Maps of Desire: Refugee Children, Schooling, and Contemporary Dinka Pastoralism in South Sudan

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(Educational Policy Studies)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2012

Date of final oral examination: 5/4/12

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals and institutions for their support in the production of this thesis, who without such support would not have been possible: Nancy Kendall, Jok Madut Jok, Jo Ellen Fair, Mark Johnson, Stacey Lee, Amy Stambach, Sharon Hutchinson, Marsha Seltzer, Kristen Cheney, Laurie Beth Clark, Kris Olds, Charlie Temple, Tom Tilson, Stuart Leigh, Naomi Pendle, Brady Zeiman, Katie Zaman, Amelia Charles, August Mayai, Dotjang Agany Awer, Maayik Thiik, Valentino Deng, Dave Eggers, Renee Zukin, Jennifer New, Kristen Molyneau, Ross Benbow, Casey Collins, Charity Schmidt, Leela Hazzah, Kathy Eldon, Isabella Epstein, Tobias Epstein, Janet Lobatz, Stephen Epstein, Michael New, May New, Hobart College, the University of Washington, Grinnell College, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Save the Children-US, UNICEF, Educational Development Center, and Management Systems International.
Abstract
This thesis examines the impact of refugee camp education and repatriation policy on a rural Dinka community in South Sudan and what implications can be drawn from this impact to inform the larger national and international projects of education in emergencies and conflict-affected settings. The author draws from the history of colonial and post colonial education projects among the Dinka and of refugee education and encampment to inform a critical analysis of the form and function of internationally-led education in emergency settings, and the role of formal schooling and the educated person in contemporary Dinka society. The narratives of children who fled the civil war in Sudan, accessed education in the Kakuma Refugee Camp, and returned to their communities as educated young adults are described and measured against the expectations of the international institutions who provided this education as well as the families who rely on these educated returnees to revive a vulnerable pastoralist enterprise. Using critical neo-institutionalist and anthropological theories, the author argues that the multiplex of refugee education and post-conflict reconstruction policies both converge and diverge from each other as well as from the communities they attempt to serve, often frustrating the state-building projects of international actors. Because communities like the Dinka who have historically been marginalized from access to formal schooling are mistakenly seen by international humanitarian aid institutions as peoples without an education history, the author also argues that education policy in emergencies and conflict-affected settings are too often divorced from the realities of life and schooling during and after crisis.
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Introduction

Tomorrow
we shall have to think up signs,
sketch a landscape, fabricate a plan
on the double page
of day and paper.
Tomorrow, we shall have to invent,
once more,
the reality of this world.

—Octavio Paz, “January First”
Translated by Elizabeth Bishop

Diasporas always leave a trail of collective memory about another place and time and create new maps of desire and of attachment.

—Breckenridge & Appadurai (1989)

This dissertation is the result of a 3-year investigation into international refugee camp education and repatriation policy, how it manifests itself in practice, and its consequences in a rural conflict-affected community in South Sudan. The newest independent state on Earth as of this writing, South Sudan has endured many decades of civil war since the 1950s, causing over 2 million deaths and 4 million displaced; this following more than 100 years of brutal colonization, resource pillage, and slavery. About 100,000 South Sudanese, more than 60% of whom were under the age of 16, sought asylum in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya between 1992 and 2005, and many—but not all—have since returned.
The violent and oppressive elements of an otherwise complex history typically take center stage in academic and journalistic descriptions of South Sudan and the future it faces as a nation. Against this backdrop, often hidden in the orchestra pit of history, was a symphony of life and livelihoods in wartime that went on despite the dire conditions, lost in the louder narratives of colonial neglect, cultural and religious oppression, and severe poverty. A neglected but important historical and cultural theme that characterized the decades between the British colonial period beginning in the 1870s and today is the relationship between schooling, space, and power. While much has been written about education in South Sudan, few accounts get past the foregrounding of war and displacement and the international framing of its challenges via instruments such as the Millennium Development Goals, the Human Development Index, or the Doing Business Ratings. These comparisons not only define South Sudan and its peoples through their deficits and needs, but also project a very particular construction of children in the context of war and displacement as vulnerable, victimized, and in need of protection.

Throughout this dissertation, I intend to provoke attention away from this construction of children as persons knowable only through their need, which denies their humanity, history, and culture (Malkki, 1997: 224). For this paper, I take the viewpoint that chronic war and displacement in settings like South Sudan might usefully be treated as a “normal” part of a child’s lived experience. While not denying the dire consequences of war nor the need for appropriate responses, this approach makes visible a set of practices, adaptations, and coping mechanisms conditioned by cycles of scarcity, conflict, and displacement, and allows for a much deeper understanding of how and why refugee
education and state-building projects look the way they do (Horst, 2006). This approach opens up an inquiry into how the practices of displaced children influence and are influenced by educational interventions mobilized by international institutions intended to protect and regulate them.

This research is based on qualitative and quantitative data collected in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya and in a small rural village called Malou\(^1\) in Gogrial East County, Warrap State, South Sudan, populated primarily by Rek Dinka agro-pastoralists. Malou is a small village to which those who were educated in Kakuma during the recent North-South civil war had subsequently returned. Because of the ideas, practices, and credentials obtained while in exile, “returnees” are now teachers in the local schools, national staff of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and bureaucrats in local, regional, and national government ministries of South Sudan. Taking into account the region’s colonial and post-colonial history, the objective of the research is to 1) describe how round-trip, war-induced migration—flight-encampment-return—influenced contemporary Dinka educational practices, 2) gain a deeper understanding of the political and cultural precedents that influenced these practices, 3) document how international refugee camp education and repatriation policy manifested themselves in a refugee camp, and 4) examine the particular consequences of these policies in a rural agro-pastoralist community in South Sudan to where many former refugees returned. As such, the primary research question of this dissertation is:

\(^1\) This is a pseudonym
What is the impact of international refugee camp education and repatriation policy on Malou and South Sudan, and what implications can be drawn from this impact to inform the larger national and international projects of education in emergencies and conflict-affected settings?

To answer this question, I conducted a multi-sited and vertical case-study between May 2007 and November 2010 in Kakuma, and in Malou and other nearby schools and villages. The research consisted of participant observations, interviews, focus groups, document reviews, and archival research. I drew from multiple perspectives (returnees, stayees, IDPs, aid workers, male, female, elders, etc.), multiple institutions (bi- and multi-laterals, governmental and non-governmental, pastoral), multiple spatial domains (local, national, international, global) and multiple temporal domains, (colonial, post-colonial, and post-conflict Sudan). The central actors in this research are South Sudanese refugees, returnees, and their families and neighbors along with the international humanitarian aid and development workers and local and regional government staff with whom they interact. The terms refugee and returnee are critically examined and compared in each of the different perspectives and domains for their particular cultural, economic and political meanings.

In Chapter I, I provide an overview of the analytic frameworks I employ to frame my approach to the research, engage the relevant literature that precedes and informs it, describe my research methods, and provide a timeline of the specific research activities in which I engaged. In Chapter II, I provide a reinterpretation of the cultural and political history of the provision and uses of formal schooling among the Dinka in South Sudan in order to expand the historic record and set the backdrop against which I present my data. In
Chapter III, I describe the history of refugee camp education and repatriation policy and describe the processes and conditions of formal and informal schooling in the Kakuma Refugee Camp from the perspective of young refugees. In Chapter IV, I review the conditions that brought about refugee repatriation to South Sudan from Kakuma and the policies and practices that both enabled and constrained return. In this chapter I also profile two young Dinka men and their narratives of their acquisition of schooling in Kakuma and elsewhere during war-time, their subsequent reintegration into pastoralist life in Malou, and the roles and jobs they acquired as educated persons. Finally in Chapter V, I discuss the relationship between the international culture of formal schooling in conflict-affected communities and contemporary Dinka agro-pastoralism, and how this relationship manifests itself in Malou through the practices of refugee camp-educated teachers and their students. In this chapter, I also profile two Dinka families and how they navigate decisions about schooling for their sons and daughters.

