspect of diasporic activities is still emerging (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2006; Shain 2002; Smith and Stares 2007; and Tölölyan 2007). These studies demonstrate the ways that the diaspora fund rebel groups and other warring parties and make life more violent for those left behind. In fact, the diaspora's contribution to conflict is so detrimental that although they are successful in initiating conflict, once conflict does start, the size of a diaspora is one factor in influencing whether a country is able to successfully transition to post-conflict and stay there or relapse into conflict again (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). A few studies show that the diaspora can be both peace-makers and peace-wreckers depending on opportunity structures available at that time (Smith 2007: 12).

The final way that the diaspora interacts with home is through their involvement in homeland politics (Laguerre 2006; Shain and Barth 2003; Sheffer 2003; Vertovec 2005). The research on this aspect of diasporic involvement is quite limited, with most considering the ways that diaspora participate in homeland politics from afar or by briefly returning home. This literature generally does not explain how the diaspora also
participates and takes an active role in governance through the construction and destruction of local institutions.

This dissertation seeks to build and expand on the above literature by exploring the ways that the diaspora not only engages in development, conflict and politics but also the manner by which they can take part in governance including collapsing the state as well as state-building from below. Using the Somalia case, I ask: What are the ways that the diaspora promotes development, contributes to conflict and engages in governance? How did the Somali diaspora contribute to the collapse of the Somali state? How have their activities contributed to the emergence and destruction of local institutions after the collapse of the central state in Somalia?

This dissertation finds that the Somali diaspora plays an essential role in development, conflict and governance. In the area of development, this study clearly demonstrates that the Somali diaspora were important in first supplementing the daily needs of their family and after the civil war, in providing life-saving assistance. The remittances that the diaspora send annually surpass humanitarian and foreign aid to Somalia. The positive contributions of the Somali diaspora is so overwhelming that their other more damaging activities are often ignored by local and international actors.

In their conflict perpetuating activities, the diaspora promotes conflict through remittances to warlords and other actors who engage in conflict. This research demonstrates that the Somali diaspora was an essential participant in the creation and funding of rebel groups, which then overthrew the government and destroyed the state.
The diaspora continued to support conflict throughout the 21-year civil war in Somalia and funded wars between clans.

The diaspora's more recent involvement with home has been through bottom-up state-building, which has been an extension of their developmental support. More recently the diaspora has taken part in political activity relating to the creation of local institutions and of regional states. In this way, they participate in state-building from the ground-up. They hold a disproportionate number of political positions relative to their numbers at the local and national governments within Somalia and through their active support for regionalization, the diaspora has also prevented the reconstruction of the state.

The literature on diaspora and development generally assumes that the diaspora interact with states and that their development activities can be guided by the state. This dissertation vividly illustrates that the diaspora can, in the absence of a state, be an effective source of development and that their support can provide services to hitherto regions neglected by governments unwilling or lacking the capacity to deliver services effectively across the country. Additionally, the diaspora utilizes the institutions, such as banking, of other countries to deliver development services to the homeland. In this way, this research shows that the study of the diaspora cannot be solely limited to homeland or host countries because the diaspora weaves a web of inter-linking relationship between home, host and other diaspora locations.

The literature on conflict and diaspora thus far has involved a limited number of cases on the ways that the diaspora contributes to conflict. This research adds to that literature while showing that the diaspora engagement in conflict goes beyond funding of
rebels and enflaming conflict: they also have played a role in instigating conflict and creating their own rebel groups. This research also expands on the diaspora and conflict literature by showing that diasporas do not only support conflict against states but that they can overthrow them. Other literature emphasizes that opportunity structures constrain or permit diaspora engagement with home and that these opportunity structures are provided by sending and receiving states. This research demonstrates that opportunity structures are not only determined by states but that local actors can equally constrain and permit diaspora activities.

Finally, the literature on the diaspora and governance is limited primarily to the ways that the diaspora take part in politics from a distance; occasionally come back home to hold political office for a short period of time; or are allocated a certain percentage of seats in the parliament. This dissertation adds to this research by showing that the diaspora has also taken an active role in state-building from below, while simultaneously undermining state reconstruction.

**The Somali Case**

The image of Somalis as unwilling to submit to external governance, yet also unwilling to govern themselves collectively, despite the presence of several regional and local states, has become a familiar cliché as Somalia enters its twenty-first year without a central government. Various theories have tried to explain Somali statelessness including Somalis' general antipathy towards authority, seeming preference for chaos, an attachment to lineage segmentation, and history of clan rivalries that makes Somalis
averse to being ruled by other clans (Drysdale 1994; Brons 2001; Lewis 1994; Laitin and Samatar 1987; Samatar 1988). These tendencies have been bolstered by Somalia’s Cold War alliances with the USSR and the US at varying times and by regional intervention from neighboring countries. While these are important puzzle pieces, they do not explain the underlying reality in Somalia today, why the state collapsed and why it remains in shambles. To date, the full impact of the Somali diaspora has been missing from analyses and the impact of this dissertation seeks to address the impact of the Somali diaspora on peace, development and conflict in Somalia and the ways that their activities have contributed to state collapse and the ongoing conflict.

Broadly, this dissertation is interested in examining the interactions of the diaspora with home. It seeks to answer the following research questions: What are the ways that the diaspora promotes development, contributes to conflict and engages in governance? A related question is how has the Somali diaspora contributed to the collapse of the Somali state? And how have their activities contributed to the emergence and destruction of local institutions after the collapse of the central state in Somalia?

Generally, the ways that the diaspora contributed to the destruction of the central state and their role in the reconstruction of institutions from the local level has been neglected. Second, the activities of the diaspora are not marginal in Somalia, instead the influence of the diaspora is felt at all levels of society and the neglected role of the diaspora may be one reason why the Somali conflict has been intractable. Third, the activities of the diaspora towards Somalia has come under scrutiny in several countries with large diaspora. Many host countries have focused on the remittance companies that
facilitate the movement of money into Somalia and the return of young Somali diaspora to fight with the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. Finally, the few research on the Somali diaspora (Hammond 2001; Sheikh and Healy 2009; Horst et al 2010; Farah 2009) have focused only on their developmental contributions while disregarding their conflict activities.

**Research Questions**

The focus of this research is the exploration of relationships that the diaspora have with their country of origin. Specifically, in the Somali case, what are the ways that the diaspora promotes development, contributes to conflict and engages in governance? A related question is how did the Somali diaspora contribute to the collapse of the Somali state? And how have their activities contributed to the emergence and destruction of local institutions after the collapse of the central state in Somalia?

To situate the Somali case within the broader studies of diaspora and their impact on their home countries, this chapter will examine the interactions between the diaspora and the state; the connections between diaspora, development, conflict and governance. What are the factors that determine the nature of that relationship? And how does the diaspora impact, challenge and transform our understanding of the state, of borders and of citizenship? In essence then, how do the multiple and contradictory activities of the diaspora support, challenge and undermine states.

**Rationale for this Research**
In November 2001, the United States designated the largest remittance company in Somalia, Al-Barakaat, as funneling money to Al-Qaeda, shut down its operations and froze its world-wide assets. This brought about anxiety and fear, as many Somalis in the diaspora wondered and worried about how they would remit money home to their families. Adding to the anxiety was that Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting was about to begin and traditionally, many in the diaspora send extra money to their families during this holy month. As someone who had remitted to family and neighbors, it was the first time that I realized the importance of remittances for Somalia. But, I also noticed that while the diaspora worried about how to get money to their families, they were also planning on how to favorably position their clans if the US invaded Somalia as part of its war on terror.

The other reason is that the explanations attributed to why the Somali state collapsed - due to clan conflicts; Somalis' dislike of authority; the Cold War - was never satisfactory. I could understand why the central state collapsed. This included loss of the support of the population, groups and communities were arming themselves and the rebel groups were coming inside the country. But I could not understand why it continued to be. What was preventing its reconstruction? Since 1991, I knew that Somalis in the diaspora not only sent money to their families but that they also sent money to their clans during conflict. I was often asked to donate and on refusing was told that I was disloyal and that the clan would not be there when I needed help. But it was only after 2001, as members of the diaspora sought to promote their clans to take advantage of a possible US
invasion of Somalia, that I began to think about the ways that the diaspora contribute to conflict and undermine the reconstruction of the central state.

The other aspect that frames this research is personal. I became part of a small Somali diaspora at a very young age when I was sent to study abroad. But in the few years that I studied in Somalia, it was instilled in me both at home and in school, that being a Somali was the most important identity of all my identities. This was also the height of the Barre government's efforts in eradicating the clan from Somali society and in promoting nationalism and self-reliance. And thus all Somalis were considered as relatives. This Soomaalinimo, that is this idea that Somalis share a link and that they owe something to each other, for example to help each other, was something that I experienced whenever I travelled abroad. No matter where I was, whether at an airport or walking in a foreign city, if another Somali saw me, they would invariably come over to see if I was well and ask if I needed anything. Having seen this side of Somalis most of my life, the civil war and its aftermath was incomprehensible. Neither did this presumed centuries old hatred of Somalis against each other. I believed that there were other reasons that the civil war began in Somalia and continued for so long. And this dissertation is my attempt to understand and explain one of the understudied causes - the - diaspora - on why the central state collapsed and why it continues to remain collapsed.

**Significance of the Study**

As this dissertation will show, the diaspora's influence on Somalia today affects all aspects of society economically, culturally and politically. This research finds that in
the first ten years following state collapse, the diaspora was largely remitting money home to family and to their clans in times of conflict. Since 1999, the diaspora began to circulate between home, host and other diaspora locations. Their activities now included investing in business, creating institutions such as schools, universities and hospitals. The diaspora also began to become involved in politics and many returned to the regions where their clans originated from. This resulted in increasing number of regional and local state formations, many like Galmudug, Hiiraan and Ximin and Xeeb are headed by returned members of the diaspora. This research argues that all these activities that the diaspora engages in have a direct bearing on the inability of the Somali central state to be reconstructed.

**Somali Diaspora in Conflict, Development and Governance**

In the London School of Economics 2003 Yearbook on global civil society, diaspora are labeled as regressive globalisers that are “groups which favour nation-state thinking through transnational means” (Kaldor et al 2003). Generally, diaspora can refer to an individual diaspora, one community of diaspora originating from the same country or a group of diaspora communities from different countries. In this dissertation, diaspora refers to all three.

In most countries, diaspora activities directed towards home are mediated through the state and other local actors, which then direct or transform diasporic activities. The Somali diaspora remain an exception to this norm because their activities unfold within a country lacking a central government. As such, in the absence of a central state, what is
the true function and the nature of their influence in the absence of a central state? This research is further animated by the multiple and contradictory ways in which the diaspora interacts with home, the kind of activities they engage in and the consequences for their home country. In exploring the impact of the Somali diaspora, I examine their activities in development, conflict and governance.

This is not to suggest that the diaspora is solely responsible for the challenges faced by Somalia, but rather to illuminate their activities and influence as a critical internal and external actor in Somalia. To place the activities of diaspora in perspective, the activities of countries such as Ethiopia, the United States, as well as other countries, will be examined.

The diaspora’s activities are a double-edged sword. Clearly, they provide a vital and much needed economic lifeline for Somalis still at home and for those in refugee camps in neighboring countries and they have reconstructed public services such as education and healthcare that collapsed with the state. On the flip side of this support for home has been the cost to the diaspora. The Somali diaspora has sacrificed itself in order to support relatives at home because so many send a great deal of their earnings back home. Many Somalis in the diaspora live in poverty and take low-paying jobs rather than going to school because of this commitment.

But they are also major players in the ongoing conflicts at home and these activities predate the failure of the Somali state in 1991. So this research seeks to chart the conflict-promoting activities of the diaspora, starting with an account of their support for rebel movements and detailing other actions which led to the collapse of the central
state. Their ongoing conflict-funding activities have continued to hinder peace as well as the possibility of reconstructing the state. The developmental support they provide in the form of over $1 billion in annual remittances, while it is vital for the survival of hundreds of thousands of Somalis, concurrently undermines the necessity for a state which would normally be expected to provide public services (Menkhaus 2001). The state becomes superfluous when public services such as education, healthcare and security can be provided by the clan, sub-clan or family members in the diaspora. This has resulted in increasing inequalities within Somali society between those who have access to remittances and those without.

**Methodology**

This research was carried out in four countries – Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and the United States (Washington, D.C.; Columbus, Ohio; and Minneapolis, Minnesota) from 2006 – 2010. Somalia is divided into three parts, Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia. This is not to suggest, as others have proposed, that Somalia should be politically and territorially divided into three parts composed of the democratizing Somaliland, the peaceful, stable but slower to democratize Puntland, and the conflict-ridden South-Central. But, in my research, I found that the interaction between the diaspora and home varies among these regions. The interactions with home have been shaped by local factors including the presence or absence of effective, legitimate and respected elders or violence-inducing actors such as warlords or other opportunistic actors; the political conditions at home, and the diversity among clans and ethnicities.
International factors that have shaped the Somali diaspora’s interactions with home include military interventions by the US, Ethiopia, Uganda and Burundi as well as the selection of political leaders and the installations of transitional governments by outsiders.

As I argue later, Somaliland and Puntland with their active, respected and effective elders, the absence of warlords and a sidelining of violence-prone political actors, as well as the presence of one main clan in conjunction with smaller clans in their territories, have dampened the diaspora’s conflict-directed activities. In contrast to Somaliland and Puntland, southern Somalia is ethnically and clan diverse, elders have been pushed aside and warlords and other political actors operate with impunity. This environment has allowed the diaspora to engage both in development, as do other Somali diaspora from Somaliland and Puntland, but also to support and take part in conflict activities with very little restraint. I was able to conduct research in Somaliland and Puntland, but not in southern Somalia due to the Ethiopian invasion there in 2007, although I was able to interview Somalis from the south in Djibouti and Kenya where many had fled.

In total, I interviewed 106 people. In Puntland and Somaliland, I interviewed 62; 11 people in Djibouti and Kenya; and 30 people in the United States (Columbus, OH; Minneapolis, MN; and Washington, D.C./Virginia). Three other people, in Australia, the United Kingdom and Denmark were interviewed via email and phone. The interviewees included elders, politicians, women activists, journalists, doctors, educators, members of civil society, youth, business people, remittance workers and returned diaspora. Within
Somalia, I interviewed diasporas from Europe, North America and the Middle East but within the diaspora, my interviewees were all US-based. Thus, although there are similarities and differences between and within the Somali diaspora, this dissertation largely draws on the Somali diaspora in the US.

Since the focus of this research is divided into before and after the state collapse, some of the interviewees were those who had knowledge of the political and economic situation in Somalia before 1991. For example, I interviewed SNM and SSDF fighters to discern their objectives and goals in fighting against the Barre government and their sources of financial support. Others worked for the Somali government and had knowledge about the government's stance on the rebel groups and towards the large migrant populations in the Middle East.

I interviewed many elders in Puntland and Somaliland because they were critical in creating and restoring peace and the collapse of the Somali state by resorting to Somali and Islamic laws. They were also in touch with the diaspora and sometimes were the recipients of development remittances intended for the community. In examining the contributions of the diaspora to development, I chose to focus on their support for health, education and business sectors, thus some of the people interviewed were those who worked in those three sectors. Some of them were returned diaspora who I believed would provide unique perspectives.

Within the diaspora, I interviewed those who were abroad before 1991 to discover their relationship and activities towards the Somali state, for example, to find out about support for the rebel groups within the diaspora. Additionally, they were questioned on
whether and in what ways their involvement with home changed after the central state collapsed. Others were those who fled Somalia as a result of the civil war and who were actively involved in development, peace-making, conflict or in politics.

The collapse of the Somali state represents the longest period in the modern period of state collapse, so in a way, the Somali case is not generalizable. But in many countries, the activities of the diaspora are courted without regard to their darker side and as such Somalia does offer important lessons on what can happen if the activities of the diaspora are not checked and re-directed. This case is generalizable if we examine the relationship of the diaspora with families, their promotion of development and in some cases, their contribution to conflict. The Somali diaspora also fulfills the expectation of developing countries and international organizations in that diaspora can play a critical role in developing their home countries.

This research utilized a variety of methods to discover the activities, impact and influence of the diaspora. For the most part, primary interviews were conducted with people on a one-to-one basis, lasting about 90 minutes. Other interviews were conducted with small groups, although sometimes these interviews became larger as others joined in, which lasted about three hours. For a few people who were not geographically close, interviews were conducted via telephone and email. Information on diaspora activities was also collected by attending events organized by the diaspora, both in Somalia and within the diaspora, including conferences, workshops, meetings and receptions for dignitaries from Somalia. In some settings, participant-observer methods were used in venues such as coffee shops where the diaspora, mostly men, met on weekends to discuss
events at home.

Most of the interviews were conducted in Somali, with English used occasionally depending on the preference of the interviewees. In Puntland and Somaliland, I had someone who provided introductions and who vouched for me. In Djibouti and Kenya, I approached interviewees directly, while in the US, I identified those who were involved in Somalia, for example who ran NGOs or were known activists in their community. Some who did not know me and were reluctant, I asked friends to intercede on my behalf to allow me to interview them.

To determine the contribution of the diaspora to development in Somalia, I focused on the education, health and business sectors to discern their relationship with the diaspora. To discover their involvement in peace and conflict, I interviewed clan elders and politicians. Because of their unique perspective, I also met with diaspora who had returned home. Additional sources for this research came from secondary resources such as books, journal articles and magazines. The internet, particularly opinion pieces and radio interviews posted on Somali websites, were valuable in providing an expansive picture of diaspora activities around the world.

The timeline for this dissertation begins in the late 1970s when Somali migration, first to the Middle East, then to Europe and later to North America, began growing as the conflict spread. The history of the Somali diaspora will be discussed further in Chapter 4 but, briefly, the nature of diaspora interaction with home was initially economic as migrants sent money home to their relatives. In the early 1980s, a significant portion of the Somali diaspora was supporting rebel groups who sought to oust the Barre
government, thus expanding their home involvement into politics. Once the Barre
government fell in 1991, the diaspora returned to mostly supporting their relatives who
had been uprooted and were internally and externally displaced refugees. It was also
during this time that supporting your clan was de rigueur because, in the absence of a
government, this funding was the only way of providing some protection against other
clans. The diaspora perfectly mirrored the divisions at home as they fell in line with
sentiments at home and sent money to their clans.

In the late 1990s and early 2000, the nature of diaspora involvement changed due
to the Arta reconciliation conference. This conference, held in Djibouti in 2000, was the
first of its kind because it included the diaspora in the reconstruction of government. It
was also during this time that the diaspora began to return home in increasing numbers.
But the height of diaspora involvement rose in response to the Ethiopian invasion of
Somalia in December 2006. The subsequent departure of the Ethiopian military from
Mogadisho in 2009 led to a momentary decrease in diaspora interest and intervention; n
contrast, the diaspora’s political involvement has continued to grow and the numbers
returning home remain unabated.

Diaspora returns for a multitude of reasons, which will be explored later in this
dissertation, but some have returned for work, to establish businesses, to run NGOs and
to become involved in regional or federal governments. There are now more diaspora
politicians in the cabinets of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and
administrations in Puntland and Somaliland than there are local Somalis.

A much smaller number returned to initially join the resistance movement against
Ethiopia headed by Al-Shabaab, although this number has significantly declined since the departure of the Ethiopian forces in 2009. Once Ethiopia withdrew from Mogadisho, Al-Shabaab turned its brutal attention to Somalis and as such, Al-Shabaab set out to destabilize the western-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and threatened the peace and stability in Somaliland and Puntland by carrying out suicide attacks and assassinations. Their harsh rule, have made them largely unpopular within the diaspora and in the country. After 5 years of wreaking havoc in Mogadisho and in southern Somalia, Al-Shabaab has been largely driven out due to the military efforts of diaspora politicians, in particular by the last Prime Minister Mohamed Farmaajo (2010-2011) and the current Prime Minister Abdiweli Ali, both diaspora Somalis from New York. Although AMISOM forces as well as Ethiopian and Kenyan forces attacked Al-Shabaab, the direct fighting was mostly carried out by Somali forces.

**Geographical Focus**

Although Somalia is recognized by the international community as one political entity, the reality on the ground is quite different. To discern whether the diaspora’s positive and negative effects are similar or vary geographically, this research divides Somalia into three political entities. These three entities include Somaliland, formerly northwestern Somalia, which seceded from Somalia in 1991 but remains unrecognized by the international community. Somaliland has created its own government and is on the road to democratization, having held several rounds of free and fair elections at the local
and national levels (Kibble and Walls 2010; Hollekim, Hansen & Sorenson 2006).

The second polity is Puntland, which formed in 1998 and calls itself an autonomous federal region within Somalia. Puntland has had three peaceful transfers at the presidential level since it was founded in 1997, but is slowly embarking on a democratic path. For example, Puntland undertook constitutional reform, which is expected to lead to local elections and direct election of the president by the people rather than by the parliament. Part of this constitutional reform would also allow the formation of political parties (Pillars of Peace 2011). Both of these regions are similar in that they have largely escaped or emerged from the conflict that continues to engulf the south and have created institutions that provide some services for their inhabitants.

South-central Somalia is the third region of focus for this study; a region that has been of central concern to international and neighboring countries and whose inhabitants have borne the brunt of the civil war, famine and massive displacement of its people. This region also suffers from an absence of any kind of institutions, indigenous or western, similar to those created in Puntland and Somaliland. Since the announcement of the Dual-Track by the United States, the number of regional states emerging in southern Somalia has mushroomed. The Dual-Track was a new way of providing development assistance to Somalia by rewarding regions within Somalia who have made progress in peace and development. The result of this US engagement has been the formation of numerous regional states, many created by the diaspora to expressly access USAID development funds for their clan regions.

This research seeks to discern whether variations exist within the diaspora of
these three regions as to the ways in which they interact with home.

**Research Limitations**

As I initially thought about my dissertation research and my research locations – Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and the United States – I expected that doing research within the diaspora would be easy. After all, I would be dealing with people like myself who would understand my research. I thought that most would not only be open to sharing their views and experiences, but would hopefully appreciate my research because it was about their contributions to their homeland. I expected that doing research in Somalia, a country that had been undergoing clan-based conflict since 1991, would be a tremendous hardship. I believed that local Somalis would be suspicious of me as an outsider and that my clan might prove to be a deterrent in getting Somalis from other clans to speak with me.

As I conducted my research, things did not turn out as I expected. The first part of my research was conducted in Puntland (Bosaaso, Galkayo and Garowe) and the second in Somaliland (Hargeisa and Borama). I was accompanied by my husband who I thought would help me in several ways. As a woman, I thought that having my husband with me would increase my level of safety since I would be travelling through a country still emerging from conflict. Since politics is largely considered to be the domain of men, I also believed that some men might not agree to let me interview them. I thought that others might be concerned about meeting me alone for the interview and having my husband there would mitigate any questions of propriety that might arise.
Instead, my expectations were turned upside down as I found that Somalis in Somaliland, Puntland and Djibouti were much more liberal and easier to interview and, rather than viewing me as an outsider, they in fact called me that “Somali girl” who was writing the book (what Somalis commonly call the dissertation).

Issues of my clan membership came up in only two interviews and both were while interviewing Somalis from the diaspora. A Somali studying political science was also a novelty as many Somalis avidly follow and passionately discuss politics daily. Some were mystified as to why I would study a subject where anyone who followed the news was an expert. But once they heard about my research, they would often point out people I might need to interview. Local Somalis generally were much more interested in whether I intended to pursue a political office, often jokingly asking whether I wanted to become the president of Somalia.

My experience with Somalis in the diaspora was much more difficult. Frequently, people were suspicious of my motives in wanting to talk with them and would ask for the questions in advance of agreeing to be interviewed. Even after I complied, they were still less likely to ever agree to let me interview them. I often needed to find someone that they trusted to vouch for me and, even then, they practiced the Somali saying of “do not say no to someone, do something that will make them go away.”

The reticence exhibited by the Somali diaspora was due to several factors. First, my research in the US was carried out in 2007-2008, at the height of the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, when Somalis in the diaspora watched the daily and indiscriminate bombings of Mogadisho by the Ethiopians and looked on as two thirds of the city
emptied out. The positions for and against, the Ethiopian invasion were mirrored within the Somali diaspora, but formed dominantly along clan lines. This polarization within the community echoed what had happened during the early days of the civil war, but in much more stark and antagonistic terms. Before people would agree to let me interview them, they first wanted to know where I stood, whether I was for or against the invasion. Because the Ethiopian invasion had created deep divisions within the community and splitting even families apart, many diaspora were not willing to share their views unless the other person shared those views. When I would not state my position or tell them my clan (for the diaspora, another indicator of my political position), and tried to explain that all I wanted to know was their relationship with home, many people politely found ways not to be available.

Secondly, amid accusations and the 2001 closure of Al-Barakaat, the largest remittance company that it funneled money to Al-Qaeda as well as the general suspicions and scrutiny directed at the American-Muslim community, many Somalis were careful about who they talked to and what they said. As well, the designation of Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization by the US, which many Somalis initially considered a liberation movement against the Ethiopian occupation, added to their anxiety of anyone interested in remittances and diaspora contributions to the conflict. Initially, Al-Shabaab came about as a response to the Ethiopian invasion and many Somalis supported them. So, when the US government designated it as a terrorist organization, many Somalis did not consider them so. Once Ethiopia withdrew in 2009, and Al-Shabaab began to implement
their harsh rule including severing of limbs, public lashings and suicide bombing, led many Somalis to turn against them.

Thirdly, although I considered myself to be an insider in the diaspora, yet this was not helpful in getting interviews as I found out that other non-Somali colleagues were able to interview some of the very same diaspora who had refused to speak with me. I should point out that my experiences with the diaspora were not entirely negative; there were some who had no interest in finding out my clan or my political position and who went out of their way to help connect me with other diaspora or to vouch for me. But, generally, my experiences within the diaspora and in Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti were a reverse of the insider/outsider perspectives I had expected to encounter.

**Data on Somalia**

Some comments about data on Somalia. The absence of a central state has meant that numbers relating to Somalia are guesswork at best and total fabrications at worst. Thus, in many studies referencing the population size of Somalia, the numbers of Somalis in the diaspora, as well as amounts of remittances, are thrown about without indicating how these numbers were obtained. This is not to say that there are no reasonable statistics relating to Somalia, but that it is almost impossible to discern the method used to obtain data. For example, the UNDP Somalia has conducted two studies on the Somali diaspora. In the first one, by Sheikh and Healy (2009), the Somali diaspora was estimated at about 1 million remitting $1 billion annually. Two years later, a second diaspora study by Hammond et al (2011) boosted the Somali diaspora to 1.5 million
remitting $1.3 - 2 billion annually. Neither report indicates how the data was obtained. But exceptions to this trend include Anna Lindley’s study on remittances, where she interviews 500 remittance recipients in Hargeisa (Lindley 2006).

During conversations with some of the authors of these reports, they acknowledged that the figures were just estimates, although one of the authors told me that their estimates of the number of Somali diaspora were based on figures collected by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). When I examined the numbers of Somalis in various OECD countries cited in that report, the number of Somalis outside Somalia, including those in the refugee camps, amounted to about 500,000. An explanation provided by another author suggested that the report was written at the height of the Ethiopian invasion when thousands of Somalis were fleeing Mogadisho (Interview by author, Nairobi July 2010). But a significant number of those settled on the outskirts of Mogadisho or fled north to Somaliland and Puntland as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Those that did go to neighboring countries were refugees living in refugee camps and, rather than remitting money to Somalia, were themselves the recipients of remittances. As such, figures based on the assumption that Somalis leaving the country automatically translate into those sending remittances did not add up. In contrast, remittance company officials I spoke with indicated that the amounts being processed through their companies were declining every year, although they would not provide specific numbers due to their companies’ privacy laws (Interview by author, Djibouti 2008).
At the launch for the second diaspora report, UNDP Somalia presented its Human Index Development Report for Somalia, where they again provided specific numbers, including the startling claim that population disparity between men and women in Somalia was approaching the same levels as India (UNDP Workshop on Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-building; May 13th, 2011, Nairobi). Although the participants at this conference were told that this survey was based on 3500 households, no further information was offered on regional breakdown or margins of error. The numbers were presented as hard facts and included population numbers, gender breakdown and GDP per capita. In contrast, the World Bank, which also provides data for Somalia, indicates that they are estimates. For example, the World Bank provides figures for life expectancy, external debt and urban development but provides no statistics for literacy or poverty rates and GNI per capita date back to 1990 when Somalia possessed a government.

The issue is not merely that numbers presented have very little basis in fact, but that these numbers serve another purpose. For example, when the UNDP increases the numbers of the diaspora and their financial remittances in its reports, they are advocating for the increased involvement of the diaspora in the development of Somalia. UNDP Somalia was quite clear about their agenda in their last report, which was to insert themselves and to mediate diaspora involvement with home through their office. As such, the numbers have a policy implication.

In this research, I use the figure of 1 million Somalis remitting about 1 billion per year for several reasons. First, it is true that the number of Somalis outside the country
has been growing, but I think that 1 million is a reasonable estimate given that there is a great deal of back and forth movement, particularly for those Somalis in neighboring countries. For example, a significant number of Somalis who initially fled to Yemen are now returning to Somalia fleeing from conflict in Yemen. Additionally, as can be seen now with the famine in southern Somalia, a sizable number of Somalis are primarily environmental refugees who will typically return once conditions improve at home. Others may return if conflict settles down in their region or the conditions in the refugee camps are so terrible that returning to Somalia is preferable.

Remittances have been declining because a significant number of Somalis have been joined by their families and are not remitting at previous levels. On the other hand, the need has grown, as the conflict has continued, to remit to uprooted relatives. As well, many Somalis have transferred their contributions from directly aiding their families to supporting development projects.

Organization

To reveal the ways in which the Somali diaspora factored in the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, and the contributions of their activities to the cycles of emergence, destruction and re-emergence of local and regional institutions following the collapse of the central state in Somalia, the layout of this dissertation is intended to present a holistic picture of diaspora engagement with Somalia. As such, Chapter 1 provides an introduction to this research including research questions, methodology and limitations of this study.
To provide a comparative framework for the Somali diaspora with other diaspora, Chapter 2 examines the interactions of other diaspora including Mexican, Indian, Eritrean and Armenian with home, focusing on their developmental and conflict producing activities. This chapter will illustrate the ways that the Somali diaspora aligns with, and deviates from, other diaspora. It is intended to illuminate the manner in which states and diaspora interact with each other as well as the means by which the state may attempt to direct, transform and control diaspora activities. Chapter 2 will also examine the ways that the diaspora challenge and transform states and the method through which they virtually extend territorial borders along with demands for greater citizenship rights from their country of origin.

Since this research is broadly concerned with what has caused the Somali state to collapse as well as examining barriers to its reconstruction, and to put into relief the diaspora’s activities towards Somalia, it is important to investigate the position of non-Somali actors. As such, Chapter 3 is concerned with the ways that countries such as Ethiopia, the United States, Kenya, Eritrea, Egypt and Yemen, and international organizations including the United Nations (UN), the Arab League, the African Union (AU) and the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), were a factor in the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and have since been a barrier to its successful reconstruction.

In pursuit of their own short term goals, many countries, both regional and international pursue policies that have directly contributed to conflict and prevented the reconstruction of the central state in Somalia. For example, the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC), which came to power in southern Somalia and brought peace and stability, was opposed by the United States which encouraged the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2007-2009. This Ethiopian invasion led to the emergence of Al-Shabaab which, through their links with Al-Qaeda, now poses a bigger threat to Somalia, the region and the international community than the UIC had been. It is this continuous knee-jerk reaction by the international community that is partially responsible for the conflict in southern Somalia. The continuous meddling by various countries in southern Somalia’s affairs has also contributed to the inability of Somalis to come together, reconcile and build institutions in a manner similar to that of Puntland and Somaliland.

To provide the historical framework of Somali migration, Somali migrants’ engagement with home and its impact on the state, Chapter 4 lays out the different stages and drivers of Somali migration dating back to the colonial era and to the variations within the Somali diaspora. This chapter also categorizes the Somali diaspora according to the timeline of their migration because the chronology of the diaspora’s migration is a crucial indicator of the manner in which they engage with their homeland. This chapter examines the higher level of engagement with home among more recent diaspora and explains why conflict-driven migrants are more likely to support conflict activities at home than are older diaspora.

Chapter 5 is one of two of the empirical chapters and examines the diaspora’s development directed activities, which have been largely positive, but with some negative undertones for Somalia and Somalis in the long-term. To highlight their activities in the context of health, education and business sectors, this chapter provides case examples,
drawn from all three regions, demonstrating how the diaspora can be considered the
primary driver of development in Somalia. Their efforts supporting revitalized and
reconstructed public services and their infusions of investment capital have lessened the
problems associated with statelessness. At the same time, their provisions of these public
goods to their clans and their financial remittances can have negative undertones and
unintended consequences by increasing dependency of local Somalis on the diaspora for
their livelihoods. In providing these services to their communities, the diaspora appears
to have undermined the need for state. The building of these institutions primarily at the
local level has contributed to the decentralization or balkanization of Somalia, negating
the call for a central state.

Chapter 6 is the other empirically based chapter which considers the diaspora’s
conflict perpetuating activities and its contribution to the downfall of the government by
supporting clan-based rebel groups. Once the government collapsed, the diaspora was a
critical factor in fueling the civil war through its support for warlords affiliated with
specific clans, along with clan-based militias. And through those activities, the diaspora
continues to hamper peace-making and peace-keeping endeavors and dampen efforts to
reconstruct the central state. This chapter offers concrete examples of the manner in
which the Somali diaspora has been a largely neglected aspect in the literature on state
collapse and civil wars.

Since 1999, diaspora activities has expanded to governance. An increasing
number of diaspora are returning to take up political offices and diaspora politicians are
now found at the national, regional and local levels. The number of diaspora politicians
has expanded so quickly that local politicians now view them as a threat and one warlord has even called for a jihad against them. This chapter will examine the impact of their latest involvement in governance and the implications for Somalia.

The final chapter concludes this research and augurs its implications for Somalia, other post-conflict countries and in general for countries with large diaspora. The findings of this research argue against simplistic explanations of the failure of the Somali state. As a result of studying the activities of the Somali diaspora, I offer research demonstrating that the diaspora has been a neglected but critical actor in the collapse of the Somali state, in the conflicts that followed, and in the emergence of peace, stability and local institutions in some regions.
Chapter Two

Comparing Diaspora

Robert Kaplan, in his Atlantic Monthly (1994) article “The Coming Anarchy”, describes sub-Saharan Africa as a nightmarish, modern version of Hobbes’ state of nature, where life is not only short, nasty and brutish, but where the Leviathan has been killed (Kaplan 1994). As if in agreement, the Somalist scholar Aw Jama Omar Isse, remarking on the disappearance of the Somali state observes, “kinship is dead, humanness is dead, barbarism is here” (Samatar 1992: 639). This image of Somalia as a Hobbesian black hole is reinforced by the presence of warlords, terrorists, pirates, drought, famine, and refugees that threaten not only Somalis, but threaten regional and international stability and peace as well as the economic interests of the international community. To paraphrase a Somali proverb, all that is evil belongs to Somalia.

For many scholars and politicians, Somalia is a premier example of anarchy, having been without a central government since 1991, and is what some scholars have described as “a failure amongst failed states” (Menkhaus 2004: 17). According to the journal Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, Somalia has ranked dead last, or rock bottom, in their Index of Failed States for the past five years (The Index of Failed States 2012).

A cursory look at Somalia makes it obvious that some forms of statehood have appeared and others are emerging from the collapse of the central government. For example, Somaliland has constructed institutions and carried out several rounds of free,
fair and democratic elections at local and national levels and it conducted the peaceful transfer of power from one political party to another at the presidential level in June, 2010 (Kibble and Walls 2010).

Puntland also challenges the perception of Somalia as failed because it has established peace, possesses some institutions and has managed three peaceful transfers of power at the presidential level. More recently, Puntland has embarked on the road to democratization with the creation of an electoral commission and the opening up of the political space to elections by the people and to multi-party politics.

Even in south and central Somalia, which are the areas that have experienced the most conflict, there are emerging political entities that exercise political power, enforce law and order, operate courts which use a mixture of Shari'a and laws that existed under the Barre government and sometimes provide public services to their residents. In most research, explanations for the failure of the Somali state include the Cold War, clan and resource conflicts, external interventions and Somalis’ resistance to authority and preference for decentralization and anarchy. Missing from these analyses are the critical roles and activities of the diaspora including their participation in the collapse of the Somali state, their contributions to the civil war that followed and their construction of alternative forms of governance. To address this gap within the literature on state collapse and within migration and diaspora studies, this research seeks to investigate the activities of the Somali diaspora and their impact on Somalia.