Ultimately, I examine the production, recontextualization, and reproduction of the knowledges, practices, and dispositions deemed necessary for Dinka boys and girls in an age of state-making and peace-building, and how former refugees reintegrate into post-conflict South Sudan as educated young adults. I also examine how they subsequently interact with a growing population of South Sudanese school children as teachers, aid workers, and government bureaucrats. I describe how these knowledges, practices, and dispositions are chosen and distributed, recalibrated as pedagogical discourse, enacted by teachers and aid workers, and transformed by refugee youth. I describe how the preferential hiring of returnees as teachers, aid workers, and government bureaucrats by
international, national, and non-governmental institutions is situated within a pastoral political economy, and how these policies and practices affect diverse individuals and groups in one particular community. The conclusions of this research will contribute to the emerging field of education in emergencies and conflict-affected settings by analyzing national and international education policy against local realities and histories.
I: Analytic Frames, Literature Review, & Research Methods

In this chapter, I outline the analytic frames from which I draw to answer my research question and guide the analysis of my data. I also go on to review the literature on the study of refugees. In later chapters in this thesis, I review the literatures on South Sudan and the Dinka, and education in emergencies and conflict-affected settings. Finally, I describe my research methods and provide a timeline of my field work.

1.1 Analytic Frames

1.1.1 Schooling, isomorphism, and Conflict-Affected Settings

It is only over the last decade that education has come to be included among the standard responses to humanitarian emergencies, and little is known about its longer term impact or consequences. There are very few ethnographies of schooling in refugee camps or conflict-affected communities—and none that link them as I do here; those that do exist have a decidedly advocacy or problem-oriented perspective, campaigning for the inclusion of education as a standard part of a humanitarian response or else examining the success or failure of particular policies and approaches to education in emergencies (s.f. Crisp, et al. 2001; Sommers, 2002; Davies, 2004; Mundy & Dryden-Petersen, 2011; Paulson, 2011).

Most acknowledge that schools built in response to war or disasters are extremely difficult to establish and maintain given the weakness of state institutions, the insecurities of their
surroundings, and the unavailability of safe school buildings, qualified teachers, relevant curriculum, or the finances to cover the recurrent costs of (re)building and maintaining a school system. When formal schools do emerge in these settings, they tend to have extremely high rates of grade repetition, dropouts (especially girls), and teacher truancy (UNESCO, 2010). These schools typically have overcrowded, multi-age, and multi-lingual classrooms serving students who are former soldiers, malnourished, deeply impoverished, displaced, or orphaned. These children and youth are likely to be from mobile transhumant or nomadic societies, communities where neither the children nor their parents have ever attended school, or families that see schools as oppressive, irrelevant, or even dangerous places especially for girls (Kirk, 2008). Still, the allowable forms and functions of schooling in these contexts remains quite narrow, shaped by international standards and conventions, Western formal institutional settings, and progressive pedagogies peddled by experts who themselves represent the apex of a schooled society.

In these settings, “[Formal] schooling arises as a favored technology…for goal attainment; its intense pursuit by individuals and by states makes sense only in a world that strongly privileges schooling” (Ramírez, 2003: 242). World culture theorists, also called neo-institutionalists, see the widespread adoption of common educational principles, policies, and practices among states with varying characteristics—even among non-state

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2 Neo-institutionalist refers to scholars who “proposed that formal organizational structure reflected not only technical demands and resource dependencies, but was also shaped by institutional forces, including rational myths, knowledge legitimated through the educational system and the professions, public opinion, and the law.” (Powell, 2007)
actors such as rebel movements and transnational collectivities—as evidence that schools and schooling are converging toward a common model worldwide (Meyer and Ramirez, 2000; Nyamnjoh, 2004; Chabbot and Ramirez, 2006). As Ramirez (2003) argues,

...the rationalized sense making linked to [formal schools]—the stress on individual empowerment, national development, organizational effectiveness, professional knowledge, and expert advice—is best seen as involving scripts rather than technical processes. The culture at work increasingly fostered both rationalization and universalism, affirming that all individuals and all societies would benefit from schooling. The culture at work…was articulated and transmitted through nation-states, organizations, and experts who themselves embodied the triumph of a schooled world ‘credential society’” (242; see also Boli and Thomas, 1999)

The widespread utilization of Western forms of pedagogy and formal schooling by aid institutions to bring crisis affected and marginalized communities into the fold of capitalist modernity, interrupt chronic insecurities and inequalities, and lift entire societies out of poverty should be seen not as an adoption of technical procedures deemed best or most efficient, but rather as the enactment of universalized scripts and bureaucratic rationalities understood as necessary to gain legitimacy by the larger constellation of state and international institutions (Boli and Ramirez, 1992; Chabbot and Ramirez, 2006).

To legitimate themselves, organizations adopt “universalistic models” within which a consensus is achieved on such issues as human rights and education and it is assumed that these models have “universal world applicability” (Meyer et al., 1997). The procedures used are modeled on what is deemed to be effective by the field at large and not necessarily because the methods themselves are the most effective; institutional policy and process are in essence “de-linked” from the particular contexts in which they are implemented. Neo-institutionalists argue that bureaucracies spread because rationalized
bureaucracy is seen as a social good, as there is often much decoupling of policy and practice (Finnemore, 1996). In addition to social merit, organizations have the desire to be seen as modern. For Meyer et al. (1997), the diffusion of ideas of modernity occurs largely due to international level organizations, and the professionals who work within them. International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), provide not only an opportunity for “ideological discussion” (Meyer et al., 1997) on any topic, but are also a means of legitimizing such discourse.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also discuss mimesis as one of the processes through which isomorphism occurs. However, following along the lines of Meyer et al (1997), their primary argument states that structures are defined by a need for legitimacy. Fields that are highly structured are often so due to a level of ambiguity. This uncertainty in how to operate promotes imitation, which leads to homogeneity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Another aspect of rationalization concerns the definition of the field in which the standardization is occurring: for a field to exist it must be defined. This process of “structuration” involves an increase in interaction of relevant organizations as well as “the development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). The standard “sectors” of humanitarian aid such as health and nutrition, water and sanitation, and child protection can be seen as arising from such institutional interactions. I document the rise the education sector in humanitarian aid in Chapter III, especially as it pertains to mass displacement and emergency settings.

In reviewing the work of neo-institutionalists, Finnemore (1996) highlights
rationality as an inherent factor in modern bureaucracies, as well as a cultural value, structured in terms of means and ends. In western society, those ends are progress and justice (Finnemore, 1996). Although progress and justice may be the ends of rational thought, they can also provide the means for rationalization by highlighting the two types of discourse prevalent in much educational work. Progress is most often thought of in economic terms and can be seen to fit with ideas of education for the development of human capital, while notions of justice are synonymous with equality or liberation, and conjured in discussions of education as a human right (Finnemore, 1996). While typically embedded in international development education discourse and processes, these norms are reflected the process used to standardize educational responses to conflict and disaster.

Standardization can occur in one of three ways: through influence and authority gained by a large market share; through government regulation; or, as the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies (MSEE) were created, through voluntary consensus. Consensus standards value the multiple interests that created them and therefore attempt to avoid any undue influence by certain parties (Mendel, 2001). They can be specific rules defining the proper tool for a job or may define a broader “socially constructed product” (Meyer, 1997, p. 1). In either case, attempts are being made to create a formula to define and regulate activities (Mendel, 2001). In addition, Meyer (1997) proposes the idea of “content-free standardization” (p. 10), which looks at processes and procedures rather than outcomes and goals. Under this latter rubric, one may find a variety of policy goals and approaches to education in a given context—some even in conflict with each other—but share common processes, procedures, and derivative values that still have
legitimacy within the larger international institutional contexts despite their diversity. In essence “they tell organizations, regardless of substantive mission, how to manage, account, evaluate and regulate” (Meyer, 1997, p. 10). I detail such a phenomenon in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Chapter III.

Neo-institutionalists believe standardization arises from two main causes: homogenization and rationalization (Meyer, 1997). Accordingly, standardization occurs when there is perceived to be a “right way” to do things. Diverse situations have underlying commonalities and have arisen due to similar reasons. As such there is presumably one correct way of analyzing those situations. Meyer argues that standardization happens at a gentler pace in the human and social domains because of people’s resistance to non-universalistic ideas. In the aftermath of World War II for example, scientific rationalization provided a framework through which to see similarities across all people. As an organization, the UN embodied theses ideas and principles within a “common rationalized frame” (Meyer, 1997, p. 8), which in turn created an epidemic of standardization, which can be viewed as “a cultural phenomenon” (Meyer, 1997, p. 9). In the field of education, practices have become standardized under the influence of the West/North and the formal model of education has been copied and spread throughout the world. Much of this is due to not only the rationalization of education but also the increasing professionalization of practitioners (Meyer & Ramirez, 2003).

With this increasing professionalization, as well as the increasing importance of professionals, Chabbott (1998) has argued that standardization is not due to world models of influence alone, but rather to “organizational variables” (Chabbott, 1998, p.207). The
institutional processes within the field of international development organizations, she argues, largely drives worldwide educational change, and the key carriers of the proper ways of doing things are the professionals. Professionals, whether in the field of international development as discussed by Chabbott, or in humanitarian work, live within their own professional and institutional culture, defined by the norms and values they deem important, rather than being tied exclusively to their particular country or ethnicity. These norms and values essentially stem from a global or world culture that exists “above” the state level. As the participants in conferences such as the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) or the creation of the MSEE, a varied group is able to develop professional consensus and generate political commitment, two aspects crucial to the implementation of the MSEE. Established global norms, stemming largely from Western ideas of justice and progress influence and are, in turn, influenced by prevalent discourses in the fields of international development education (Chabbott, 2003; Meyer, 1997). The presence of both a human rights and a human capital based discourse has effected the form and function of education in emergencies and post-conflict settings, both directly and indirectly.

Neo-institutionalists and world culture theorists simultaneously acknowledge, however, that the rhetoric of globalism, institutional isomorphism, and world culture masks the specific local conditions of schools, and “de-link” from their original contexts dependent as they are on the history, culture, infrastructures, and power relations found only in particular sites. The result is that schools everywhere, but in emergency settings in particular, confront deep contradictions, competing expectations, unrealistic and often
opposing practices, and visions of schooling as it should be rather than as it is (Anderson-Levitt, 2003). For example, formalized schooling is supposed to be decentralized for local control and cultural context, but also standardized state-wide so as to hold schools and teachers accountable; teachers are to be professional and autonomous but also mandated to teach highly scripted curricula and meet strict national content standards; pedagogy is to be pupil-centered, active, participatory, and experiential, but also highly content-centered, test-driven, and teacher-centric; and the products of formal schooling—the graduates—are supposed to serve the internal-facing needs of their local communities as leaders, organizers, and critical thinkers, and fluent in their own culture and language, but also serve the needs of the external-facing state as loyal citizens, workers, and consumers and knowledgeable of the cultures and languages that reproduce global capitalist power relations (Pannu, 1996; Anderson-Levitt, 2003; Tabulawa, 2003).

As communities recover from disaster or conflict, few of these ideals are possible, not only because they are contradictory, but because they ignore the realities of conditions on the ground and the history of schooling and educational interventions among the effected communities. As such, the field of education in emergencies reflects a field of contestation and shifting power relations between multiple actors and multiple discourses around the form, function, and value of education for displaced children and the meanings and roles of the educated person in society.

Drawing from neo-institutionalist theory as well as from its critics, I intend argue in this dissertation that the refugee camp education policy multiplex is embedded in the
regulating institutional setting of the refugee camp, and despite their variations and sometime contradictory nature, together simulate the larger institutional culture of their promoters as well as of the institutions of the modern state, its manifest regulation of space, and subservience to institutional cultures and geopolitical power relations that are decoupled from the historical, political, and cultural realities on the “ground.” This policy multiplex—as I describe the many visions of the future projected onto refugee children in Chapter III—is oriented toward gaining external legitimacy among the constellation of state and international institutions dominant in the international refugee protection regime. The global constructions of refugee children and the institutional cultures of the actors that come to their aid drive the primary form and function of the refugee camp education system, but are also subverted, transformed and resisted by refugee communities as well as by the considerably restrictive, unpredictable, and changing conditions of war and displacement. Because institutional cultures are not value free, I argue furthermore that the preparation of refugee children for eventual return to (re)build modern state institutions is a primary objective of camp education; a neo-institutionalist state that emulates the bureaucratic rationalities and vaues of justice and progress so as to promote the legal, political, economic, and social environment suited to Western strategic interests.

Using a neo-institutionalist understanding of the state, the “modern state,” as I will refer to it throughout this thesis, is not the sum of the state’s legal, financial, human and

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3 I define education broadly here to include formal schooling, but also includes the educative spaces and processes inherent in encampment such as extracurricular activities, employment, aid distribution processes, and the spatial organization of the camp.
military resources. Rather it is a shifting set of relations between institutional actors both within the state, between states, and in the international and global fields. These relations sometimes compliment and sometimes conflict with each other, but are oriented toward external legitimacy. Their commonality lies in the enlightenment era values of scientific rationality, progress, and justice. They are expressed both through institutional policies and procedures as well as through its bureaucrats and professionals. But the institutional policies and procedures that derive from these relations must be measured against the ways in which they are subverted by their intended beneficiaries. The promotion, implementation, and transformation of formal schooling in mass displacement and post-conflict settings presents rich opportunities to research such phenomenon.

1.1.2 Faith in Formal Schooling and “The Hope Generating Machine”

Most investments in formal schooling have as their prerequisites a deeply held faith in schooling’s contribution to the creation of a modern society and the modern state, with “modern” usually defined as that which has legitimacy in the contemporary international arena, but which is also defined in opposition to “indigenous,” “primitive,” or “traditional.” This faith is palpably present among the constellation of international actors and institutions that deploy education in emergencies and post-conflict settings. Much of this faith is framed by political and economic discourse, especially among the leaders of developing countries and their march to emulate the developed and align themselves with international donor priorities, the Millenium Development Goals, and Education for All. It
is no coincidence that a symbiosis of faith in schooling conveniently exists between these
country’s political and military elites and the policymakers of international development
regimes who peddle education-as-salve and its accompanying resources. This can be seen
most clearly in the nearly uniform promotion of Education for All initiatives for the
world’s poorest nations no matter the historical or cultural context.

It may be, however, an altogether more complex phenomenon when examining the
symbiosis of faith in the peace-building and modernizing potential of education between
the modern state apparatus and the populations of developing world peoples who will send
their children to school, often at great economic and social expense—if not even their and
their children’s personal safety—despite scant evidence that jobs and prosperity await the
educated. It’s genesis may be found in what Max Weber (1930) identified as a
“disenchantment of the world,” an emancipation from a world of magic and fate as
determined by god(s) and replaced by a faith that salvation lies in rationalized structures
grounded in scientific and technical knowledge—government institutions, schools, and the
market, for example. The new religious elites in this formulation are the entrepreneurs,
professionals, scientists, and intellectuals who pronounce secularized and unconditionally
universalistic versions of the salvation story, along with the legislators, policymakers, and
technocrats who press it into practice. It is individuals, institutions, and states which have
become the highly legitimated entities whose interests are defined in equally universalistic
terms, and they are both expected and entitled to act as agents of a population’s interests
(Meyer and Jepperson 1996).
Education plays a moral and ethical role in narratives of modernity — education as salvation, as progress, as panacea, as liberation, as peace maker (s.f. Dewy, 1916; Friere, 1970; Sinclair, 2002; Vavrus, 2003). It was arguably the rise of faith in the free market, however, that became the solution to educational problems; a new magic or what Stronach (1993) calls “policy witchcraft”: “a form of reassurance as well as a rational response to economic problems.” Thought, reason, and rationality are treated as the new “secular salvation” themes of modernity, in which state-sanctioned, rational knowledge, and rational action plays a central role in dominant theories of the child, the family, and the citizen (Popkowitz, 2004). As Rushdoony (1963) laments in the conclusion of The Messianic Character of American Education:

Statist education increasingly assumes that (1) the child is the child of the state or property of the state, which can therefore interfere extensively with parental authority. (2) The state “priesthood” of educators are best able to rear the child and prepare him for life, viewed as statist life. (3) Statist education alone is “objective” and hence true, the state having the impartiality and transcendence of a god. Statist education is thus entrance into the true catholicity of the civil religion of the modern state (p. XX).