Migration
Some scholars have labeled this era as “the age of migration”, but migration has always been and continues to be an integral part of human history (Castles and Miller 1993). Migration can be considered as both a manifestation and a consequence of globalization, which can be defined:

As a number of related processes, among the most important being the steadily increased circulation of capital, production and goods; the global penetration of new technologies in the forms of means of transport, communication and media; and the elaboration of regional and transnational political developments and alliances (Nyberg-Sorenson et al 2002: 9).

What may be new today is the intensity and speed with which migration occurs as well as new migration patterns and paths (Chekuri and Muppidi 2003). This intensity and speed has been facilitated “by the revolution in transportation and communication technologies that has made international travel and communication (telephone, electronic communication) accessible and affordable to enable migrants to maintain ongoing connections and links with their families and communities in origin countries” (Bardouille 2008; 2). For the past fifty years, migration has been driven by a decrease in exit requirements as many former colonies became independent in the 1950s and 1960s and by the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Other drivers of migration include an increasing awareness “of growing disparities in life chances between rich and poor countries” as well as wars and other conflicts that force people to leave their homes and countries (Nyberg-Sorenson et al 2002: 9). Environmental factors are increasingly becoming another driver of migration as people flee earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis and drought.
Despite concerns about brain drain through the loss of skilled workers migrating out to wealthier countries, migration is positively viewed by most developing nations because the contributions of migrants, usually in the form of remittances and other social and technological transfers, are now the most reliable and unconditional source of aid for the development of home (Orozco 2003; Page and Plaza 2006). Unlike foreign aid or foreign investments, migrants will continue to remit to their families regardless of the political or economic conditions in their home countries. A growing number of political leaders have noted these contributions and have sought to closely link their diaspora with their home countries in order to strengthen their ties and increase their contributions to their country.

According to the World Bank in 2010, 215 million people or 3% of the world’s population live in countries other than that of their birth, indicating that the number of migrants around the world has more than doubled since 1975 (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2010). In reality though, the percentage of the world’s population that is on the move is not much different than movements from earlier centuries and may, in fact, as a percentage of the world’s population, be less than that of the 19th century (Nyberg-Sorensen et al 2002: 8).

Today, the United States, the Russian Federation and Germany are the leading recipients of immigration, each receiving 42.8 million, 12.3 million and 10.8 million migrants respectively. Top migrant sending countries are Mexico with 11.9 million, India with 11.4 million and the Russian Federation with 11.1 million (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2010: 1-3).
The recent financial crisis has led to a decrease in migration, bolstering the view that many people migrate for economic opportunities. Migration from Bangladesh, for example, declined by almost half in the first nine months of 2009. In the US, the number of applicants for temporary work visa or H-1 B visas dropped dramatically with only 46,700 of the 65,000 available visas being filed. In contrast, in previous years the quota was quickly filled within days of the opening of application (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2009; 5-6).

Contradicting the popular image of migrants from poor countries invading the richer ones, most migrants stay within their region. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, 40 million people migrated and a majority of those, or 63% migrated to other African countries and only 24.8 percent migrated to wealthier OECD countries (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2010: 33).

People migrate for multiple reasons including political, economic, demographic and environmental factors as well as social networks. The kinds of people who migrate vary from students, professionals, skilled and unskilled workers to refugees. Migrants are now found in every region, with some moving within the region and others outside of it (Bardouille 2008; 1). Like other African migrants, the majority of Somalis are to be found in the Horn of Africa region, particularly in nearby Kenya, Yemen, Djibouti and Ethiopia. The most significant way in which migrant contributions to home is measured is in the amount they remit.

**Remittances**
Migrants contribute to their home countries in a variety of ways but their most significant contribution is through remittances, far outpacing exports and foreign and humanitarian aid. The World Bank estimates official worldwide remittances at $325 billion for 2010, an increase of six percent from 2009 when remittances declined by five point five percent. This trend in remittances growth is expected to continue with an increase of 6.2% in 2011 and 8.1% in 2012 when remittances are expected to reach $374 billion. The financial crises around the world affected remittances sent by migrants variably. Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica and other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean experienced a steep decline in remittances. Mexico, for example, experienced a 13.4% decline in the first nine months of 2009 because Mexico’s economy is so closely linked with that of the US and Spain and both of which experienced the financial crisis earlier than other parts of the world. On the other hand, in countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines, remittances actually increased by 16 percent, 24 percent and 4 percent respectively in the first eight months of 2009 (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2009: 2).

Remittances are sent in a variety of ways including through banks, through international remittance companies like Moneygram and Western Union, and through locally owned remittance companies such as the Somali-owned Dahabshil. Remittances can also be sent in ways that escape official channels including cash hand-carried by migrants returning home, funds transferred through the mail, internet or PayPal, or in the form of goods. This converts remittance figures into estimates that are grossly underestimated. One study by the World Bank estimated that actual remittances were
underreported by a factor of 25 in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Balance of Payment data. About 10 percent of the world’s population is thought to rely on remittances, although to what extent and for what purpose is not known (Page and Plaza 2006: 266).

In 2010, sub-Saharan Africa’s worldwide share of remittances was estimated at 6.6 percent (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2010: 34). These remittances were used to meet daily expenses including education, healthcare, and housing (Maimbo and Ratha 2005; 4-5). Remittances, particularly to poor countries, can reduce the number of people in poverty. For example, in Burkina Faso, remittances reduced the number of rural households in poverty by about 7 percent and the number of impoverished urban households by 3 percent (Sander and Maimbo 2005: 63).

For Somalia, remittances are estimated at about US $1 billion and have surpassed income from Somalia’s traditional exports of livestock and frankincense as well as from foreign aid and humanitarian assistance. Due to the lack of a central government, and particularly in light of the collapse of the banking system, remittance companies have stepped in to facilitate the movement of funds from the diaspora to home.

Remittance flows take several routes. Most remittances are sent from the diaspora to Somalia but some remittances are destined for other countries where Somalis are living but may not have the right to work. This occurs in places such as Egypt, Greece and South Africa where there are increasing numbers of Somali migrants who are trying to make it to Europe or North America. Other remittances are sent to locations
where large numbers of Somali refugees have taken up residence including Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen.

Remittances to Somalia are most likely to be sent initially to someone living in urban areas, but many Somalis are also supporting relatives living in rural or nomadic areas. Particularly during hardship periods such as drought, remittances then flow from urban to rural. For example, there exists a system of internal remittances which often flow from Somaliland and Puntland, where a large number of internally displaced Somalis are living, to southern Somalia. As such, remittances are not always from rich countries to poorer ones.

In contrast, some research also illustrates that remittances can have negative consequences for individuals and societies and that remittances increase inequalities between those receiving remittances from migrant relatives and those without relatives abroad (Stark et al. 1986). Other negative consequence of remittances is that creates dependency, instability, developmental distortion which benefit only a minority of people. Remittances create dependency for those receiving them by removing incentives for these individuals to work to meet their daily needs (Russell 1986; Stahl 1982; Keely and Tran 1989; and Finkle and McIntosh 1982). Since remittance-sending declines over time, migration has to continue at the same or higher levels as earlier migrants reduce their contribution to home when they obtain residency in their host country and family joins them. Research on the children of migrants presents a complicated picture of their involvement with their parents’ country of origin, ranging from having no links to contributing in non-financial ways. But, in most cases, the descendents of migrants do
not engage with the same intensity or give as much as their parents. This difference in engagement is also found among young Somali diaspora who prefer to engage at the national rather than at the communal level preferred by their parents.

For many years, migrants and their contributions in the form of remittances were concealed in plain sight. The main organization responsible for tracking international flows, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), relegated billions of dollars to the errors and omissions category of its accounts (Terry 2005). Since 1996, income from remittances has outpaced private capital flows, official development assistance and some countries’ most important exports. International Remittances accounted for 5 percent of developing countries’ imports and 8 percent of domestic investments. In Mexico, Sri Lanka and Morocco, remittances accounted for more than Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), tea exports and tourism respectively (Page and Plaza 2006: 261). By contrast, total international development aid was at $174 billion. In the case of Somalia, remittances exceed FDI, development aid and exports combined (Chalmers and Aden 2008). More recent figures indicate that humanitarian aid has in fact declined and, for 2010-2011, the US government will provide $174 million in aid for Somalia, but more half of that will be going to support African Union (AMISOM) forces in Somalia and other security programs. The remainder will be for humanitarian and development projects. Meanwhile, the UNDP’s most recent estimates suggest that remittances have increased up to $2 billion as the number of Somalis migrating has grown (Hammond et al 2011).
Regardless of their reasons for migrating, most migrants send remittances. For example, those migrating for short periods are more likely to remit most of their earnings home compared to those who have migrated permanently. Most diaspora, through their remittances, provide critical support to help their families meet daily needs. For many developing countries, remittances are a stable source of income and, unlike foreign aid and foreign investments, will continue to come regardless of the political or economic situation in the home country. Various studies have documented the impact of remittances on development, including in the areas of poverty and inequality. These funds promote investment in education, health, housing and other productive endeavors such as entrepreneurship (Ozden and Schiff 2006).

Now considered critical components for development, many international organizations, including the World Bank, encourage countries with diaspora communities to adopt a “diaspora approach” (Maimbo and Ratha 2005). Using this approach, developing countries are expected to exploit the diaspora’s potential as a source of capital by creating networks that promote diaspora participation in trade, tourism and investment (Maimbo and Ratha 2005: 39). In other words, remittance-receiving countries should strive to utilize the knowledge, skills and assets of their diaspora communities to promote economic development at home.

Since the 1990s, there has been dramatic change and migrants and their contributions have been increasingly researched, with some of the most important studies undertaken by major international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and
the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Donor organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom’s Department of Foreign and International Development (DFID), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and various UN agencies have also produced their own studies on remittances (Fagen and Bump 2005: 5). As part of this trend, UNDP Somalia has commissioned 2 major studies to reveal the ways that the Somali diaspora contribute to development.

This increased attention paid by the international community to diaspora contributions has expanded investigation into productive methods of channeling resources that flow from diaspora communities to their home states. For example, the UNDP and the IOM have created various programs, such as TOKTEN and QUESTS-MIDA, to temporarily reverse brain-drain by paying the salaries of diaspora professionals who return to their countries of origin for short-term employment while, at the same time, filling gaps in needed skills (http://www.sd.undp.org/projects/tokten.htm; http://www.quests-mida.org/).

The consensus among developing and developed countries, as well as international organizations and financial institutions, is that diaspora contributions are the way for developing nations to play catch-up with the developed world. In the Somali case, diaspora involvement with and contributions to home have been driven by familial, clan, regional and national ties rather than by the urging of the international community or central government, as in the case of other countries. In fact, Somalis expressed a preference that the international community and various organizations not insert
themselves into the relationship between the diaspora and home. This was clearly conveyed in the last UNDP Somalia report, which admitted that diaspora involvement with home “was effective, targeted and efficient” and that both diaspora and local Somalis had repeatedly told UNDP Somalia and other international actors “not to fix it if it is not broken” (UNDP report Workshop on *Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-building* May 13, 2011, Nairobi).

But, during the presentation of the report’s findings, workshop participants which included Somali diaspora and donors, UNDP Somalia disregarded the findings in their own report and announced that they would be setting up mechanisms to assist the diaspora in channeling its developmental donations to Somalia (UNDP Workshop on *Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-building;* May 13th, 2011, Nairobi).

**Defining Diaspora**

People migrate due to economic, political, environmental or social reasons but all of those who move from their country of origin to another can be classified as migrants. However, there are different kinds of migrants, most notably, voluntary and forced migrants. Voluntary migrants are those who move for economic or social reasons, while involuntary migrants include those who leave their country of origin due to political persecution, as refugees, and increasingly those who flee environmental disasters which have made their place of residence uninhabitable. In some studies, those migrating due to poverty or lack of economic opportunity are now classified as forced migrants, making
the distinction between voluntary and forced migration tenuous when, in fact, “what begins as economic migration may transmute into internal displacement or international refugee movement” (Nyberg-Sorensen et al 2002: 15). Generally, voluntary and forced migrants are thought to differ from each other primarily by their reasons for migrating and the effect this is thought to have on their relationships with home. However, another critical distinction between migrants is that of time – between those who migrate for a short-term, long-term or permanently. The time away from home impacts on the migrant’s relationship with home, particularly for those away for long periods and those who have moved permanently.

Although all diaspora are created as a result of migration, not all migration results in diaspora formation. The original meaning of diaspora was a term describing a community that had been forcibly dispersed from their homeland and, until recently, this term was associated primarily with the Jewish, African, Armenian and Greek diaspora. Diaspora were communities imbued with “a sense of powerlessness, longing, exile and displacement” (Butler 2001: 190). Since the 1980s, the use of the term diaspora has become widespread and communities which were earlier defined as immigrant, exilic, refugee, nomadic, expatriate, guest worker, overseas community or even a minority have now adopted this term (Tölöyan 1996: 10). In calling themselves diaspora, these communities are making linkages with other communities and their home country for protection.

For Tölöyan, part of the reason for the increasing usage of the label diaspora may be due to the limits of the nation-state, along with the simultaneous emergence of
diaspora in scholarly and intellectual discourse “as the exemplary communities of the transnational moment” (Tölölyan 1996: 4). This increased usage of the term diaspora means that it has become “a signifier, not simply of transnationality and movement, but of political struggles to define the local, as distinctive community, in historical contexts of displacement” (Clifford 1994: 307). In essence then, displaced communities of people are invoking the language of diaspora because they want to “feel (maintain, revive, invent) a connection with a prior home. This sense of connection must be strong enough to resist erasure – through the normalizing process of forgetting, assimilating, and distancing” (Clifford 1994: 310).

For Soysal, the concept of diaspora is a way that migrants make sense of their new lives outside of their homeland:

Diaspora is a past invented for the present, and perpetually laboured into shapes and meanings consistent with the present. As such, it exists not as a lived reality but as part of a broader scheme to insert continuity and coherence into life stories that are presumably broken under the conditions of migrancy and exile. It is the reification of categorical homelands, traditions, collective memories and formidable longings. It is a category of awareness, in which present-tense practices lack capacity in and of themselves, but attain significance vis-à-vis the inventiveness of the past (Soysal 2001: 2).

Recollecting the past is particularly important for conflict-driven migrants as it helps them to make sense of their present lives amid dislocation and loss of family, country, identity, wealth and status. In recalling the past, migrants can briefly escape from the negative stereotypes, such as refugee, illegal immigrant and undocumented migrant, imposed on them by their host community. Remembering the past also helps some migrants resist the leveling of migrants from different socio-economic strata, as the same.
Brubaker defines diaspora, not as a group of people, but as a category of practice permitting diaspora to be “used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate projects, to formulate expectations, to mobilize energies, to appeal to loyalties” (Brubaker 2005: 12). Diaspora then utilize these claims for their own ends, often directed at states – homeland and hostland – and this is demonstrated because “the new meanings of diaspora have often been coupled with a larger project of re-articulating the nation-states” while at the same time dis-articulating it (Tölölyan 1996: 5). This re-articulation and dis-articulation of states by the diaspora reflects their position as outsiders of the territorial control of their home countries and in their location between states.

To define exactly what features characterize the diaspora from other groups, various scholars have sought to classify what characteristics the diaspora should possess. Safran has six qualities, including:

1. They or their ancestors have been dispersed from a specific original “center” to two or more “peripheral” or foreign regions
2. They retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland – its physical location, history, and achievements
3. They believe that they are not - and perhaps cannot be - fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it
4. They regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendents would (or should) eventually return – when conditions are appropriate
5. They believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity
6. They continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such relationship (Safran 1991: 83-4).

Although Safran notes that many diaspora communities such as the Greek, Armenian, Maghrebi, Turkish and Palestinian meet some of the above criteria, he considers the Jewish diaspora as the “ideal type” (Safran 1991: 84). But many scholars have found
Safran’s model of what diaspora should be to be too narrow and even too restrictive for own his model - the Jewish diaspora (Clifford 1994; Butler 2000). First, some diaspora are formed after dispersal and not before. Some examples are the early African migration, which was composed of people from different nations, languages, ethnicities and religions, and the Indian migration of the 19th century, which was also diverse and comprised of Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, who did not conceive of themselves as one community until they were “turned into a diaspora by the gaze” of their hostland (Tölölyan 1996: 10). Additionally, various scholars have criticized Safran for presenting a binary model of the diaspora, which is between exile and home and where the end goal of the diaspora, according to Safran, is a return home.

The reality of diaspora practices points to diaspora connecting laterally with other diaspora and sites of exile, often moving between these sites and home and “this greatly complicates the spatiality of diasporas and produces, instead, a geography of diaspora, which is built around multiple localities connected by ever-changing networked relationships” (Clifford 1994: 306; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000). This reality is a partial reflection of the speed of transportation as well as ease in moving between countries. This circular movement complicates defining what makes someone a diaspora.

A much more broadly accepted, though still somewhat restrictive, definition includes these elements suggested by Butler, who enumerates the following requirements:

1. After dispersal, because of its implications of scattering rather than transfer, a minimum of two destinations
2. Some relationship to an actual or imagined homeland because this provides a foundation from which diasporan identity may develop
3. Self-awareness of the group’s identity which binds it not only to the homeland but to other diasporan locations as well
4. Existence over at least two generations (Butler 2001: 192).

Some communities, such as the Somali, Bosnian and Ethiopian, may not meet the last criteria but consider and act similarly to older diaspora. And even within older communities, there may be a back and forth movement by a segment of the community, between the hostland and homeland. A more useful definition for this case study builds on Connor’s broad definition of diaspora as “that segment of a people living outside the homeland” (Connor 1986: 16). Additionally, the diaspora are those who care about the homeland, maintain contact with home and other diaspora locations, and engage in advocacy on its behalf. Finally, a diaspora must act and believe that being part of the diaspora entails a cost and a demonstration of loyalty and sacrifice to the homeland.

Tentative research indicates variations among and within diasporic communities. Diaspora who were expelled or fled their homes due to political violence behave differently than those who migrate for economic or social reasons. As well, not all diaspora who were political refugees necessarily contribute to conflict. Those who encounter difficulties in integrating into their new communities concurrently with conflict taking place in the homeland may experience stress and marginalization in their new societies. This may underline the critical importance of integrating migrants into the host societies. Their lack of integration could become a problem for both host and home societies. Unsuccessful integration or marginalization within the host society might increase the need to have the conflict at home resolved in their or their groups’ favor so
that they can go back (Brinkerhoff 2007). This suggests that when migrants feel most alienated, unwelcome and least successfully integrated into their host societies, they are more likely to maintain strong harmful connections with home. For example, rather than advocating for peace, these kinds of diaspora are more likely to influence events at home in their group’s favor at any cost.

In some scholarship, the relationship between states and their diaspora are often depicted as straight-forward, but the diaspora interacts with their state in a variety of ways including supporting, challenging and undermining states. The following section explores the manner that states and diaspora interact with each other. Most literature on the ways that the diaspora engages with home views the state as the mediator between the diaspora and locals. The next section focuses the myriad ways that these interactions between the state and the diaspora take place.

**The State and Diaspora**

Migration has created a “new order of instability in the production of modern subjectivities” (Appadurai 1996: 4). As people move to other countries, they retain links with their home countries so that, for example, “Turkish guest workers in Germany watch Turkish films in their German flats…and…Pakistani cabdrivers in Chicago listen to cassettes of sermons recorded in mosques in Pakistan” creating new kinds of spaces (Appadurai 1996: 4). These migration and diaspora spaces are a new “phenomena that confound theories that depend on the continued salience of the nation-state” (Appadurai 1996: 4). This widespread migration has also created landscapes that are the building
blocks of “imagined worlds” where these “multiple worlds…are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe” (Appadurai 1996: 33). Appadurai proposes five kinds of landscapes or – scapes; the most relevant for migration and diaspora is the ethnoscape, which is:

The landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals constitute an essential feature of the world and appear to affect the politics of (and between) nations to a hitherto unprecedented degree. This is not to say that there are no relatively stable communities and networks of kinship, friendship, work, and leisure, as well as birth, residence, and other filial forms. But it is to say that the warp of these stabilities is everywhere shot through with the woof of human motion, as more persons and groups deal with the realities of having to move or the fantasies of wanting to move. What is more, both these realities and fantasies now function on a larger scale, as men and women from villages in India think not just of moving to Poona or Madras but of moving to Dubai and Houston, and refugees from Sri Lanka find themselves in South India as well as in Switzerland, just as Hmong are driven to London as well as Philadelphia (Appadurai 1996: 33-34).

As Appadurai notes, migration has become the norm, new destinations have emerged and it can take many forms including that of imagining it. As such, places like Dubai, where the majority of the residents are migrants, are not only normal but to be emulated and countries like Djibouti now desire to become the Dubai of Africa. Further, Appadurai points out that diaspora challenge states because they inhabit spaces that are between states and their multiple loyalties and linkages test the clearer line often more formally drawn in international relations between states.

As migration increases, most countries and particularly developing countries have created infrastructure and services to support the migration of their citizens to wealthier countries, simultaneously encouraging their settlements in these countries while
promoting their continued engagement with home. Recent scholarship on the diaspora has promoted the benefits of maintaining close links with those left behind. These studies, as well as government policies, have primarily celebrated the positive potential of the diaspora for their home countries. The emphasis has been on their potential as a tool for promoting development of their home countries through their remittances as sources of development, investment and skills transfer. For example, DFID has created a website specifically for this purpose called Send Money Home [www.sendmoneyhome.org](http://www.sendmoneyhome.org) which seeks to not only encourage the diaspora to send money home but provides other kinds of information related to remittances.

But these large-scale movements of people, including the manner by which they remain attached to their homelands as well as other diaspora, their influence in shaping and restructuring the very nature of states and their role in international systems, have received scant attention. The diaspora, through their activities, have re-defined what states do; expanded and de-linked the territorial boundaries of states; and re-worked the meaning of citizenship. Now more countries than ever allow dual citizenship, which were previously largely limited to democratic countries, but has become an increasingly common feature of many developing countries who seek to keep the links with their diaspora as they obtain other citizenships. Many countries allow diaspora's to vote in their embassies, while others have set aside a certain number of parliamentary seats, allow them to open foreign currency accounts, provide preferential interest rates if they deposit hard currency with local banks, and offer special tax breaks and access to other resources, such as buying land at favorable rates not available for residents.
Rather than clinging to the traditional image of a diaspora that maintains long-distance relations with home, occasionally returning to visit family, a more realistic and dynamic image reveals that more and more are circulating between home, host and other diaspora locations. Michel Laguerre, in his research on the Haitian diaspora, clearly demonstrates these global relationships by showing that the diaspora go through a process of de-diasporasation when they move home and re-diasporasation as they return once again to their host or other diaspora sites. For Laguerre, this process is not just one of changing location but may involve acquiring citizenships in the case of second-generation diaspora or re-acquisition of a lost or renounced citizenship. This movement back and forth is often linked to business and political opportunities, as well as meeting familial obligations (Laguerre 2006).

In the political sphere, Laguerre categorizes diaspora activities into five groups. The first is the diasporic politician as a go-between or broker. This group of diaspora is most active between the politics of the homeland and that of the political establishment of the host societies. For example, Haitian Americans might call their elected officials in Congress to represent certain actors at home or try to influence hostland politicians in favor of their group at home. So, when President Aristide was forced out of the presidency in 2004, Haitian diaspora in the United States lobbied for his return to power with the US government (Laguerre 2006: 14-16). Similarly, the Somali diaspora, particularly those living in the US and other democratic countries, are in touch with their local, state and federal representatives, feeding them information on what is taking place within their countries of origin, thereby attempting to influence their views.
Secondly, the diaspora can act as government strategists or as informal lobbyists. Sometimes home countries may ask members of their diaspora to discuss particular issues and to send recommendations that may then be adopted as policies. In doing this, the homeland is doing two things. First, it is making sure that the diaspora remains active and cares about issues of importance to the homeland. Secondly, the home country is tapping into the skills, knowledge and expertise of their diaspora for the benefit of the home country. Although this kind of relationship is often informal, it may become formal if some of the diaspora are later appointed to government positions (Laguerre 2006: 16-17). Like other diaspora, the Somali diaspora holds meetings and conferences, collects petitions and issues press releases directed at other diaspora, their country of origin, other interested countries as well as international bodies such as the UN and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The diaspora can also be influence peddlers by using their power within a host society to benefit the homeland. Laguerre gives a powerful example to illustrate this relationship. During the Clinton inauguration festivities, the ousted Aristide was living in Washington and was invited as a guest of a diaspora lobbyist, who himself had been invited through the office of Congresswoman Maxine Waters. The diaspora wanted to provide a valuable opportunity for Aristide “to rub shoulders with other important political leaders” (Laguerre 2006: 17). In essence then,

This represented an unheard-of-breach of diplomatic protocol. On the one hand, the lobbyist felt that Aristide had to be there to keep the attention of American policy makers on the political crises in Haiti, but on the other, the uninvited president would be accompanied not by his Washington ambassador or his exiled minister of foreign affairs, but by a diaspora who was not an official member of his government. The two officials in charge of the portfolio of diplomatic
relations between Haiti and the United States were left out of potential transactions that clearly fell under their aegis (Laguerre 2006: 18).

The above reveals the two hats worn by the diaspora. In the first instance, this diaspora is clearly acting as a lobbyist by providing “a homeland government official access to the Washington political establishment” (Laguerre 2006: 18). Secondly, the diaspora is circumventing established channels of communications and relations between two states. In this way, the diaspora are affecting relations between states and are global actors in their own right.

When government officials visit, diaspora Somalis are often the ones who mediate between these officials and their host government officials. These diaspora often assist with protocol and diplomatic skills, set up meetings with the State Department and with think tanks. In some cases, discussed later, they hire security guards and off-duty police officers to provide the semblance of an official government delegation visiting another country.

The diaspora politician can also be a transitional activist through transnational interaction between those who live in the homeland and those within the host society. These activities take place in a variety of ways including “through satellite bureaus that maintain contacts with the office headquarters, activists in grassroots organizations who contact their peers,” as well as those who speak with family and friends about the political situation at home. The diaspora thus injects an external perspective on local events, affecting the views of local participants in events to which the locals, unlike the diaspora, are often witnesses and are thus better informed. Many diaspora utilize the internet to communicate with, and discuss the political conditions at, home. They often
interact through “the medium of virtual communities, cybersalons and chat rooms” (Laguerre 2006: 18).

The final kind of diaspora politician is one who becomes a homeland government official within the hostland. This is not unusual because the appointment of diaspora as ambassadors or consultants serves two purposes. First, the homeland is attempting to benefit from the local knowledge and links that these diaspora possess as members of the host society. They are also called to serve their diaspora communities in an official capacity such as Consuls or even as Ambassadors (Laguerre 2006: 20). But, the interactions that diasporas, as groups or communities, have with their home countries are mediated by the conditions at home, conditions in the host society, as well as conditions in international relations; therefore, “in analyzing transnational political subjects, it is important to recognize the multiple positionality that diasporas inhabit and that reflects both their agency and subjectivity” (Um 2007: 254). It is these positionalities where the diaspora are located that challenges the state and its seeming concreteness.

Factors that shape diaspora engagements with home can be divided into three categories. First, shifts in global opportunity structure will either accommodate diaspora interventions or inhibit them. As such, the diaspora may receive financial and other kinds of support to engage with home. At other times, depending on international conditions, diaspora engagement with home may be curtailed by governments who seek to promote their own agenda. For example, during the first Iraq war, the US encouraged the Kurdish, particularly the Kurdish diaspora, to demand autonomy from Saddam Hussein as a way to limit his power and to keep him occupied with possible Kurdish secession.
After the US invasion of Iraq, the Kurds were discouraged from completing their claims for autonomy as the US sought to keep Iraq from disintegrating. In this way, the Kurdish diaspora was encouraged and prevented from fulfilling their demands for autonomy by the US at different times. In the post-9/11 world, some diaspora have been forced to rethink and alter their engagements with home. For example, once the Sri Lankan guerrilla group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were labeled as a terrorist group by many countries including the United States, Canada and Britain, the Tamil diaspora came under more stringent scrutiny for their support for this group and some cut their ties with the LTTE or at least were not openly supportive of them (Cohen 2005: 180). The Somali diaspora has been similarly affected by the International community as interest in Somalia increased and waned. For example, during the US/UN mission, the Somali diaspora were actively recruited by the US government, while after the emergence of Al-Shabaab, Somali-Americans who returned home and then came back to the US, were perceived and treated as potential Al-Shabaab supporters.

A second way that diaspora engagement with home varies is whether that diaspora is state-less or state-linked. Various studies have demonstrated that state-less diaspora are more likely to foment conflict (Vertovec 2005; Smith 2007). In contrast, state-linked diaspora are more likely to engage in benign activities such as the social and economic development of the home country. These kinds of engagements were demonstrated by the Eritrean diaspora during varying periods. From the 1960s, when Eritrea began its armed struggle against forced Ethiopian rule and until it gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, the Eritrean diaspora provided funding, manpower
and advocacy for Eritrean independence. After Eritrea became independent, the activities of the diaspora transformed into one supporting the development of Eritrea. In this way, the Eritrean diaspora changed from state-less to state-linked and their activities accordingly changed from conflict promoting to development (Cohen 2005: 180-1). In contrast, the Somali diaspora was always a state-less diaspora from the beginning and functioned independently and often opposed to the government.

The final way that diaspora engagement with home is shaped is through the leaders of the diaspora. These leaders may be embedded in dominant state structures or they may seek to remain free of state influence. In this way, diaspora leaders seek to use and are used by the state, especially if the home or host states are powerful. Ahmed Chalabi, the British-Iraqi diaspora manipulated and was manipulated by the Bush Administration while presenting himself as a spokesperson for all Iraqis. Chalabi provided a pretext to the Bush Administration for overthrowing Saddam Hussein as well as a justification for the American occupation of Iraq (Cohen 2005: 181). The Somali diaspora has not been successful at producing leaders who are recognized both within the diaspora and at home and who can influence foreign governments.

**Diaspora and Development**

Diaspora takes part in the development of their home countries in numerous ways, including the transfer of knowledge and skills from their host countries. Diaspora members possess an advantage over non-diaspora investors in linguistic, technical and cultural skills that enable them to establish businesses in their home countries. In China,
70 percent of foreign investments have come from the Chinese diaspora. Similarly, in India, the diaspora has played a critical role in the growth of the high technology sector, particularly the software industry. The Indian software exports grew from US $52 million in 1988 to $7.7 billion in 2001 representing 2 percent of India’s GDP and 14 percent of its exports (Davone 2005: 4-5).

Second, aside from being investors in home, diaspora also attract foreign investors to their home countries. The Indian diaspora have contributed to the development and growth of their country by attracting multinational corporations, particularly American companies. For example, Yahoo and other multinational corporations like Hewlett Packard and General Electric all opened research and development (R&D) centers in India because of their positive experiences with Indian workers in the US. It was this familiarity which gave these multinationals the confidence to expand their businesses to India (Davone 2005: 9).

Third, diaspora can also formally engage with their home countries through the formation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or through hometown, ethnic, religious and professional associations. All of these types of organizations connect with home in diverse ways to promote the development of their countries. These diaspora organizations collaborate with locally based organizations or individuals, who are then responsible for the disbursement of funds and project implementation. Sometimes these organizations may also collaborate directly with their home governments, and the government matches whatever funds are collected by the diaspora.
Mexico has one of the most progressive systems for promoting development by linking the diaspora to the central and local governments as well as the hometowns that benefit from these projects. There are many Hometown Associations (HTA) that support different types of projects such as those benefiting religious institutions; those that invest in public infrastructure including town beautification; and those that promote health and education. One research project conducted on the activities of US-based Mexican HTAs showed that at least 50 percent of projects supported by HTAs were related to health, education and public infrastructure (Orozco 2003; 9-10). The focus on these three sectors may be primarily due to two reasons. First, the Mexican government may not be providing adequate services in those areas and the diaspora recognize the need and step in to fill this need. In fact, it may also be this lack of development which is the initial driver of migration because the improvement of public infrastructure is tangible and likely to increase fundraising for other activities. Second, the matching program offered by the Mexican government may be encouraging HTAs to support projects with lasting impact for the community. This Citizenship Participation Program, more commonly known as 3X1, was established in 2002 when the Mexican government set aside US $15 million to match developmental donations from the Mexican diaspora. The Mexican government agreed to contribute three dollars for each dollar that the diaspora remits. Various Mexican states have also instituted a 2X1 program that works independently of the 3X1 program. As such, matching donations by federal and state governments can total 5 dollars for every dollar that the diaspora donates (Orozco 2003; 9-10).
These partnerships with local and federal governments have had the desired effects and HTAs have increased the volume of donations, particularly to rural Mexico. This has resulted in increased funding allocated for public works, thus providing public services that were previously not available. Diaspora not only gives money to promote the development of home, but also provides social remittances. In the case of the Mexican diaspora, HTAs have had a positive impact on civic participation both within Mexico and in the United States. In the projects that Mexican diaspora fund, HTAs pressure governments to be transparent and accountable. They monitor the progress of the projects and ask for clear budgets and timelines from local governments. If their demands for transparency and accountability are not met, some HTAs opt to end their collaboration. In this way, HTAs have had a positive political impact. The expectation of transparency and accountability has spilled over to the local communities and has resulted in institutional changes in government (Orozco 2003: 19-20).

In promoting diaspora support for development, there is a potential to construct a new, different and perhaps more useful approach to development. But, there is an assumption here that diaspora know best what their countries need. However, in some cases, diaspora development NGOs make the same mistakes as international development NGOs. For example, diaspora “may not have lived in or even visited their country of origin for many years, perhaps even decades, meaning that their knowledge and networks may be outdated, especially in situations of conflict where rapid changes occur. Furthermore, living abroad for many years may have altered their habits and viewpoints, hampering a full understanding of the local context” (Horst et al 2010: 12). Like
international NGOs, diaspora NGOs may first decide on what kind of a project they want to carry out without consulting the community and then seek the help of individuals within the community to carry it out. Once the money is collected, only a few people may know how the money is actually used and whether the project is even implemented. So, although the diaspora at large demands accountability and transparency in their dealings with home, they may not offer these to the diaspora members who financially support their development projects and their engagement with home.

In pursuit of diaspora dollars, some developing countries have forged closer links with their diaspora by opening up rights previously restricted to citizens living within their borders. Additionally, some governments offer a variety of services to their diaspora in their host countries. For example, Mexico has established a Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad that liaises with Mexican migrants in the US. At home, the citizenship laws have been altered so that Mexicans can now hold dual citizenship. The Mexican government has negotiated with the US government to recognize Mexico’s national identity card and to allow undocumented Mexicans to open bank accounts in the US. Additionally, the Mexican diaspora are permitted to open bank accounts in US dollars in Mexico. All this is intended to entice the Mexican diaspora to remit their hard currency to Mexican banks and to place their savings in Mexico (Page and Plaza 2006: 305).

Diaspora or remittance bonds offer another way for developing countries to tap into their diaspora’s resources. Diaspora bonds are a debt instrument often used to raise money from the diaspora and many countries now consider diaspora bonds as a reliable
source of foreign funds. These bonds are targeted to the diaspora for investment at home, placing their savings in their countries of birth. Many countries, such as Israel, China, India, Eritrea and Lebanon, have successfully convinced their diaspora to buy these bonds. Israel was one of the first countries to issue diaspora bonds in 1951 and has consistently used the funds raised from diaspora bonds to finance major public sector projects. The Indian government has been one of the most successful in issuing diaspora bonds, although only on an as-needed basis. For example, India only issues diaspora bonds when they encounter difficulties and are short on foreign currency. As such, after being sanctioned in 1998 following nuclear tests, India raised $4.2 billion from its diaspora bonds and, in 2000, India issued the India Millennium Bonds raising $5.51 billion (Lowell and Gerova 2004: 15). Combined, Israel and India have raised over $40 billion dollars from their diaspora. For migrant-sending countries, diaspora bonds tap into the patriotism of their diaspora and provide a constant and cheap source of external funding. Diaspora will buy these bonds, and often accept less return on their investment and sometimes payment in the local currency, because they are helping their home country. These amounts, although small, can be leveraged to meet development needs. Countries like Mexico use diaspora bonds as a way of improving their credit rating and obtaining lower interest rates for their loans from international donors (Ketkar and Ratha 2007; Page and Plaza 2006: 305).

Diaspora contributes to the development of their home countries for several reasons. First, many migrants’ departure expenses are paid by their family with the understanding that they will help the family once they have reached their host country.
Additionally, there are cultural expectations of those who are better off to help other less fortunate family members. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, there is a belief that being economically successful is a gift inherited within families. As such, the wealth is to be shared within those families (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). For diaspora to refuse to support their families, whether able to or not, is to risk ostracism at home and within their diaspora communities. Supporting family members also presents an opportunity for the diaspora to demonstrate how successful they are within their host communities.

Another result of governments courting their diaspora is that the diaspora can engage in political activities on their behalf. This involves political lobbying, promoting cultural exchange and establishing religious networks and institutional linkages. But encouraging diaspora participation in politics may have a downside, particularly for diaspora with exposure to democratic nations who might demand domestic, political, legal and economic reforms (Lowell and Gerova 2004: 10). Often the diaspora’s enthusiastic promotion of human rights and democratization in repressive regimes may result in governments squashing political dissent, which could then escalate into violence. In turn, this repression increases the number of people leaving the country for political reasons, enlarging the diaspora, which may then conduct their opposition from relatively more free countries (Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002: 231).

Diaspora may also be agents for peace by establishing research centers and holding conferences promoting dialogue and reconciliation among warring factions. They conduct research at home and in the host community, thereby increasing the
knowledge pool. Often, their reports and findings include recommendations for promoting peace-building, human rights and good governance. In providing this knowledge, which many developing countries may not have the capacity to do, the diaspora is positively contributing to the policy making process.

A possible negative impact of migration on developing countries is the effect of the brain drain. It is estimated that one in ten tertiary-educated adults born in the developing world resides in North America, Australia or Western Europe. This figure is even higher – 30 to 50 percent – for those trained in science and technology (Lowell and Gerova 2004: 6). The region most affected by this brain drain is sub-Saharan Africa; out of the 15 countries with the highest rates of skilled immigration, 9 are in Africa (Page and Plaza 2006: 259). For example, 18.4 percent of physicians, and 11 percent of nurses, trained in Africa migrate to Europe, the Middle East or North America (Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal 2010).

**Diaspora and Conflict**

Two images emerge concerning diaspora and conflict. In one picture, the diaspora from Kashmir, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka and Kosovo are “long-distance nationalists or fundamentalists that perpetuate conflicts through economic and political support without risking their own neck” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006: 11). The other image shows a diaspora that is very much concerned about conflicts and human rights violations and that plays an important part in conflict resolution, which “may stimulate and reinforce local
processes of democratization and post-conflict reconstruction in their countries of origin” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006: 11).

By acting as peacemakers, the diaspora may hinder or stop violence. For example, the Cambodian diaspora scattered in neighboring and far-off countries were critical players in the country’s politics. The Cambodian diaspora began with “disparate and unorganized attempts to resist the Khmer Rouge” and ended with “the transnational mobilization against Vietnam’s occupation” (Um 2007: 253). Opposition against the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was “waged and sustained as much from Long Beach, Seattle, Washington D.C. and Bangkok as it was from inside Cambodia” with the diaspora providing the “financial, moral and human resources needed to sustain the military and political struggle” (Um 2007: 253-4). Other diaspora have assumed leadership positions in their countries of origin, particularly in countries experiencing or emerging from conflict such as Afghanistan, Liberia and Rwanda.

More notable are the activities of the diaspora in contributing to conflict. Rather than raising the standard of living of those left behind, and helping with the balance of payments as argued by migration and development theories, in reality, the diaspora may contribute to making life even more onerous, destructive and miserable for those remaining in conflict and post-conflict situations (Vertovec 2005). As one World Bank study demonstrated, the diaspora can have significant impact on renewing and sustaining conflict. Countries undergoing five years of post-conflict peace, and having a large diaspora, experienced a six-fold chance of renewed conflict. The important point was not that larger numbers in the diaspora increased their capacity to influence the attitudes of
the home population, but rather that their preserved hatreds and memories increased their willingness to finance rebel groups and others engaging in conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

Whether diaspora become peace wreckers or peace makers often depends on events at home, and sometimes on those within the hostland. Whether diaspora contribute to conflict at home or not is often determined by the conditions under which they left. Political refugees are more likely to contribute to conflict in the homeland than economic migrants. And if the diaspora was forced out of home, they are also likely to support conflict than if they left voluntarily. In funding conflict, diaspora ensure that the cycle of migration continues as others flee the violence and in their turn send money home. The Tamil diaspora is a classic example of this cycle of violence leading to migration to funding more violence, which then results in more people leaving.

The diaspora is an important factor in framing conflict issues for those at home, in the diaspora as well as for their host governments and within the international community (Lyons 2006: 111). Diaspora support conflict in a variety of ways including funding conflicts through remittances. For countries with natural resources, the diaspora are critical actors in providing information, arranging buyers and transportation of the sale of these resources.

It is important to note that diaspora communities are not monolithic and often include economic and social migrants as well as political refugees. However, political refugees fleeing from their home and country due to war or other types of violence have particular sets of traumatic memories and experiences that define them by a strong
emotional attachment to home. Unlike other diaspora, many political refugees engage in political activities seeking to alter the conditions that led to their departure (Basch et al 1994: 270). These political refugees can be more accurately described as conflict-generated diaspora because of their origins in violent displacement and identities linked to symbolically important territory (Lyons 2006: 111). Conflict-generated diaspora play such critical roles in homeland conflicts that political leaders at home can only disregard diaspora preferences at their own risk (Shain 2002: 116). Conflict-generated diaspora more closely correspond to the original meaning of a diaspora – a group of people who have been forced to leave their homeland.

Diaspora coming from conflict zones and living in developed countries have access to resources that diaspora living in developing countries do not. These conflict-generated diaspora have an undue influence in framing conflict issues and defining what is politically acceptable for those at home. In a way, political refugees are the embodiment of the consequences of a violent conflict and diaspora created by conflict, and sustained by traumatic memories of violence and loss, become hardliners less willing to compromise on homeland politics than those at home (Shain 2002: 116). The trauma associated with being in the diaspora remains “vivid in the minds of the first generation and is often kept alive in subsequent generations through commemorations and symbols” (Lyons 2006: 113). This remembrance of past grievances “continues to shape identities” and is recalled for community mobilization (Lyons 2006: 114). Thus, these diaspora frequently extend and exacerbate conflicts and diasporic hard-liners may be unconcerned about the present and future of the homeland and care more about rectifying the injustices
of the past (Shain 2002: 121). As such, conflict-generated diaspora can contribute to the political destabilization of their home countries by undermining the stability of states, particularly weak or reconstructing ones. These conflict-generated diaspora can also be relatively new, such as the Somali and Kosovo communities, or have existed over several generations and become integrated into their host communities as with the Irish and the Armenians. As well, these conflict-generated diaspora often worsen ethnic tensions and promote extremism by escalating conflicts through funding of rebel and opposition groups.

The financial and political support from Tamils living abroad to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is well documented (Sriskandarajah 2003). In their decades-old war against the Sri Lankan state, Tamils in countries like Canada have been a critical source of funding for the LTTE. Despite the LTTE’s categorization as a terrorist organization, its funding did not stop, nor did its activities within the Tamil diasporic communities; but it has gone underground. Many of the Tamil associations, such as the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils, continue to collect funds but not directly for the LTTE. Rather, these funds are collected for rebuilding social services and medical and rehabilitation programs in Sri Lanka, although it is believed that the LTTE taps into these funds (Radtke 2005: 16).

Another way that the diaspora contribute to conflict is through governments who are at war with another country. During the war for independence, the Eritrean diaspora was a critical source of support for the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in sustaining a 30-year war of independence against Ethiopia. The Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front (EPLF) mobilized the Eritrean diaspora so that they paid for the costs of the war, funded relief and welfare services in the EPLF-held areas, and engaged in campaigning and raising public awareness in their host countries. The role of the Eritrean diaspora changed once Eritrea achieved independence in 1993 (Koser 2003).

Nevertheless, the Eritrean diaspora remained connected with Eritrea. Politically, the Eritrean diaspora voted in the 1993 referendum, which brought about Eritrea’s independence and gave it recognition as a separate country from Ethiopia. Diaspora were also closely involved in the drafting of Eritrea’s 1997 constitution, commenting on three separate drafts; their concerns and comments were incorporated into each draft and into the final constitution. Additionally, the diaspora received six seats of the 50 member National Assembly (Koser 2003). Economically, the diaspora has continued to remit money, changing only the recipient from the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) to the newly formed Eritrean government. The nature of the remittances has also changed, from contribution to the liberation of Eritrea from Ethiopian occupation, to taxation for the development and reconstruction of the country. To carry out long-term planning for development activities, and to be able to rely on a regular source of income from the diaspora, the Eritrean government replaced the donations with a two percent voluntary tax on annual income for every Eritrean abroad. This tax is expected of all diasporic adults, regardless of their economic standing, excluding only the unemployed and students (Koser 2003). Failure to pay this tax precludes the diaspora from accessing services and rights provided by the Eritrean state for the diaspora, including the right to purchase land.
When Eritrea and Ethiopia went to war in 1998, this regular source of income was an important factor in the Eritrean state’s decision to challenge the much more powerful Ethiopia. The Eritrean state’s deep suspicion of foreign aid has only increased its reliance on diaspora funds. At the beginning of the war, the Eritrean government increased its requests for financial assistance from the diaspora. For example, Eritreans in Great Britain were asked to increase their donation by £1 plus a one-time annual payment of £500. Similarly, in Germany, the 2 percent voluntary tax was raised to 10 percent for one month, a one-time payment of DM1000 was levied, and monthly contributions were increased by an additional DM30 per month. To raise additional funds, in 1999 the Eritrean government issued bonds and was successful in raising an additional $55 million from the diaspora. Whether supportive or critical of the government, Eritrean diaspora rallied behind it once the war began. The diaspora engaged in fundraising, demonstrated against what they called Ethiopian aggression and called on the international community to restrain Ethiopia (Al-Ali, Black and Koser 2001: 587).

Some Eritrean diaspora, unhappy with the Eritrean government’s increasingly authoritarian policies at home, have taken their criticism to online forums and websites. For example, during the Eritrean-Ethiopian border wars, Eritreans in the diaspora posted articles online contradicting the government’s reports on the war and showing that Eritrea was badly losing the war. This influenced the perception of Eritreans at home who were told that the war was going in Eritrea’s favor. Other diaspora refused to send their voluntary contributions to the government and instead sent the money directly to local communities (Stewart 2008: email communication).
The earlier Eritrean diaspora, who had been firm supporters of the Eritrean government, began to change their views of the government and withdrew their loyalty and support. These diaspora received support in their opposition campaign, initially from the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments and, later on, only from Ethiopia. The nature of the opposition within the diaspora also changed as more and more Eritreans fled Eritrea to escape the government’s dictatorial behavior. This newer opposition was caused by the progressively harsher internal repression by the Eritrean government and the arrests of both leaders of the resistance movement as well as high-ranking government officials. These newer diaspora, with their first-hand knowledge and experience of the government’s policies, simultaneously crystallized and radicalized the opposition in the diaspora.

In 2006, the Eritrean diaspora remitted an estimated $411 million, constituting 37.9 percent of Eritrea’s GDP (Bardouille 2008: 9). Despite their opposition to the Eritrean state, the diaspora still continues to remit. This demonstrates that the diaspora can be constrained in their opposition to the state. In the case of the Eritrean diaspora, they encounter three barriers in fully and openly conducting their opposition to the Eritrean state. First, Eritreans abroad are concerned about Ethiopia and do not want to signal their opposition to the government of Eritrea lest Ethiopia decide to take advantage of it. Secondly, having fought the longest war for independence in sub-Saharan Africa, Eritreans abroad remain committed to Eritrea and its survival as a state, even though they oppose the leaders. Finally, Eritrea’s belligerent relations with most of its neighbors in the Horn of Africa and its increased isolation from, as well as economic and political
sanctions by, the international community have made it more reliant on the diaspora while, at the same time, constraining what the Eritrean diaspora can do without jeopardizing Eritrea.

Recognizing the vital importance of this tax in supporting the Eritrean state, Ethiopia, in pursuing political and economic sanctions against Eritrea, convinced IGAD members to call for more sanctions on Eritrea in its Extra-Ordinary session. IGAD’s July 4th, 2011 communiqué:

Calls on the AU and the UN Security Council to fully implement the existing sanctions and impose additional Sanctions selectively on the Eritrean Regime specially on those economic and mining sectors that the regime draws on including the Eritrean Diaspora as well as ensuring compliance with previous decisions of the UN (Communiqué of the 18th Extra-Ordinary of IGAD Assembly Heads of State, July 4th, 2011)

Diaspora living in, and integrated into, democratic societies are well placed to sway the foreign policies of their host countries by organizing as interest groups and influencing the treatment of the countries from which they or their families have fled. For example, many Armenian-Americans are descendents of survivors of the Ottoman Empire’s genocide against Armenians during World War I (Tölölyan 2007). These diaspora, almost a hundred years later, still carry vivid historical memories that is passed on from generation to generation of the Armenian genocide and have so far successfully opposed any efforts by the Armenian government to normalize relationships with Turkey. The Armenian-American diaspora was instrumental in helping to remove from office the first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, who believed that the Armenian state should decide what is best for the country, including normalizing relations with
Armenia’s traditional enemy, Turkey. In pursuing positive relations with Turkey, Ter-Petrossian played down the issue of the Armenian genocide -- the most important issue rousing Armenian-Americans. The Armenian diaspora organized through the diaspora-led Dashnak Party which was founded in 1890 by the Armenian diaspora in Georgia. It has been, and remains, a critical organization in representing diaspora views on issues related to Armenia (Tölölyan 2007). The Dashnak Party in turn mobilized domestic opinion against Ter-Petrossian through their newspapers. Ultimately, the Armenian-Americans were successful in forcing the resignation of Ter-Petrossian. The next president of Armenia, Robert Kocharian, quickly signaled that he was fully in line with the diaspora’s position, reverting to the traditional anti-Turkish modes of Armenian nationalism. Kocharian also pledged a closer involvement of the diaspora in homeland politics, appointing them to positions in the cabinet and parliament (Shain 2002: 122-3). If Ter-Petrossian had been successful in normalizing relations with Turkey, Armenia might have benefited economically, but the cost to the diaspora would have been high because their main concern – the Armenian genocide – would no longer be as important for the homeland. Rather than relegating to history the reasons that led to their families’ departures, Armenian-Americans preferred to craft an economically and diplomatically isolated Armenian state that is weak and has hostile relations with two of its three neighbors - the other hostile neighbor being Azerbaijan. As a result, the Armenian diaspora constrained the ability of actors in the homeland to propose other ways of engaging in constructive conflict resolution.
In an uncompromising stance, the diaspora seeks to privilege their experiences and views over those who remain at home by “advancing a model of citizenship that emphasizes rights over obligations, passive entitlements, and the assertion of an interest in the public space without a daily presence” (Lyons 2006: 118). In this way, the diaspora alters conceptions of what citizenship entails by demanding rights, but not necessarily accepting obligations.

Conclusion

The literature on diaspora relations with home and with host societies has largely been limited to the diaspora as individuals that interact with other individuals at home and in their host societies. Alternatively, the diaspora as a group, and the relations which the group has with their host and home countries, is largely mediated through the state. Diasporic engagement with home ranges from supporting family through remittances, contributing to development and investing in home. In addition to their critical financial remittances, the diaspora also transfer skills and knowledge to their home country as well as attracting non-diaspora investors to their home country. Some countries encourage emigration and create institutions to support their migrants and to promote their remittances, but the resulting brain drain is a negative consequence of increased migration. Many studies seem to suggest that developing countries exporting their highly skilled migrants are making the best use of, and gaining the greatest return on, their skills (Ozden and Schiff 2006). But, in fact, no significant research has been conducted on the long-term effects of this continual loss of knowledge and skills or on how much money is
spent on educating and training these professional migrants at the expense of developing countries and for the benefit of developed countries. Whether these remittances are adequate compensation for all these costs has yet to be calculated. As well, the question of how developing countries can build up their institutions and industries, in essence, how well developing countries can develop without the required knowledge and skill pool has not been fully considered.

Whether diaspora investments are beneficial in the long term to their home countries remains unclear. Remittances can have a negative aspect for the recipients – the individual, family or country – by creating a “Dutch Disease” because those with family abroad may have all their needs met through the remittances sent, thus creating dependency, which has two consequences (Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman 2007).

First, since migrants and the diaspora remit less the longer they are away from home, migration must keep pace in order to maintain the levels remitted. If the second-generation follow in their parents’ steps and engage with home, various studies have shown that they are less likely to remit financially. Most second-generation migrants are more likely to provide indirect financial support by donating their skills, returning to volunteer or supporting fund-raising for projects that have collective benefit. In the Somali case, discussed more in Chapter 5, second-generation Somalis are likely to resist financially supporting relatives in the way that their parents did, but are more likely to fund-raise and donate to projects that are indiscriminate, in that they do not focus on the clan or regional affiliations of those benefiting from them.
Secondly, with the exception of Mexican migration due to their proximity to the US, migrants most likely come from families with the resources and links needed to facilitate migration. As such, most recipients of remittances are already among those who are relatively well off. In turn, this can exacerbate inequalities within society, with the gap between the lower and middle class increasing.

Another way that developing countries have sought to more closely tie the diaspora to home, in order to tap into their resources and knowledge, is through the extension of rights previously limited to citizens living within a country’s borders. But this can be problematic, particularly extending citizenship rights to people who live within other polities. Diaspora do not always consider the well-being or best interests of the people left behind; in some instances, they may undermine this well-being by tipping the balance of power. This was clearly illustrated by the 2009 presidential election of in Romania. In the run-off, there were two presidential candidates left, and throughout the weeks leading to the election, Mircea Geoană was expected to win. On the day of the election, as polls closed in Romania and other parts of Europe, the gap between the two candidates narrowed but with Geoană still expected to win. Once the Romanian diaspora realized that Geoană was likely to win, they began to telephone, email and text each other to vote. In the final hours before the polls closed, many Romanians in the diaspora, specially in the US and Canada, began to head to their embassies to vote, thus ensuring that Traian Băsescu got a second term in office winning with a margin of 70,000 votes (Interview with a Romanian diaspora 2010; NY; Gallagher 2010). Tellingly, in the 2008 European election, only about 15,000 of the 3 million Romanians living abroad voted.
But in the presidential elections, about ten times that number was estimated to have voted. The diaspora was driven by a dislike of Geoană’s socialist party as well as remarks made by an ally that diaspora votes should count for less than those at home (Gallagher 2010: 20). This clearly demonstrates how the diaspora can thwart the will of the majority of people living within a political territory.

The diaspora’s conflict perpetuating activities are clearly detrimental to both the people left behind as well as to the home government. When the diaspora engages in conflict or when they promote peace-building varies and is dependent on the conditions at home, conditions within the host society and who constitutes the diaspora. Due to their linkages with home, and because the diaspora often believe that they know what is happening at home as well as what is best for those left behind, the diaspora can engage in activities that cause more harm than good. Alternately, if the diaspora deems that supporting the homeland will threaten their interests, they are less likely to engage in conflict.

In comparing several diaspora groups and their relationships with home, I will show the ways that the Somali diaspora fits or deviates from this larger framework. How well do the activities of the Somali diaspora, in the absence of a state, correspond to those of other diaspora or does the lack of government make their activities atypical? This research views the diaspora as a critical, independent but overlooked actors in both domestic politics and international relations. This dissertation argues that the ways in which the Somali diaspora interacts with home, in the absence of a state, is unique in that what the Somali diaspora does for Somalia surpasses all other forms of support from all
other sources including the international community. The diaspora provides support to family and friends; they are the largest source of development and investor funds; they utilize the infrastructure of other countries and they bring back their knowledge and experience to benefit Somalia. The diaspora can be found in all aspects of life in Somalia and they are one of most important actors in explaining what is taking place in Somalia today.

For example, Somali-Americans routinely visit other diaspora locations, particularly in Europe, the Middle East and regional countries on their way to and from Somalia. More and more are establishing businesses, building houses, creating NGOs and working for regional and national institutions. Many send their families home for summer vacations. This intense and sustained connection of the diaspora with Somalia is increasing rather than decreasing. In this way, the Somali diaspora challenge the common theory within migration studies that as migrants are joined in a new country of residence by their families, they slowly begin to disengage from home, sending less money and returning less often.

That Somalia and Somalis can only appeal to their diaspora for help and expect to be answered was brought home when, on a visit to the victims of the drought in Mogadisho, Ismail Omar Guelleh, the President of Djibouti, told Somalis in the diaspora “your brothers can only rely on you for help” (Guelleh 2011).

The Somali diaspora’s relationship with home occurs within the larger events taking place in the world. As such, the diaspora’s activities towards Somalia respond to and are shaped by external actors. The following chapter seeks to lay out the activities of
international actors in order to frame and understand the opportunities and constraints encountered by the diaspora.
Chapter Three

The Activities and Impact of International Actors

The diaspora is both an internal and external actor in the affairs of their home and host country. As such, to situate the diaspora’s activities towards Somalia, it is important to study the manner that external actors including most countries in the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia; regional neighbors such as Egypt and Yemen as well as by the United States and Italy shape diasporic behavior. Other external actors are the United Nations (UN), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Arab League. External actors are foreign countries and non-Somali actors who are intervening in the internal affairs of Somalia and generally contributing to the conflict in Somalia.

Explored more in later chapters, the Somali diaspora engages in development, peacemaking and peace promotion as well as in conflict but the activities of the diaspora do not take place in a vacuum. As such, how do interventions by external actors impact on, undermine or support the developments and conflicts taking place in Somalia today? And how do they shape diaspora engagements with home? In other words, how do these external interventions drive and shape diaspora activities towards home.

Intervention in Colonial and Post-Colonial Somalia

The first European-led external intervention in Somalia began with the arrival of colonialism. For Somalis, this meant being split into five different regions under the rule of five countries. The British arrived in 1884, the French in 1887 and the Italians in
1889. The other two Somali regions which switched back and forth between Britain and Italy were eventually forcibly annexed to Ethiopia and Kenya. Colonialism brought with it the imposition of state authority and the co-optation of traditional leaders. Whereas Somalis appointed leaders on the basis of their leadership skills, the colonizers appointed clan elders on the basis of their loyalty to their colonial masters. Any elder who resisted was replaced and sometimes deported to other parts of the colonial empire. As well, the Somali economy, which was based on subsistence, was disrupted and Somalia forcibly integrated into the world economy (Bryden 1998: 12; Issa-Salwe 1996: 5). Colonial rule so disrupted existing Somali systems in a way that Somalis continue to grapple with it today. Before colonialism, the process of leadership selection and qualification was established but the arrival of colonizers, who disregarded these processes created “competition among the lineages, thereby damaging the integrity of the clan and with it the office of the clan leaders” (Issa-Salwe 1996: 5). The colonizers obliterated the personal nature of politics, where warring clans would sit together until a solution had been reached, replacing it with politics that was “faceless, anonymous and remote” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 27).

The creation of small, urban elite and an administration with coercive institutions – the military and security services – damaged Somali politics in a way that it has yet to fully recover. For the colonizers, the urban elites assisted them in evading “traditional Somali codes of solidarity by introducing western structures and concepts of hegemony”, while the coercive institutions taught Somalis that only those who control the institutions can benefit from it (Bryden 1998:12).
Two (British and Italian Somaliland) of the five parts of the Somali lands became the Somali Republic, gaining independence in 1960, while two (the Ogaden and the Northern Frontier District) were forcibly handed over to Ethiopia and Kenya respectively. While the area under the control of the French received independence in 1977, becoming a separate country called Djibouti. From the very beginning, both the USSR and the US competed to bring Somalia under its sphere of influence, because of Somalia's strategic location, particularly its location at the entrance of the Red Sea as well as its proximity to the Middle East. The Soviet Union sought to turn the Horn of Africa into a socialist region, while the US sought to balance Soviet presence in the region by first allying with Ethiopia during the Haile Selassie rule and switching to Somalia after Mengistu Haile Mariam transformed Ethiopia into a socialist state (Issa-Salwe 1996; Mohamoud 2002).

In the first nine years after independence, Somalia attempted to implement a democratic system of governance, which failed miserably because the new elites were trained by the colonizers; they followed the same methods including bribing clan elders to endorse them for political office as representatives of their clan. The civilian governments were characterized by corruption and clanization of politics.

The assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in October 1969 provided an opportunity for the military to take over power, installing Mohamed Siyad Barre as president. Somalis initially welcomed the new government as it promised the abolition of clannism, multipartyism and corruption and economic development. This government declared Somalia a socialist state and quickly allied with the Soviet Union (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 79). The Soviet’s primary aid to Somalia was military and
Somalia’s military become one of the most powerful militaries in sub-Saharan Africa. The Soviets also pressured Barre in implementing socialist policies including declaring women equal to men in inheritance laws. Under Islamic law, women are entitled to half of what their brothers receive and when the religious scholars condemned this change, Barre publicly executed ten of the most vocal scholars. This affected Somalia’s relations with the Arab League as they cut off financial assistance to Somalia, making Barre even more dependent on Soviet assistance (Lewis 1994: 165).

In exchange for its military assistance, the Soviet Union received access to the port of Berbera on the Red Sea as well as access to Somalia’s rich marine resources in the Indian Ocean. However, from 1974 to 1977, the Soviet Union’s main objective was to create a “Pax-Sovietica federation” that would include Somalia, Ethiopia and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (Issa-Salwe 1996: 91). In 1977, Somalia went to war against Ethiopia to liberate the Ogaden, the Somali land that was given to Ethiopia. The war was popular with Somalis, who held dreams of Somalis being united under one flag. In the early part of the war, Somali troops claimed 90% of the disputed region but the tide turned against Somalia, once the Soviet Union decided to fully back the newly socialist Ethiopia. The Soviet Union stopped all military aid to Somalia, increased military aid to Ethiopia and in addition to transferring Soviet military personnel in Somalia to Ethiopia, the Soviet Union provided 18,000 Cuban soldiers and Yemeni and East German technicians. Having failed in its attempt to create a Soviet zone in the Horn of Africa, the Soviets were so determined that Somalia should lose the war that they even took with them “virtually all of the Somali maps of the region [and] from May 1977
through March 1978, by land and by sea, the Soviet Union supplied about $1.5 billion in military equipment to Ethiopia (Issa-Salwe 1996: 92; Laitin and Samatar 1987: 142).

In embarking on this war, Barre had relied on American promises that it would assist Somalia if it would cease its alliance with the Soviets. Once the war began, Somalia appealed for assistance from the US but the Carter Administration was afraid of starting a proxy war with the Soviet Union (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 89). Somalia’s once powerful military was obliterated by the combined force of Soviet, Ethiopian, Cuban and Yemeni forces with “over 8,000 Somali troops killed, three-fourths of the Somali tank force destroyed, and about one-half of the Somali aircraft out of commission” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 142). For Somalia, the loss of the war brought about an “intolerable refugee crises, a domestic political crisis, and an economic crisis as well” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 89). It also forced Barre to re-orient himself westward, placing “Somalia under the patronage of the United States, and the country then became dependent on western foreign aid to sustain its economy” (von Hippel 2000: 58). The image of the Barre government as undefeatable cracked with the loss of the war, emboldening the opposition who attempted a coup d’état and then formed the first opposition movement the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) fighting the government from their base in Ethiopia (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 92; Lewis, 1994: 178).

The political upheavals and economic problems facing Somalia were driving forces that set in motion the second wave of migration. Throughout the 1980s, several other opposition groups formed, all located in and supported by Ethiopia. As revealed in recent Wikileaks documents, Barre was worried about the growing opposition to his rule
but continued US military and economic aid kept his enemies at bay ("Rumors of Tensions in the Somali Regime" 1985).

In 1988, Barre signed a peace agreement with Ethiopia, which included not supporting each other’s opposition groups and forcing them back into their country of origin after disarming them. This forced the Somali National Movement (SNM), the second rebel movement that formed in 1981 to return to Somalia fully armed. The arrival of the SNM in Somalia in 1988 elicited a brutal response from the Barre government including aerial bombardment of Hargeisa and Burao as well as massive killings and disappearances of those sought to be allied with the rebel group.

Government forces committed atrocities against civilians (an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Somalis died, mostly members of the Isaaq clan, which was the core support for the SNM); aerial bombardments leveled the city of Hargeysa; and 400,000 Somalis were forced to flee across the Ethiopian border as refugees, while another 400,000 were internally displaced. These atrocities fueled Isaaq demands for secession in what became the self-declared state of Somaliland in 1991 (ICG 2005: 10).

When members of the Somali military proved untrustworthy and unwilling to kill other Somalis, Barre brought in Afrikaner mercenaries, who had no compunction about killing civilians. This conflict between the people of the north and the Barre government started the third wave of Somali migration. This brutal response to the SNM contributed to northern Somalis' determination to break off from the rest of Somalia and declare their independence. More than twenty years later, Somalis who experienced these attacks remember it as if it happened yesterday. This brutality from their own government has made them even more determined to govern themselves.
By the end of the 1980s, Somalia heavily relied on foreign assistance, constituting 57% of its GNP (Marchal 1998: 11). In 1985, Somalia received $35 million in military aid from the United States (Rothchild 2001: 183). As the Cold War came to an end and Somalia lost its strategic importance, the US began to pressure the Somali government to respect human rights as US Secretary of State, James Baker “told the Somali prime minister that U.S. bilateral assistance would be suspended unless the government improved its respect for human rights” (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 28).

As the situation in Somalia deteriorated, no one seemed able or willing to do anything to resolve the impasse. Attempts by Somalis such as the Manifesto Group, which included well-known and respected Somali politicians, elders, businessmen and religious scholars failed to convince Barre to leave peacefully. Instead Barre purportedly uttered these prophetic words to the UNDP chief in Mogadisho that:

I, Mohamed Siyaad Barre, am singularly responsible for the transformation of Somalia and Mogadishu from a bush country and scruffy hamlet into a modern state and commodious city, respectively. Consequently, I will not allow anyone to destroy me or run me out of here; and if they try, I will take the whole country with me (Samatar, Ahmed 1994: 119).

As the rebel groups headed for Mogadisho, the response from the UN, the US and other countries was to evacuate their staff and leave the Somalis to themselves. Somalia imploded on January 1, 1991 but it would take another four months before Barre was finally driven out of Somalia. To protect themselves from the marauding rebel groups, some clans formed their own militias and armed themselves with the vast weapons donated first by the Soviet Union and then by the United States. The result was a carving up of Somalia into a “fractious mosaic of militia fiefdoms, Islamic enclaves, mafiaesque
commercial empires, and large zones of lawless, predatory banditry” that persist to this
day (Menkhaus and Ortmayer 1995: 211).

Djibouti, Italy and Egypt, with financial help from Saudi Arabia, waited five
months after the ouster of Barre to hold a reconciliation meeting for Somali leaders. This
meeting, which took place in Djibouti in May 1991, did not include Mohamed Farah
Aideed who headed the United Somali Congress, the rebel group that had helped to oust
Barre from power. Aideed feared that his rival Ali Mahdi, who had been appointed as
president, would be confirmed and chose to stay away from the meeting. Northwestern
Somalia, which had declared its secession from Somalia on May 18, 1991 refused to
participate. The delegates to the conference were restricted to the armed factions, who
returned to Somalia to consult with their groups. The second reconciliation conference
took place in July 1991, but during that conference both Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali
Mahdi, fearing a take-over by the other, remained in Mogadisho. At the conference, Ali
Mahdi was confirmed as president and tasked with forming a government (Prunier 1995:
11).

The Djibouti conferences were symptomatic of the failures of other major
reconciliation conferences that followed. First, the conference took place outside
Somalia and the agenda was largely set by Italy, Egypt and Djibouti, who decided who
would be invited, while Somalis were expected to sign on the dotted line. As well, the
international community was not very interested in addressing the root causes of the
Somali conflict. The conflict was driven by deep distrust between clans based on the
experience of the Barre government, which had restricted the power and resources of the
country to a few. Having waited for years to seize power from Barre, many in the opposition were not willing to compromise.

Intra- and inter-clan fighting in Mogadisho crisscrossed southern Somalia, particularly the inter-riverine areas, the bread-basket of Somalia, leading to a massive famine in late 1991. As the world watched, thousands of Somalis perished. After declining to intervene for over a year, suddenly the Bush Administration announced that it would send a military intervention to facilitate humanitarian aid to Somalia. Some attributed this sudden turn around to the "CNN effect" where after months of daily reports on the humanitarian disaster unfolding in Somalia, the Bush Administration was morally forced to intervene. For example, Marlin Fitzwater, White House Press Secretary said that although the Bush administration faced tremendous pressure from many groups, it was the effect of television that "tipped it over the top." Similarly, the US Assistant Secretary of State for human rights and democracy was quoted that "the media got us [the USA] into Somalia and then got us out" (Quoted in Jakobsen 2000:132-4).

Others suggest that since it was only towards the end of the famine that U.S. president George H. W. Bush, on his way out of the White House after losing the presidential elections, would order humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Having ignored the civil war in Somalia for almost two years, some attributed Bush’s intervention to his desire to leave a legacy of his new world order. Former US Ambassador to Somalia Robert Oakley credits the US intervention in Somalia to a simplistic perception that Somalia’s problems could be solved with the right amount of force and “the Pentagon felt
that they could provide what you might call ‘a blanket foam’ which would be powerful enough to put the Somali fire out” (Oakley 1997: 611).

Others viewed the decision by the US to intervene in Somalia as a result of interactions among American political elites and that in the first year of the humanitarian disaster, that "selective engagers" held sway over US foreign policy towards Somalia. These selective engagers viewed Somalia as a place that of no value for US interests and thus, they opposed intervention. Opposing these selective engagers were liberal humanitarianists who believed that the humanitarian disaster in Somalia was due to the pursuit of callous and self-interested elites who were organizing violence against civilians as part of their political ambitions, resulting in the famine. Western argues that the liberal humanitarians were aided in their efforts to change US policy towards Somalia by media coverage, the UN, visits to Somalia by the President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, members of Congress and the daily barrage of the media showing children dying on TV, all calling for US intervention which altered the Bush administration's stance towards Somalia and permitted the deployment of US troops to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid (Western 2002: 2-7).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, newly appointed as the UN Secretary General welcomed US intervention because he wanted to use Somalia as a showcase for his new doctrine “that the absolute sovereignty of nations in the post-Cold War era, was over and that universal sovereignty had taken its place” (Drysdale 1997: 1).

The Djibouti reconciliation conferences and the US/UN intervention set the stage for future engagement with Somalia by the international community, namely that any
country could disregard Somali sovereignty in the name of doing something about the Somalia conflict. Part of this engagement included that Somalis need not be consulted in the interventions in their home country; that there need not be a clear mandate; that force would succeed in resolving Somalia’s deeply complex problems; and finally that if things got too complicated, these countries would make a quick exit. For example, the US/UN mission was changed from a humanitarian mission to peacekeeping to peacemaking and state-building. The following quote could be said to represent the entire US/UN intervention in Somalia in that it reflects the posturing and rhetoric of the international community when it comes to solving the problems of Somalia. It also demonstrates the arrogance and ignorance of the international community in believing that it could solve Somalia’s complex, dynamic and ever-changing problems.

> When CNN cameras tracked US marines landing in Somalia the cameramen formed their only obstacle. On the beaches, no guns confronted the soldiers. Instead, they dodged floodlights and ran a gauntlet of requests to assume the poses of fighting men. In a way, this was prophetic…also ironic, for the grand visual rhetoric that CNN purveyed prefigured the grander and hollower rhetoric of a great state declaring it would safeguard a peace and a people it could not understand” (Chan 1999, ix).

During the UN/US mission, also known as Operation Restore Hope, two reconciliation conferences took place, this time in Addis Ababa, again only involving the armed factions and again with no cessation of hostilities and no agreement on rebuilding the central government. After the death of thousands of Somali civilians at the hands of both UN/US forces, the downing of two Black Hawks and the killing of 19 US marines, the US closely followed by the UN left Somalia to its own devices. As one departing
American Marine expressed “It’s sad we’re going to leave the country like this. It’s no better off than when we showed up” (Carr 1995: 67).