The state provision of formal schooling, it must be acknowledged, is always embedded in political currents. For example, education was used throughout colonial Africa to draw converts to Christianity, considered synonymous with the delivery of “civilization” and the production of “modern” citizens. Following WWII, formal education modeled after western institutions promoted the modern democratic citizen, as much an attempt to stem the rise of god-less socialism and communism, bolster the capitalist world centers by enveloping the resource-rich periphery, and provide the rationale for development assistance and its conditionalities during the decades of decolonization (McMichael, 1996).
For a time, modernity was considered a natural stage in the social and economic evolution of nations and investment in education merely an enabling mechanism in its inevitability (Rostow, 1960). Fueling mid to late twentieth-century modernization theory, Rostow’s highly influential, scientifically-argued faith in economic growth joined Adam Smith’s (1776) “invisible hand of the market” to expound a secular religiosity that fueled investment in human capital initiatives for decades. By the turn of the 20th century however, the temporal inevitability of development became largely debunked as the least developed countries experienced crippling political, economic and social decline despite heavy foreign investment and economic restructuring, leaving many in the economic periphery nostalgic for the days of Rostowian faith (Ferguson, 2006).

Yet modernization schema are far from the grave, and nostalgia indeed has a role to play. Echoing Stambach’s (2000) “schools-to-the-rescue models” and Tyack and Cuban’s (1997) notion of school reform as “tinkering toward utopia,” Vavrus’ (2003) investigation into the education-as-panacea theme in Tanzania reveals a complex interplay between political, economic, and social change since the colonial period. She argues that the desire for schooling comes largely out of parents’ recognition of a decreasing ability to make a living off the land and students’ increasing identification with an “educated class,” despite an overall environment of economic decline and government ineffectiveness if not outright corruption. Stressing the equally influential forces of the imagination and nostalgia, Vavrus also draws from Appadurai (1996) and Boym (2001) respectively to argue that collective visions of the future and of the past drive faith in the transformative effects of schooling, and not merely the content of what is learned there.
It is through this combination of the statist imagination with the very real benefits of having a family member, through a formal educational credential, gain access to the power and resources of the emerging state and its international interlocutors that the culture of the state began to grow throughout South Sudan, especially after colonial independence. This growth produced what Monique Nuijten (2003) calls “the hope generating machine,” a view of the state as that which can make anything possible, “that things will be different from now on” (197). Despite the inequalities and divisions it ultimately creates, the state-as-hope generating machine is impervious to the dysfunctions and corruption of its manifest bureaucracy and sometime repressions of its political elite, for few will blame the base concept of the state for the very real vicissitudes of state-sponsored oppression nor would most forfeit the power advantages of having a family member firmly ensconced in the state bureaucracy; in other words, the “strong influence of the culture of the state should not be confused with a strong state apparatus” (Nuijten 2003: 198). Throughout this thesis, I will draw from this perspective to make sense of why schooling, which in most parts of South Sudan has been for so long either irrelevant, oppressive, or ineffective, is increasingly sought to rescue a vulnerable pastoralist enterprise.

1.1.3 Governmentality

In confronting the relationship between states and a range of pastoralist and
transnational practices that meaningfully overlap with the state’s traditional functions, I have found it useful as suggested by Ferguson and Gupta (2002) to draw from the idea of “governmentality,” first introduced by Michel Foucault (1991). Foucault draws attention to all the processes by which the conduct of a population is governed: by institutions and agencies, including the state; by discourses, norms, and identities; and by self-regulation, techniques for the disciplining and care of the self. More recently, scholars have examined how the social and regulatory operations of the state are increasingly “de-statized,” and taken over by a proliferation of “quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations” (Rose 1996:56). This indicates a new modality of government rather than less government, and works by creating mechanisms that work “all by themselves” to bring about governmental results through the devolution of risk onto the “enterprise” or the individual (now construed as the entrepreneur of his or her own “firm”) and the “responsibilization” of subjects who are increasingly “empowered” to discipline themselves (see also Rose and Miller, 1992; Barry, et al. 1996; Burchell, 1996; Rose, 1996; O’Malley, 1998). I demonstrate this phenomenon in Chapter III where I examine the way governmentality is nurtured in and through the pedagogic spaces of the Kakuma Refugee Camp. I also examine how the practices of self-governance obtained in the camp subsequently manifest themselves in non-camp localities following repatriation.

I use the term statist governmentality throughout this thesis to describe what I have found to be a common objective through what are otherwise a multiplex of education policies, practices, and official and unofficial curricula promoted in the Kakuma Refugee Camp by the UNHCR and it’s INGO partners as well as in other emergency and post-crisis
settings. Never static and always changing, statist governmentality in this context reflects the ideal state in neo-institutionalist terms, into which is embedded the in-vogue humanitarian aid and development principles, global cultural scripts around rights discourses, displacement, and children, economic frameworks, and the enabling and constraining mechanisms of institutional bureaucracy, international law, and geopolitical interests that together earn state institutions legitimacy in the eyes of other states and international institutions. The end–result of a camp education is the refugee child who is envisaged to carry these knowledges, practices, and scripts back to the refugee producing state to initiate repair and renewal.

1.1.4 Communities of practice

State schooling in South Sudan has a unique and turbulent history that cannot be separated from the history and practices of agro-pastoralism. Since the changing relationship between state-building empires and the institutions of agro-pastoralism forms a central narrative in this thesis, I endeavor to understand contemporary Dinka educational practices using Lave and Wenger’s (1991) concept of “communities of practice.” In Chapter II and IV, I draw on this concept to get at the complex and often contradictory meanings of formal schooling in Dinka society.

In contrast to functionalist and Marxist conceptions of schooling and social reproduction, which are more concerned with Western contexts and over-emphasize the
school as a “conservatory of inherited tradition” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: 32), Lave and Wenger’s concept of communities of practice informs our understanding of the Dinka context more productively. Their concept allows for the simultaneous existence of multiple forms of knowledge acquisition which can be apart from, but also intersect with or nest within, each other. They conceive of learning as that which is situated in social practice and in relations between learners and those with higher degrees of mastery, which they call “situated learning” and “legitimate peripheral participation.” In this schema, everyone engages in producing and exchanging knowledge, moving within and altering the makeup of a community of practice, and in this process of ongoing exchange, knowledge and practice evolves as well. Thus, “learning, transformation, and change are always implicated in one another, and the status quo needs as much explanation as change” (57). Always embedded within conditions and power relations they have neither chosen nor can completely control, communities of practice “produce their own futures” by both conserving and altering the material social practices that define and enable them, producing new contradictions as they go. This conception allows for a dynamic view of culture, where the introduction of new knowledges and skills is met with both resistance and acceptance, but also is itself transformed so that the members of a community of practice simultaneously produce and reproduce cultural practices. Communities of practice around formal schooling imposed by external actors among the Dinka, in this conception, encounter other communities of practice that integrate or remake some aspects of formal schooling while rejecting others.
I use this perspective to account for the changing educational practices within Dinka society throughout their contemporary history. I examine in particular detail how recent war-induced migrations to refugee camps and the subsequent schooling that was obtained there impacted Dinka schooling practices, the roles and expectations of educated persons, and how these circular migrations fit into the history of schooling in South Sudan. Furthermore, I go on to examine how the return and reintegration of former refugees educated in camps influence emerging South Sudanese state institutions, as well as contribute to the attitudes and practices of the current generation of children. Given that migration for education is not only a long-time practice of Dinka children and their families, but one that has been a motivating factor in the movement of people around the globe for some time (Appadurai, 1996; Castles, 2000; Appiah, 2006), I will confront in the course of this investigation the different conceptions of belonging, space, and movement within a global “national order of things.” I will use Liisa Malkki’s concept, the *metaphysics of sedentarism*, to make sense of this issue.

1.1.5 The Metaphysics of Sedentarism

In many ways, the journey of the migrant is the inverse of the tourist. If the tourist, for the most part, travels backwards in time in which there is a return to the “present” of home, then the migrant travels forward in time with no promise of a restored home, even when migration turns out to be circular like in the case of repatriated refugees. Nomads and
pastoralists, however, construct ideas of “the present” and “home” that normalize patterns of migration and return. In essence, they are at home on the move. And so contemporary proclamations of a new global era of mobility, of non-places and transit points, (Augé 1995) are not so novel among communities like the Dinka of South Sudan. Yet in such a day and age, does the nomadic pastoralist share characteristics with the so-called neo-nomads of the new global order of space: labor migrants, diplomats, military brats, international business travelers, refugees, and their virtual or digital counterparts, who are also tethered to the sped-up undercurrents of geographic necessity, be it economic, ethnic, environmental, or political? Really, what does the international business magnate have in common with a Dinka herder? True, they tend toward greener pastures when the cycles of boom and bust necessitate it, taking their wealth (cattle or capital) along with them. Yet the former is valorized, representative of a global reorganization of space, while the latter is pathologized, remnants of an archaic or primordial past.