After Operation Restore Hope

Once the international community turned its back on Somalia, the situation within the country, particularly in southern Somalia stabilized as the various factions consolidated control of their areas. There were smaller attempts to bring back a government for Somalia including meetings that took place in Nairobi, Kenya on October 1996; in Sodere, Ethiopia in January 1997; in Sana’a, Yemen in May 1997; and in Cairo, Egypt on May and December 1997 (Cairo Declaration on Somalia December 1997: 2). These meetings failed because the same mistakes were repeated, conferences were held outside of Somalia, initiated or supported by the United Nations and only included the warlords. A re-occurring problem with these meetings was that different countries were pursuing their own agenda. For example in 1996 after an agreement was reached at the Sodere conference to hold a large reconciliation meeting in Bosaaso, Egypt called a meeting in Cairo, which disrupted the Sodere process. Both countries were pursuing their own national agendas. Ethiopia wanted to see the establishment of a weak, decentralized but functioning Somali state, one that would not be a rival or a threat to it. Egypt on the other hand wanted to establish a strong central state, one that would be an ally in case Egypt and Ethiopia came to conflict over the Blue Nile (Kendie 2002). Aside from signed declarations from the armed factions, nothing else came out of these meetings.
Meanwhile reconciliation efforts by Somalis within Somalia met with more success. For example, although Somaliland had announced its secession from Somalia in May 1991, soon thereafter, Somaliland was having its own civil war, which lasted from 1993 to 1997. These conflicts were resolved through clan mediations, which resulted in the stabilization of Somaliland from 1997 to present. Similarly, northeastern Somalia, later known as Puntland, which had remained stable after the collapse of the state, briefly experienced conflict in 1992 in which Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI), a fundamentalist group, who sought to take over Puntland and then expand to the rest of Somalia were defeated and driven out from Puntland by a reconstituted Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Some members of AIAI, who were from Puntland were allowed to return as long as they stayed out of politics and disarmed. In 1998, a gathering of clan elders, business people, religious scholars and diaspora members created Puntland, an autonomous region within Somalia (Battera 2003: 230).

In both Somaliland and Puntland, the reconciliation meetings that took place within Somalia, were driven and funded by Somalis including the diaspora and was marked by an absence of the international community. This building-block, bottom-up process was not seriously undertaken by the international community, although from 1997 onward, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) did promote this method of conflict resolution and there was an attempt to incorporate it into the 2000 Arta reconciliation conference sponsored by the government of Djibouti. “This approach tried to find local solutions, involving traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution and often traditional clan leaders” (Hansen 2003: 59). Instead, the norm was that almost all
the reconciliation conferences took place outside Somalia, were organized by different
countries and involved only the heads of the armed factions and they all failed to produce
anything beyond signed declarations.

In 1998, Eritrea and Ethiopia went to war over a border dispute. This conflict
then spilled over into Somalia as both countries fought a proxy war by arming different
factions within Somalia. Both countries also accused each other of breaking the 1992
UN resolution 733, which imposed on outside parties “general and complete embargo on
all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia” (S/RES/733 1992). The
UN released a press release noting that this proxy war has created “a serious deterioration
of the situation in Somalia” and called on member states to respect the arms embargo
their proxy war unabated.

**Arta Conference**

In 1998, the president of Djibouti, Hassan Guled Aptidon, and the chair of the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) proposed holding another
reconciliation conference, but one where civil society, rather than the warlords and armed
faction leaders, would be the focus. The newly elected president of Djibouti, Ismail
Omar Guelleh, went forward with this proposal, giving a speech at the UN General
Meeting on September 22, 1999, where he called on the world to support this latest
initiative. This proposal met with massive support from Somalis inside Somalia as well
as within the diaspora. Initially, 60 Somali intellectuals, elders, traditional leaders,
politicians, prominent members of civil society and members from the diaspora were invited to provide technical advice on the peace process. For the first time, the diaspora were not only represented but took a leading role. For example, the chair of the Technical Committee was a Somali-French diaspora (United Nations and Somalia November 2000).

The Arta reconciliation conference, which began in May 2000, involved the participation of thousands of Somalis including elders, religious scholars, traditional leaders, civil society groups including women’s groups and the diaspora. Although there were some faction leaders, many of the key warlords stayed away. In August 2000, the conference resulted in the formation of Somalia’s first National Parliament in a decade and the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) headed by Abdiqassim Salat Hassan as president (United Nations and Somalia November 2000). For the first time, a diaspora Somali-American, Ali Khalif Galaydh, was elected as the prime minister of the TNG.

The Arta conference was unique in several respects. It was the first conference that set out to minimize the influence of the warlords and faction leaders. Civil society groups including women, elders, religious scholars and diaspora were invited to participate. It was hosted by Djibouti, a country many Somalis consider an extension of Somalia. The international presence was reduced and there was an attempt made to minimize external intervention. But this did not mean that it was an entirely Somali process free from external influences. For example, the president of Djibouti intervened several times and according to some of the participants, Guelleh believed that the
presidency should go to the clan i.e. the Habr Gedir, that had emerged victorious in the
civil war – i.e. the clan that controlled Mogadisho (Interview with author May 2002,
Chicago).

Another aspect of the conference that set in motion a procedure that Somalis, ten
years later, struggle with is the division of power along clan lines. Commonly known as
the 4.5, under this process, seats would be allocated on equal basis among the four major
clans – the Darood, Dir, Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle) and Hawiye, while minority
groups would be allocated half of what one major clan received. As such, parliamentary
seats numbering 275 as well as the cabinet would be divided under the 4.5 formula,
whereby the four major clans listed above each receive 61 seats, while all minority
groups combined receive half of that, or 31 seats in the parliament. Similar to previous
reconciliation conferences, there were no attempts to reconcile as the assumption that the
Somali conference was only about disagreements over power-sharing continued to
dominate.

By October 2000, the TNG had relocated to Mogadisho and attempted to establish
itself. The arrival of the TNG was greeted by thousands of Somalis who came out to
greet the first inclusive government since the collapse of the state (BBC October 14,
2000). The Arta reconciliation conference “was the most grassroots-based, centralized
conference that the Somalis ever had, but it infuriated many of the warlords, and Hussein
Aideed and Osman Atto refused to attend, partly because of the limited power they were
granted” (Hansen 2003: 65). Unfortunately, the warlords including Hussein Aideed and
Osman Atto as well as Abdullahi Yusuf fearing that their influence was on the wane
quickly formed the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) to oppose the TNG. Others who had attended the Arta conference such as Mohamed Said Hersi “Morgan” and “Shatiguduud” who had joined the TNG later on withdrew and joined the SRRC. Ethiopia opposed the TNG because it saw it solely as Djibouti dominated and it suspected that the TNG included some Islamist members and sympathizers such as Hassan (Hansen 2003: 65). But, there was little to distinguish between the TNG and the SRRC, “the real distinction between the two “is a question of sponsorship: the TNG has been dependent on the backing of Egypt and the Arab League, while the SRRC is an Ethiopian creation and client” (Bryden 2003: 45). To counter Egypt and the Arab League’s financial and military support for the TNG, Ethiopia was criticized by the United Nations for being a major weapons supplier to Somali factions and Ethiopia’ justification for breaking the UN arms embargo as “an excuse for Ethiopian involvement in Somali internal affairs” (Bryden 2003: 46).

Egyptian and Ethiopian competition over Somalia would make the years following the formation of the TNG as one of the bloodiest periods since the collapse of the Somali state. “By late 2002 to mid-2003, the situation had regressed several years in terms of peace-building and political development. With the exception of Somaliland, Somalia reverted in the space of a few years from administrative consolidation to factional rivalry” (Bryden 2003: 46). This pattern by neighboring countries and other international actors of wiping out and often regressing gains made by Somalis would be a common feature in post 9/11 Somalia.
Post 9/11 Somalia

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 irrevocably changed the way that the international community would deal with Somalia. It particularly changed the views of the United States which, for a time, considered Somalia “as next up” in the War on Terror after Afghanistan (Bryden 2003: 25). But, the United States had largely ignored Somalis since its departure and the cost of ignoring Somalia since 1994 was that the US were “caught trying to formulate policy about a country we know virtually nothing about” (Menkhaus 2002). U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld issued instructions to examine military options in Somalia and “from late 2001, the U.S. stepped up its counter-terrorism efforts in the region, effectively opening a new front in its ‘War on Terror’” (ICG Report 2005: 9).

Meanwhile Somali warlords, particularly members of the SRRC, decided to take advantage of that lack of knowledge, mistakenly believing that the United States would generously reward them and were “queuing up to declare their country a potential haven for terrorists and a threat to international security” (Bryden 2003: 24). The warlords accused the TNG of being a front for Al-Islam, attempting to link it to Al-Qaeda and thus arguing for its removal by the United States. But Menkhaus, a professor at Davidson College and a close observer of Somalia, argued against this characterization and suggested that the TNG was “not a front for al-Ittihad, and is not the Somali equivalent of the Taliban government. It is extremely weak, controlling only half of the city of Mogadisho, and while it has some Al-Ittihad members in its parliament, it is by no means a front for violent Islamists” (Menkhaus 2002).
Ethiopia also joined in the chorus of those calling for an American invasion of Somalia, suggesting that Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) was a front for Al-Qaeda in Somalia despite the fact that Ethiopia, in a series of raids in Somalia, had dismantled AIAI’s military and political structures in 1997 (ICG Report 2005: 1). Although the US would not directly intervene in Somalia, the fallout from 9/11 continues to the present and by November 2001, “the Bush administration added Al-Ittihad al-Islami, a major Somali Islamist organization, to the US list of terrorist groups. The US also froze the assets of Al-Barakaat, the largest money transfer and telecommunications company in Somalia, and under Executive Order # 13224 listed some twenty Somali companies and individuals as ‘terrorists’ (Elmi 2010: 75).

Although the US ruled out direct engagement in Somalia, it began to anchor its naval ships off the coast of Somalia and carry out drone missions targeting terrorist groups. “Western governments, led by the U.S., responded to the threat of terrorism in and from Somalia by building up Somali counter-terrorist networks headed by faction leaders and former military or police officers, and by cooperating with the security services in Somaliland and neighbouring Puntland” (ICG Report 2005: i). Somalia was also a “theatre for a shadowy confrontation involving local jihadist, foreign al-Qaeda operatives and intelligence services from a number of regional and Western countries” including Ethiopia and Djibouti as well as the United States, the UK, Italy and France (ICG Report 2005: 4). During this time, Ethiopia was also engaged in assassinations in Mogadisho targeting those that they considered as enemies, particularly the Oromos and Islamists.
As the mandate of the TNG came to an end, there was a call for another conference and an IGAD-sponsored conference was held in Kenya from 2002-2004. Like previous conferences, this conference attempted to compensate for some of the shortcomings of the Arta conference by giving the warlords prominent positions but it left out the powerful Habr Gedir sub-clan who had ruled Mogadisho since the collapse of the state. This conference was also notable for the palpable external interference by Ethiopia and Kenya. In fact, the former president of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi, who oversaw the IGAD peace process, revealed that neither Kenya nor Ethiopia could be trusted with the Somali peace process because both countries “fear that a reunited and prosperous nation might resurrect Somalia's territorial claims” (ICG Report 2004: 11). As well, international observers to the IGAD talks believed that “entrusting the Somali peace process to Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya would be roughly equivalent to leaving Pakistan, Iran and India alone to solve the problems of Afghanistan” (ICG Report 2004: 11).

The conference concluded with the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was plagued with “political miscalculations, vote-buying and Ethiopian support” (Menkhaus 2005: 75). Splits within the Hawiye clan and push by the Ethiopians led to the election of Abdullahi Yusuf, a former head of the rebel group, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and former president of Puntland who “was not an ideal choice for a government of national unity [and whose] leadership style is authoritarian and divisive” (Menkhaus 2005: 75). For the first time in history, Ethiopia and Kenya were also able to impose on the Somali people “a charter, a parliament and a government of their design in Somalia” (Elmi 2010: 24).
The formation of the TFG was greeted with cautious hope and optimism by the international community. Most Somalis tired of governments created abroad and designed by other countries took a wait-and-see attitude, while others left out of the transitional government prepared to oppose, especially because many of the important ministerial positions were given to those who had close relations with Yusuf or the Ethiopians. External actors such as “Eritrea and Egypt were not happy with the outcome of the conference in Kenya” and geared up to undermine the TFG (Elmi 2010: 25).

Meanwhile, the international community rushed to offer assistance to the TFG. In response to their concerns about their safety in moving to Mogadisho, “the African Union offered peacekeeping troops; the World Bank and bi-lateral donors began mobilizing foreign aid and coordination mechanisms with the new government; and regional states in IGAD offered diplomatic support, provided police training, and urged the international community to help the fledgling government” (Menkhaus 2005: 73).

Before agreeing to relocate to Somalia, Yusuf demanded a 20,000 strong multinational military force, but most Somalis were opposed to troops from neighboring countries and particularly from Ethiopia. Although these troops were described as peacekeeping, they were in fact intended to provide support to the TFG in pacifying Mogadisho. The UN passed resolution 1725 calling for 10,000 troops but none from the neighboring countries (UN Security Council Resolution 1725).

But soon after, the TFG split into two factions and rather than Somalia on the road to peace and stability, the flow of arms “increased into the country, and remobilization rather than demobilization is occurring throughout southern Somalia” (Menkhaus 2005:
Pushed out of Kenya by the Kenyan government without any of the protection troops that they had asked for, part of the TFG including the president and prime minister first went to Jowhar and then relocated to Baidoa but refused to go to Mogadisho due to insecurity. In reality, many of the warlords opposed to the TFG were located in Mogadisho and were waiting to fight against them.

By 2005, the confrontation between local actors who were suspected of being linked to Al-Qaeda and intelligence services from the US, Ethiopia and other countries were gaining strength. The US was using warlords, who had formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) to assist in counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia. Many Islamists as well as foreigners, particularly Arabs who were suspected of being linked to terrorism were abducted. As the International Crisis Group noted, some of the foreigners were Iraqi refugees and others were Pakistani Tablighs who were on missionary work (ICG Report 2005). One of the warlords, Muse Sudi was rumored to have said that “the Americans threw so much money at us that you would have handed over your mother if they had asked” (Interview with Author 2007, Chicago; Prunier and Wilson 2006: 750).

But this kind of engagement was not unanimously accepted within the US Government and there were warnings voiced within the US about this strategy including David Shinn, a former US ambassador to Ethiopia and a scholar on the region, “called for a broad approach, not focused exclusively on counter-terrorism” (Prunier and Wilson 2006: 750). Others like Michael Zorrick, the political and economic affairs officer for Somali affairs at the US Embassy in Kenya, which is also responsible for Somalia, had
voiced his concern against supporting the warlords, which he judged dangerous and short-sighted, only to be transferred out for daring to voice his criticism (Prunier and Wilson 2006: 750).

Ethiopians were also engaged in similar activities, primarily targeting the leaders of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) as well as prominent members of the Oromo community who were either rendered to Ethiopia or assassinated in Mogadisho (ICG Report 2005:11).

Towards the end of 2005 and in response to the activities of the ARPCT, a group of actors including businessmen, political actors and others began to unite the Islamic courts. The courts were originally intended to resolve neighborhood conflicts were united and began to fight against the members of the ARPCT. After months of bloody war, in June 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) emerged victorious, chasing the ARPCT members out of the Mogadisho and becoming a serious threat to the TFG. Desperate to respond to the rapidly changing situation on the ground, the US created the Somali Contact Group, which included the US, the Arab League, the African Union, the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Norway, the European Union and, independently, Britain, Sweden, Italy and Tanzania (Prunier and Wilson 2006: 750). But, it was too late.

The departure of the warlords was greeted with a sense of relief in Mogadisho, the rest of Somalia and within the diaspora. People remained anxious about the intentions of the largely unknown UIC but there was a sense of hope that perhaps for the time in 16 years, Somalis would have a chance to chart their own future. The militias of the UIC
spread out quickly over southern Somalia coming within a few kilometers of Puntland.

Feeling the heat of the support that the UIC was receiving throughout the country, even Puntland and Somaliland made an effort to voice their support of governing through Shari’a (Samatar, Abdi 2009: 71). Unfortunately, the US did not learn from their previous mistakes and rather than calling for dialogue and trying to separate the moderates from the small extremists within the UIC, it continued to treat as one entire and “both the United States and Ethiopia remained implacably opposed to the group” while publicly calling for dialogue and power-sharing (Norris and Bruton 2011: 8).

Meanwhile, other countries including Sudan immediately called for bilateral talks between the UIC and the TFG. This afforded another opportunity for the internal conflict in the TFG to increase, with Abdullahi Yusuf seeking to avoid any accommodation with his enemies, and the speaker of the parliament, Sheikh Adan Madobe, insisting on a dialogue. The agreement finally signed at Khartoum in Sudan on 22 June 2006 was immediately broken by both parties” (Prunier and Wilson 2006: 751).

Several meetings took place in Khartoum between the UIC and the TFG to try to come up with some sort of a power sharing agreement but neither group was negotiating in good faith. Meanwhile, different countries were enflaming the situation within Somalia by arming and providing other support to the TFG and the UIC. According to the 2005 United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia Report, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, Syria and the Hezbollah of Lebanon and trading networks in Yemen were providing money, foodstuff, medical supplies, military uniforms, arms, ammunitions and military to the UIC. Uganda, the Government of Yemen and Ethiopia
were providing arms, ammunition, training and troops to the TFG. The United States continued to carry out attacks within Somalia.

The period when the UIC was in control of Mogadisho was the most peaceful since the collapse of the state but by late 2006, it appeared that the US was changing its public image of calling for dialogue and power-sharing between the UIC and the TFG. In a controversial press conference on 14 December, Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer characterized the leadership of the UIC as ‘extremists to the core’ and ‘controlled by al Qa’ida cell individuals” (Menkhaus 2007: 378). Soon after, the US pushed a UN Security Council Resolution, which lifted the UN arms embargo on Somalia.

In contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1725, which specifically forbade countries bordering Somalia from deploying troops, in late December 2006, Ethiopia labeled the UIC as a threat to their national security and sent troops to occupy Mogadisho (Dagne 2009: 11). The Ethiopians claimed that they were in Somalia at the invitation of the TFG and to support the establishment of the TFG in Mogadisho. The US provided intelligence, military targeting and logistical support. The two-year period that followed this invasion was the bloodiest since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. The arrival of the Ethiopians signaled the end of the UIC as the organization disbanded and its leaders fled to Nairobi, Djibouti and Asmara. Eventually, UIC leaders gathered in Asmara, forming an opposition coalition called the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), which vowed to fight Ethiopian and TFG forces. This coalition included former leaders of the UIC including Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and
Hassan Dahir Aweys, disaffected TFG parliamentarians such as the former speaker of the house Sharif Hassan and diaspora Somali nationalists.

In cooperation with the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, Kenya promptly sealed its border with Somalia, arresting any members of the UIC who attempted to cross over to Kenya. Kenya also carried out at least 85 cases of rendition to the TFG, who then handed suspected members of the UIC as well as foreigners over to the Ethiopians (Menkhaus 2007: 381). One case involved a Somali-Canadian Bashir Makhtal, a businessman who fled to Kenya and was sent to the TFG, who handed him over to the Ethiopians. Makhtal continues to be held in an Ethiopian jail, charged with terrorism, although the Ethiopian government has produced no evidence of this, other than that he is the grand-son of the founders of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a long-term rebel group that is agitating for self-rule in the Ogaden. The Ogaden is inhabited by Somalis and was part of the territory handed over by the British to the Ethiopians.

The only country in the Horn of Africa that condemned the Ethiopian invasion was Eritrea, which temporarily suspended its membership in the regional body of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) over its silence. According to Eritrea’s Minister of Information Ali Abdu, “we feel that it’s not responsible to stay in that organisation when decisions are being made that are not legally or morally acceptable” ("Eritrea Suspends its Membership in IGAD over Somalia" April 22, 2007). But Eritrea switched providing weapons from the UIC to Al-Shabaab and continues to do so as part of its on-going proxy war against Ethiopia and its ally, the TFG (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia Report 2011: 13).
Waiting to greet the Ethiopians was a small, extremist wing within the UIC called Al-Shabaab who would carry out an urban insurgency against the Ethiopians. The US Government supported the Ethiopian invasion by providing a small group of American advisors to the Ethiopian troops (Mazzetti 2007). According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia (2007), the US carried out several strikes targeting Al-Qaida members, which resulted in at least one of the strikes, with the deaths of 70 civilians and the destruction of vital water resources (Dagne 2009: 98).

In the minds of many Somalis, the US had gone from complete neglect, to funding the warlords, to supporting the Ethiopians, to carrying out military strikes against Somalis (Elmi 2010: 75). Although the UIC was not ideal but during its six month tenure, it had presented for the Somalis the best hope that Somalis had had in 15 years of civil war and state collapse. American support for the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia “remains a particularly egregious example of an ill-advised tactical approach to Somalia that yielded disastrous long-term results” (Norris and Bruton 2011: 6). The combined US-Ethiopian intervention in Somalia led Al-Qaeda to launch an “e-jihad (electronic jihad) in Somalia by referring to the country in media addresses disseminated via television and the Internet and calling upon dedicated jihadists” to come to the aid” of those fighting against the occupation (Hoehne 2009: 2). It also led to the internationalization of the conflict, which actually led to a dramatic increase in the number of foreign fighters in Somalia. A few members of the diaspora, including Somali-Americans also came back to fight alongside Al-Shabaab, while others have been found guilty of raising funds for Al-Shabaab (Shah and French October 20, 2011).
Al-Shabaab painted itself as a national and a religious liberation movement seeking to oust the imperial, expansionist and Christian Ethiopia, who was assisted by Americans who were determined to invade Muslim lands and its Western-backed and created TFG. Even those who disliked Al-Shabaab’s philosophy and tactics found it inevitable to support them and as one resident of Mogadisho stated:

I have to fight side by side with anyone who is fighting Ethiopia….People do not want to join the Islamists [wadaado]…but if it comes to that, how can you refuse a coalition with them? It won't matter who chews qaad and who doesn't when the enemy is just over the horizon (ICG Report 2005: 3).

This belief was widespread, although there were significant numbers who supported the TFG and believed that Ethiopian help was needed to protect the TFG from the UIC and its remnants. The diaspora also reflected this split with some siding with Al-Shabaab and others with the TFG. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

People were caught between Ethiopian troops’ brutal disregard for civilians, indiscriminate shelling of neighborhoods and Al-Shabaab’s cruel determination to oust the Ethiopians at any cost, out of Somalia. For Somalis, the Ethiopian invasion was “bloodier than any of the previous wars in Mogadisho, and transforming 1/3 of the capital’s residents in IDPs” (NYT Editorial January 25th, 2007). The Ethiopian and TFG forces carried out attacks against civilians, shelling entire neighborhoods and at least 1000 deaths in the first months of the fighting and over 400,000 thousand residents displaced. In some neighborhoods in north Mogadisho, eye-witnesses estimate that as many as one in three structures have been damaged or destroyed” and Mogadisho became a virtual ghost town (Menkhaus 2007: 386; Norris and Bruton 2011: 8). By the time Ethiopia withdrew “more than 15,000 civilians have been killed, an estimated 1.1 million
people displaced, and 476,000 Somalis have fled to neighboring countries” (Dagne 2009). In fact as early as 2008, it was clear that rising food prices and failed crops would result in famine ("Famine in Somalia Once Again" July 22, 2011).

As the humanitarian cost of the invasion as well as the inability of the Ethiopian troops to win clearly against Al-Shabaab, the US and more specifically the Under Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Frazer, began to backpedal, claiming for example at the August 2007 meeting of the Somali Studies held in Columbus, Ohio, as well as at the African Studies Association annual meeting in Chicago in November 2007, among other forums, that the United States had specifically told Ethiopia not to go into Somalia. In reality, Frazer was encouraging the Ethiopians to invade Somalia as early as June 2006, when the UIC took power. In a meeting that was recorded by a member of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, which took place in Addis Ababa on 24th June 2006, which is part of the documents released by Wikileaks show that Frazer in a meeting with Admiral Hunt, US Navy and the Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, Ambassador Vicki Huddleston, US Charge d’Affairs at the US Embassy in Ethiopia and Colonel Richard Orth, Military Attaché at the US Embassy in Ethiopia, where Frazer clearly states that if “Ethiopia intervened in Somalia, it would be a mistake for the international community to condemn it”. A few days later, in a meeting with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi, Frazer tells him that “any Ethiopian action in Somalia would have Washington’s blessings” (Meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa June 26, 2006). The humanitarian toll was described by one political observer as “the most lawless war of our generation” (Menkhaus 2007: 387).
Increasing condemnation over human rights abuses forced Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, to describe the fierce treatment by the international community as one where Ethiopia “didn’t anticipate that the international community would be happy riding the Ethiopian horse and flogging it at the same time” (Interview with Meles Zenawi, August 27, 2008).

The UN Monitoring Group (2007) also documented the use of chemical weapons including white phosphorus by the Ethiopian military against civilians. A NYT editorial described this indiscriminate level of brutality by the Ethiopians and disregard for civilians, “freed the Shabaab from all constraints, transforming them into a terrorist entity and bringing them into the forefront of Somali politics”, where they have yet to be dislodged (NYT Editorial January 25, 2007). For the first time since 1991, the nature of the Somali conflict changed from militias fighting each other with civilians sometimes caught in the middle to one where assassinations, indiscriminate shelling of entire neighborhoods, remotely detonated landmines, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombing and beheadings were routinely carried out by Al-Shabaab and Ethiopians (Menkhaus 2007: 386).

The Ethiopians and their TFG allies also carried out torture, particularly targeting clans that were opposed to them or those that revealed the problems of the occupations. For example, the Ethiopians targeted journalists who would reveal the human costs of their operations or who would let their citizens at home know about the casualties and costs suffered by their troops. Many journalists were killed, kidnapped and tortured by Ethiopian forces for their coverage. In one example, close to 20 journalists fled
Mogadisho to Hargeisa and then sought refuge in Djibouti after the Ethiopians asked the Somaliland authorities to hand them over. Some of these journalists had escaped attempted assassinations while others had been jailed, interrogated and tortured by both TFG and Ethiopian security officers. One journalist who spoke Amharic and worked for a European media that broadcast into Ethiopia was told by Ethiopian security officer that they would kill him if he reported on civilian deaths and Ethiopian casualties again (Interview with the author February 2007, Djibouti).

By 2008, African Union forces were authorized by the African Union and the United Nations to go to into Somalia as peace-keeping forces to prop up the TFG. Due to the ban on peacekeeping forces from the neighboring country, Uganda and Burundi volunteered to send troops to Somalia and deployed by late 2008. By 2011, Uganda and Burundi had a total of 9,200 soldiers to support the TFG as part of the AMISOM mission (Norris and Bruton 2011: 28).

The most serious consequence of the invasion was that it transformed the conflict into a religious one that aligned with what was taking place in the world with the war on terror. Almost five years after the Ethiopian invasion and 3 years after its departure, Somalia has yet to recover. The Ethiopians departed from Mogadisho, but not from Somalia, in January 2009. They entered a country, which in 2005 had a handful of unpopular hardcore militants, had by 2009 produced Al-Shabaab which had “become the dominant military force in southern and central Somalia” (Hoehne 2009: 2). Ken Menkhaus, a long-time observer of Somalia also faults the U.S. activities in Somalia, writing that:
Shabaab attacks against aid workers are a direct response to the U.S. designation of Shabaab as a terrorist organization in March 2008, and the May 2008 U.S. missile strike... Threats and violence by hardliners in the TFG against civil society figures and aid workers also can be traced back to Western policies, inasmuch as the TFG police force, which is implicated in attacks on and abuse of Somali civilians, have been provided training and even salaries by Western donors, via the UNDP” (Menkhaus 2008: 5).

Having succeeded in internationalizing the Somali conflict, creating Al-Shabaab into a movement that was more of a threat to the restoration of peace in Somalia, to regional and international security, the US, TFG, and Ethiopian officials which had labeled the entire leadership of the UIC as extremist and terrorist in 2006 were 2 years later calling for the inclusion of some former UIC members in a UN-led peace process (Dagne 2009: 100). In a UN-led reconciliation conference, many members of the Asmara group were invited to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with the TFG to be held in Djibouti whose “primary objective is to form a new national unity government made up of Somalis from different backgrounds” including former members of the UIC (Dagne 2009: 101-102).

Both the TFG and the Asmara group were undergoing internal conflicts over power-sharing, which led to the eventual departure of President Abdullahi Yusuf, who was considered a highly polarizing figure. The ARS split into two factions – ARS-Asmara, which opposed any negotiation with the TFG and ARS-Djibouti, which was willing to negotiate with the TFG. The Djibouti peace process led to the formation of a new TFG, with an expanded parliament of 550 members, which included 61 seats for the four major clans; 31 seats for minority groups; 200 seats for ARS-Djibouti and for the first time 75 seats were allocated for members of civil society and diaspora. One of the
three new leaders of the TFG would be drawn from ARS-Djibouti - the new president would be one of the former leaders of the UIC, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the prime minister would be Omar Abdirashid, a diaspora from Canada, while the position of speaker of the house would remain with the old TFG. The new TFG relocated to Mogadisho, amid threats from both ARS-Asmara and Al-Shabaab.

The departure of Ethiopia from Mogadisho did not deter Al-Shabaab from its attacks, which it continued against AMISOM forces and the newly installed TFG. Al-Shabaab also made significant advances in controlling most of southern Somalia. They attempted to enforce their twisted version of Islamic law, which the residents were expected to immediately comply with or face execution or amputations of limbs. Their unpredictable and arbitrary rules turned the population against them.

Meanwhile, the TFG remained dysfunctional and despite the assistance it was receiving from the international community was not able to maintain the safety of parts of Mogadisho that were under its control. Al-Shabaab continued to carry out suicide attacks and assassinations against TFG officials and AMISOM forces. The most devastating attack by Al-Shabaab was carried out on December 3rd, 2009 when they carried out a suicide attack in the graduation ceremony of the Benadir University medical school. That attack killed four TFG ministers, officials from the Benadir University, parents, journalists and about a dozen medical students. These were students whose skills were so badly needed in Somalia and who had risked their lives on a daily basis to attend classes and whose parents had struggled to pay the fees. These students who would be the future doctors of Somalia, replacing those trained under the Barre government and who were
retired, dead or living abroad. For Somalis in Mogadisho, this bombing made them realize that Al-Shabaab was not just about routing out the hated Ethiopians but that in fact Al-Shabaab had a foreign agenda, which included the continuation of conflict in Somalia and the imposition of religious rule which was neither in line with Somali culture or with the Islam practiced by Somalis. Although, Al-Shabaab quickly realized that they had seriously miscalculated and sought to distance itself from the bombing, Shamo was a turning point for Somalis and how they viewed Al-Shabaab. Within a few days of the bombing, on December 7 and 8, 2009 Somalis in Mogadisho took to the street, chanting anti-Shabaab slogans and burning their black flag ("Somalia: Attack on Graduation Ceremony the "Last Straw” IRIN News 10 December 2009). There were several demonstrations that took place in Mogadishu and Al-Shabaab’s black flag was burned by protestors. Although Al-Shabaab denied carrying out the bombings, many believed that Al-Shabaab realized that they had seriously miscalculated and now sought to distance themselves.

For the diaspora, this was also a turning point in their perception and support for Al-Shabaab. Many organizations condemned the attack and a group of diaspora singers created Qaylodhaan (Call for Help), a song that graphically described and mimed the brutality of Al-Shabaab naming and showing pictures of those that Al-Shabaab had slaughtered. Using a phrase from the Somali national anthem, the group called on Somalis to wake up and stand up to Al-Shabaab

(\text{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SYnOhU8Npk})
By 2010, Ugandan forces altered their mandate from peace-keeping to a peace-enforcement force that would directly engage with Al-Shabaab. But now the environment in Mogadisho had changed and Al-Shabaab was hated and resisted by the population it controlled but the TFG was unwilling to take advantage of Al-Shabaab’s failures and turn them in to the support and goodwill of the people. Instead, the leadership of the TFG continued to bicker, providing no services to those who lived in the areas they controlled. For example, many residents complained about being robbed by government forces who were not receiving a regular salary. In mid-2010, there was a conflict between the Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid and the president, which resulted in the departure of Abdirashid.

The placing of Al-Shabaab on the US Terror list and the killing of their leader ‘Ayro by American forces, only hardened Al-Shabaab, driving them even further into the Al-Qaeda fold. In July 2010, Al-Shabaab carried out two suicide bombings which rocked the capital of Uganda, Kampala, killing and injuring scores of people and promising a similar treatment to the Burundians for their participation in AMISOM and support for the TFG.

In October 2010, a little known Somali-American technocrat from Buffalo, New York, named Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo” was appointed as the new Prime Minister. Farmaajo was appointed as prime minister by president Sheikh Sharif, with little or no political experience, after meeting with the president in New York City. Farmaajo was picked out of among half a dozen candidates, all of them diaspora. His selection was carried out a by a group of diaspora who were close advisors of President
Sheikh Sharif. He was chosen primarily because he was unknown and had no political history, unlike the other candidates, that would make him objectionable. Farmaajo surrounded himself with diaspora particularly from the US, who had both the educational and technocratic skills to run their ministries. He gained popularity among Somalis when he stood up to UN agencies, nicknamed the “Nairobi Mafia,” and told them that needed to move to Mogadisho to effectively carry out their work. He also ensured that government soldiers received a regular salary thereby reducing their armed theft against civilians in TFG controlled neighborhoods. In the eyes of the Somalis, both in the diaspora and at home, by standing up to the international community and increasing the security of the areas under TFG control, Farmaajo returned a little of the dignity that Somalis had lost along with the state. Farmaajo also began, along with AMISOM forces to seriously challenge Al-Shabaab, increasing the percentage of Mogadisho under the control of TFG/AMISOM forces (Interview with a senior TFG official May 2011, Nairobi).

In August 2010, the extended mandate of the TFG came to an end. As local and international actors negotiated on what would happen next, a UN Security Council meeting on Somalia took place in Nairobi in May 2010, which extended the TFG mandate for another year. A month later in June 2010, another meeting to discuss the TFG mandate was called in Kampala, Uganda, which resulted in the Kampala Accord. This accord called for the replacement of Farmaajo, while both President Sheikh Sharif and speaker of the house Sharif Hassan would maintain the position. For many, that the two most unpopular and venal politicians in the country could decide the fate of the
country, while safeguarding their own interests and getting help from the international community enraged them. The Kampala Accord extended the mandate of the TFG for another year and called for the appointment of a new prime minister and the cabinet positions. The implementation of the Kampala Accord was to be supervised by the President of Uganda Yoweri Museveni and UN Special Envoy for Somalia Augustine Mahiga and the head of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) 
(http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/110609%20-%20Kampala%20Accord%20%28signed%29.pdf)

For Somalis, the firing of Farmaajo was once again a clear example of negative external intervention by the international community and specifically by Uganda and the UN Special Envoy Mahiga. There were demonstrations that took place in Mogadisho resulting in several deaths and throughout the diaspora including in Cairo, Nairobi, Johannesburg, Sydney, London, Rome, Stockholm, Minneapolis and Toronto. In essence then, Farmaajo paid the price for being effective at his job, for refusing to appoint Speaker Sharif Hassan’s corrupt allies to cabinet positions and for standing up to the international community. Many of the usual spoilers in Somali politics felt threatened by these diaspora who were largely committed to making a difference in their country. For example, through successive diaspora prime ministers, the number of cabinet ministers from the diaspora steadily increased. Today, all the TFG ministers are from the diaspora. Additionally, senior officials, such as the mayor and deputy of mayor of Mogadishu are also from the diaspora. Often, the Prime Minister will appoint other diasporas, with several coming from their host countries. For example, Nur Adde's had many of the
ministers in his cabinet hailing from his host country - Britain, while Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and the current Prime Minister Abdiweli Gaas appointed fellow Somali-Americans to their cabinet.

Local political actors believe that they are being squeezed out of politics. Many of the usual suspects, particularly warlords, in Somali politics began to strike back against these diaspora politicians. One of the warlords changed the word diaspora into a denigrating name, calling them a threat to Somalia, similar to Al-Shabaab and called for a war to oust them. Others have called the diaspora Tablighi, after the Muslim missionary workers who stay in one place for 40 days, implying that the diaspora will only remain in Somalia for a short period before going back to their countries of residence.

In Farmaajo’s place, Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali “Gaas”, a professor of economics at the University of Buffalo and the former Deputy Prime Minister under Farmaajo was appointed as prime minister. Abdiweli appears to be continuing the work of Farmaajo and 95% of his cabinet is diaspora. In August 2011, Al-Shabaab suddenly vacated the areas that they controlled in Mogadisho, but it is not clear that the TFG/AMISOM forces are taking full advantage of this retreat as once again, there seems to be personal differences between the top TFG leaders.

**Conclusion**

The Somali conflict has now dragged on for more than 20 years but rather than ending or at least improving the situation within Somalia, it appears that international intervention has deepened divisions, added new actors and added new layers of
complications onto the search for peace. “With each failed peace process, the Somali crisis has become more intractable and difficult to resolve as distrust grows, grievances mount, coping mechanisms become entrenched” (Menkhaus 2010: 17). But it seems that there is some hope. About 60% of Somalia, particularly the northern areas have created peace and stability along with local governance structures including Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug and Ximan and Xeeb. But even these areas face continuous threat from the south, primarily due to international intervention there.