The global reorganization of space thus has its own power relationships and structural inequalities. It remains solidly within the larger organization of the globe into borders and states, which claim broad powers to regulate the movement of people and define who belongs. The pervasive assumption of a natural—or original—world in which people are rooted in their own proper soils or territories is described by Liisa Malkki (1997) as the “metaphysics of sedentarism”—through which a culture is equated with a people and that people with a bounded geographical place or territory. The assumptions of homogeneity and purity built into this model are at odds with the actual state of flux of peoples and cultures in increasing parts of the contemporary world. Nonetheless, this
racialized and territorialized model of culture continues to have enormous influence in both popular and academic consciousness. From this metaphysics then flows a further set of binary oppositions—between us and them, here and there, and our own and other cultures or societies. According to Malkki, this sedentarist perspective “actively territorializes our identities, whether cultural or national…[and] directly enables a vision of territorial displacement as pathological” (1997; 42, 62).

One picture which emerges in popular media is of migration born by “ethnic” violence producing genocide, civil war, and refugees. Another picture is populated with the value-laden innuendo of territorial promiscuity, where in the case of an international business person like the George Clooney character in the film, *Up In the Air* (2009), or a migrant worker loyal to the growing season rather than the homeland, identity is untethered to the culture of place and instead exists in a culture of time (Heller, 1995) or perhaps a global, cosmopolitan, or transnational culture (Cheah 1998, Levitt, et. al., 2002).

Against the metaphysical sedentarism that seeks to keep people(s) in their “proper” place, Malkki observes that we must pay urgent attention to the global social fact that, now perhaps more than ever before, [many] people are chronically mobile and routinely displaced, and invent homes and homelands in the absence of territorial, national bases—not “in-situ,” but through memories of, and claims on, places that they will never corporeally inhabit (1995: 100).

The displaced are indeed not inert in the process of their signification. In her study of Hutu refugees in exile from Burundi, Malkki (1995) observes that, in so far as the true nation was imagined as the moral community formed centrally by those in exile, their very displacement became a form of categorical purity to which they clung. Similarly,
Bisharat’s (1997) study of Palestinian refugee camps reveals that for the inhabitants, their refugee status became a badge of entitlement and of a moral claim which meant that their reluctance to leave the refugee camps for better temporary accommodation elsewhere was “a deliberate, conscious statement of their determination not to be assimilated...[in their place of exile] but to return to their ancestral villages” (217). Their refugee ID cards were felt to be the “promissory note” on the right of return.

Studies of the forced migration of children is thus faced with a dual hurdle: on the one hand, it is blinded by a pervasive sedentarist bias which constructs the displaced as a pathological embodiment of a “national order of things” (Malkki, 1995); and on the other hand it is limited in scope by its tendency to steer the research agenda toward policy solutions to crises, and as such, constructs the displaced as a problem to be solved; indeed I believe the field of education in emergencies is unproductively bounded by this dual bias. Together, these constructions act to both de-historicize and reify its subjects and de-link them from the larger structural inequalities that produce, and are produced by them. One way to avoid these hurdles is to bring the study of crises to the center and present the experiences and practices caused by these crises as a normal state of affairs. As mentioned in the introduction, I intend to do just that throughout this thesis.

It should be noted further that the African research site, in particular, is an ethnographic site that not only challenges western notions of “normalcy,” but also defies a unifying description of place; efforts to attribute wholeness and integration to its range of meaningful orders are doomed from the start. Indeed, globalization posed problems to the
ethnographers of urban Africa even before it was invented in academia. Epstein\(^4\) (1961), writing about Zambia's Copperbelt towns during the colonial period, bemoaned the challenges to ethnographic representation in "a society inchoate and incoherent, where the haphazard is more conspicuous than the regular, and all is in a state of flux" (29). Over three decades later, Ferguson (1999) did fieldwork in the same towns and, despite their tangible economic decline, was overcome with a similar sense of a runaway society. "Certainly," he affirms, "[Epstein's] description resonates with my own field experience" (18).

Despite the resonance between Epstein's and Ferguson's field experiences, it is not only three decades that separate them. Whereas Epstein's words convey a measure of despair before a perplexing diversity of practice and meaningful repertoires, Ferguson accepts diversity, on reflection, as an obvious characteristic of the Copperbelt social world. The three decades have made a traditional community study an implausible proposition in ethnography, and Ferguson defines as his analytical object "a mode of conceptualizing, narrating, and experiencing socioeconomic change and its encounter with a confounding process of economic decline" (1999:21). Although much of his insight builds on the social anthropology of Epstein's generation in so-called British Central Africa, Ferguson's ethnography also draws on a more recent interest in global space. Flows and movement are essential to the making of the Copperbelt social world, through institutions and ideas that are in global circulation. Among the Zambians in Ferguson's study, however, not all is

\(^4\) No relation to the author of this thesis
flow and transcendence. Ferguson shows how the economic decline of the Copperbelt is part of the global disconnect that marginalizes and yet does not isolate people such as impoverished Zambians.

The shifting predicaments of the displaced prompt me to join those scholars who ask whether globalism has, as Louie (2000) puts it, "carried the liberatory potential of transnational flows too far" (661; see also Ferguson 2006). Re-territorialization has come to complement perspectives on deterritorialization and the impact of schooling throughout the contemporary history of South Sudan has had this dual effect; the individuals profiled in this thesis who arrived in refugee camps as children and returned to South Sudan as educated young adults arrive back “home” not as disconnected to their “roots” but rather into a re-ordered world both familiar and strange. Many must navigate multiple institutional moralities as they attempt to revive a declining pastoral enterprise in large part through the very practices meant to dismantle it.

I do not, however, intend to frame these conditions—and the problems associated with establishing effective schooling in crisis effected settings—as a culture clash between the “global” institutions of the modern state and the “local” institutions of pastoralism. The local-global distinction rapidly loses its analytical value once it is properly interrogated. For not only is the so-called local an emergent property of nonlocal processes as I show in Chapter II, the so-called global also requires particular sites and terrains to operate, where it retains some semblance of its global imaginations, but which are ultimately transformed and in many cases resisted by its imagined beneficiaries. As education in emergency and
post-conflict settings becomes increasingly standardized, global models of formal schooling--cited as the salve for communities and states recovering from war and disaster—must come under critical scrutiny should we desire to understand its particular manifestations and impacts in settings like the pastoralist communities of South Sudan.

1.2 Researching Refugees

1.2.1 Ethnography and Displacement

Loizos’ *The Heart Grown Bitter* (1981) and Harrell-Bond’s *Imposing Aid* (1986) are two of the earliest ethnographies to have described the experience of refugees and internally displaced peoples in camps, spontaneous settlements, and countries of asylum. Since then, some studies covered several decades and were able to examine over time processes set in motion by uprooting (Habarad, 1987; Gilad, 1990; Peteet, 1995; Hirschon, 1998). More recently, anthropologists and other social scientists have examined the experiences of repatriation and reintegration (Allen and Morsink 1994; Black and Koser 1999; Hammond 2004). Other ethnographies focus on the institutions created to deal with massive population displacements, or on the emergence of new international diasporas through which the displaced keep in touch with one another and with people in the homeland (Bousquet, 1987; Fuglerud, 1999; Loizos, 1999; Wahlbeck, 1999; Tambiah, 2000). For example, Bascom (1998) examines the transformation of rural East Africa
through refugee flows and Sommers (2001) describes the life-worlds of urban refugees from Burundi in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Ethnographic work has also been carried out on development- and environmentally-induced displacement (Kiste, 1968, 1974; Scudder and Colson, 1979; Fahim, 1981; Salisbury, 1986; Salem-Murdoch, 1989; Wali, 1989; Dreze, Sampson, and Singh 1997; Mahapatra, 1999; de Wet, 2005). Some ethnographic studies of displacement now have time depths that allow us to examine resettlement as a continuing process (Jing, 1996; Colson, 1999). They cover a spectrum of dispossession and allow for a comparison of the experience of those officially resettled as communities with what happens when people are left to find their own way. Anthropologists have also explored how host populations are affected by the arrival of large numbers of refugees and other displaced persons (Salem-Murdoch, 1989). Others have found new ethnographic sites in the world of non-governmental organizations and humanitarian agencies that structure much of the refugee experience (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Baines 2004).