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the complex and often negative effects of international intervention in Somalia and to bring into relief the activities of the diaspora in development, peace and conflict as discussed in chapters five and six. The diaspora are both internal and external actors in the events that take place within Somalia and the international community has been keen to encourage the diaspora to return home viewing them as capable of filling the gaps that the international community and local actors have been unable to meet. And largely the diaspora has responded. After the takeover in southern Somalia by Al-Shabaab, many foreign NGO workers left and their positions were filled by the diaspora. Now that they have left, many more continue to return to work with the TFG and with international organizations. But they face suspicion and hostility from both the international community and from local actors. These issues will be discussed further in the following chapters.

The history of Somali migration and the formation of its diaspora is the focus of chapter four which will contextualize the drivers of migration by examining the internal and external factors that have pushed Somalis to migrate. This chapter is intended to
provide a historical context of the Somali diaspora in order to understand their activities in development and conflict, presented in chapters five and six.
Chapter Four

Framing the Somali Diaspora

This chapter will place the process of Somali migration within the larger framework of Somali history, showing how and why the various waves of Somali migration took place as well as their ties connecting them with home. This chapter categorizes the Somali diaspora depending on the time of their migration, arguing that the date of departure as well as the condition under which diaspora left home shapes their relationship later on. It will also identify the problems associated with counting and locating the Somali diaspora.

History of Somali Migration: The First Wave

Somalia is one of the few countries in Africa where the majority of its citizens are pastoral nomads, sharing a common language, ethnicity, culture and religion. Before the arrival of the colonial power, the clans had their own system of governance using the Somali law (xeer) and Islamic Shari’a. Political authority was highly decentralized and Somalis were described as a “fierce and turbulent race of republicans” (Burton 1987: 122). The lineage elders usually gathered to deal with important issues – war, peace, migration, marriage or divorce - facing the community, through discussion and consensus. Thus the traditional authorities’ involvement with pastoral politics was limited and these structures were utilized only when needed. This highly decentralized system of governance was the most common in Somalia, although in some parts there existed sultanates resembling the kingdoms found in other parts of Africa. Generally, the
clan and membership in it provided a collective socioeconomic and personal security, latent in times of peace but activated in response to an external threat (Lewis 1993; Issa-Salwe 1996; Bryden 1998). Somalis, particularly the northerners were predominantly nomadic, constantly migrating in search of water and pasture for their livestock, while southern Somalis were a mixture of pastoralists and farmers. The Somalis thus travelled and settled all over the Horn of Africa sometimes as far as south-east Africa and the Middle East. Thus migration is not new to Somalis and is an integral part of their way of life.

Somalis claim descent from two brothers, Samale and Sab. Most Somalis are descendents of Samale including the Darood, Dir, Hawiye and Isaaq, while the Digil and Mirifle are descendents of Sab. The primary difference between the Sab and Samale are that the Sab do not claim to be related by blood and consider themselves to be a federation of different clans who share place of residence, while the Samale claim descent on the basis of blood (Issa-Salwe 1996). Other groups that live in Somalia include the Reer Hamar, the descendents of Arabs, the Reer Barawe and the Baajuun who are Swahili-speaking and the Jareer who originated from southern Africa. The Tumal, the Madhiban and the Yibir are the most marginalized groups within Somalia (Issa-Salwe 1996: 2). The chart below lays out the major clan-families in Somalia.
Map of Somali Clans

The arrival of the colonial powers in Somalia in the nineteenth century included the imposition of state authority; co-opting of traditional leaders to fulfill political or administrative functions, unequal access to the advantages (distributive goods) of imperial rule by favoring some clans over others and the evolution of a small but relatively privileged, educated urban elite. Colonial rule negatively influenced Somalia’s future political and socio-economic development because the colonizers destroyed the
traditional person-to-person nature of political discourse without replacing it with any workable alternative governance model. The colonizers created an administrative bureaucracy headed by a central authority with an exclusive monopoly on enormously powerful coercive institutions – the military and related security services. Thus from the beginning many Somalis perceived the central state as a source of violence intended for the benefit of the few who control it (Issa-Salwe 1996).

Recent migration and the subsequent formation of the many Somali diaspora took place over several decades and spread over many countries and continents. The earliest wave of Somali migration occurred in the 1940s and 1950s, consisting primarily of seamen working for the British Empire. These seamen who were employed on British ships in the late nineteenth century eventually settled in London’s East End, Cardiff and Liverpool, with their families. There were also a small number of students who went abroad to seek higher education and soldiers from WWII (Berns McGown 1999; Farah 2000; Waldo 2006: 19).

When British Somaliland and Italian Somalia became independent and joined together on July 1st, 1960, politics was significantly characterized by rampant corruption and political parties that appealed to clan solidarity characterized the first nine years of independence. It appeared that clan fission and fissure, so apparent in traditional Somali politics, were transferred to the modern arena, without the traditional safeguards, which sanctioned the removal of inept or corrupt leaders. Traditional authority was officially and methodically undermined by the post-colonial elite (Hohne 2006: 3-4).
When Siad Barre came to power through a bloodless coup d’état in 1969, most Somalis welcomed it, especially when Barre promised the abolition of clannism and multipartyism, presenting both as forces against progress and economic development. For the first few years, it appeared that the Barre government was carrying out its promises. But soon, it became apparent that despite the rhetoric of abolishing clannism, Siad Barre in fact favored his own clan, the Marehan and two others – the Ogaadeen and the Dhulbahante - respectively (Galaydh 1990; Samatar 1991; Bryden 1998: Issa-Salwe 1996). This clear favoritism along with access to the resources of the state would drive further migration in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.

The Second Wave of Somali Migration

The second wave of migration was economically driven and occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many were migrant workers who were attracted to the Middle East’s booming oil economies, along with a few students and exiles in Europe and North America. The migrant workers included both professionals and laborers, with both remitting most of their earnings home with the goal of returning home after a few years. The students were mostly on government scholarships and like the migrant workers were returning home after finishing their studies. The exiles included those who left of their own accord because of ideological differences with the government and those who had fled and became refugees fearing for their lives. Out of these three groups, the most economically and politically involved with home was the migrant group.
By the mid-1970s, the Somali economy was in “imminent doom” and in response to these declining economic opportunities, many Somalis began to migrate to the Middle East and particularly to Saudi Arabia in order to supplement their families’ incomes (Jamal 1988: 783). Most migrants sent most of their earnings back to Somalia with the intention of returning home once they had accumulated enough money to sustain themselves and their families. The funds were often remitted through clan networks and were used to support family as well as investing in businesses. Meanwhile, both the Somali government and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), failed to take into account how remittances had changed the whole character of the Somali economy. When the Somali government was forced to implement the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which included drastic cuts in social spending and currency devaluation, the World Bank and others expected to see its impact – in the form of malnutrition and other privation – on the streets of Mogadisho, with many Somalis expected to encounter hardships in meeting their daily needs. Instead the IMF and World Bank officials were baffled as the economy thrived and the markets were filled with luxury items because many people, especially in the urban areas, were receiving remittances from relatives in the Middle East that allowed them to maintain or exceed their living standards. Because remittances were often sent through informal networks, they escaped official notice (Ahmed 2000; Jamal 1992; Horst 2002; Medani 2002; Green and Jamal 1987).

Vali Jamal, a scholar who carried out extensive research on the Somali economy described this contradiction in the statistics, which showed:
that average incomes are abysmally low, that a large portion of the population lives in poverty, that real incomes are falling, grain imports are increasing, the balance of payments in an ever-increasing deficit – in short, that the country is in lamentable shape (Jamal 1988: 783).

There were several reasons why the reality of the Somali economy failed to be captured by the official statistics of the government and international financial institutions but the most important, according to Jamal, was that remittances accounted for a large part of the national income but it was not counted (Jamal 1988: 784). And by the mid-1980s, Somali migration to the Middle East was estimated at 200,000 with earnings of $700 million a year, remitting about $370 million in 1987 of which only a fraction amounting to $30 million was sent through government banks (Jamal 1992). Migrant workers bypassed the government banks because as part of the SAP implementation, the Somali government took two actions. The first, known as the *Franco Valuta* system changed government policies towards imports and exports by lifting restrictions on it (Gundel 2002). Previously, business people were required to obtain their hard currency through the government owned banks. This restricted the business people because access to hard currency was given to those with connections to the government. With the *Franco Valuta* system, business people could now get hard currency from anywhere. Many headed to the Middle East to buy migrant workers’ dollars and in exchange, they would give the families of the migrant workers Somali shillings at a favorable rate in comparison to the government banks. The Somali government also looked the other way as the black market in hard currency flourished (Jamal 1992; Green and Jamal 1987; Waldo 2006: 20).
Even those willing to remit their earnings through the Somali banks encountered several barriers. First, the Somali government had no bank branches in the locations where Somali migrants lived and migrants would have to use European or American banks in order to remit money to the Somali banks. Secondly, the Somali government required proof of legal residence whereas many Somalis were working illegally in the Middle East. Finally, for their families to collect the money, recipients would have to come to Mogadisho (Jamal 1988: 806).

Remittances permitted Somalis, particularly those in urban areas, to live with increasing inflation, decaying government institutions, growing unemployment and corruption. The Somali government instituted a number of policy measures to encourage migrants’ decisions to remit using official channels. Since remittances are essentially private transfers, many governments adopt policies that first encourage the flow of remittances, and then try to capture the hard currency and finally they seek to influence the uses of remittances domestically. The policies adopted by the Somali government included the liberalization of the economy and the legalization of the black market. This latter policy would allow the Somali economy to continue functioning, and in some cases thrive after the collapse of the state.

In the 1980s, diaspora uses of remittances were clear. Remittances were sent to family to either meet their daily needs or for investment. As Siad Barre’s rule became more dictatorial, Somali migration to the Middle East was driven in response to political repression, resulting in a growing segment within the diaspora conducting their opposition to his regime by providing financial and other support to the different armed
groups stationed in Ethiopia. Many diaspora were members of the Majerteen and the Isaaq, who were being persecuted by the regime. The armed groups, which formed in response to the brutality of the regime, were initially open in their membership to all Somalis but they soon began to reflect deep clan divisions existing within the Somali polity. Through their financial contributions and political activism from a distance, the diaspora managed to effectively draw attention to the viciousness of the regime, while minimizing that of the rebel groups (Omaar 1990). The conditions for state collapse were set when the Barre regime lost its ability to satisfy various demand-bearing groups in society as resources dried up. Dissatisfaction and opposition grew, leading to the regime’s increased use of violence in order to maintain order.

The Somali government failed dismally in its attempts to tap into remittances, because many of the migrants came from groups that actively opposed the government due to its ongoing war in the north. Some of these migrants were also actively engaged in overthrowing the Barre regime through their fundraising and other contributions to opposition groups. Others preferred the more informal system to the government banks because it was more secure and their families got more when they exchanged their money at the black market than at the banks (Jamal 1992; Russell 1986; Lyons and Samatar 1995).

The inability of the Somali state to access remittances and decreasing foreign aid was a significant factor in the destabilization of an already weak state. The state was unable to overcome its budget deficit and greasing its large patronage networks in return for loyalty. The blatant pursuit of private goals at public expense by elites was also
instrumental in the further deterioration of the state. The end of the Cold War, pressure from Western countries to improve human rights and visible opposition from previously silent groups were the final straw that broke the central state. There was a consensus from within and outside of Somalia that Barre must step down. In a manifesto drawn up in 1990 calling for Barre’s resignation, many of the signatories resided outside of Somalia (An Open Letter to President Mohamed Siyaad Barre 1990). Once the armed opposition groups ousted Barre from power, any cohesion among the diaspora fragmented along with the state. The main opposition groups claimed the right to lead the country as compensation for their suffering under the Barre regime (Bradbury 2008: 46).

**Third Wave of Somali Migration**

The third wave of Somali migration occurred in the late 1980s in reaction to the deteriorating economic and political conditions at home. Many of those who fled were refugees who sought and received refuge in Europe and increasingly in North America. Initially, many of those were from northwest Somalia, which was coming under escalating repression from the Somali government. As the fighting moved to southern Somalia, more and more people escaped the fighting. Although internationally recognized as a collapsed state since 1991, for some scholars, the Somali state had never really existed according to the Weberian definition of a state that has a monopoly over a territory as well as the legitimate use of the means of violence. The Somali state was unable to exercise any significant control over large portions of its polity because its
presence was not felt outside the urban areas. This absence of the state outside of the urban areas was due to several factors including lack of infrastructure, inhospitable geography, and a considerably mobile population. The state also came to be seen by a sizeable portion of the population as serving the interests of elites and urban dwellers. This perception of the Somali state increased particularly from the 1980s on as the state reduced the delivery of basic services to other urban areas as the government focused on Mogadisho (Bayart 1999; Rotberg 2002; Gros 1996; Little 2003; Herbst 2000). Because Somali society has traditionally been nomadic and authority decentralized, the Somali state as it limited itself to Mogadisho became even more suspended over the society. The subsequent civil war among opposition groups as each clan fought for domination over the collapsed state, affected virtually all of Somalia’s 9 million people.

In 1991, when several different armed opposition groups representing some of the major clans entered Somalia from their bases in Ethiopia, they were able to overthrow the Barre regime within a short period and the Somali state has since remained collapsed. Anne Simons, in her book The Dissolution of the Somalia State suggests that the dissolution of the Somali state took place “once enough Somalis realized that they were being failed by structures of state, it was only a matter of time before so much inequity would provoke them to regain autonomy through anarchy” (Simons 1994: 822). Thus, for Simons, the failure of the Somali state in fact translated into reclamation by Somalis of their freedom. But rather than seeking freedom through anarchy, most Somalis wanted and expected a better government with Barre’s departure (An Open Letter to President Mohamed Siyaad Barre 1990).
The collapse of the state was exacerbated by high levels of distrust among the elites who perceived zero-sum political outcomes and frequently engaged in unrestrained, violent struggles for dominance. Division within the elites increased due to lack of communication across factional lines in any meaningful way. Elites also disagreed on the rules and codes of political conduct and even on the worth of existing institutions (Galaydh 1990; Mohamoud 2002; Samatar 2001; Field, Higley and Burton 1991).

**The Making of the Somali Diaspora**

As the civil war spread throughout the country, many Somalis sought safe haven in other countries. By late 1990, thousands of Somalis were escaping the violence. Once the Somali state disappeared in January 1991, millions of Somalis were on the move with at least 2 millions leaving for Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti and some continuing on to the Middle East, Western Europe, North America and Australia.

The size of the Somali diaspora dramatically increased, reaching at least a million. Those who settled in developed regions in Europe and North America continued to remit to remaining family. They also continued to support the armed groups who were now fighting each other for supremacy. Whatever happened in Somalia played itself out in the diaspora as people began to socialize, interact and even primarily inter-marry within their clan, which contradicted the long-held Somali tradition of marrying outside of your lineage. They fundraised for their groups and lobbied their host government to recognize only their warlord as the only legitimate leader of Somalia and a few even declared themselves as the president of Somalia. In the 1990s, warlords were critical actors in the
prevention of the re-emergence of the central state and claimed to be representing their clans and its interests.

Over a million Somalis sought refuge outside of Somalia, with majority going to neighboring and other developing countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Egypt. About one million went to richer countries in the Middle East, Western Europe, North America and Australia and New Zealand. Those that managed to enter rich developed nations maintained family networks by sending remittances and facilitating family reunification. Additionally, they sent money to support armed factions, organized events to generate support for their clans while publicizing atrocities, perceived or real, committed by other clans and met with government officials of their host countries to lobby for their groups (Adar 2001; Gundel 2003; Ahmed 2000; Omer 2002).

The collapse of the Somali state and the civil war meant that both employment and livelihoods were disrupted and the difference between life and death hinged on whether you had family abroad who could send you money to live on as well as to migrate to other countries or to neighboring countries. It was during this time that remittance companies began to emerge in a formalized manner.

In the early 1990s, remittances relied “on trust relations so that the sender could be relatively certain that the money would get to the recipient. The money would then be flown into different cities by carriers on daily khat flights. The money would then be distributed to the various cities where recipients lived. Often, they were contacted by high frequency (HF) radio operators who would inform them that they had money waiting for them (Waldo 2006: 20).
Categorizing the Somali Diaspora

Reflecting their divergent migration experiences as well as education, age and socio-economic standing, the Somali diaspora communities can be divided into several categories. These categories are based on observations during fieldwork and through interviews with Somalis in the diaspora.

The first group is those that are well integrated into their communities, are highly educated, holding professional employment. In the US, many within this group arrived in the 1980s and early 1990s as students and exiles. For the most part, this group has been the least involved in events in Somalia. The 2007 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia has re-awakened their interest in and involvement with home. Although, acknowledging the benefits they have received from Somalia, free education for example, this group appears to be the least interested in returning home and actually contributing to the development of home. While they do support their family and different causes, they are likely to give less. Aside from following events at home, from both the host and Somalia media, they do not see a future in Somalia for themselves or their children. In contrast, many Somalis in Somalia see this group’s involvement and return to Somalia as essential if things are to improve.

The second group of diaspora Somalis comprises of those who migrated after the collapse of the Somali state and who experienced the civil war and life in a refugee camp. Numerically, they outnumber the first group and include those whose migration was facilitated by family members already in the diaspora and those who came through the
UNHCR resettlement programs. For the most part, a significant number of this group consists of women and children. Consequently, their educational and employment experiences are less than those of the first group. Their outlook on events in Somalia is colored by their encounters with violence, flight and life in the refugee camps. This group is also much more occupied with events in Somalia and more likely to both visit and to plan a future where they and their children would return to Somalia. In fact, a 2000 survey on immigrants in Minnesota found that 71 percent of Somalis interviewed (many of who are members of this group) expressed hope of returning to Somalia one day (Wilder Research Center 2000: 8).

Those who arrived as adults are less likely to be successfully integrated into their host communities. Their experiences with violence and life in the refugee camps hamper their integration. They may also be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder but the cultural stigma of mental illness and their unfamiliarity with the healthcare system makes them less likely to seek assistance.

Due to their lack of language skills, education or relevant employment experiences, this group tends to work in factories, retail or hospitality sectors. In line with their goal of permanently returning home, they remit a great deal of their income to care for family left behind. They also invest in businesses and buy property at home. They are intensely engrossed with events at home, often following developments there by listening to the BBC and Voice of America in Somali as well as reading the Somali news websites available online.
In comparison, their children become well integrated into the host society with some not integrating in a positive way. For example, Somali boys are more likely to drop out of school than Somali girls. Some other negative behavior includes drinking, drugs, joining gangs and generally engaging in criminal behavior. Instead, many parents prefer that their children obtain the best that their host society has to offer and use it to advance themselves and Somalia. Some children that are not doing well academically or behaviorally are sent to Somalia to be re-introduced to the language and cultural values of their parents. Many Somalis in Somalia believed that the best way for this group to contribute to Somalia is for them to remain in the diaspora and continue to support family and development projects at home.

The final group is the smallest numerically. This group can be said to be those who have failed to integrate meaningfully into their host communities in any significant manner. Many are men who spend many hours in coffee shops like Starbucks in Minneapolis, Columbus and Virginia discussing the political conditions at home. Their views are often in line with that of their clans and their willingness to collect and donate money to their clans. They are nick-named *fudhi-ku-dirir* or those who fight while sitting. This group is mostly concerned with maintaining the honor of their clans. Many Somalis in Somalia regard this group as “pouring gas on the Somali fire” with one returned diaspora calling them “Somali cancer” (Interview with a returned diaspora June 2007, Virginia).

It is important to note that variations exist in integration patterns in different countries. For example, Somalis in the Scandinavian countries are less integrated into
their host community than Somalis in North America and a partial explanation is that the culture and institutions in different countries affect how well Somalis integrate into their host community.

**Counting and Locating the Somali Diaspora**

Twenty years after the massive movement of Somalis to other countries, the number of Somalis living in the diaspora remains a guess with the most popular number being that there are one million Somalis living abroad, constituting about 11% of the population. Recently, various reports including one by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have advanced a figure of 1.5 million Somalis concentrated in three locations. The first are those who have remained within the region, living largely as refugees in the neighboring countries of Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen. The second group is to be found within the Middle East, especially in the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The final group are those who have settled in Europe and North America including the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, the United States and Canada. Newer movements have created communities in Malaysia, Australia, South Africa, Libya and Greece. This spread of the Somali diaspora has merited the description of Somalia as a “globalised nation” (Sheikh and Healy 2009; Menkhaus 2008). The map below visually demonstrates the locations of the Somali diaspora.
Counting the number of Somalis abroad has been problematic in the absence of a central state. Many studies have sought to look at destination countries that might keep track of the nationalities entering their country but even here, getting a good estimate has been problematic. For example, the number of refugees entering the countries of the
members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) from 1997 to 2005 is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Number of refugees entering the OECD countries (Quoted in Sheikh and Healy 2009: 8)

Because people enter countries in various ways, looking at only refugee numbers does not provide an accurate number. For example, people come through family re-unification or through government sponsorships, looking at census data provides figures closer to the reality, although they can also be outdated. For the same countries above, their census data provides the following numbers for Somali-born residents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number (Year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>93,000 (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>36,000 (2000 census)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>34,000 (2001 census)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Number of Somali-born living in selected countries (Sheikh and Healy 2009: 9)
But anecdotal figures place the number of Somalis in the countries listed at much higher numbers. Somali refugee figures for the US from 1983 to 2004 were listed as 55,000 but in 2004 alone 13,000 Somalis entered the US. Some studies have suggested the number of Somalis in the US as high as 150,000 (Menkhaus 2009; Lehman and Eno 2003). The 2010 US census numbers the Somali diaspora in the US at 85,700 with at 60% entering the country 2000 and later. With a median age of 26.8, the Somali diaspora is one of the youngest immigrant communities in the US. One-third of Somali-Americans are to be found in Minnesota and others in Columbus, Ohio; Seattle, Washington and Lewiston and Portland, Maine.

The United Kingdom has one of the largest and oldest Somali diaspora, now including diaspora that have relocated from other European Union countries. The city of Leicester’s Somali community increased by about 15,000 in the last ten years augmented by the arrival of many Somalis holding Dutch, Danish and Swedish citizenships. The Somali population in the UK is considered to be the largest community outside of the Horn of Africa, but their numbers do not match their influence in their host community. Despite their long presence in the UK, the Somali community is labeled as an “invisible community” because of their lack of connection with their host government and community, and they are considered to be one of the poorest communities among the diaspora. One characteristic of Somali migration is that it can take place “on a large scale in a very short timeframe” (Sheikh and Healy 2009: 10). In the US, this was seen in Lewiston, Maine when Somalis began to settle there. From 2001 to 2007, the percentage
of Somalis living in Lewiston became 10% of its population (Sheikh and Healy 2009: 10).

Because many members of the diaspora fled at the height of the civil war, or spent many years in refugee camps, their perception of events in Somalia is colored by those experiences. Until very recently, only those with the financial means or with family connections could afford to migrate to richer countries. Most of Somalia’s educated professionals and artists were the first to leave. Those who remained were often from lower socio-economic standing and those from the rural or nomadic populations. For example, Somalia’s adult literacy rate fell from a pre-war level of 24% to 19.2% (UNDP 2001). While those living in Somalia often came to terms with the civil war, viewing the warlords and other political opportunists as the main cause of violence, members of the diaspora used their resources by deepening societal divisions and continuing the conflict that led to their departure.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to place Somali migration in the larger context of what was happening in the country. The early drivers of migration were primarily economic and it was only in the 1980s that people began to migrate for political reasons. During the early 1980s, as more sought to migrate for economic reasons, the demands for passports were so great that the Somali government suspended its issuance for a time. These migration movements have created a diaspora that have different patterns of engagement and affiliation with home. Traditionally, early migration movement have
attracted later migration movement and provided support to each other. Because diasporic movements are transnational, the diaspora is also impacted by events at home and within other diaspora locations. But their support through remittances is so crucial that it lessened the consequences of war and state collapse in a way that is difficult to measure. Their engagement in development and conflict perpetuation will be discussed in the following two chapters.

Chapter Five

Diaspora Contributions to Development

The focus of this chapter will be on the critical role of the diaspora in promoting the development of their home countries. The chapter will first provide an overview of the ways that diaspora promote homeland development including the nexus between diaspora, remittances and development. It will also provide the different modes of diaspora involvement in development and this will be illustrated by a discussion of different diaspora supported developmental projects in the fields of education, health, business and research. This discussion includes the developmental contributions of businesses that rely on the diaspora such remittance and telecommunication companies. The final discussion examines the negative side of diaspora development and the larger implication of involving diaspora communities in the development of home.

Developing Home
Diaspora participation in the development of home takes place in a variety of forms. First, Diaspora support and promotion of educational initiatives has been either in financial and material contributions or in diaspora returning home to reconstruct schools, which were destroyed during the civil war that consumed much of Somalia particularly in the larger cities which had government schools. The diaspora have also sought to provide these services in areas of the country where schools were not previously available. The diaspora have built universities, colleges and vocational schools across Somalia. Almost all of the universities working or being constructed in Somalia has been diaspora driven and supported. From the University of Southern Somalia in Baidoa, to East Africa University in Bosaaso to the decade old Amoud University in Borama, were all began with ideas and support from the Somali diaspora in the United States, Europe and the Middle East. But, diaspora participation in education is not limited to higher education but includes the establishment of elementary and high schools.

Diaspora Somalis have taken a vital role in the provision of health services in Somalia, in the absence of a central state. Whether it is in the form of establishing new hospitals, collecting money and material or bringing those unable to receive the right medical help into their host countries, the diaspora have been critical in the provision and availability of health services in Somalia.

Some diaspora establish organizations that, like the Mexican Hometown Associations, link up with communities at home to fund specific areas or projects. This can be formal with an organization that is registered with the host government and which does fundraising activities and employs staff. These formal organizations can also
include research institutes and centers that produce research and documentations on
issues of importance to the home and diaspora communities. The ways that they exist
also varies; some of these NGOs have paid staff, offices and do fundraising drives.
Others only exist in virtual reality; have volunteer staff and conduct most of their
activities including fundraising online. The first group is represented by Amoud
Foundation and the Somali Family Services and the second by Somaliland Forum.

Other organizations are on an ad hoc basis and only come together in response to
events such as disaster relief or to requests for help from their communities at home.
This group can also include individuals who come together to support a specific project
and conduct annual fundraisers.

Other ways that the diaspora contribute to the development of home is through
their investment and creation of businesses. Many diaspora send money to relatives for
investment purpose, while they remain abroad. A few come back to start the businesses
themselves and because they speak the language and know the culture, returned diaspora
have an advantage over non-diaspora investors. Their investments and creation of
businesses has several impacts on the local community. They hire people to work for
them. They also change the working norms of their communities because they bring with
them the norms of their host communities. For those who have returned from developed
countries, they expect their employees to show up on time, work longer hours and not
have any bad habits such as smoking or chewing khat. These returned diaspora are also
more likely to hire people on their qualifications rather than just on their relationships
(Interview with author, November 2006 Bosaaso).
Diaspora business people often do not remain in only one business but often begin other businesses that are sometimes related or provide missing services to their original business. For example in Bosaaso, three male returned diaspora from Canada, Sweden and the Britain built a hotel and restaurants in Bosaaso. They also began other businesses including a small-scale farm where they raised chicken, lamb and cows to provide meat for their restaurants which they had been shipping from a distance (Interview with author, November 2006 Bosaaso).

Diaspora try to level the playing fields with the locals by making rules and services open, accountable and accessible. The diaspora in Bosaaso attempted to improve the health of the community by trying to push the Puntland government to better monitor and inspect restaurants and provide formalized training for those working in the hospitality sector. Many diaspora who were running businesses in Somalia believed that they had advantages in running a more successful business. For example, they believed that they were more conscious of time, better at planning and more experienced in running businesses than local Somalis (Interview with author, November 2006, Bosaaso). Contrary to their beliefs, the large and lucrative businesses were owned and run by non-diaspora Somalis.

For some diaspora, whether establishing schools, hospital or other businesses, an important aspect of their contribution to the development of home is that some of the services be accessible to marginalized groups including women, girls, orphans and minorities. Thus, these groups would either receive these services free of charge or pay a reduced fee.
Forms of Somali Diaspora Support for Development

Diaspora participation in the development of home takes several forms. First, some diaspora establish organizations, like the Mexican Hometown Associations, that link up with communities at home to fund specific areas or projects. This can be a formal organization that is registered with the host government, engages in fundraising activities and employs staff. These formal organizations can also include research institutes and centers that produce research and documentations on issues of importance to the home and diaspora communities. The ways that they exist also varies; some of these NGOs have paid staff, offices and do fundraising drives. Others only exist in virtual reality; have volunteer staff and conduct most of their activities including fundraising online. The first group is represented by Amoud Foundation and the Somali Family Services and the second by Somaliland Forum.

Other organizations are on an ad hoc basis and only come together in response to events such as disaster relief or to requests for help from their communities at home. This group can also include individuals who come together to support a specific project and conduct annual fundraisers.

Amoud Foundation (http://www.amoudfoundation.com) is an example of an organization that is formal and is registered with the US federal government. It was founded in 1998 and is based in Dallas, Texas. After 9 years of prolonged conflict in Somalia, a few diaspora got together to form the Amoud Foundation and to fundraise and meet the variety of needs they knew existed in Somalia. The Amoud Foundation
provides financial support for development projects spanning most of the Somali inhabited lands including Somaliland, Puntland, southern Somalia and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya. They were originally founded to help Amoud University in Borama, which they still support. The Amoud Foundation also provides scholarships for students at Mogadisho University and Hargeisa University. Additionally, the Amoud Foundation is building Al-Hayat Hospital in Borama from the ground up and furnishing it with all the equipment needed. The cost of the construction and setting up of the hospital was $325,000 which was funded entirely by Amoud Foundation. The foundation also supports Kaalmo Orphanage Center, also in Borama, and has provided it with $15,000. In Wajir, Kenya, Amoud Foundation runs another orphanage and has established Furqan Integrated Academy alongside it. The academy has a dual purpose, which is to provide a culturally relevant school for Somali-Kenyans who are underserved by the Kenyan government. The school is attended by 362 students. It is also intended to generate funds for the orphanage through school fees as well as provide schooling for the orphans (Phone Interview with Foundation official, June 2009).

Other projects supported by the Amoud Foundation include the Hawa Abdi Hospital in Afgoi, southern Somalia. This hospital, which is run by Dr. Hawa Abdi, encompasses the longest running and largest internally displaced camp in Somalia. Aside from these constant projects that they fund, the Amoud Foundation also responds to humanitarian disasters by sending financial support for food, water and shelter. Many of those who established the foundation arrived in the US several decades ago and seem to have a broad and nationalistic view of Somali identity, which is why their projects
encompass 4 of the 5 regions inhabited by Somalis. Rather than limiting themselves to their region of origin, the members of Amoud Foundation seek to support projects that serve a broad group of Somalis. They also seek to fill in the gap left by both the absence of the Somali state as well as international relief organizations. In line with their motto, “helping people help themselves,” the Amoud Foundation considers its role as helping to deal with short term needs while building and rehabilitating institutions and infrastructures that were either destroyed or that never existed under the Somali state (Phone interview with Foundation Official, 2009).

In contrast to the Amoud Foundation, the Somaliland Forum [http://www.somalilandforum.org](http://www.somalilandforum.org) is region specific, limiting its activities to Somaliland. Unlike the Amoud Foundation, which has an office and exists in the real world, the Somaliland Forum exists only in cyberspace. The forum’s membership is restricted only to Somalilanders, who believe and support the independence and recognition of Somaliland. The forum has provided a platform for Somalis to gather from all over the world to discuss issues of concern as well as contribute to the development of Somaliland. For example, the forum has contributed to the building and re-building of schools and hospitals destroyed during the conflict including Farah Omaar Secondary school, Hargeisa Orphanage and the Edna Adan Maternity Hospital in Hargeisa. The forum has also supported both Amoud and Hargeisa universities (Interview with a Somaliland forum member, June 2007, Washington D.C.).

In addition to its developmental activities, the Somaliland forum has served to be an organizing forum on issues of concern to Somaliland. So, the forum has organized
demonstrations in different cities around the world to highlight the situation of Somaliland and advocate for its recognition with different countries that have Somaliland diaspora communities. They issue press releases on issues of importance to the Somaliland community. For example, the forum has issued a press release on the issue of the bombing that occurred in Somaliland in October 2008, calling on the United Nations, the European Union, and the African Union to stand with Somaliland by helping with its security. Describing Somaliland as the “last stable place” in a troubled region, the Somaliland Forum implied that maintaining the peace in Somaliland now enjoys is linked to its recognition as a sovereign state (Somaliland Forum Press Release, October 2008).

Another kind of a diaspora organization involved in both the host and home communities can be found in Somali Family Organization (http://www.ussfs.org) based in Minneapolis, MN. The Somali Family Organization is very similar to the Somaliland Forum in that it is region specific, in this case, Puntland. But this organization has the dual goal of assisting in the integration of Somalis in Minnesota by helping them access resources and opportunities. The Somali Family Organization’s other role is to create linkages between Somalia and its diaspora communities. This organization has been instrumental in funding the Puntland Library and Resource Center in Garoowe. It did this by partnering with organizations based in the United States as well as international organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme Somalia (UNDP) and Diakonia, a Swedish NGO that carries out developmental projects in Puntland (Interview with author, July 2007, Minnesota).
The Somali Family Organization has also been critical in getting support for Puntland State University (PSU) in Garoowe. The organization used resources available in Minnesota for the benefit of its home community. It linked up PSU with the Minnesota Community Technical College so that PSU could benefit through the exchange of knowledge, books and other resources (Interview with author, July 2007, Minnesota).

Individuals acting on their own can also be an important source of support for developmental activities at home. Some individuals collect money, and remit the money home to various projects that they have identified as in need. Others try to fill a need or a service that may not be available at home but is accessible within their host communities. For example, they may bring from home people whose illnesses cannot be treated at home or sponsor students who want to continue their higher education or invite politicians who want to connect with the diaspora communities. Some individuals team up with other individuals or organizations from their host communities to meet these missing services.

In the US, Abdiazis Maahaay brings in young children who have illnesses that are not treatable in Somalia. First, the children with severe health problems are identified. Then Maahaay finds doctors, hospitals and others who will help if the children are brought to the US to receive treatment. Others, not only bring sick people into their host communities, but sometimes arrange for a larger number of people at home to receive treatment for free. Another Somali-Australian diaspora took teams of doctors with different specialties, along with medical equipment and medicine. The doctors would
often stay for a short period of time but during their stay in Somalia, they would see, diagnose and treat hundreds of people. This Australian diaspora would occasionally take some children who could not meet their health needs in Somalia to Australia (Phone interview with author, August 2006).

The final form of diaspora participation occurs when diaspora return home to personally take part in the development of home. These individuals can participate in the social service sector, in the business sector or in politics. This group may rely on the diaspora to fund their projects at home and come back to show what they have done and to do more fundraising. The next section of this chapter will provide examples of returned diaspora support in the areas of education, health and business. These examples will be the Galkayo Educational Center for Peace and Development (GECPD) in Galkayo, Puntland; Arafat Hospital in Mogadisho; and businesses run by a diaspora from the Netherlands in Hargeisa, Somaliland. This final section will also include the Somali Investment Business Council, an organization who have a significant diaspora members and who are pooling their resources and wealth and investing in Djibouti and in other African countries.

**Galkayo Educational Centre for Peace and Development**

In Galkayo, Puntland, the diaspora furthered contributing to their communities by establishing schools that were free to girls, minorities and women. Four diaspora women founded the Galkayo Education Centre for Peace and Development (GECPD). One of the diaspora women, Hawa Aden, returned while the others remained abroad, fundraising
for the center. The center received its first school building from the government of Puntland. When it applied for and was denied funding from the UN and other international organizations, the center’s founders turned towards the Somali diaspora and received support from 13 countries to fund the first school. Even though GECPD now receives international funding, it continues to still receive funds from the diaspora. To demonstrate both the widespread support received by the center as well as their gratitude to their donors, Aden lists all their funders by name and place of residence on their office wall. GECPD supporters include individuals who send their contributions directly to the center as well as groups who hold annual fundraisers. For example, a group of Somali-American women in Virginia send donations of about $1500 a year (Interview with author, May 2007, Washington, D.C.). Other funders are diaspora organizations such as the Amoud Foundation which funded GECPD for a period of time (Phone interview with Amoud board member, June 2009).