Malkki (1997) considers the ethnographic study of these “familiar forms of humanitarianism” as essential for the discovery of better ways of conceptualizing, designing, and challenging them (225). She casts doubt on the validity of research focused on refugees per se and, by extension, the more general category of the forced migrant, who, she says, “do not constitute a naturally self-delimiting domain of anthropological knowledge” since their uprooting is due to “extraordinarily diverse historical and political causes and involve people who while all displaced, find themselves in qualitatively
different situations and predicaments” (1995: 496). Dealing with them as victims, as persons knowable only through their need, she claims, dehumanizes and dehistoricizes the refugee (1997: 224).

Berger (1984) makes the argument that movement around the globe be regarded as the “quintessential experience of our time” (55), with emigration, banishment, exile, labor migrancy, tourism, and urbanization are our central cultural motifs. Rootlessness and displacement, living between a lost past and fluid present are in the present day considered the most fitting metaphors for the modern consciousness: “typical symptoms of a modern condition at once local and universal” (Nkosi 1994: 5). It may however, be one of the grand clichés of social theory, going back to Weber and Durkheim, that locality, a sense of place and belonging, comes under siege in modern societies. For whether in the most intimate, geographically confined places or in the nomadic life-world of constant upheaval and uncertainty, locality must be actively maintained through the production of the local subject, whether by ritual (i.e. festivals, epic narratives, rights of passage), lineage (i.e. kinship, sects, geneologies), material (i.e. houses, gardens, neighborhoods), or indeed through formal and informal education.

1.2.2 Vertical Case Study

Hardy et al. (2001) describe the interconnectedness, dynamism and integration among various systems that deal with the displaced as “social” subjects and as “research”
subjects. Adopting an actor-network theory, they consider the net-like systems of actors (governments, non-governmental organizations and community organizations) involved in the production of the “social subject”—the displaced—and draw a parallel with the integrated systems of actors, researchers and the research community (peer reviews, journals, etc.) involved in the production of the “research subject”—the displaced as a subject of academic inquiry. Within and across these systems, as Foucault (1980) writes, power circulates:

Foucault’s insights into the workings of power have been used to understand refugees’ predicaments in general. Hardy (2003) investigated the dynamics of power in refugee determination systems in three countries to challenge the view that determination systems function according to rational decision-making processes of the State. Hendrie (1997) employed them to analyze a famine relief operation with Tigrayan refugees in eastern Sudan in 1984/1985, and showed that certain discourses of “famine” led to the dominance of certain kinds of institutional practices that altered the original intentions of policy makers. Triantafillou and Nielsen (2001) examined two empowerment projects for refugee women and showed that the recasting of empowerment from its usual meaning of transfer of power to a Foucauldian analysis of technologies of power, revealed that the
subjects sought to create self-governing and responsible individuals in the western liberal
democratic sense.

Just as the actions of refugees in a refugee camp are heavily constrained and
enabled by shifting positionalities in the camp, so too are they constrained and enabled as
returnees back in their home communities. Thus a researcher must consider the
positionalities among students, school staff, parents, and NGO and government staff with
an understanding that each group, while not homogenous, have both shared perceptions
which reflect participation in a shared social system, and divergent perceptions and
assumptions, which reflect the circulation of power within this shared social landscape. As
a researcher, I of course bring characteristics, theories, assumptions and constructions,
personal history, and position in a larger economic and cultural milieu that interconnect
with the life-worlds of actors in the community in which I am conducting my research. So
in order to effectively investigate this dynamic, a vertical case-study method was employed
to structure my research methods.

Case study methods are not new to comparative and international education
(Vavrus and Bartlett, 2006). Crossley and Vulliamy (1984) for example, identify three
case-study traditions in the broader field of education—the anthropological, the
sociological, and the evaluative—and contend that there is a common conviction regarding
the centrality of contextual understanding and detailed micro-level research. They make an
epistemological ‘case for the case’ by arguing that what can be known about one context
cannot be assumed to be true in another context. This issue, which they call “ecological
validity” (p. 198), highlights the importance of examining how cultural, economic, historical, and political forces within a given context play out in schooling (see also Vulliamy, 1990). As Broadfoot (1999) argues, “education can only be fully understood in terms of the context in which it is taking place…. The unique contribution of comparative studies is that of providing for a more systematic and theorized understanding of the relationship *between* context and process, structure and action” (225-226).

The vertical case study differs from the traditional ethnographic case study described by Crossley and Vulliamy (1984) in its concomitant commitment to micro-level understanding and to macro-level analysis. It strives to situate local action and interpretation within a broader cultural, historical, and political investigation. According to Vavrus and Bartlett (2006), the vertical case should be “grounded in a principal site—e.g., a school, a community, an institution, or a government ministry—and should fully attend to the ways in which historical trends, social structures, and national and international forces shape local processes at this site” (p.96). In other words, local understandings and social interactions should not be considered demographically or geographically bounded, though beginning in a geographic or institutional setting allows for a comparison of discourses and practices at multiple levels. In a vertical case study, “understanding of the micro-level is viewed as part and parcel of larger structures, forces, and policies about which the researcher must also develop a full and thorough knowledge.” In this way, the vertical case study has enabled me as a researcher to ethnographically link the village, refugee camp, and international bodies such as the UNHCR.
1.2.3 The research subject: Defining the displaced

From the outset, studies of displacement have been dogged by terminological difficulties. As Zetter (1988) noted in an opening editorial for the Journal of Refugee Studies, the term “refugee” is one that has found favor in popular discourse over the course of this century. Indicating uprootedness and exile, it often implies a dependence on humanitarian intervention and a rupture of “normal” social, economic and cultural relations. The refugee is commonly distinguished from the economic migrant, as someone who is forced to migrate, rather than somebody who has moved for reasons the international community considers to be “unforced.” The category of “refugee” also remains deeply consequential in international law. As such, a refugee is a person with particular experiences and needs for whom special measures of public policy are justified. When refugees are explicitly defined at all, the 1951 Geneva Convention definition (as amended by the New York Protocol of 1969) is most commonly used, whereby a refugee is someone who is outside their own country due to a "well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Some argue that the term simply reflects the designation of refugee enshrined in a particular Convention at a particular time, within a particular international political and economic context. As such, it could be argued to be devoid of any deeper academic meaning or explanatory power - it is what Andrew Sayer would call a
"chaotic conception" (Sayer, 1982). However, the category still largely defines the flow of resources and the prospect of military intervention and asylum; thus while it may be arbitrary, it remains part of a technology of power that defines who belongs where.

More recent work on refugees has tended to adopt a rather broader interpretation of the term refugee than that defined by the actions of international organizations (Ager, 1999). Yet, there is still far from a clear consensus on what the term - and more importantly the field of refugee studies - should or should not include and, indeed, criticism that the field as a whole has remained under-theorized (Hein, 1993; Nyers 2006). Some academic work has argued for an extension of the refugee definition to include other types of forced migrants. There are various terms in use that describe forced migrants of one kind or another. Some have a specific meaning in national or international policy, including the term “refugee” as well as others such as “asylum-seeker,” “humanitarian refugee” (in certain countries) and “stateless person.” Others denote more generalized categories such as exiles, expellees, transferees, and even economic refugees, as some term those forced to migrate by poverty, underdevelopment or social exclusion (Richmond, 1993).

The term internally-displaced person (IDP) has also gained increasing attention as scholars have sought to highlight the similarities between forced migrants who have and have not been displaced across international frontiers (Lee, 1996; Davies, 1998; Cohen and Deng, 1999). The notion of environmental refugees has periodically appeared as an issue demanding the attention of academic researchers and policymakers (Jacobson, 1988;
Myers and Kent, 1995), with the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) playing an important role in attempting to popularize the term (El Hinnawi, 1985). Similarly, the notion of development-induced displacement has received a fair amount of attention both in edited volumes (Thukral, 1992; McDowell, 1996; Dreze et al, 1997; Cernea and McDowell, 2000) and academic articles (Scudder, 1993; Parasuraman, 1999), with significant contributions coming from within the World Bank.