Tapping into her knowledge of the diaspora, the executive director of the center, Hawa Aden, uses trips abroad to raise funds. On a trip to Columbus, Ohio, a fundraiser was held for the Center, when Aden visited in 2002. Now, the Center receives support from the diaspora in Canada, the US, Sweden, Switzerland, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Australia and Kenya. Signaling its growing importance to the larger Somali community, the center also receives funding from individual Somalis and companies across the country (Interview with Aden, December 2006, Galkayo).

Today, GECPD operates over a dozen schools for girls, minorities and women. To encourage nomadic and internally displaced parents to send their daughters, the center
owns and runs several boarding schools. It also offers an afternoon school program called Second Chance for young girls who are either working outside the home to support their families or household chores during the day that prevents them from attending the day school. Other programs that the center offers include vocational training and adult literacy programs for women. Overall, more than 4000 girls, women and minority students benefit from the programs offered by GECPD (Interview with Aden, December 2006, Galkayo).

Aden’s activities are not limited to the educational sector she also tackles a variety of topics, some of which are taboo within Somali culture, but which are detrimental to the health and well-being of girls and women in Puntland. This is in line with the view that the diaspora bring with them social remittances including ideas, beliefs and ways of doing things, from their host countries to their home countries. These social remittances are intended to transform home by concerning themselves with issues that the diaspora sees as infringing on the human rights of some groups or those that hamper good governance such as corruption or promoting free and fair elections.

Two of the issues that Aden undertook and that she continues to fight against are female genital cutting and prostitution along with the accompanying rape of young girls. In the first case, Aden was uncompromising on outlawing the practice of female genital cutting on girls. For example, rather than calling it female circumcision, which is the name preferred by Somalis as well as a direct translation of what it is called in Somali, or using the more neutral and descriptive term female genital cutting, Aden uses the much more controversial name of female genital mutilation. Aden organizes workshops and
even made posters and T-shirts condemning this practice. She also incorporates the detrimental effects of this practice in all her schools (Interview with Aden, December 2006, Galkayo).

The other much more divisive issue that Aden confronted was the issue of forced prostitution along with the rape of young girls. This issue most affected internally displaced people (IDP), particularly women and girls who fled the conflict in southern Somalia. Often these women lacked protection and because they lived in areas that were not part of their clans’ territory, they did not receive the same level of protection that the women of Puntland could call upon. If a woman who is from Puntland claimed rape, theoretically, her male relatives and her clan, would come to her aid in asking for justice. But due to their IDP status, many of these women who were forced to engage in prostitution used the money to meet their family’s basic needs. Their IDP status and their clan membership meant that these women were unable to protect their young daughters from being raped and received no assistance from the dominant clan or the Puntland state in seeking justice. Hawa Aden tried “to get the religious scholars to address this issue by condemning it in the Friday sermons but without much success.” According to Aden, the “religious scholars preferred to ignore the problem especially since I had linked it to the widely available pornographic films that are openly sold in the city’s main market” (Interview with Aden, December 2006, Galkayo).

The Center also contributes significantly to peace promotion. Galkayo is split into north and south, between the two clans that live there, and which have hostile relations with each other. Except for the city center, which is open to everyone, each clan
mostly keeps to its side of the city. But, GECPD runs schools in all the neighborhoods of the city and the staff of the Center freely moves within the city (Interview with Aden, December 2006, Galkayo).

Diaspora contributions to education whether in the form of remittances, or sending materials or returning home to build these institutions is in line with migration literature which shows that diaspora engage in activities that not only contribute to its development but which transform home. The activities carried out by Hawa Aden and the GECPD are in line with the latter in that the organization does not stop at only educating girls and women but also seeks to transform the position of women within that society by directly addressing barriers to women’s rights and their advancement.

**Arafat Hospital**

The Arafat Hospital in Mogadisho is another example of how the diaspora make significant contributions in the field of health. This hospital, founded by five Somali doctors, four of whom were from the diaspora of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Holland and Italy. Although part of the building cost was met by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) through funds administered by a local NGO, Zamzam Foundation, for the most part, the hospital was built and equipped by the doctors’ own $200,000 investment. These diaspora doctors also used their connections abroad to purchase equipment and medicine at a lower rate. Part of the development contributions of Arafat Hospital was treating everyone regardless of his or her ability to pay. For those that were able to pay, they were not charged if they came back within 10 days. To
provide healthcare services to those unable to pay, every Thursday, the doctors would see patients free of charge and on that day between 450 to 600 people would turn up (Interview with author June 2007, Washington, D.C.).

Other services offered by the hospital included providing free medicine for emergency cases, ordering medicine that was not readily available to patients such as insulin while covering the postage costs. Occasionally, Arafat would partner with foreign hospitals that were willing to send specialized doctors. For example, the Kikuyu Eye Hospital in Kenya would send 3 doctors and 7 nurses to perform eye surgeries on Somalis with cataracts. The Kenyan doctors “operated on about 500 people, free of charge, while Arafat provided free stay at the hospital, free medicine as well as medicine and transportation costs for the patients.” These doctors were also trying to increase health awareness on a variety of topics including getting sick people to go to trained health care workers rather going to untrained people who were claiming to be doctors or nurses (Interview with Arafat Hospital doctor, June 2007, Washington, D.C.).

Arafat also provided a realistic and an informed view of the health needs of Somalis by conducting and publishing research on some of the challenges of providing health care to a society without a central state. For example, one of their studies indicated that 85 percent of Somali children in Mogadisho were being given anti-TB medicine for simple pneumonia and “having this kind of information was critical to carrying out public awareness encouraging parents to not diagnose their children’s illnesses or even ask pharmacists but to go to a trained health care worker” (Interview with Arafat Hospital doctor, June 2007, Washington, D.C.).
The goal of the doctors in going back to Mogadisho, leaving successful and lucrative practices, was to primarily improve the healthcare sector. These doctors also believed that they could promote peace through health. Unfortunately, due to the Ethiopian invasion in 2007, most of the trained diaspora health care workers were forced to leave Somalia, particularly Mogadisho. They risked assassination from those that did not want to see a peaceful Somalia.

Since the collapse of the Somali state, the Somali diaspora have been targeted and killed by a variety of actors to the conflict including Mohamud Ali Ahmed "Elman" who was killed by Mohamed Farah Aideed in 1996 for encouraging youth to stop fighting for the warlords and created skills training and jobs for youth. Other diaspora who were killed because they threatened the interests of those who benefitted from the war, include Ali Sharmarke, a Somali-Canadian, who co-founded Horn Afrik, one of the earliest talk radio in Mogadisho. Sharmarke was killed by a remotely detonated landmine, while returning from the funeral of a colleague who had been killed earlier in the day.

On December 3, 2009 one of the worst suicide bombings was at a graduation ceremony for medical students from Benadir University. Widely thought to have been carried by Al-Shabaab, the Shamo Hotel bombing in Mogadisho claimed the lives of 19 people, four of whom were TFG ministers. The minister of higher education Dr Ibrahim Addow, a Somali American and former administrator at the American University in Washington, DC and the TFG minister of health, Qamar Aden Ali, a lawyer from Britain and Ahmed Abdullahi Waayeel, the minister of education were killed at the scene. According to political observers, these ministers were very effective in their jobs and they
might have been targeted to weaken the TFG, to encourage those who had returned to leave and to discourage diaspora Somalis from returning to Somalia (Howden December 2009; Interview with a diaspora medical doctor June 2007, Washington, D.C.).

The funding for Arafat Hospital did not come from the United Nations or any other international agency but from these diaspora doctors who left their successful practices to meet a basic need at home. Those who want to continue the conflict in Somalia often target those that are making a difference in Somalia whether in the health sector or in the media. For a country largely abandoned by the international community, which preferred to watch things from the comforts of Nairobi, the developmental contributions of diaspora Somalis was essential in meeting gaps in the basic needs of Somalis at home. In meeting these needs, the diaspora are engaging in state-like activities.

These kinds of activities that the diaspora described above have been engaged in, are becoming more common. For example, according to the latest UNDP report on the Somalia, over a third of the NGOs in Somalia have connections to the diaspora. The highest donations were sent to southern Somalia, at 32.4%, while Puntland and Somaliland based NGOs received 6.1% and 9.7% respectively (Hammond et al 2011: 55). This demonstrates that the Somali diaspora is responsive to events at home, sending the largest amount of donations to areas in need.

**Business Creation and Investment**
A returned diaspora from the Netherlands is another example of the developmental impact that the diaspora can make to their home countries. Coming back to Somaliland in 1997, this diaspora brought along about $180,000 worth of investments. Because the fighting in Hargeisa had destroyed many businesses, there was a shortage of basic needs to meet the needs of those returning once peace had come back to Hargeisa. He saw a need for a bread factory, which worked around the clock. This factory made $560,000 in total profit in its first year. He then used the profit to start other businesses including factories making ice-cream, plastic and flour. This diaspora now employs 600 people. The profits from all his businesses have resulted in an expansion and investment in Djibouti and beyond. For this diaspora, if one wanted material security, home represented an opportunity to make money and he believed that “much should not be expected from the diaspora because you cannot make money in Europe and the US” (Interview with diaspora businessman March 2008, Djibouti).

In 2007, many diaspora and locally-based business people pooled their wealth and resources and created the Somali Business and Investment Council (SBIC). This organization was intended to search for investment opportunities in other parts of Africa. SBIC, headquartered in Djibouti began investing in real estate, livestock and transportation sector. They were also looking to invest in Somalia as well as other African countries. Memberships in SBIC is limited to those involved only in business, who have money to invest and who could pay an initial membership of $5000 as well as an annual fee of $500. In essence, SBIC is doing what many governments do, that is, promote favorable trade links for the private sector with other countries. SBIC promotes
investment within Somalia as well as in other countries in the region. By investing as a
group, SBIC provides its members with information about potential projects. SBIC also
negotiates with governments to get the best arrangement for their members including tax
cuts. For example, SBIC was able to take advantage of investment incentives, including
not paying the prohibitive taxes charged by the Djiboutian government for ten years, for
those establishing large businesses (Interview with SBIC member March 2008, Djibouti).

Diaspora businesses people also have an impact on other areas in society. For
example, the business people in Bosaaso tried to push the local city council to improve
the collection of property tax while reducing the incentive for tax collectors to make
private arrangements with property owners that would reduce the amount of tax they had
to pay to the city by giving some of the money to the tax collector. Instead, the business
people wanted the city to ask property owners to come to the city council offices to pay
the tax. These diaspora business owners wanted the local city council to be independent
and have its own source of funds so that it could provide basic goods for the residents of
the city (Interview with a returned diaspora businessman November 2006, Bosaaso). For
the diaspora then, one of the most important issues was to fix the road because they
believed that their businesses could not grow with bad roads.

Sometimes to speed up the changes that they want to see diaspora business people
may try to get into public office or elect those who would best advocate for their needs.
In Hargeisa, some diaspora businessmen were trying to remove from office a local
politician whom they had helped to get elected but who was now working against their
interest (Interview with a returned diaspora businessman December 2006, Hargeisa).
Another diaspora business owner joined the local city council so that he could push for better services for his businesses and by extension other businesses. This same diaspora was trying to press the city council into hiring people on merit rather than on familial ties and to fire city employees who did not show up for work but only collected salaries. Although acknowledging the difficulties in changing the culture, he was determined not to give up. While he was on the local council, the city established a firefighting unit. As an indication of the experiences and knowledge that the diaspora bring back, the number to report a fire was 911 (Interview with returned diaspora businessman November 2006, Bosaaso).

The three projects highlighted above demonstrate the importance of the diaspora in the development of home. In all the cases, diaspora Somalis have stepped in to provide needed services in the absence of government. Diaspora businesses also give charity to schools, hospitals and other public services.

**Diaspora-linked Services**

The following section will deal with the contributions that remittance and telecommunication companies make to the development of home. Although these services are often owned and run by local Somalis, they are services that target the resources of diaspora communities, in the case of remittance companies, by facilitating remitting money home and telecommunication companies for making it easier for Somalis to stay in touch with their diaspora relatives. Both of these kinds of companies contribute to community projects. For example, in Puntland, remittance companies pay a
sales tax to the regional government. As well, they take part in the improvement of infrastructure by donating to reconstruction projects. For example, Dahabshiil in Bosaaso donated money to the “building of the Bosaaso airport, university cafeteria, Bosaaso Bridge, Tsunami survivors, famine relief, Bander Qasim Hospital and Mother and Child hospital” (Interview with a Dahabshiil manager, October 2006, Bosaaso). Other ways that they assist their communities include giving money to schools for the purchasing of furniture, books or sometimes paying the tuition fees for poor and orphaned students. They also donate to the internally displaced camps in Bosaaso as well as give charity to the poor who come in from the street. According to Dahabshil’s owner, Mohamed Said Du’ale, each year his multi-million dollar company “gives at least 20% of the company’s profits to charitable donations” (Interview with author October 2010, Djibouti). Some have estimated this donation at several million dollars a year.

Similarly, telecommunication companies also pay tax and give charity to a variety of projects as a way to demonstrate their commitment to their customers and community. In 2008, Golis Telecommunication in Puntland built traffic signs across the main highway in Puntland, some 800 km, and which links many cities in Puntland like Bosaaso, Garowe and Galkayo. This highway also links Puntland with Somaliland to the north and to southern Somalia and particularly the three largest cities of Bosaaso, Garoowe and Galkayo. These companies use their good works to promote themselves by distinguishing themselves from the competition.

Aside from the above noted contributions, diaspora Somalis help to shape the image of Somalia at home and abroad. Most of the 500 hundred websites that are related
to Somalia and Somalis are owned and run by the diaspora (Issa-Salwe 2006). Although this can be problematic, as discussed in chapter 5, it allows those in Somalia to have a variety of websites where they can access news in Somalia as well as post their views and for those with forums to talk to each other.

In addition to the websites, some media houses within Somalia were began by returning diaspora. For example, Horn Afrik radio and television was founded by three returned diaspora in 1999 in Mogadisho (Webersik 2005; 179). Horn Afrik was one of the first not to be aligned with the political factions fighting in Mogadisho and it tackled socially sensitive issues such as poverty, minority rights and the effects of the conflict on civilians. Its call-in shows were very popular, giving a voice to a previously silenced population. As well, it was the first station to air the Somali peace process in 2000 in Arta, Djibouti. This was really the first time that Somalis in Somalia were able to closely follow a reconciliation conference and to see just how power sharing was taking place. Through their call-in shows, Somalis were also able to voice their hopes and aspirations for the conference.

The diaspora have established research institutes that are intended to carry out and produce research on Somalia. The intention of these institutes is to come up with Somali solutions to Somali problems. As well, these institutes are not purely academic in their goals but also intend to produce tangible solutions to resolve the conflict in Somalia and in the wider region. Many of these institutes organize conferences, send delegations home and often publish their findings. For example, the Somalia International Rehabilitation Center (SIRC) based in Lund, Sweden is an organization that describes its
goals as seeking the “reconstruction and rehabilitation of Somalia’s destroyed institutions.” It attempts to accomplish this goal by undertaking research that is action focused (http://www.sirclund.se/). Every year since 2002, SIRC has been holding annual conferences on issues dealing with the Horn of Africa and publishing papers presented at the conferences for wider dissemination in both the diaspora and at home. Aside from its workshops and conferences, and as part of its action-oriented goals, since 2003 SIRC has been involved in improving food security through the advancement of agricultural infrastructure. The five projects that they have funded have sought to make small-scale farmers more self-sufficient (http://www.sirclund.se/).

Another organization that has combined research with practical application is the Somali Initiative for Dialogue and Democracy (SIDD). This organization, based and registered in the United Kingdom, was founded in 2006. As its name partially suggests, its focus is on promoting dialogue, reconciliation as a way of establishing trust and social cohesion among Somalis in the diaspora and in Somalia. It attempts to encourage the integration of Somalis in the diaspora into their host communities while facilitating the return of skilled diaspora Somalis home. SIDD trains Somalis in conflict reconciliation to get the diaspora to use their skills to lessen the distrust and blame that occurs within the Somali community for atrocities committed during the war. For example, SIDD arranged a meeting between prominent supporters of the United Somali Congress (USC), an organization that had been critical in the ouster of Siad Barre in 1991, and leaders of the Benadiri community. The Benadiri community is a small minority group, primarily living in Mogadisho and that experienced the brunt of the civil war. At this meeting, the
supporters of the USC offered apologies on behalf of the USC for the atrocities committed by the USC on the Benadiri community (SIDD Background Paper 2005; 18)

SIDD also transfers these reconciliation and dialogue promoting skills to Somalia. For example, SIDD sent a member in 2004, who worked in Galkayo to apply these methods. Galkayo is inhabited by two different and hostile clans, one living in the south and the other in the north of the city. It is one of the most divided cities in Somalia. SIDD’s goal was twofold. First, it was to “create a society in the southern part where law and order and democracy could begin to function.” Secondly, it was to lessen the hostilities by creating “constructive relationships” between the two clans, “so that they could work together and cooperate on the basis of equality” (SIDD Appendix II 2005; 22).

As a result of the work of the SIDD member, a police force of 70 men was established in southern Galkayo whose cost would be shared between local Somalis and diaspora Somalis. As a result of this, crime was reduced by 60 percent. Some headway was also made to increase the free movement of residents. SIDD also sent another delegation to mediate conflicts between two local clans as well as take part in the formation of Galmudug State in central Somalia (SIDD Appendix II 2005; 22).

SIRC and SIDD are not exceptional in doing this kind of work. There are many other diaspora based research institutes such as the Somaliland Policy and Reconstruction Institute (SOPRI) which does similar work to SIRC and SIDD directed at Somaliland. Since there are existing institutions in Somaliland, SOPRI not only advocates for Somaliland recognition as a separate state but also took an important role in holding the
Somaliland government accountable while pushing the democratization of Somaliland. For example, a delegation of SOPRI members visited Somaliland in 2007, where they traveled all over the country meeting with a variety of stakeholders including civil society groups, clan elders, elected officials and opposition groups (Interview with SOPRI member June 2007, Washington, D.C.). The report that they produced was widely disseminated and discussed within the diaspora and in Somaliland. The government, which met with the brunt of their criticism, was quick to dismiss them as a bunch of out-of-touch diaspora who had no idea of life at home and therefore had no right to comment, much less criticize.

In this way, SOPRI, SIRC and SIDD and others like them are performing significant work in producing these reports and books which provide us with information on Somalia that would otherwise not be available. Although they play a vital part in information gathering and dissemination, they also go beyond and are doing active and practical work on the ground. In this way, they are engaged in capacity building and the transfer of knowledge and skills.

**Dark Side of Diaspora Development**

Despite all the good and necessary things that the diaspora does for development, there are negative consequences. For some the diaspora cannot really do anything for those home and as one elder put it “the diaspora are not privy to my life in Somalia” because in reality it is the diaspora that need help having migrated “to a society too far ahead and left his own society and they are lost and misinformed.” And even the life
saving remittances they send, cause people to be “more reliant on the family, clan and to be unproductive (Interview with an elder November 2006, Bosaaso).

Remittances can also be damaging to a society, because they create dependency on those in the diaspora. Because their daily needs are guaranteed by relatives abroad, many at home do not bother to look for work or support themselves. This can have devastating effect on society because remittances generally decline over time unless supported by a steady stream of migration. Second generation diaspora are not as generous as their parents in supporting relatives at home whom they do not know. As one local Somali who had visited London described it, younger Somalis are not interested in the country of their parent’s birth. For example, when he asked his London-born nephew if he would come and visit Somalia, the nephew replied, “I watch Africa on TV” (Interview with a Somaliland Member of Parliament December 2006, Hargeisa).

For a group of young Dutch-Somalis who visited Somaliland in 2006, the experiences gave them a connection with their relatives and with the country of their origin and many were more willing to support family and as one young woman put it “I have seen the reality for myself, so I will send money to my relatives” (Interview with a young Dutch-Somali January 2007, Hargeisa). But some of these young people also wanted for people at home to become independent and were more interested in “investing in infrastructure like roads and airport,” which would then attract businesses and other investors (Interview with a young Dutch-Somali January 2007, Hargeisa).

The developmental services such as education and healthcare provided by the diaspora are public goods and their activities privatize previously free and public
services. This creates inequalities within society by transforming a largely egalitarian society into one where “people will be rich or poor” depending on how many family members are abroad (Interview with a Somali journalist November 2006, Bosaaso). The privatization of all services undermines the areas traditionally under state control, because many diaspora develop the towns and villages that their families originate from, the development they engage in has “private particularistic ends” by re-enforcing kinship loyalties and undermining “national goals” (Farah 2009: 20). An example of this can be seen in the activities of a group of diaspora who built a free school for their own sub-clan and when other clans wanted to send their children, asked them to pay tuition (Interview with a Somali researcher July 2010, Nairobi).

Another possible negative outcome of diaspora development is that they undermine the economy. For example, there have been several incidents where the diaspora has printed counterfeit money, causing the devaluation of the Somali shilling and destabilizing the economy in the process. In fact, the UAE government detained in Dubai airport a shipment of 180 billion Somali shillings destined for Somalia and printed by a Somali diaspora. There was also a rumor in Bosaaso that a factory printing fake Somali shilling had been established there by a returned diaspora (Interview with a Somali journalist November 2006, Bosaaso).

Other non-diaspora Somalis felt that although “the diaspora contributes a great deal but not as much as was expected” (Interview with an elder November 2006, Bosaaso). For others, the problem was that “the diaspora does not come to ask what does Somalia need? What should we do?” but rather comes with ready projects that may not
be what the locals need (Interview with a political activist November 2006, Bosaaso). For example, one diaspora in Somaliland built a factory to produce plastic bags. This was after the government of Somaliland had declared plastic bags as hazardous to the environment and animals and had passed a law forbidding its importation into the country.

Some local Somalis perceive the diaspora as disorganized, which undercut the effectiveness of their activities and for others, the diaspora’s multiple organizations and their “lack of coordination impacts on the efforts of the diaspora” (Interview with a Somaliland politician December 2006, Hargeisa). Another common complaint about diaspora who visited home was that “they have promised to help but we have not heard from them since” (Interview with a school principle October 2006, Bosaaso). Others believed that the diaspora did not contribute to development and that although they collected money from themselves; often the money remained in the host society and was used by a few people as had happened with funds collected for the 2004 Tsunami victims (Interview with an elder November 2006, Bosaaso).

Even when the diaspora carry out development work, they may intentionally or unsuspectingly contribute to conflict. The example below demonstrates how diaspora deliberately contribute to conflict, while carrying out development. The case involved a returned diaspora from the UK who returned to the town of Galgal in Somaliland, his family’s origin and built a house and a dug well. The town was settled by two sub-clans who both made exclusive claims on it dating back 50 years. There was an informal agreement that in order to keep the peace, no-one would build houses or dig well. The
opposing clan - the Habr Jeclo - to the diaspora's clan viewed his activities as a way to strengthen the exclusive claims of his clan - the Dhulbahante and attempted to destroy it. But the Dhulbahante, anticipating the attack, had created a militia to defend the construction. To counter the claims of the Dhulbahante, the Habr Jeclo began to dig a well. It is clear from this example that the diaspora knew what he was doing would create communal conflict and although this was disguised as a development project, that it would result in conflict was plain to the diaspora (Hoehne et al 2010: 11).

In the example above, the diaspora under the guise of development, intentionally enflames relations between clans which although tense were nevertheless stable. The diaspora who built the house had no intention of living there and this was a project that was hashed in the diaspora and which had no visible positive development value for the local Somalis.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the positive role of the diaspora in the development of Somalia. Many of the activities of Somali diaspora communities date back to the last ten years. Prior to that, many diaspora believed that things would resolve themselves in Somalia and that it was the job of the international community and Somali faction leaders to put the country back together. After ten years of waiting, the participation of diaspora communities, particularly in development, has slowly grown. Many of the projects supported or carried out by the diaspora attempt to meet the basic needs of a population long neglected by the international community. Most of their energy has been directed at meeting the overwhelming needs of Somalis for basic
services. Almost all of the universities in Somalia were constructed or founded by diaspora communities. Many of the elementary and high schools receive some support from diaspora Somalis.

The collapse of the Somali state has not only contributed to the disappearance of all public goods but their provision by the private sector has made them accessible to those who can afford to pay for it. Many older diaspora, educated in Somalia, remember that they received free healthcare and education from primary school all the way to university and as one local Somali described it “the Somali government took care of me more than my parents by providing me with free healthcare, free education up to university, room and board and even a monthly pocket money” (Somali diaspora researcher 2010, Nairobi). Their focus on providing these services is partly a reflection of a debt they feel obligated to repay. In addition, living in developed nations has made many of them appreciate the importance of education in getting ahead. As such, many not only contribute to these kinds of development projects but pay the school fees for family and relatives. They also try to make sure that services are accessible to marginalized groups including women, orphans and minorities. This is primarily due to their experiences, sometimes as a marginalized group in their host country, which has increased their understanding and appreciation of what it means to be a minority. Many Somalis in Somalia note with some puzzlement that “diaspora Somalis are miserly with money but generous in giving if you mention that you need it for school (Interview with a Somali journalist 2006, Bosaaso).
The diaspora have not only participated in the reconstruction of destroyed public institutions but they have also provided services that were not available before. That the educational and health sectors are recovering and in some instances thriving in the absence of a state can be seen in Somalia’s human development index which is either at 1990 levels or has surpassed it.

The other aspect of diaspora involvement in development has been the decentralization of Somalia. Now each city, town and hamlet can attempt to have its own services and if it has an active and giving diaspora, it can probably build schools and a clinic for its residents. For despite their generosity in giving to public goods, most diaspora prefers to donate to projects that specifically target their communities or regions. Many think that the money they give will benefit their group only. But the last 20 years in Somalia has in fact led to even more mixing of groups, so that now significant populations from southern Somalia, especially from the inter-riverine areas can be found in the other side of the country, in large cities like Bosaaso and Hargeisa. In effect then, services intended by the diaspora to benefit their group only are being accessed by other Somalis from other regions of the country. Sometimes, this happens by accident but in other cases, the local community makes deliberate effort to reach out to other communities. Many in Somalia make an effort to open up services to all Somalis, for example, Amoud University sets aside seats for students from other parts of the country and Mogadisho University actively courts students from Puntland.

Creation of businesses and investments within Somalia also cuts across regions and clans. The SBIC is an indication of that reality and Somali business owners as well
as returned diaspora understand that erecting artificial borders across different regions harms everyone. As one business man arguing against the Somaliland government closing its borders with southern Somalia complained that it now takes his trucks two hours to traverse the entire Somaliland whereas it would take days when he used to ship merchandise all over Somalia. He is rumored to have asked the Somaliland government to let them out of the container they had placed the country in. In fact in business, it is more productive to ally with others from different clans who will then guarantee any merchandise passing through their regions (Interview with returned diaspora businessman March 2008, Djibouti).

There are of course exceptions in the diaspora such as Amoud Foundation, which funds projects all over the Somali-inhabited lands, but for now they are rare. It appears that the diaspora buy into the thesis that the problems in Somalia can be solved when each group can separately develop its own region. In fact, Abdi Samatar argues that the problems in Somalia is not that the different clans cannot get along, but that it is in fact the failure by elites “to nurture shared cultural and social commonalities, and sectarian entrepreneurs’ instrumentalist accentuation of social differences [that] has become a lethal weapon in the hands of sectarians” (Samatar 2001; 108). So although the diaspora is an undeniably critical actor in the development of Somalia, their goal is largely to provide services for their own communities, although often these services are then accessed by other communities. That the diaspora links the provision of services to the clan also undercuts the reconstruction of Soomaalinimo (the essence of being a Somali) and of the Somali state.
The next chapter will examine the conflict perpetuating activities of the diaspora and the ways that they fund and fan conflicts at home. By contributing to clan and other conflicts, the diaspora in some instances destroy their development projects. This chapter will explore their role in state collapse, civil war and the on-going conflict in Somalia today.
Chapter Six

Conflict and Governance

Although the Somali diaspora undeniably contributes to conflict, beginning in the 1980s during the rule of Barre, nevertheless determining exactly how much they contribute has been difficult, particularly since 9/11 and the passage of the Patriot Act which have made Somalis in the diaspora unwilling to divulge exactly how much of the money they remit home is destined to fund conflict. But even pre-9/11, Somalis who had fled the war were not willing to be viewed as contributing to further conflict and to being clanistic. But now governments hosting diaspora communities have began to keep track, particularly support for groups that engage in terrorism and several Somalis in the US were convicted in 2011 of providing support for Al-Shabaab (Shah and French 2011). To fully document the diaspora’s conflict perpetuating activities, this chapter will begin with their support for rebel groups which successfully ousted the government of Siad Barre, their support for the warlords and clan militias that followed the collapse of the central state and since 2007 their support for Al-Shabaab, particularly during the Ethiopian invasion of southern Somalia.

Diaspora and Rebel Movements
Somalia’s migration up until the 1980s was largely driven by economic needs but the combination of a weak economy and the devastating defeat suffered by the Somali army in 1977 in the Somali-Ethiopian war increased opposition to the government. On April 9, 1978, a coup d’état against Barre failed. Some of the coup members were captured and executed, while others fled initially to Kenya and later to Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, many members of the opposition gathered to strategize on how to overthrow Barre. They formed the first significant guerrilla group, which eventually became the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). The SSDF received extensive financial and military support from Ethiopia, Libya and other governments hostile to the Somali government. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a coup member, headed the SSDF, which quickly “converted itself from a pan-Somali opposition, with members and leadership representing different clans, to one dominated and headed by one clan” – the Majerteen, Ahmed’s sub-clan (Former SSDF fighter November 2006, Bosaaso).

Initially, the SSDF was able to carry out cross-border attacks against the Barre government, which responded with a scorched earth policy against the northeast of Somalia and parts of southern Somalia largely inhabited by the Majerteen. “Water wells were either poisoned or destroyed; the nomads’ livelihood – their livestock – were confiscated, schools and hospitals were closed in many of the towns inhabited by the Majerteen, villages were burned and landmines were planted around the main towns” (Former SSDF fighter November 2006, Bosaaso). Many Majerteen in the military or those working for the government were fired and any Majerteen suspected of subversive activities was imprisoned (Issa-Salwe 1996).
Subsequently, in an effort to diffuse the growing opposition and play on clan divisions, Barre offered pardon to members of the rebel groups if they disarmed and returned to Somalia. Disenchanted with Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed’s grip on the SSDF and his intolerance towards dissent, many members of the SSDF either returned to Somalia or left for the Middle East, Europe and North America. In April 1988, the Somali and Ethiopian governments, faced with growing internal opposition, signed a peace accord. Both countries agreed to stop supporting each other’s rebel groups and instead to expel them from their countries. By the mid-1980s, internal conflict within the SSDF led to the imprisonment of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed by the Ethiopians and although the SSDF continued to exist as an opposition movement, it was largely neutralized as an effective threat against Barre (Issa-Salwe 1996; Lewis 1989: 575; Interview with a former SSDF soldier 2006, Bosaaso).

The Isaaq clan in northwest Somalia, which was experiencing political and economic discrimination at the hands of the Barre government, set up the second guerrilla group - the Somali National Movement (SNM). The SNM was formed in London by a group from the Isaaq clan from within Somalia and from the diaspora communities in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. By 1982, the SNM had set up bases in Ethiopia with a leadership primarily drawn from the diaspora, while most of the foot soldiers were from the northwest (Introduction 2005: 13). The SNM was initially open in their membership to all Somalis but they, like the SSDF before them, began to reflect deep clan divisions mirroring those within the Somali polity. Eventually, the SNM came to represent one clan – the Isaaq. Its leadership, membership and financial support came
primarily from the Isaaq (Medani 2003: 217). But, the SNM possessed one critical element that the SSDF and other rebel movements did not and that would contribute to their success later on as well as peacebuilding and peacemaking efforts in Somaliland after secession. And this was the active presence and involvement of the clan elders or the Guurti within the SNM (Interview with a peace activist December 2010, Djibouti).

The SNM conducted successful cross-border raids against the government. In response and to discourage civilian support for the SNM, the government targeted the Isaaq population with increasing viciousness including destroying the livelihood of the nomads by closing or mining water wells and confiscating their livestock without compensation. Those living in urban centers were subjected to arrests, detentions and executions. In a 1985 visit to the northwest, the noted anthropologist I.M. Lewis wrote that the region resembled “a colony under a foreign military tyranny” (Lewis 1989; 576). Rather than diminishing support for the SNM, these assaults only strengthened the support from members of the Isaaq clan.

Many members of the Somali diaspora in the Middle East were Isaaq, resulting in a growing segment of the diaspora conducting their opposition to the Barre regime by providing financial and other support to the SNM. Members of the Isaaq diaspora fundraised and brought international attention to the atrocities being committed by the Barre government. The Isaaq contributed millions of dollars to the SNM in their attempt to bring down the Barre regime. From the founding of the SNM, the Isaaq diaspora in Saudi Arabia remitted directly to the SNM about $150,000 per month (Interview with a former SNM representative in the diaspora, December 2006, Hargeisa). As the SNM got
ready to make its final push against the government in 1988, the Isaaq diaspora in Saudi Arabia collected $380,000 (Interview with a former SNM representative December 2006, Hargeisa). Others document that in 1990 alone, of the $200 to $250 million remitted to northwest Somalia, $14 - $25 million went to the SNM for the purchase of arms and support of the guerillas (Lewis 1989: 576). In a way, the SNM was a private army of the Isaaq diaspora.

Other support given by the diaspora included meeting with government officials in their countries of residence, collecting petitions, writing about human rights violations and generally highlighting the viciousness of the government’s actions. For example, Rakiya Omaar in (1990) A Government at War with its own People: Testimonies about the Killings and the Conflict in the North documents the brutality inflicted on the residents of the north by the Barre regime.

Although late to the game, the third significant rebel group was the United Somali Congress (USC), created in Rome, Italy, in 1988. Like the SSDF and the SNM, the USC membership was composed of one clan – the Hawiye. Two groups were the main drivers of the formation of the USC – Hawiye fighters who had left the SSDF and the SNM – over clan differences. Since they were not the majority clan in both the SSDF and the SNM, these Hawiye fighters felt a need to form their own rebel group that would safeguard Hawiye interests. The second group pushing for the formation of the USC, and which came up with the name, were Hawiye migrant workers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. These diaspora had the financial capacity to implement their agenda and were able to recruit Somalia-based businessmen and politicians into their cause. At the founding
meeting in Rome, many of the participants came from Jeddah and other parts of Europe with only a few from Somalia. In less than a year, the USC had split into two factions, with a Rome faction and an Addis Ababa faction. The latter faction headed by Mohamed Farah Aideed, a general, had been in Somalia's ambassador to India and had refused orders to come back into Somalia. Instead, Aideed went to Ethiopia to prepare for war against the Barre government. “The USC in Rome, supported by the elite Hawiye in Mogadisho, was opposed to war and wanted to negotiate Barre out of power but Aideed was getting support from both the Hawiye diaspora and business men within the country” (Interview with a participant at the USC Rome meeting July 2010, Nairobi). Moreover, it was Aideed and his faction that carried out most of the violence against civilians and that perpetuated the conflict. “Aideed’s reliance on the Jeddah diaspora as well as local business men from his sub-clan for funding allowed him to directly recruit young nomadic men. His financial independence contributed to the sidelining of the clan elders who would never be able to wrest control from Aideed and other warlords who followed him” (Interview with a participant at the USC Rome meeting July 2010, Nairobi).

The success of the SNM in carrying out its resistance against the Barre government was due to several factors. Unlike the SSDF, the SNM was able to mobilize and receive significant and consistent support from the diaspora. Rather than relying solely on foreign governments for its support as did the SSDF, the SNM had three sources of support. The government of Ethiopia which provided it with weapons; the diaspora which sent money; and the elders and local communities which provided it with fighters. Additionally, the Isaaq who had fled Barre’s attacks becoming refugees in
Ethiopia provided both foodstuff and a place of hiding within the refugee camps for the SNM fighters. This was in stark contrast with the Majerteen who were ambivalent about the SSDF and its presence within the borders of Somalia’s traditional enemy and who did not offer the same level of support (Interview with a Somaliland elder December 2006, Hargeisa). Secondly, like other rebel groups, their presence in Ethiopia, made them impervious to repression by the Somali state. This allowed the SNM to carry out attacks inside Somalia while the Somali state was unable to respond, unless it wanted to risk a response from the Ethiopian state. This changed once a truce was signed between Somalia and Ethiopia in April 1988. The SNM was forced into stepping up its raids and moved its guerrilla forces inside Somalia. When the SNM captured the cities of Burao and parts of Hargeisa, the second largest city in the country, the Barre regime responded with indiscriminate ground and aerial bombing of these cities and of Isaaq civilians (Issa-Salwe 1996). Thousands were killed while hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled as refugees to Ethiopia, Djibouti and to southern Somalia. One estimate put the dead at 50,000 and the refugees at 500,000 (Introduction 2005: 13).