Some authors offer typologies of different kinds of voluntary and involuntary migrations (Kunz 1981; Zolberg et. al. 1989; Richmond 1988, 1993; Hein 1993), but these attempts are not without their critics (McGregor, 1993; Kibreab, 1997). Much of this debate, and subsequent implications for international action, arises out of distinctions between human rights and social and economic rights, framed by debates in the United Nations while crafting its relevant charters and declarations. While “human rights” have at least gained more universal recognition, “social and economic” rights remain hotly debated and widely un-ratified. It may be necessary to take seriously the warning of Bascom (1998) that there is no 'theory of refugees' and accept that, as such, there is not going to be. As Malkki (1995) argues:

The term refugee has analytical usefulness not as a label for a special, generalizable “kind” or “type” of person or situation, but only as a broad legal or descriptive rubric that includes within it a world of socio-economic statuses, personal histories, and psychological or spiritual situations. (496)

My research on forced migrants in South Sudan has proven this true, as migration has been a normal part of pastoralist life for the Dinka and forms a major part of their oral mythology, retelling their migration from areas in Northern Sudan and even in some
versions from ancient Egypt (Beswick 2004). As schooling and formally educated people became more integrated in Dinka society, the enduring scarcity of educational infrastructure made it necessary for children to travel long distances, commonly staying with distant relations who lived near a school and to Khartoum for post-primary education, and constantly changing locations as many decades of war and chronic famine visited South Sudan. Travel for education in particular, both within the country as well as beyond its borders, has long been a normal part of life for Dinka families. This fact complicates the labels of refugee, IDP, and returnee even further. The labels to which Malkki refers above, however, do carry particular implications for the re-ordering of power and space in communities where a large portion of the population, for whatever reason they left in the first place, have come home. Only through ethnographic research can one begin to understand the local complexities and implications of this re-convergence, a phenomenon of re-emplacement that is increasingly common all over the world.

1.3 Data Collection

Data for this dissertation was collected in two primary locations; 1) the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya between June and August of 2007 and 2) the village of Malou in Gogrial East County, Warrap State, South Sudan, and surrounding schools and villages between March and August of 2009 and in November of 2010. A former refugee who had returned to the Malou area just prior to my arrival was hired as a research assistant and translator for my research there. As sanctioned by the University of Wisconsin-Madison
Internal Review Board, oral informed consent was obtained for all participants and parental consent was obtained prior to including participants under the age of 18. Oral rather than written consent was obtained by all participants due to low literacy levels throughout the research area as well as the sensitivity of my research questions regarding experiences and roles during war-time. Informed consent scripts were read to all participants in Dinka unless another language was preferred. Most interviews were conducted in Dinka; those conducted in English were done so by preference of the research participant. All formal and semi-formal interviews were audio recorded. Extensive field notes were taken for all other research activities.

1.3.1 Research methods and timeline

A. Kakuma Refugee Camp

Research period: May 15th to August 15th

I undertook a number of research activities to compare practices around asylum, encampment, schooling, and repatriation among youth and their families in and outside schools in Kakuma. My school-based research activities included observation, participant observation, interviews, and focus group discussions. I documented school physical and administrative structures; pedagogical practices; student-student, teacher-teacher, and student-teacher interactions; and attitudes about the role of education in their future. I interviewed teachers, aid workers, and students, and observed classrooms in a camp.
secondary school. I spent a few days with a team of school evaluators conducting evaluations of the camp primary schools. The team, all of whom were refugees, worked for the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the NGO contracted by the UNHCR to manage education programs in the camp. I also interviewed LWF staff in Kakuma and their headquarters in Nairobi.

In addition to school-based activities, I accompanied staff from the World Food Program to observe food distribution in the camp, and attended a camp management council and an agricultural project with the host Turkana community. I also accompanied a WFP security guard, a Turkana, to his family home near the camp. I accompanied staff from the international non-governmental agency Film Aid on their various projects, showing movies in the camp and conducting a participatory video project with camp youth.

B. Southern Sudan

Research period: March 10th to August 15th, 2009

I went to Malou as a volunteer teacher and teacher trainer invited by the founder of one of the schools nearby, and I lived on the compound of World Vision adjacent to the village. None of the activities I conducted in this capacity involved grading any students or issuing performance evaluations of teachers. I conducted a series of teacher training sessions and subsequent teacher support in the form of formal trainings and consultations. I

5 Malou is a pseudonym.
had been asked to cover the topics of non-corporal discipline and classroom management, learner-centered pedagogy, and cooperative and experiential learning as well as support the teaching of English, the language of instruction in southern Sudan and Kenya. I set aside specific times each week for drop-in teacher support. It was during the first month of my work with these teachers that I got to know them and develop rapport in preparation to obtain informed consent to conduct on-going participant observations with them for the duration of my research period.

With the consent of teachers and school administration in this and one other school near Malou, I spent the majority of my days observing all aspects of the school and interacting with the students who attended and the people who worked there. I observed teachers in the classroom who have a variety of displacement experiences and informally interviewed many of them. I then selected 6 teachers with a variety of displacement experiences and conducted a series of semi-structured interviews that looked more deeply at issues of displacement, schooling and identity.

About three weeks after my arrival Malou, I began traveling around the county to other schools and villages, collecting some basic enrollment and school statistics. I used the standard data form from the Southern Sudan Education Census being conducted at the time. I visited a total of 15 schools in addition to the two school in and near Malou.

After one month in Malou, I began to assist an English teacher in a few English classes in one of the schools. The teacher was chronically absent, having to travel long distances and stay with friends when school was in session. I covered for him when he was
unable to get to school. I conducted a number of academic activities with these students in order to get to know them better for the purposes of selecting 3 students and their families to participate in research I intended to conduct outside of school. One activity was aimed at constructing a visual life history of themselves and their parents through map making. Students were then asked to label their maps, write short sentences describing various points of interest, and then briefly present their maps to the class. This activity as well as the following one were drawn directly from the South Sudan English Language curriculum booklets.

In a second activity I asked students to describe two future scenarios: one imagining what they would ideally like their life to be like in ten years, and one imagining what they realistically believe their life will be like in ten years. Like in the first activity, students were asked to briefly present their two scenarios. These activities served two purposes. It allowed me to understand the variety of life histories and spatial trajectories during the recent civil war, get a sense of the student’s class identification, and with what images, ideas, and practices they populate their imaginations of the future. I used these materials to draw a sample of 3 students with whom to spend time outside of school to conduct individual, semi-structured interviews and conduct participant observations with them and their families.

Originally, there were two boys and one girl in the group of students I selected. The girl, however, was sent by her family to live with her uncle in Wau, the nearest urban area. Because the travel times in the area to get from one village or school to the next were very
long, I decided not to replace this participant. I was able to conduct interviews and spend time with a few of the two other participants’ female relations, sisters and cousins, to in part make up for the lack of a female participant in this part of the research. I spent one to two days a week after school with each student and their families, conducting semi-structured and informal interviews with their parents, siblings, extended relations, and neighbors. I accompanied them on their walks home from school (which was 7 miles), and “hung out” with them in the market and other leisure and recreation spaces. I continued these activities throughout the research period. By doing so, I was able gain a better understanding of the daily lives of these students and their family members.

After 3 months in Malou, I held a series of four focus groups with teachers and students from each school: one with teachers who were former refugees, one with teachers who remained in Sudan (there were no female teachers), one with male students, and one with female students. All teachers were invited to participate in the focus group discussions, and 8 participated out of 12. The students in the 6th grade English class, with whom I had been spending time as a substitute teacher, constituted the boys’ focus group, totaling 7. All girls in 4th grade and above were invited and 5 out of about 15 participated. In every case, participation was voluntary and informed consent was collected in advance. There were no incentives and the focus groups were held right after school.

From the start of my research in and around Malou, I conducted semi-structured interviews and observations with government officials and international nongovernmental organization (INGO) staff involved in education, public safety and justice, reconstruction
and development, health care, and other services. I interviewed Individuals of different generations in Malou and in different positions in the government and NGOs. I conducted extended participant observations in the town market and two INGO compounds, one of which I lived in. I observed a traditional Dinka healing ceremony, a ritual bull slaughter, a groundbreaking for an agricultural training center and a maternal health center, the drilling of bore holes, and a number of education ministry meetings and trainings, including those having to do with the ongoing national education census.

C. South Sudan II

Research Period: November 1st to November 20th, 2010

I was able to travel back for a brief stay in Malou in late 2010 to follow-up with some of my research participants, especially the students and families with whom I had spent the most time during the main period research there. Over three weeks, I visited these families, the school that I volunteered in, and some of the INGOs that participated in the research. During this time, I conducted semi-structures and informal interviews and observations, learning about what had taken place over the year since I had been there. I followed up on themes emerging from my initial data analysis, such as the decision making processes involved in parent’s decisions whether to send a child to school and for how long.