There was a consensus from within and outside of Somalia for Barre to step down. In a manifesto drawn up in 1990 and signed by 110 prominent Somalis, including intellectuals, politicians and elders called for Barre’s resignation. A significant number of the signatories resided outside of Somalia, while others fled there after Barre imprisoned some of them and continued their opposition to his regime (An Open Letter to President Mohamed Siyaad Barre 1990). By the late 1980s, multiple opposition groups had formed, whose members came from specific clans and were all based in Ethiopia.
Like the SNM, these other rebel groups drew most of their leadership from Somalis in the diaspora. The SNM formed an alliance with the other diaspora created rebel group, namely the USC and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) representing the Ogaden clan. The three rebel groups agreed that the USC and SPM would secure the south while the SNM would capture the north. On ousting Barre, these rebel groups would then form a new government. The SNM also provided material assistance to both the USC and the SPM groups (Interview with a former SNM leader January 2007, Hargeisa). In January 1991, when several different armed opposition groups representing some of the major clans entered Somalia from their bases in Ethiopia, they were able to overthrow the Barre regime within a short period and the Somali state has since remained collapsed. By April 1991, Barre had given up any hope of defeating the rebel groups and left Somalia. The scramble for who would rule Somalia began in earnest.

**Remittances and Their Role in Conflict Perpetuation**

As foreign aid dried up, the conditions for state collapse were set when the Barre regime lost its ability to satisfy various demand-bearing groups, including a variety of clans and the military that had remained loyal to the regime in exchange for political and economic rewards. Dissatisfaction and opposition among the general population grew, leading to the regime’s increased use of violence in order to maintain order. The Somali government failed dismally in its attempts to tap into remittances entering the country, because many of the migrants came from groups that opposed the government. Some of these migrants were also actively engaged in overthrowing the Barre regime through their
fundraising and other contributions to opposition groups like the Somali National Movement (SNM). In fact the largest remittance company in Somalia today, Dahabshiil, was initially created to funnel funds to the SNM from the diaspora (Jamal 1992; Russell 1986; Lyons and Samatar 1995; Gundel 2003).

The inability of the Somali state to access remittances and decreasing foreign aid was a significant factor in the destabilization of an already weak state. The state was powerless in overcoming its budget deficit and greasing its large patronage networks in return for loyalty. The blatant pursuit of private goals at public expense by elites was instrumental in the further deterioration of the state. The end of the Cold War, pressure from Western countries to improve human rights and visible opposition from previously silent groups were the final straw in the collapse of the state. State collapse was exacerbated by high levels of distrust among the elites who perceived political outcomes in zero-sum terms and frequently engaged in unrestrained, violent struggles for dominance. This desire for dominance was due to the view of the state as a source of unlimited resources. As such, if you control the state, you control its resources. Division within the elites increased due to lack of communication across clan lines in any meaningful way. Elites also disagreed on the rules and codes of political conduct and even on the worth of existing institutions (Galaydh 1990; Mohamoud 2002; Samatar 2001).

The subsequent civil war among opposition groups as many clans fought for supremacy over the others affected virtually all of Somalia’s estimated population of 9 million. Over a million Somalis sought refuge outside of Somalia, with the majority
going to neighboring and other developing countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan, Tanzania and South Africa. Others fled to richer countries in the Middle East, Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. Those that managed to enter rich developed nations maintained family networks by sending remittances and facilitating family re-unification. Additionally, they sent money to support armed factions, organized events to generate support for their clans while publicizing atrocities, perceived or real, committed by other clans and met with government officials of their host countries to lobby for their groups (Adar 2001; Gundel 2003; Ahmed 2000, Omer 2002). For example, a group calling itself Concerned Somalis and based in Washington D.C., released a press release in March of 1991, calling the conflict in Mogadisho genocide. Although appearing to be concerned about the systematic killings carried out by the USC, in fact it is mostly concerned with the killings of the Majerteen. Rather than calling for an end to all hostilities, this group repeatedly suggests to the USC that they should direct their revenge killings against Siyaad Barre, his cronies and his clan and not against the Majerteen who fought against him (Concerned Somalis Press Release 1991).

With the central government in Mogadisho routed, factional differences within the resistance movements were exposed. In the north, tensions were on the rise between the Isaaq and some non-Isaaq clans who had not joined the fight on the side of the SNM, supported the Barre regime against the SNM or remained neutral. However, instead of plunging into another period of armed conflict, the elders who had worked with the SNM “were able to restrain the armed SNM” from looting and revenge killings and the SNM agreed to hand power over to the Guurti (Interview with an elder December 2006,
Hargeisa). In the months directly following state collapse, a number of clan meetings took place in northern Somalia in order to deal with entrenched resentments and political differences between the Isaaq clan and other clans who also lived in northwestern Somalia but had sided with the government. As one elder put, the people of Somaliland had to decide whether “to govern the living or grieve for the dead.” In other words, whether people would now come together to create peace or embark on more war and revenge killings (Interview with an elder December 2006, Hargeisa). As the fighting between clan-based militias in the south continued, there had also come a time to make some difficult decisions about this region’s political future.

The official position of the SNM throughout the guerrilla war, as stated in their constitution and at the time of Barre's defeat was to maintain the territorial integrity of the Somali Republic but to gain a certain degree of regional autonomy. The SNM took this position for two reasons. First, it did not want to create hostility with the non-Isaaq clans who would be opposed to the carving up of Somalia. Secondly, there were some Isaaq, who although opposed to the Barre regime and supported removing him by force, were not open to the idea of seceding from Somalia. To lessen any antagonism from these groups, the SNM did not publicly question the integrity of the Somali state (Interview with a former SNM leader January 2007, Hargeisa).

Unofficially, the SNM set the groundwork for eventual secession from Somalia in several ways. The SNM presented the conflict between it and the government as deliberate targeting of the Barre regime because of its hatred towards the Isaaq who were not from Barre's clan-family - the Darood. This contradicted the reality on the ground
and particularly the experiences of the Majerteen who were from the same clan-family as Barre but who were targeted by the Barre regime as a clan first. According to a former Isaaq government official and who later joined the SNM, Barre accompanied by many of the top Isaaq officials in his government went to Hargeisa in 1988. From Barre’s perspective, this was an attempt to make overtures to the Isaaq population to get them to stop supporting the SNM. Instead, Barre was greeted with massive demonstrations. This hardened Barre’s belief that the Isaaq were generally anti-government and pro-SNM, perhaps leading to his indiscriminate bombings of the Isaaq population and of the large cities of northwestern Somalia (Interview with a former SNM Central Committee member April 2008, Djibouti).

In presenting the conflict as one of Darood vs. Isaaq, the SNM was able to use the clan in mobilizing human and financial resources among the Isaaq both within Somalia and in the diaspora. Many Isaaq, particularly the SNM guerrilla fighters and the civilians who experienced the wrath of the Somali government believed, and were in fact told by SNM leaders, according to a former SNM Central Committee member, that if victory was achieved against the Barre government, northwestern Somalia would secede to its original pre-union borders (Interview with a former SNM Central Committee member April 2008, Djibouti). Other SNM leaders contest this, instead suggesting that although there was some talk about secession, for most SNM leaders and members, this was not a serious option. Many Somaliland observers believe that the demand for secession came from the people of Somaliland rather than SNM leaders who did not want to secede. In fact some of the SNM leaders, like the head of the SNM who would become the first
president of Somaliland Abdirahman Tuur were opposed to it (Interview with a former SNM leader January 2007, Hargeisa).

The basis for Somaliland secession rested on four issues. First, northwestern Somalia had been a British colony, while the rest of Somalia had largely been under Italian colonial rule. For some Somalilanders, they believe that the different colonial experiences resulted in the emergence of two different cultures. This is not supported by reality because most Somalis believe in the same religion, speak the same language, albeit with regional variations, and a significant portion of the population across the country are pastoralists. All ethnic Somalis claim descent from two brothers - Sab and Samale - and physically, it is impossible to differentiate Somalis physically.

Other Somalilanders believe that the British were better at governing than the Italians who taught southerners corruption. Therefore, for many Somalilanders these differences contributed to the failure of the union. But, the failure of the union was not seriously questioned by Somalilanders until the 1980s, when the SNM began to fight against Barre and even then it was not certain that the outcome would be secession.

Finally, northwestern Somalia had achieved independence five days before southern Somalia and as such had been an independent country before joining with southern Somalia on July 1, 1960. Since it had voluntary joined with Italian Somaliland, the view was that it could also voluntary leave. Additionally, some Somalilanders suggest that the Act of Union was never ratified, as such, northern and southern Somalia were never officially one country. The atrocities committed by the Barre government
was seen by many as being supported by southerners and in order to protect themselves, northerners had the right to protect themselves by seceding.

The increased violence in the south and southern clan militias’ tendency of ignoring the voices from the northwest as well as the appointment of a southern president without consultations gave the SNM the grounds to question the inviolability of the union. Additionally, many Isaaq wanted nothing to do with the south and believed that secession was the next logical step. A month after the departure of Barre from Somalia, a meeting was organized by the clan elders and held in Burao. This meeting brought together a large number of intellectuals, business people, artists, and members of the diaspora. At the end of the meeting, it was agreed to declare an independent Republic of Somaliland on May 18, 1991. The SNM, led by Abdirahman Ahmed Ali also known as Abdirahman Tuur was mandated to govern the new country for a two-year transitional period (Fadal et al 1999: 19).

Two conflicts occurred in Somaliland, in 1992 and again in 1994 - 1996, before it would achieve a measure of peace. The conflict in 1992 occurred due to unresolved disagreements within the SNM, which broke into two factions. This conflict spread to several cities within Somaliland, again leading to large numbers of internally displaced people. It was the Guurti who stepped in to diffuse the conflict. At this time, it was agreed to hold a broad reconciliation conference in Borama to resolve all outstanding issues. At this meeting, the foundation for the Somaliland state was created and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal elected as its second president. Unfortunately, the removal of Abdirahman Tuur led him to promptly announce that the Somaliland has not seceded
creating another crisis within Somaliland. As well as continuing disagreements within the SNM, deeply rooted distrust within the Isaaq clan and divergent interests of internal and external actors led to the outbreak of a full-scale conflict that resulted in the displacement of large numbers of people (Interview with a SNM leader January 2007, Hargeisa).

In both of the 1992 and 1994-96 conflicts, the Somaliland diaspora lined up behind their clans. They fundraised for their militias, lobbied and generated propaganda for the correctness of their position in the conflict and generally reproduced the divisions of their homeland within their communities abroad. It was noted that the diaspora was even more bitterly divided than those affected by the conflict in Somaliland (Ibid; 81). According to one elder, one of the clans involved in the conflict “collected $400,000 from its diaspora” (Interview with a Somaliland elder December 2006, Hargeisa). This conflict, which lasted from October 1994 to October 1996, was brought to an end by using Somali conflict resolution methods. The peacemaking process lasted 6 months and took place in three villages. In this process, the conflict was transformed from one of politics into one of clan, which in effect meant that the elders – clan and religious – would have to lead to its resolution. By having the hostile clans sit and work out their conflict over a period of time and the barring of politicians from participation meant that a lasting solution could be reached (Interview with a peace activist December 2010, Djibouti). Once peace was achieved, Somaliland has not experienced any major conflicts. Whenever conflicts break out, the elders are immediately involved and other sectors of society including women’s groups call for peaceful resolutions has helped to
resolve many of these clan conflicts and created a platform for sustainable peace and state building (Svedjemo 2002; 13-4).

**Somaliland**

In Somaliland, the diaspora play a double role. To the outside world, the diaspora has been publicizing the positive aspects of Somaliland and advocating for its recognition because of its stability, peace, democratization and a growing economy. To secure international recognition for Somaliland and increase awareness of Somaliland’s positive attributes, the diaspora has organized continent-wide demonstrations in both Europe and North America, met with their host government’s decision-makers and invited Somaliland leaders to visit their host countries to push for recognition (Kleist and Hansen 2005). However, the diaspora has often created the conditions that jeopardize Somaliland’s fragile peace by fueling conflicts through their challenges to established power-sharing agreements between clans. For example, when the second Somaliland president Mohamed Ibrahim Egal died suddenly, his vice-president Dahir Rayale Kahin was appointed as president. Some members of the Somaliland diaspora objected to his appointment because Rayale was viewed as politically weak, temporary and that challenging him might create clan conflicts, but that he could hold the office until an election was held to decide who would rule the country. For many diaspora, the idea of a non-Isaaq holding the highest office was neither realistic nor acceptable. According to some interviewees, when Rayale was chosen to be the vice-president, Egal told him to keep out of sight in case some try to avenge relatives killed during his tenure as the head
of the Somali National Security (NSS) in Berbera in the late 1980s (Interview with a former SNM leader January 2007, Hargeisa).

When an election was called in 2003 and Rayale decided to run for the presidency on his own merit, many members of the Isaaq, both within Somaliland and in the diaspora, mobilized against him. Some opposed Rayale because he was not a member of the dominant clan - the Isaaq – and even though other clans lived in Somaliland, for these diaspora, these groups did not deserve to hold the highest office because they had not fought with the SNM to liberate Somaliland. Others objected because of Rayale’s human rights violations during the Barre era and his work with the dreaded NSS where as station chief in Berbera, a large number of civilians, most of whom were Isaaq, were tortured and killed by the NSS. Rayale had also been personally implicated in taking part in the extra-judicial killings (Omaar 1990 and 2003).

Opposition political parties in Somaliland such as the Justice and Welfare Party (UCID) and the Peace, Unity and Development Party (Kulmiye or UNITY) parties took advantage of the uproar particularly within the diaspora to lobby, fundraise and increase membership within the diaspora. When Rayale won the election with only 80 votes, many questions were raised about the validity of the elections. But, the election was seen as largely fair by both local and international observers although some members of the diaspora alleged that the election had been rigged and that Rayale should not be the president (Hussein 2010:167).

In Somaliland, two factors have been critical in largely maintaining peace and checking the tendency of the diaspora to promote conflict. The first factor that has
worked in favor of largely curtailing the negative tendencies of the Somaliland diaspora to conflict is their desire to see Somaliland recognized as an independent entity. To emphasize why they are different from the more violent south, Somalilanders point to the peace that they have attained and the democratization of their institutions.

Secondly, the clan elders have been a critical force for peace and are widely listened to and respected. Somaliland is also unique in that the traditional role of the elders has been institutionalized. The upper house of the Somaliland parliament, also known as the Guurti or House of Elders has its members appointed by their clans. This has given the clan elders the capacity to assert their influence both through their traditional role as moral authority and through their new role as lawmakers. The critical role of the clan elders in maintaining peace could be seen in the impasse over the presidential elections.

Rayale’s term in office expired on April 14, 2008 and according to the Somaliland constitution, elections were to be held before that date. The Guurti legalized the postponement of the election by passing a law extending the president’s term. This action by the Guurti has had several negative consequences. First, the Guurti elders have become active members to the dispute between the government and the two opposition parties of UCID and Kulmiye. Rather than being able to act as impartial peacemaker, clan elders have now become active members in the dispute. Previously, some Somalilanders considered the Guurti as an institution that “joined tradition with democratic ideals” but as those elders died and were replaced with younger men who are less versed in Somali culture and law and who lack peacemaking skills, many have come
to see the Guurti as part of the problem because they are “unelected and over-riding democratic laws” (Interview with Somaliland politician April 2008, Djibouti).

The Somaliland constitution allows for the postponement of elections only due to lack of security in the country. To qualify, a bomb went off near the parliament - an act that was widely seen as an attempt by the government to demonstrate the lack of security in the country (Somaliland Parliament Bombed 2008). Another area of contention within Somaliland has been the status over Sool and Sanaag, two regions claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland. Sool and Sanaag are inhabited by Somalis who are related to the clans living in Puntland but share a history and culture with the other clans in Somaliland. For example, Sool and Sanaag were under British rule while the Italians administered Puntland and southern Somalia. The leaders and clan elders of Sool and Sanaag are split on whether to be part of Somaliland and secede from Somalia or to remain within the larger Somali nation. Sool and Sanaag have representation within the Somaliland legislature and cabinet, where unlike other parliamentarians they are appointed and not elected because Somaliland has been unable to conduct elections there due to hostilities from the local populations; within the Puntland government; and within the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Some Puntlanders and Somalilanders felt that the people of those two regions were taking advantage of the conflict over them. The various movements of politicians and clan elders from these two regions, frequently change allegiances from Somaliland to Puntland, and vice versa, if they do not feel adequately rewarded (Somalia: Tensions Rising in Disputed Northern Regions, 2007).
In interviews with various Somaliland government ministers as well as opposition leaders, the solution was to bring in these two regions through discussions and increasing the development funds allocated to these two regions (Interview with Somaliland politicians December 2006, Hargeisa). In contrast, the Somaliland diaspora advocates for the forced annexation of Sool and Sanaag and berates the Somaliland government for allowing Puntland to claim land that is rightfully part of Somaliland (Gagale 2005). In opposition to the Somaliland diaspora are the diaspora from northwestern Somalia, particularly from Sool and Sanaag, who deny that Somaliland has the right to secede and in fact dispute many of the claims for secession advanced by Somalilanders. For example, Northern Somalis for Peace and Unity (NSPU) is composed of Somali diaspora from northern Somalia whose primary goal is to counteract the activities of the Somaliland diaspora in promoting the secession of Somaliland. NSPU produced a lengthy document where they systematically address and undermine the arguments for Somaliland secession in favor of Somali unity (“The Illusory Somaliland” May 18, 2006). Like their Somaliland counterparts, NSPU also writes opinion pieces, holds conferences, meets with US policy makers and organizes demonstrations when Somaliland leaders visit the US, including a visit by Somaliland President Rayale to Washington in January 2008. In one article, pro-union northerners sought to present the Rayale visit as one for medical purposes and not a state visit as Somalilanders claimed. In this opinion piece, the author suggests that the number of people meeting him at the airport – four – and statements that he received from officials within the US State Department demonstrates that Rayale is visiting for personal reasons. He also suggests
that contrary to rumors spread by the Somaliland diaspora, the US does not intend to enter into talks with Somaliland leading to recognition (Roble 2008).

**Puntland**

Puntland and Somaliland share many characteristics including largely escaping the conflict that engulfed southern Somalia. Similar to Somaliland, Puntland emerged out of a clan meeting. In the founding meeting of Puntland, over 600 participants attended from all parts of society (Interview with an elder November 2006, Bosaaso). Rather than following the Somaliland example and seceding, Puntland became an autonomous region in 1998. Once Somalia is reconstituted, Puntland would become a state within a federal system.

Unlike Somaliland, those living within the Puntland borders are largely members of the same clan, but like Somaliland, Puntland has established government institutions, e.g. a parliament, a president and a cabinet although it has not gone as far in democratizing as Somaliland. Moreover, the elders perform a critical role in resolving clan disputes, although their role is not institutionalized as in Somaliland but remains traditional. But for some elders, the “Puntland government acts more like a rebel group than a government” and has been unable to make the transition to governing, the elders continue to be “concerned with issues of security, peace, justice” which are supposed to be the domain of government (Interview with an elder November 2006, Bosaaso). Because Puntland elders have preferred to remain outside of the political establishment, they continue to maintain their authority and legitimacy, which rests on the recognition of
their moral authority and impartial rule by groups in conflict as well as those in government. Thus, elders can often compel those in conflict or those in leadership positions to act in the best interests of the community, although the politicians have often sought to marginalize their role.

Until recently, the diaspora from this region were more involved in the efforts to reconstituting Somalia as a whole than in developing Puntland. Diaspora members from Puntland are active at the national level, taking part in reconciliation conferences but like their Somaliland counterparts, they have supported political actors who engaged in conflict. The diaspora from Puntland have promoted retaining Sool and Sanaag within Puntland and have supported conflict occurring within Puntland and in southern Somalia. For example, when the former Puntland president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed whose term had ended was asked to step down by the elders, Ahmed refused and pledged to fight if forced to step down. When the elders went ahead and installed a new president, Ahmed went to war (“Somalia: Abdullahi Yusuf Takes Qardho” October 2002). Claiming that he had been illegally removed, Ahmed appealed to his clan family within Somalia and in the diaspora. The diaspora from Puntland supporting Ahmed fundraised for his militia and the purchasing of weapons. The conflict lasted for two years before the elders gave up and allowed Ahmed to come back to end the violence. Within Puntland, there was widespread support for the elders and a desire to see Ahmed leave. In this case, the diaspora clearly contributed to the conflict by rewarding Ahmed for initiating violence, aligning along clan lines and undermining the authority of the clan elders.
The more negative effects of the Puntland diaspora have become clearer since 2004, when General Mohamud Musse Hersi, known as ‘Adde Musse took over the Puntland presidency. Musse, a member of the Somali-Canadian diaspora since the 1980s, had originally come to Puntland to fight against Ahmed as the head of the militia seeking to oust Ahmed. After Ahmed’s second term ended, a presidential election led to ‘Adde Musse election. According to an interview with a former Puntland politician, Musse, unlike Ahmed, has very little knowledge of the culture of this region and especially of clan obligations. Musse surrounded himself with other members of the diaspora, particularly from Canada, where they were disproportionately represented at the ministerial level. Many Puntlanders view the diaspora as opportunists who are there to make as much money as possible before leaving to where they came from. The irony of coming from developed nations to enrich themselves from the scarce resources of one of the poorest countries in the world does not escape Somalis. Rather than contributing to the development of Puntland, the diaspora, particularly politicians from the diaspora are seen as devouring its natural resources. For example, selling licenses to foreign companies to mine Puntland’s natural resources has increased with the return of the diaspora. Most of that money remains in their pockets and according to one informant, corruption existed under Ahmed, but “rather than being satisfied with stealing in the tens of thousands of dollars, like the local politicians, diaspora politicians are not even satisfied with stealing millions of dollars” (Interview with a former Puntland government official, November 2006, Bosaaso). In fact, this idea that the diaspora do not distribute resources and keep it to themselves can be seen in a cartoon drawn by a well-known
Somali-Canadian artist, Amin Amir. In that cartoon, the first image shows Ahmed sharing camel milk (national wealth) with many people. The second image is one of ‘Adde Musse sharing the milk only with his ministers and the final image is of Abdirahman Faroole, the current Somali-Australian president of Puntland, drinking the milk with his son. In each image, there are people left out from drinking the milk, but the number progressively decreases, demonstrating diaspora tendencies to not share the wealth of the country (http://www.aminarts.com/19_SEP_2009.html).

A common view among Somalis living in Somalia is that although the diaspora provide for the daily needs of a majority of Somalis through their remittances, discussing the hardships of living in Somalia is a source of entertainment for them – a *fadhi-ku-dirir*. The diaspora gather in coffee shops and restaurants on weekends to debate about these tragic events from the safety of Europe and North America (Author's personal observations May - June 2007, Virginia). Those that have returned are there for their own personal gain – either to obtain a position or money. The scattering of Somalis all over the world has strengthened clan loyalties and the belief that the Somali situation can only be resolved through the clan system. In online discussions on websites like Somalinet.com, a major preoccupation and topic of discussion is the clan and its effects on Somalis within and in the diaspora (Brinkerhoff 2006).

**South-central Somalia**

The region most affected by the civil war has been south-central Somalia, particularly Mogadisho and the surrounding areas, which has experienced continuous
violence at the hands of both internal and external forces. In the early days of the civil war, Somalis within the country and in the diaspora firmly lined up behind their clans and militia. Not all clans had armed militias, but for those clans that did, support tended to go towards the militias and their leaders, and not the clan elders.

Unlike the SNM, which had first been demobilized by the clan elders and later by Somaliland President Ibrahim Egal, in Mogadisho the number of warlords and their militias multiplied over the years. There are several reasons why warlords and their militias dominate in south-central Somalia but not in Puntland or Somaliland. South-central Somalia is incredibly diverse in clans, ethnicity, language and culture, while both Puntland and Somaliland have one dominant clan and a few smaller clans living within their respective regions. This diversity in the south has led to the emergence of politically opportunistic leaders that tap into real and perceived grievances by different clans. Mogadisho, the capital of Somalia is a prize that many warlords have attempted to capture but failed and this has contributed to most of the ongoing conflict in southern Somalia. Many of these warlords believe that control of Mogadisho translates into control over the entire country.

The SNM had relied on clan elders to provide fighters, but the USC largely bypassed the Hawiye elders, instead recruiting rural youth directly with financing from the Hawiye business and diaspora communities. These youth were beholden to the warlords for their wages and the stark presentation of the conflict as a clan against clan was familiar to them from their nomadic environment. This also explains why the Hawiye clan elders could not control nor demobilize the *mooryaan* – or youth fighters (Interview
with a participant at the USC Rome meeting July 2010, Nairobi). But, the marginalization of the Hawiye elders predates Aideed and can be traced back to Italian colonization. “The Italians and later Somali governments, placed religious and clan elders under their control making them into employees and locating them to Mogadisho. This had the dual impact of undermining their authority while removing them away from the people they were supposed to lead” (Interview with a Somali researcher July 2010, Nairobi).

External intervention in Somalia, whether the UN/US presence in the 1990s, support provided to various fighting factions by regional countries or the 2007 Ethiopian invasion has contributed to the further destabilization of south-central Somalia as well as the ready availability of weapons.

The multiplicity of groups living in south-central Somalia brings with it a trust issue. In both Puntland and Somaliland the clan elders know each other and often work together to resolve clan conflicts, even during the Barre era, but south-central Somalia had little, or no experience with inter-clan conflict resolution. This created a problem for the various clan elders living in the region in trying to create peace between the different groups. The abundance of weapons, either abandoned by the Barre military, or brought in by the rebel groups from Ethiopia and those given by various countries has prevented the emergence of peace in south-central Somalia. Additionally, in the largely nomadic environments of Puntland and Somaliland, where the presence of the Somali government was minimal at best, the clan provided protection and social services. In contrast, in south-central Somalia and especially in Mogadisho and the surrounding areas, the
cosmopolitan environment and the close presence of the government made the clan appear less important.

As the civil war dragged on, many Somalis within Somalia came to view the warlords as the violent offspring of Siad Barre, with worse tactics than that of the Barre regime (Yusuf 2004). The failure of any of the warlords to achieve their stated promise - supremacy over other clans and reconstructing the state – also decreased their support. Over time, it became apparent to many Somalis that the warlords did not represent their clan interests but rather their own personal interest. The reality of some sub-clans having three or more warlords demonstrates that it is personal rather than clan interest that drives them. For example, before the Ethiopian invasion, one of the largest sub-clans of the Hawiye, the Habr Gedir had at least four warlords, all based in Mogadisho and who frequently fought each other over territory and other resources. One of the most well known is Hussein Aideed, a Somali-American.

Although many in the diaspora have come to hold similar views to people at home, in that the warlords are pursuing their own private interests, the diaspora encounters two problems in challenging the warlords. First, the diaspora lacks accurate information on the daily reality in Mogadisho and Somalia in general. For the most part, the diaspora turn towards the internet and Somali news websites to find out what is happening at home. According to researcher Abdisalam Issa-Salwe who has studied Somali websites and their uses by the diaspora, in 2006 there were over 527 Somali websites of which 203 or 39% are community/political websites. Issa-Salwe finds that many of these websites are based in the diaspora and their names reflect group, regional,
or clan identities. Many diaspora rely on these Somali news websites that often mirror and sometimes create fragmentation within Somali societies. As well, some of these websites are clear about their political affiliations and their representation and advocacy for different political factions. For example, Dayniile (http://www.dayniile.com) speaks for former warlord and member of the TFG Parliament Mohamed Qanyare Afrah. Waagacusub (http://www.waagacusub.com) represents former warlord and former TFG chief of police Abdi Qaybdiid. And AllPuntland (http://www.AllPuntland.com) advocates for former head of the SSDF, turned warlord and former president of the TFG Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed.

Some of the most popular Somali political websites include www.hiiraan.com (Canada), www.dayniile.com (Sweden), www.allpuntland.com, www.garooweonline.com (US) www.shabelle.net (UK) www.somalilandnet.com (UK/Canada) and www.somalinet.com (Canada). Some, like Dayniile and AllPuntland make no effort to hide their partisanship and blend factual news stories with dubious ones in favor of their group or negatively portraying the opposing group. For their advocacy, some politicians have rewarded the owners of these internet sites. For example, the owner of Idamaale (www.idamaale.com), Hussein Huub-Sireed who was an active supporter and a propagandist for Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed became a spokesperson for the TFG president during his tenure.

Many of these websites are located outside of Somalia leading to some in the diaspora selecting and deciding which news the Somali diaspora and local Somalis read. These websites often do not hide their bias and support for certain political actors. Just a
A cursory look at the pictures on different websites signals their political affiliation and the political actors that they support and promote. They also act as an outlet for the warlords and other political opportunists to communicate with their supporters in the diaspora. Some websites appear impartial, but for the most part, Somalis tend to believe information coming out of websites representing their own clans, warlords or political factions. These websites are also a means for the diaspora to both advertise and report on the success of their activities to both their supporters and detractors. Diaspora groups involved in Somali politics advertise fundraising, demonstrations or conferences they will be holding. In reporting after those events, for example, the number of people who attended a demonstration or the amount of money collected, the success of their efforts is often exaggerated and unverifiable.

The diaspora is also captive to its experiences of leaving home, particularly the violence that they or their relatives experienced and are prone to believing that other clans are out to destroy their own clan. The warlords have understood that the diaspora will donate substantial amounts of money if they engage in conflict and efforts by the international community to curtail money for conflict has not been successful, partially because it is difficult to separate it from funds for business or development. In fact, this inability to determine exactly where money were ultimately headed and what they would be used for has led many banks in the US to refuse to transfer money for remittance companies because they are fearful of breaking the Patriot Act ("Somalia Fears as US Sunrise Banks Stop Money Transfers" 2011).
When fighting occurs between two clans, the diaspora from those two groups fundraise among themselves, exhorting each other to give as much as possible and send the money, often within days to the warlords. While doing fieldwork in Minneapolis, I witnessed members of the diaspora who were reluctant, being pressured, into giving by friends or relatives. If they still resisted, they would be told that all those harmed or killed would be on their conscience because of their refusal to help when it was most needed. It was clearly understood what the money would be used. The warlords and their supporters would use the specter of their clan being defeated to raise funds and the diaspora with vivid memories of their own narrow escapes from the conflict and their targeting as specific members of a clan respond positively. These memories and fear often predisposes the diaspora to act to save their clan and to give generously.

The activities of the diaspora and the ways in which they add to violence at home have become clearer since the arrival of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and their ally, the Ethiopian government. Ethiopian troops arrived in Mogadisho at the invitation of the TFG as it attempted to establish itself in the capital, Mogadisho. In the process, they overthrew the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had itself overthrown the warlords and brought a measure of peace to southern Somalia unknown since before the collapse of the Somali state. The UIC, also called by a variety of names including the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), controlled Mogadisho and parts of southern and central Somalia for six months in 2006, before they were overthrown. For many Somalis, the era of the UIC represents a time of peace and for those in the diaspora it was a golden era.
The defeat of the UIC at the hands of the TFG, which included members of the despised warlords and Ethiopian troops created a rift within the Somali diaspora.

Some supported the TFG-Ethiopian alliance for a variety of reasons. Some in the diaspora viewed the UIC as an attempt by one clan to seize power under a religious cloak while others were concerned about the UIC’s claim of ruling through Islamic law. For most diaspora, their support and opposition to the TFG-Ethiopian coalition followed clan allegiance. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Ali Gheedi, the TFG president and prime minister respectively, hailed from two of the dominant clans – the Majerteen, a sub-clan of the Darood and the Abgaal, a sub-clan of the Hawiye. Predictably, their most active supporters were from those two clans. Gheedi who resigned in 2007 was replaced with Nur ‘Adde, also of the Abgaal sub-clan and a diaspora from the UK but a less divisive figure than Gheedi. The UIC’s leaders were predominantly associated with the Habr Gedir, a sub-clan of the Hawiye and many of the most outspoken critics against the TFG and the Ethiopians were from this clan. There were others, who crossed clan lines for ideological reasons, but they were few in number and for the most part, they were not very outspoken.

Thus, clan members of the TFG president and the prime minister, the Majerteen and the Abgaal respectively, overwhelmingly supported the TFG and the Ethiopians. In contrast, clan members of the ousted UIC tended to support the opposition. In 2007, Somali diaspora in the US engaged in a variety of activities supporting and lobbying for their groups. Diaspora supporting the TFG and the Ethiopian presence in Somalia argue that clan allegiances are not a motivating factor but rather a desire to see Somalia
establish a government at any cost. They also minimize the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia as temporary and only until peace is established and the TFG can rule the country. For this group, it is opposition to the TFG and attempts to drive it out of Mogadisho that is prolonging the Ethiopian presence. For them, the Ethiopians would leave once peace is restored and the threat of an Islamist take-over eliminated. For some pro-TFG diaspora, they do not support political leaders like Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed but rather the process of reconstruction and institutional building. For these diaspora, Ethiopia and problematic leaders like Ahmed will leave once institutions are in place. They consider this phase of Somali politics as transitional (Interview with an active TFG diaspora supporter, June 2007, Washington, D.C.).

In their portrayal of the UIC and their supporters in the US, TFG supporters in the diaspora use the language of the war on terror, describing them as extremists and terrorists whose only goal is to ensure that Somalia remains chaotic and without government. In pressing their case with US government officials, TFG diaspora supporters utilize this language in advocating support for the TFG and making linkages with the US government’s foreign policy. They present the TFG as an ally of the US government because they are both fighting against terrorism. Pro-TFG diaspora denounce the UIC as a terrorist organization with links to Al-Qaeda and who will turn Somalia into another Afghanistan or worse. They also label UIC supporters as radicals and extremists who should to be eliminated. For example, in one event held to welcome former PM Ali Gheedi to Washington, DC, many of the participants urged Gheedi and the TFG, in very violent language, to use the strongest possible methods to wipe out the
UIC and their remnants. Particularly after Gheedi described Mogadisho as being split into two – one city above ground, while the other exists below ground. This particular image generated a violent response from the participants who loudly called for the annihilation of those that lived underground. But throughout the conference, the anti-TFG opposition, especially those fighting them in Mogadisho were presented as less than human. To continue the dehumanization of the anti-TFG forces, many of the speakers denied their Somaliness, instead they called the Ethiopian PM Meles Zenawi as a brother who had come to the aid and defence of Somalia when it needed it the most (Author's personal observation at Gheedi welcoming event June 2007; Washington, DC).

For Somalis, who have centuries-long enmity with Ethiopia, to be using this language whereby other Somalis are labelled as un-Somali and even as animals that live underground, while Ethiopians are presented as relatives and described in terms echoing the language of the War on Terror. In a poem recited during the conference, those who opposed the TFG and the Ethiopian presence were labelled as the morticians of Mogadisho who only “deal in death and destruction; in murder and mayhem” and as the four horsemen of the apocalypse who will only bring “pestilence, war, famine and death” (Togane 2007).

In supporting the TFG, many members of the Somali diaspora have held numerous conferences, demonstrations and meetings with government officials in their host countries. In April 2007 alone, Pro-TFG diaspora organized two large conferences that attracted participants from across the US and Canada. They have also held numerous demonstrations in support of the TFG and the Ethiopian presence and met with various
US officials advocating for their group. Money was collected for the TFG but was often done discreetly and along clan lines. Thus, when both the president and the PM visited the US, they were given money by the diaspora. However, this money was often depicted by the diaspora as *sooryo*, a Somali custom of giving gifts to visiting guests.

Those diaspora supporting the ousted UIC used the language of invasion and occupation when describing the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia. They often dismissed the TFG as an illegitimate entity that was created by the Ethiopian government in Kenya for the purpose of annexing Somalia – a long-term ambition of imperialistic Ethiopia. Many Somalis historically view the Ethiopian state as expansionist and in dire need of an outlet to the ocean. Somalia is an attractive target because of its long coastline. This idea of Ethiopia desperate to find access to the ocean has found vindication especially since the war with Eritrea in 1998 has deprived Ethiopia of access to a seaport. These diaspora regard the era of the UIC as a golden age and the best chance that Somalia had had for peace in 17 years of conflict. These opposition diaspora believe that Ethiopia invaded Somalia, not to eliminate, in their mind, a non-existent terrorist threat, but to prevent Somalia from attaining peace and reconstructing a strong government that would rival Ethiopia’s. For many of these anti-TFG/Ethiopia diaspora, Ethiopia has not only broken international law by invading Somalia but has committed genocide in its pursuit of imaginary terrorists. For example, in a press release issued by the Somali Diaspora Network (SDN), an organization based in Virginia, explicitly calls the action of the TFG and their Ethiopian allies as genocide and calls on them to stop shelling in civilian areas. It also called on the World Court in The Hague and on the
larger international community to investigate the war crimes that have been committed and bring the Ethiopian and Somali forces to justice. Explicitly absent from this press release is the activities of the militias’ of the UIC, particularly of Al-Shabaab that have based themselves and are fighting against the TFG and the Ethiopians from civilian neighborhoods (SDN Press Release March 29, 2007).

The opposition diaspora have also been much more active in holding conferences and demonstrations, often in responses to events at home and to those held by TFG diaspora supporters. Conferences and demonstrations have been held numerous times in Columbus, Ohio; Seattle, WA; Minneapolis, MN; Washington, DC; Toronto and Ottawa, Canada; London, UK; and Stockholm, Sweden.

These diaspora have fundraised humanitarian causes, although difficult to precisely gauge where the money is going. Many diaspora supporters of the TFG believe that the money is used to fund the insurgency that has been battling government and Ethiopian troops. Some of the organizations, such as the Hawiye Action Group (HAG) based in Toronto, have fundraised across the US and Canada to fight against the Ethiopian occupation. In press releases, HAG claimed that it had collected over $100,000 from UIC and anti-TFG and anti-Ethiopia supporters. However, the amount of money collected is difficult to verify because diaspora groups exaggerate the amount of money they have collected, to make it appear as if their group has more support.

The problem confronting the opposition diaspora is that, aside from their resistance to the Ethiopian presence, very little else unites them. They include those moved by clan allegiances, others who are motivated by religious beliefs to see Somalia
governed under Shari’a and those stirred by nationalist sentiments in opposing Ethiopian troops on Somali soil. There are individual motivations by those who are using this issue to position themselves for a position or receive other benefits.

The first group, inspired by clan allegiances are those who perceive a loss of power and prestige by their clans. For the most part, these groups are not open about their views unless they are among their own clans. As such, in public they utilize either nationalist or religious sentiments in opposing the TFG and the Ethiopian occupation. Others, like the Hawiye Action Group (HAG) are very obvious and their clanistic position is indicated in their name. Unlike other groups that attempt to hide their clan affiliation, by using regional or nationalistic names, HAG does not. And although they use the Hawiye clan name, in reality they represent the views of a few individuals. But HAG is emblematic of other diaspora groups that use clan or regional names to give themselves legitimacy. However, in their press releases, they present themselves as speaking for the entire Hawiye clan. They also try to fan conflict between different clans in Somalia. For example, in conflicts between Puntland and Somaliland, HAG routinely calls on Somaliland to defend itself because it views the predominant clan living in Puntland - the Majerteen - as the enemy of its group – the Hawiye. It also blames it for the Ethiopian invasion and the general conflict that has been on-going since then (HAG Press Release January 2008).

To overcome these ideological differences and unite under a common agenda, these opposition diaspora have formed an umbrella organization called the Somali Cause (www.somalicause.org). This group includes diaspora organizations based in the US and
Canada including the Somali Diasporic Network in Virginia and the Somali Diaspora Alliance in Toronto. This organization focuses on the primary thing that unites opposition diaspora, the liberation of Somalia from Ethiopian occupation and considers protecting the territorial integrity of Somalia’s borders of paramount importance. Due to the terrorist label attached to the UIC and their remnants Al-Shabaab, opposition diaspora have had a harder time linking their agenda with US foreign policy. Al-Shabaab are mostly composed of young men who used to be in the militias of the warlords, then became fighters for the UIC and were instrumental in ousting the warlords. With the defeat of the UIC, Al-Shabaab effectively carried out the insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian troops and many former UIC leaders admitted that Al-Shabaab was no longer under their control. Opposition diaspora often focus on two issues in making their case relevant to US policy makers; the illegality of the Ethiopian occupation and the ongoing human rights violations committed against civilian populations.

In one meeting with the staff of a US lawmaker who had voted against the Iraq war, anti-TFG/Ethiopia diaspora tried to connect the lawmaker’s opposition to the American presence in Iraq with their opposition to the Ethiopian presence in Somalia. But, their argument was undermined by the equal violations being committed by Al-Shabaab, especially because these diaspora often present them as liberation fighters, while the US has placed them on their list of terrorist organization. Both the pro-TFG/Ethiopia diaspora and their opposition in the diaspora point fingers at each others, while unwilling to admit the violations being committed by their side. Clearly, this
example demonstrates the ways that the diaspora can be uncompromising and hardliners in their positions on events taking place at home.

**Governance**

Members of the Somalia diaspora began to return in significant numbers to take part in the political process in Somalia only within the last two reconciliation conferences (1999-2000 in Djibouti and 2002-2004 in Kenya). Previous conferences had been largely limited to the faction leaders fighting for supremacy within Somalia. And for the first time, power was to be shared along clan lines. The first took place in Arta, Djibouti in 2000 and for the first time Somalis from civil society including women’s groups, religious scholars, elders and members of the diaspora, were invited. From this conference, the Transitional National Government (TNG) emerged, which was a broad-based government aimed at bringing in the different stakeholders within Somali society to govern together. Within this government, the diaspora was well represented at all levels and had a significant presence within the parliament as well as ministerial posts. Additionally, the two prime ministers that headed this government during its tenure came from the US.

The TNG was mostly unsuccessful in carrying out its goal of bringing peace and effective government to the country. This was due to the absence by most faction leaders, who sought and were able to prevent the TNG from carrying out its objectives. As the mandate of the TNG came to a close, in 2002, another reconciliation conference was organized in Kenya. This conference sought to avoid the pitfalls and the problems
that had plagued both the Arta conference and the TNG by including faction leaders. Although the conference was hosted and mediated by Kenya, for many Somalis, it was Ethiopia that was orchestrating who would be chosen to be in the parliament. Ethiopia was also behind the choice of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as president and Ali Mohamed Gheedi as prime minister. Those diaspora and other Somalis who opposed Ethiopian activities were sidelined from the process, many of whom would later join the opposition groups. Still, many diaspora managed to buy their way in to being appointed by their clans for seats.

As more Somalis from the diaspora return home, their participation in different aspects of the country is increasing. But, throughout Somalia, the diaspora’s most visible role has been in politics. In Somaliland, 30% of the elected House of Representatives are from the diaspora as well as the leader of the opposition UCID party. In Puntland, the president and many cabinet ministers are from the diaspora. But, the largest numbers of diaspora politicians are to be found within the TFG, where in 2008, 70% of government ministers including the prime minister were from western countries including the UK, Canada, Sweden and Australia. In the current administration, 16 out of the 18 or 90% of cabinet ministers and the prime minister are from the diaspora.

Many local Somalis resent the political participation of the diaspora for several reasons. First, they consider that many in the diaspora did not suffer the consequences of the civil war and do not now have the right to come back to claim a share. Secondly, many consider the diaspora as uninformed of the realities on the ground and that too many things have changed in Somalia since the fall of the Somali government in 1991.
and as one elder put it, “the diaspora are not privy to my life in Somalia” (Interview with an elder November 2006, Bosaaso).

In light of this ignorance of the reality in Somalia and because the diaspora minimize this ignorance, their engagement in the politics of today’s Somalia is viewed by local Somalis as making the situation worse rather than better. Interestingly, many diasporans that I interviewed also agreed with the assessment that the diaspora lack accurate information on the reality in Somalia, nevertheless, they still believed that they were critical to stopping the conflict in Somalia and were convinced that without their active participation, nothing would be resolved in Somalia. These diaspora believed that they could be a counter-balance for good to forces inside Somalia (Interview with a TFG diaspora supporter June 2007, Washington, D.C.).

Other Somalis resent the diaspora because many have no qualifiable skills for public office other than a foreign passport and the financial capacity to buy a seat. Many local Somalis consider some of the returned diaspora as those who were unable to make it in their host countries, educationally and economically, and who have now come to make money in politics. As one Somalia-based journalist put it, “we would not mind them, if they came with more education or skills than the local Somalis” (Interview with author, December 2010, Djibouti).

Some Somalis in Somalia deem diaspora to be very clan-oriented in that they only carry the memories of clans fighting but not of them making peace. Thus, diaspora will only contribute to further conflict because they have a very narrow view of the clan and
tend to misunderstand, disregard or misuse the webs of relations and obligations that connect Somalis to each other and that help to lessen conflict.

Demonstrating their increased participation in politics at home, in the 2009 Puntland presidential election, out of a dozen candidates that were running for office, at least eight came from Canada, UK, US and Australia. The TFG in a settlement with one of the opposition group that was signed in Djibouti in November 2008 enlarged the number of parliamentarians from 275 to 550. Fifty of those seats were specifically allocated to the diaspora, although the diaspora are free to contest the other 500 seats as well. Since then, the diaspora’s role in the political, economic and social sphere in Somalia has continued to grow. In the last three administrations, the diaspora has held an increasing number of seats in the cabinet and all the prime ministers have come from the diaspora. In the current TFG cabinet, 90% of ministers hail from the diaspora. As well, the diaspora is to be found in senior level civil service positions as well as in embassies and consulates. What the long-term impact of this will be is yet to be seen, but if the last eight years is any indication, then the diaspora will continue to return home both for wealth, for power and to make a difference.

**Bottom-up State-building**

One of the ways that the Somali diaspora differs from other diaspora is in their creation of regional states. Aside from their very visible positions in the TFG and the Puntland and Somaliland administrations, the diaspora has played a very prominent role in the creation of multiple states, along the lines of Puntland that is autonomous regions
within Somalia. In the last few years, there have been a dozen or so autonomous states created within Somalia. Many of these states have been created with diaspora support and often with the diaspora appointing themselves to top positions in the newly created administrations. Some of these states are genuine attempts to re-create some sort of institutions that would bring peace, stability and provide a modicum of services to the residents, but in most instances these states exist only on paper and are often created with the help of other countries. Aside from Somaliland and Puntland, the other regional states are Galmudug; Ximan and Xeeb; Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC); Maakhir; Azania; Jubaland; Central State; Hiiraanland; Waax and Waadi; Juba and Jazeera; Mareeg; Cowl; Xamar and Xamar Daye; Shabeelle; Ceelbuur State; Raas Casayr; Awdalland; and Southwestern Somalia. Aside from Somaliland and Puntland, which were emerged out of community consultations, have widespread legitimacy from most of its inhabitants and have had a decade and more to create peace, stability and institutions, the rest of these states are relatively new having emerged in the last five years.

These states can be divided into three groups, including those that have been created by the diaspora with the consent and assistance of the elders such as Galmudug and Ximan and Xeeb. In fact, Ximan and Xeeb are a few towns that have made themselves into an administration, albeit one that has contributed to peace and stability. The second group of states has been created by other countries such as Azania, which has been created and funded by Kenya. In fact, the Kenyan government hosted and paid for the election of the administration in Nairobi. Azania, which follows the borders that Somalia and Kenya share, was expressly created by Kenya so that it could have a buffer
zone between it and Al-Shabaab controlled areas in southern Somalia (Mutambo April 3, 2011). Like other states, whose borders are not clearly marked, the borders between Azania and Jubaland, as well as whether they are the same or different entities have been a source of confusion.

The final group of states are those that have been created solely by the diaspora and are akin to phantom states. The creation of these diaspora-led states has led to violence within Somalia. For example, Hiiraanland declared outside of Somalia with the inauguration held in Nairobi in 2010, contributed to conflict among the clans living there when some clans disputed that they had not agreed to create a state. Others are those that are already parts of other regional administrations such as SSC, which is claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland. Even more confusing, Maakhir state is claimed by Somaliland, Puntland and SSC. Others such as Central State whose location is not even known are no more than a declaration by Somali-British diaspora whose address is given as Leicester, United Kingdom (Interview with author May 2011, Nairobi).

Other areas of Somalia, as shown on the map below, are governed by religious groups, primarily Al-Shabaab and the Ahlu-Sunna wal Jama (ASWJ). While Banadir region, which includes Mogadisho and the surrounding environs, has an administration which has been fought over by the TFG and Al-Shabaab and has been flip-flopping between them as they fight for control over this region. The map below displays the locations of the some of the regions named above.
Figure 4 Map of Somalia - Regional Divisions Available at: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9f/Somalia_map_states_regions_districts.png

Transforming Politics and Home

The diaspora has sought to insert themselves into the political situation in Somalia through the creation of political parties. In 2010, as the mandate of the TFG came to an end, there were flurries of activities by diaspora actors to create political parties that would then allow them to run for president and other high offices. There were three
parties created in 2010 including the Peace and Development Party (PDP), the Democratic Party of Somalia and Hiil-Qaran, the last two parties were created outside of Somalia and have little or no presence inside Somalia, while the PDP was created by a group of activists who had remained in Mogadisho throughout the civil war but who fled after the Ethiopian invasion in 2007. The Democratic Party of Somalia is headed by Maslah Siad Barre, the son of the former president and many of its members were high-ranking officials from that era.

Hiil-Qaran appears to be the party with the most diaspora presence and influence whose creation was spearheaded by the two brother professors Ahmed Samatar of Macalester College and Abdi Samatar of the University of Minnesota. Hiil-Qaran came out of a meeting held in Djibouti in December 2010, where 75% of the participants were from the diaspora. The conference provided a series of recommendations to get Somalia on the path to statehood including the type of state and qualifications for leadership, rejecting the leadership of those who had caused the conflict. Recommendations that emerged from the conference included the number and types of ministries, the number of parliamentarians and even how embassy locations should be selected. The roles of Islam, diaspora and regional and international actors were also part of the recommendations. For the diaspora, it was recommended that they “take part in current and potential activities to retrieve Somali nationhood and a capable state.” The conference recommendations also suggested that the diaspora “lobby their respective local and national governments for supporting the establishment and success of the reconstructive state and spirit” (Somali Intellectuals Conference recommendation 2011).
In February 2011, Hiil-Qaran was announced as a new political party in London, which was chosen as the location due to the presence of the largest Somali diaspora and because it is close to other diaspora locations in Europe and the hope is that many in the Somali diaspora will become members of this party. The announcement for this party tells Somalis that:

we find ourselves at a cross roads: either to accept that our condition is permanent or to regroup to dream a new vision, mount an unprecedented effort, and resurrect our individual and national dignity and those who will come after us (The Birth of a New Political Party Somali Renewal 2011).

This is not new and other Somalis have periodically established political parties to participate in the reconstruction of the Somali state and like this one, most of them were formed outside of Somalia and many of its members live in the diaspora. How successful they will be, particularly in light of the lack of participation of Somalis at home remains to be seen. But in a way, this initiative and others like it are typical of the diaspora in that they believe they are the primary solution to Somalia’s problems and do not see the need to include, in a real and meaningful way, Somalis who have lived through civil war, famine and invasions. Like the international community and their failed efforts to bring peace and a reconstructed state to Somalia, the Somali diaspora also prefers the top down approach to state building, in other words to talk about and bring political solutions for Somalia outside of Somalia.

As of this writing (2012), the situation in Somalia seems paradoxically bleak and hopeful. It is bleak because Somalia faces the worst famine in 60 years with millions of Somalis at risk. Even worse, Somalia has become an international battleground where neighboring and far-off country intervene, not just politically but military as well, the
latest being Kenya and Djibouti in addition to Ethiopia which has come back into Somalia after withdrawing in 2009. The well-known Canadian-Somali cartoonist Amin Amir pictures the current reality is Somalia as one where Somalia, weak, starving and bleeding is tied to a tree, with its hands tied by Al-Shabaab, while Kenya and Ethiopia wearing boxing gloves line up to beat up on it.

It seems hopeful because countries like Turkey are becoming more involved in Somalia but in a different way. It is also hopeful in that about 60 percent of the country is peaceful and has begun the long and arduous process of building local institutions and democratizing, but whether northern Somalia and parts of central Somalia will escape the conflict in the south remains to be seen.

In the latest international intervention, Kenya under the guise of defending its tourism industry and its economy, which has come under threat lately as several foreigners were kidnapped from tourist areas close to the Somali border and killed in Somalia, began a full invasion of southern Somalia. The Kenyan military, along with American drones and French naval assistance have carried out air and ground attacks, although both the United States and France denied their involvement (Kron and Gettleman, 2011). Despite the killings of civilians and internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing the famine and on their way to the refugee camps, Kenya has escalated its war on Somalia. In a Twitter feed, the Kenyan military announced that they would “continuously attack 10 towns in Somalia” going as far as Afgoye, about 30 Km from Mogadisho and for the residents to leave those towns (“Kenya Issues Attack Warning Over Twitter” 2011).
It now appears clear in a Wikileaks cable that Kenya, with assistance from a variety of countries, is less interested in protecting its tourist industry and more in protecting Lamu, where the Kenyans, with financial backing from the Chinese are building a deep water port, which would help in bringing oil from South Sudan as well as create infrastructure for China to send its products into Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda. The same Wikileaks cable documents that the Chinese have provided “weapons, ammunition, supplies, and textiles for making uniforms in support” of the Government of Kenya's Jubaland/Azania initiative ("US Embassy Cables: China Providing Military and Intelligence Gathering Support to Kenya" 2010).

Believing that more military intervention is the way to fix Somalia, Ethiopia is coming back into Somalia for round 2. Except this time, Ethiopia has sought and received international support, from IGAD and the AU, for its military intervention in Somalia, although the US has expressly told the Ethiopians not to go into Somalia fearing a repeat of what happened after their last invasion – that is a more radicalized population and perhaps a resurgence of support for Al-Shabaab (Gettleman 2011).

Djibouti and Sierra Leone are also both set to send 850 troops apiece to bolster the Ugandan and Burundi AMISOM forces (“Somalia: Sierra Leone to Send Troops” NYT, November 4, 2011). As well, the US has also physically surrounded Somalia with drone and military bases in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Seychelles. Many of these drone attacks have resulted in civilian deaths, many who were fleeing the massive humanitarian disaster in southern Somalia. What the history of international involvement in Somalia, particularly military, shows is that invariably these countries leave Somalia in a much
worse and dangerous situation than before the intervention. Yet, rather than assessing how best to handle Somalia, in a manner that creates peace and stability for Somalis and security for its neighbors, foreign countries intervene in Somalia blindly following their own national interest and in every case, the guaranteed result is a more violent Somalia that is even more of a threat not only to itself but globally. For example, when the US engineered the fall of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the Ethiopian invasion in 2006, the Somali conflict shifted from one where clans were fighting over resources to one where religion would be the only paradigm, ensuring the emergence of a militant group like Al-Shabaab. Where this latest invasion will lead Somalia is yet unknown but from past experience, it will most likely alter the politics and the nature of the conflict in a manner that is detrimental to Somalia and other countries.

The one hopeful and positive international intervention in Somalia has been that of Turkey and one which challenges previous interventions. As the human cost of the famine became clear, the prime minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan did not only send massive amounts of aid to Somalia but visited the most dangerous city in the world – Mogadisho, taking his family, his foreign minister and other ministers as well as the newly appointed Turkish ambassador to Somalia with him. Calling on the international community not to watch the suffering of Somalis, Erdogan wrote that “this crisis tests the notion of civilization and our modern values. It reveals, once again, that it is a basic human obligation to pursue international cooperation and solidarity to provide solace for those suffering from natural and man-made disasters” (Erdogan October 12, 2011).
What shocked Somalis and the international community was not just that Turkey was treating Somalis as humans but dealing with them in a respectful manner and was not coming to tell Somalis the problems that they had caused the world but giving them a hand so that they could stand for themselves. And as the world watched, squabbling about how to keep aid away from those living under or unable to leave Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, Turkey poured millions of dollars in aid and within a few weeks, reopened Turkey’s embassy in Mogadisho and sent doctors, engineers and teachers to help in institutional building. In the past few months, Turkey has also opened orphanages and hospitals, dug water-wells and assisted with the travel arrangements of those IDPs wishing to go back home, now that the rains have started (“Turkish NGOs Take Care of Somali Orphans” 2011)

By-passing the usual aid agencies, Turkey delivered aid to the IDPs directly. Recognizing that after twenty years of war, Somalia suffers from lack of human resources, the Turkish government has offered scholarships to hundreds of Somali students to study in Turkey and has promised to remain engaged in Somalia for the long-term (Ali 2011). By striving to meet the basic needs of Somalis before embarking on anything else, Turkey is approaching state reconstruction from the bottom-up. Whether this international intervention will be successful remains to be seen, but the fact that Turkish aid workers are freely able to work in Somalia with little or no problems, while UN agencies refuse to come to Mogadisho or travel beyond the airport, due to safety concerns has cast an even more positive light on Turkey. And Somalis have responded positively with Istanbul becoming the most popular newborn girl’s name.
The diaspora also responded to Turkey with an outpouring of emotional gratitude, in online discussions, in opinion pieces and even going to Turkish embassies around the world from Nairobi to London to thank the government of Turkey. It is in these ways that the Somali diaspora has acted as a representative of Somalis and Somalia. Viewing Turkey as a non-interested party in Somalia, the diaspora has called on Turkey to keep on doing the work that they are doing, asking them not to leave Somalia to its fate, as others have done. Somalis are particularly anxious that Turkey not to leave Somalia at the mercy of UN agencies in Nairobi, nicknamed the 'Nairobi Mafia', as other donors have done.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has tried to illustrate the role of the Somali diaspora in first contributing to the collapse of the Somali state and secondly in their perpetuation of the conflict in Somalia and finally in the ways that they have participated in governance. Although, they were not the only factor, their involvement with events in Somalia and support for guerrilla groups, warlords and other opportunistic political actors allowed for conflict to take place and to persist. The absence of a central government in Somalia for the past 21 years allows us to better discern the effects of the Somali diaspora. The tendency of the Somali diaspora to frame homeland conflict in categorical, hard-line terms strengthens confrontational homeland leaders and organizations, undermine others seeking compromise. The cost of contributing to conflict is very low for the diaspora living in developed nations and the benefits high. As seen in the Armenian-American diaspora, communities emerging out of conflict, even decades later, seek to
alter the political conditions that led to their initial departure either peacefully but more often violently.

The diaspora is also disproportionately represented in political offices but their activities and decisions are often motivated by personal or clan interests. Somalis in Somalia are grateful for the involvement of the diaspora in Somalia through their remittances to families, their role in providing basic services such as the construction of schools, universities and hospitals and their investment in business. But they are also keenly aware that the diaspora is oblivious to the reality at home and that although clans fight, they also make peace.

Somalis at home pay the price for diaspora support for uncompromising political actors who would rather engage in conflict than resolve it peacefully. A popular image of the diaspora at home is that conflict in Somalia is a source of entertainment, engaging in fadhi-ku-dirir or fighting while sitting. This is when Somalis, mainly men, gather in coffee shops after work and school to discuss which clan was winning or losing and how many had died and then head home to their families undisturbed by violence. Many Somalis in Somalia would agree with one diaspora scholar who wrote of the Armenian view of the Armenian diaspora “just shut up and send the money” (Tölölyan 2007). In contrast, the diaspora sees their role in Somalia as essential, beneficial and the only thing holding the country together.

In light of their conflict-contributing activities, it is imperative for developing countries, particularly those experiencing conflict or in post-conflict situations to consider how to minimize the role of the diaspora in conflict and to promote their
contributions to development. The Somali case clearly illustrates the effects of the diaspora in the absence of a government. The combination of significant financial remittances has resulted in reliance on immediate, extended and clan family. In turn, this has translated into the belief that assistance and protection will only come from your clan.

The idea that one can and should only rely on their clan is underscored by the relatively peaceful existence of Puntland and Somaliland. In both of those regions, there is one dominant clan but in those areas where several clans come into contact, such as the border regions between Puntland and Somaliland, these areas experience more conflict than in the rest of the two regions. Southern Somalia, which is inhabited by multiple clans, is multi-lingual and multi-cultural has remained mired in conflict. With their memories of trauma and victimization, diaspora add to this hard-line view of others. Other countries, particularly those experiencing or emerging out of conflict or with weak governments and significant diaspora can use the Somali case to see how they can overcome the negative and conflict generating activities of their own diaspora.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

Migration and the transnational nature of the diaspora have been linked to processes of globalization which undermine the power and domain of states, in fact the Somali diaspora demonstrates that politics has been delinked from territory and replaced with a new transnational politics that “is intensely focused on specific locations, nations, identities, and issues. Politics remains fundamentally about local issues even while political processes are increasingly globalized” (Terrence and Mandaville 2009). The activities of the Somali diaspora are complex and conflicting, and in the absence of a central state, it would be easy to believe that they have an unfettered hand in what they do at home. But similar to other diaspora, the Somali diaspora faces constraints from internal and external actors that hamper or assist their activities towards peace or to conflict. At the same time, the diaspora uses states and international non-state actors to advance its own interests and sometimes that of Somalia.

The activities of the Somali diaspora cannot be reduced as simply being positive or negative since it does both and sometimes their negative activities undermines their positive ones. As such, the Somali diaspora complicate the research on the diaspora and their relationship with home by showing the multiplicity of relationships, not just between home and the diaspora but within diaspora locations as well as with other countries that have been turned into hubs for the diaspora. In this way, the Somali diaspora’s activities can be compared to a web of relationships that they weave around Somalia and these other diaspora locations. In some ways then, Somalia is more
globalized than it would have been with a government and certainly much more so than many of its neighbors.

In those areas where Somalia is lacking due to a lack of a central government, Somalis and particularly the Somali diaspora compensate by utilizing the infrastructure of other countries. For example, there are no banking facilities in Somalia, so Somalis have set up banks in Djibouti, which can be used to facilitate business between Somalia and the rest of the world. Similarly, for the half-dozen airlines operating in Somalia, many are registered and headquartered in Dubai. In this way then, Somalis and particularly the diaspora mitigate the effects of conflict and the lack of infrastructure by utilizing those of other countries.

The Somali diaspora’s activities towards Somalia fit into the three categories outlined by Cohen (2005) in that the diaspora’s activities at home are first determined by shifts in global opportunity; whether the diaspora is state-less or state-linked; and who are the leaders of the diaspora. In the first case, as seen in this study, the Somali diaspora and their involvement with home is affected by global events including the national and security interests of other countries. For example, during the US/UN intervention in Somalia from 1992-1994, the Somali diaspora was encouraged to both support this intervention and to get involved in it. Those that were openly critical of it paid a heavy personal price for their opposition.

After 9/11, the activities of the Somali diaspora were curtailed as the War on Terror began and Somalia came under US scrutiny. As well, the financial contributions of the diaspora were disrupted when the largest Somali-owned remittance company, Al-
Barakaat, was listed as funneling funds to Al-Qaeda and its world-wide assets frozen. More recently, the activities of the diaspora came under investigation when Al-Shabaab, fighting a bloody war against the weak and western supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was listed by the US as an organization engaged in terrorism. After some young Somali-American men went to Somalia, fighting on behalf of Al-Shabaab, with some committing acts of suicide, the Somali diaspora came under investigation with some hauled in for questioning as the FBI charged and convicted some with providing material support to terrorism in Somalia. This has had a chilling effect on diasporic activities towards Somalia.

Even more frightening for the Somali-American community has been the increasing trends by American banks to refuse to work with remittance companies. American banks, afraid of being charged under the US Patriot Act with facilitating the transmission of funds to terrorist groups have closed the accounts of Somali remittances companies in the US, in effect, making it impossible for Somali remittance companies to transfer funds from the US to Somalia ("Somalia Fears as US Sunrise Banks Stop Money Transfers" 2011). This has meant that Somalis are not able to support the millions of Somalis who have relied on these monthly remittances for the past twenty years. Somali-Americans have taken to the streets in demonstrations calling for the re-opening of remittance companies' accounts with US banks and a more comprehensive resolution by the US government to sending life-saving remittances to those intended for groups like Al-Shabaab.
Secondly, the Somali diaspora is a state-less diaspora and thus the literature suggests that they contribute to conflict at home. This is partially true, as the Somali diaspora tends to support conflict between clans and they supported militias fighting against the Ethiopian invasion as well as against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). But, they also support development. In fact, the development of Somalia is being under-written by the Somali diaspora who remit about $1 billion annually. Many of the schools, universities, hospitals and businesses are funded and sometimes staffed by the diaspora. Highlighting the crucial life supporting role of the diaspora, the former minister of Finance of Somaliland, Mohamed Said ‘Gees’ said “if there is no diaspora, there is no life” (Farah 2009: 20). That in the absence of a central government, minuscule foreign aid and no investment, it really is the diaspora that continues to support Somalis displaced at home, in the refugee camps and those stuck in various countries like Egypt, Greece, Libya and Malta, without any rights to work or citizenship. It is this life-saving role that the Somali diaspora plays that really distinguishes it from other diaspora. Interestingly, in recognition of their positive role, successive UN Envoy to Somalia routinely put out updates on Somalia specifically aimed at the Somali diaspora and what they can do to help, encouraging their engagement and return to home.

In the third category, there has been no effective leadership that has emerged from the Somali diaspora, although this appears to be changing. There are many that claim to represent the Somali diaspora of specific countries but there are none that are accepted as such. Like other diaspora, the Somali diaspora mirrors the societal divisions and splits within Somalia and as such, they lack not only leadership but have no unified agenda.
towards Somalia. This is demonstrated in the numerous diaspora organizations that exist in the diaspora that support diverse and contradictory issues regarding Somalia. For example, a number of diaspora groups have simultaneously condemned and commended the Kenyan and Ethiopian invasions of Somalia.

In advocating and representing Somalia, the Somali diaspora has failed to effectively sway the foreign policies of their host governments significantly. In fact one State Department official portrayed meetings with the Somali diaspora as a waste of time because they undermine each other (Interview with author September 2007, Washington, DC). There are some diaspora that have close relationship with the diplomatic staff of embassies from their host countries working on Somalia and try to influence their understanding and activities towards Somalia but often they are interested in getting the support of foreigners to obtain a political position or advocate for their clans. At the same time, the diaspora that do return are derided by Nairobi-based international organizations and non-Somali academics for their ignorance of the situation on the ground and their inability to play a constructive role in Somalia aside from sending remittances (Former TFG minister January 2011, Djibouti).

Since the departure of the Ethiopian troops and the end of the invasion in 2009, the diaspora have increased their involvement with home. Many diaspora have returned to fill various positions from working with NGOs, to establishing businesses and institutions, but in no sphere are they so prominent than in that of politics. In the last four years, all four TFG prime ministers have been from Britain, Canada and the United States and the percentage of cabinet ministers who are from the diaspora has progressively
increased to 90% today.

**Explaining variations in diaspora engagement**

How to bring about peace and reconstruct the state from below carried out in the northern parts of Somalia clearly demonstrating that the Somali diaspora can contribute to peace and state building but they can just as equally foment and fund conflict. The examples of Somaliland and Puntland reveal that peace can be restored, institutions established and even have changes in power through free and fair elections. But the question that needs to be asked is what explains the different outcomes in Somalia since Somaliland and Puntland shared with the rest of Somalia many of the same problems including economic decline, weak institutions and political corruption (Reno 2003: 4).

Despite the similarities of experiences under government, three issues differentiate northern and southern Somalia – geographical location, the presence of indigenous institutions and international intervention.

First, the distance from the center of power in Mogadisho meant that the post-independent Somali governments left the northern regions under-developed as the state was unable to project its power that far. This proved to be positive after state collapse because these regions were largely untouched by the absence of state power and institutions.

Secondly, the presence and strength of indigenous institutions and actors in the north remained unaffected. For example, under colonialism, the British and the Italians treated the elders differently, largely leaving them alone in the British case while they
were closely incorporated under Italian rule. After independence, incorporation was more effective in southern Somalia because of its proximity to the center of power in Mogadisho. Thus both the civilian and military governments continued to bring the elders under their control by paying their salaries in return for their loyalty. Somaliland and Puntland largely escaped this because of their distance from the center. This meant that the elders were known and considered legitimate in the eyes of their people. The legitimacy of the elders was strengthened once the Somali government first targeted the Majerteen and later on the Isaaq.

In the case of Somaliland, the elders were a critical part of the SNM and in the fight against the Barre government and this role placed the elders in a position of leadership not only over the people but also over the SNM. In Puntland, after so many people had fled from the civil war in southern Somalia, many found themselves in regions that their families had left long ago and in the upheaval that followed their arrival, the elders were a critical force in keeping the peace and adjudicating among the people. In both Somaliland and Puntland, the elders were not only a force for peace but in fact they had the power to mobilize the people for both war and peace.

Finally, both Somaliland and Puntland were ignored by the international community as they invaded and intervened in southern Somalia. This neglect by the international community provided the north with an opportunity, denied to the south, to successfully resort to Somali methods of conflict resolution. Shortly after declaring its secession from the rest of Somalia, Somaliland plunged into three year civil war that similar to the south was about power-sharing. What brought Somaliland out of this
conflict was that the elders transformed what was becoming an intractable conflict over political power into a clan conflict. The elders did this because if the conflict could be made into a clan conflict, then it was easy to identify the actors and the issues and have the clans sit together until reconciliation was reached. They also kept out of the reconciliation meetings those actors who were contributing to the conflict and who were the spoilers of peace. This meant that political opportunists who wanted to use conflict to reach their ends were in reality without people to fight their battles because the clans had reconciled.

The lack of international intervention helped to stabilize and bring lasting peace to Somaliland because outsiders invariably become party to the conflict in Somalia, as has routinely happened in southern Somalia from the UN/US involvement onwards. Similarly in Puntland, an internal conflict over who would govern Puntland that led to war was resolved by the elders and resulted in the creation of rules of transferring power that continues to effectively exist today.

The role of the diaspora in all three regions is more similar than different in that they supported family, contributed to development and sided and supported their clans in conflicts with others. What made a difference for Somaliland and Puntland, particularly the former, was that the activities of the diaspora was checked and often redirected by the elders and civil society groups. As well, the desire by the Somaliland diaspora to receive international recognition has tempered their conflict-perpetuating activities. In southern Somalia because of the weakened position of the elders, the diaspora were able to carry out their conflict perpetuating activities unchecked and in some case encouraged and
supported by warlords, self-appointed elders and other political actors. More recently, the importance of the diaspora and the elders working together was illustrated in the example of Ximin and Xeeb, a small region in central Somalia where the elders and three young diaspora established an administration, creating peace and providing basic services to the residents.

**Research Contributions**

The main contributions of the Somali diaspora are three-fold. First, through their involvement in the development of home, the Somali diaspora has demonstrated the ways that the diaspora interacts with home in the absence of the state. Their support for development shows that the diaspora can provide aid that is effective and targeted without a state to direct their activities. The diaspora does not only provide development aid and the provision of basic services but they privatize public goods. This aspect of diaspora development of home is largely missing from the literature.

Secondly, this research expands on the literature which has primarily examined the ways that the diaspora funds rebel groups and perpetuated conflict. This dissertation documents the ways the diaspora effectively contributed to the collapse of the Somali state and contributed to civil war. In the post-conflict literature, the diaspora is largely absent as a factor influencing whether peace is maintained or not. This dissertation provides clear evidence that the diaspora was a critical factor overpowering overwhelming the state and in supporting conflict for two decades.
Finally, this dissertation fills in the gap in the literature concerning the participation of the diaspora in governance, going beyond the usual long-distance involvement in politics. Rather, this research shows that the diaspora can return home to play an active role in politics and that it can take part in state-building from below.

Although this dissertation has sought to examine the multifaceted connections maintained by the diaspora between home and other diaspora locations, it is important to note that despite the often heroic and sometimes destructive activities engaged in by the diaspora, they have made an enormous sacrifice for their families and for Somalia, by mortgaging their future and often that of their children in their host countries. In many countries, the Somali diaspora, in comparison to other diaspora, is ranked at the bottom in income and educational attainment, often living in the poorest neighborhoods. To be able to send $1 billion annually, the Somali diaspora have given up going to school and universities, which would help them find better jobs and make better lives for themselves in their new country. Instead, often within days of arrival, the diaspora find low paying jobs working long hours to be able to send a few hundred dollars to their families. For example, Somali-Americans are one of the youngest communities in the US, this loss of talent is tragic for both Somalia and for the United States but for the diaspora, a choice to better themselves now and delay assisting their families is really no choice at all and many opt to delay their dreams and ambitions for when things get better in Somalia. Many have been waiting for two decades.

For the past twenty years, the Somali diaspora's gaze has been primarily fixed on Somalia and the cost to them is that rather than bettering their lives, they have sent
everything they had to Somalia. Thus, despite their development and conflict engagement, their enormous and sustained commitment to Somalia differentiates them from other diaspora.
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