D. Archival research and document collection
In addition to the time I spent in Kakuma and Malou, I collected academic research, documents and oral accounts of past and current regional, national and international policies and practices pertaining to displacement, education in emergencies, post-conflict peace-building, and statecraft in South Sudan, and especially in or near the regions where I worked, before, during and after the terms of my field research. I was particularly interested in those of bi- and multi-lateral institutions, governmental and non-governmental institutions, and community organizations operating in the areas of interest, and relevant local, county and national government ministries, as well as existing ethnographies and histories of South Sudan and the Dinka. I paid particular attention to publications and policies pertaining to repatriation, reintegration and post-conflict recovery activities as well as education.

E. Data Analysis

All notes, audio recordings, collected media, photographs, and institutional documents were transcribed and coded during and shortly after the data collection period. The following primary codes were used as a starting point to begin analysis of the data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Exile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Government/governance</td>
<td>War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>African</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>Homeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Belonging/Membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>Displacement</td>
<td>Outsider/other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data analysis focused on the comparison of curricula, pedagogical practices, and community relations in multiple school settings; the social, economic, and political practices of educated returnees and their families as well as educated and non-educated stayees; and how education was situated in aspirations of the future from a variety of local, national, and international perspectives and individuals.

**Research Frames and Codes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparative Frames</th>
<th>Vertical Frames</th>
<th>Temporal Frames</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Village/Payam/Boma</td>
<td>Pre-colonial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>County/State</td>
<td>Colonial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>1st Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Adults</td>
<td>International/Transnational</td>
<td>2nd Civil War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth/Children</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Post-CPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced (refugees/IDPs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-displaced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle keeper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not educated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3.2 *Procedural and Ethical Notes*

The ethnography of displaced people faces multiple methodological and ethical challenges, especially when researchers become deeply involved and familiar with their subjects. Researchers living or working among refugees may be more likely to accept a particular “imagined” history, or become incorporated into refugees’ survival strategies. It is difficult in these situations to resist charitable acts, nor should one altogether refrain from them. But it raises the methodological problem of reactivity—where the active
presence of the researcher potentially influences the behavior and responses of subjects. Of course, all research affects subjects, but the greater the researchers’ involvement, the greater the effect is likely to be. When subjects are like refugees—many of whom are marginalized and poor—the methodological problems fade into ethical ones.

Other problems concern implicitly or explicitly condoning or enabling illegal behavior or taking sides in conflicts. Most social scientists who have worked in the humanitarian field know of researchers who have helped people commit illegal acts, such as smuggling food and people across borders. Academics have also been known to engage in quasi-military activities, aiding or fighting counter-insurgency. Tacit approval of these acts is not easy to avoid, even when there is no complicity. It raises ethical concerns that need to be considered.

The security and well being of the participants in this study were of primary importance. I protected all research subjects’ identities through the use of pseudonyms of names and specific localities in this dissertation. Where I recorded particular case studies and life histories, aliases were used in all research materials including notebooks and transcriptions. I uploaded computer files and digital audio to a remote secure server in the United States through the Apple MobileMe service, and saved on an external hard drive which was stored in a safe along with all notebooks and digital audio tapes at the World Vision Compound in Malou where I stayed. There are no photographs or video of my primary research subjects.
I am very much aware of the fact that doing research among groups of people living in unstable or dangerous environments is inevitably a navigation through multilayered stories (Utas, 2004). The production of different stories for different audiences is a method of survival in unstable or difficult life realms. For example, interviews with research subjects in spaces where humanitarian aid is a prominent feature often respond in “victim modes” and tend to conceal many important aspects of lived experience (Fleischman & Whitman, 1994; Goowin-Gill & Cohn, 1994; Brett & McCallin, 1996). This is to say, respondents such as refugees or internally displaced people often express their individual agency by representing themselves as powerless victims. It is a tactical manipulation in part aimed at presenting an image in line with Western cultural ideals, but also as a political response to real security threats, and as an economic strategy in relation to humanitarian aid projects and, as such, can be both an obstacle and provide insight to my research. This is particularly an issue for quantitative, short-term research designs. As my research was qualitative and long-term, where I spent considerable time with my research participants, I attempted to directly address these issues, especially by spending a month or more in my research locations before I began formally collecting data.

It also must be noted that my association as a volunteer with one of the schools in my research may have predetermined my initial relations with potential research participants. This was likely not completely mitigated, particularly since I chose to work with a group of students who were in some of my classes and teachers who were both colleagues and research participants, even though I did not evaluate anyone’s performance or give grades, something I purposefully arranged so that it would not interfere with my
relationship with research participants. Furthermore, as a male researcher, my access to girls and young women was limited and so I also acknowledge that my data on gender issues is tentative. In addition to my position as a western male researcher, these multilayered relations established particular power relationships that cannot be fully overcome and must be acknowledged as a weakness. I figured this issue deeply in the accuracy of the data I collected and attempted to gain multiple perspectives on particularly important issues so as to triangulate their credibility. Again, the long-term, qualitative aspects of my research design, especially the time I spent with students outside the school setting, addressed this issue to some degree.
II: A Cultural History of Schooling Among the Dinka of South Sudan

In order to understand the meanings that contemporary Dinka children and their families give to schooling and the educated person, it is necessary to understand something of how they arrived at them. A review of Sudan’s colonial and post-colonial history and the regimes of external governance and aid through which formal schooling arrived is therefore required. What follows in this chapter is offered less as an original contribution to the historical and ethnographic record of the Dinka, but rather a reinterpretation of research done by others—most notably Godfrey Lienhardt, Francis Deng, David Sconyers, Lilian Passmore Sanderson and Neville Sanderson, Robert O. Collins, Stephanie Beswick, and Jok Madut Jok, among others. This chapter will organize the history of schooling in Sudan into three periods—colonial, the first civil war, and the second civil war—and examine the moral and spatial economies of schooling behind each period, describing the justifications and intended purposes for its provision, how and where it was provided, and who attended school and why. I also include a description of Dinka cultural history and use Lave & Wenger’s (1991) concept of communities of practice to set up my subsequent analysis of how the emerging practices of educated and school-going boys and girls stood apart from, but also overlapped, intersected, and nested in the practices of existing age, gender, territorial, and kinship groups in Dinka society.

While much of the academic work around the history of schooling in the South has focused on locating blame for the cultural, religious, and linguistic bifurcation of the Sudan
into Northern and Southern identities, foretelling its ultimate disintegration (Sconyers, 1978; F. Deng, 1971; Sanderson and Sanderson, 1982; Collins, 2005; Jok, 2007), little has been focused on how this history has subsequently influenced the contemporary educational practices of the South’s majority pastoralist peoples, aside from highlighting the infrastructural and socioeconomic deficits that resulted (s.f. Sommers, 2005; L.B. Deng, 2006). In fact, an accounting of the existing educational practices of communities where there has historically been little to no access to formal schooling is seldom considered in tandem with efforts to remedy its absence—it is assumed that they are people without an educational history. In this chapter, I will argue that the history of schooling in Southern Sudan does not simply tell us that the South was neglected and developmentally behind in a teleological sense, the narrative upon which so many contemporary accounts of this history focus and from which justifications for an internationally supported dose of catch-up are supported (UNESCO, 2011). Rather, the very meaning of formal schooling and its uses to pastoralist communities emerged in particular ways, through colonial policy precedents despite their contradictory character and meager provision, and also through existing interpretive frameworks embedded in Dinka communities of practice and oral histories of literacy. These precedents were then subsequently transformed by an oppressive post-colonial state and intra-Southern violence, expanding both the spatial attributes of schooling and the political and economic meanings of education credentials.

Below, I describe how formal schooling in Southern Sudan turned from a weak and irrelevant Missionary project into a deeply complex and contradictory set of meanings over
the past 80 years; as an alternative source of wealth for the maintenance of pastoralist institutions made vulnerable by decades of war and as a symbol of resistance and Southern nationalism, but also as a source of competition for power, extreme intra-Southern violence, and lingering cultural skepticism of the emerging educated elite. What education policy makers in South Sudan confront today are not only infrastructural, institutional, and human capital deficits, but also deeply embedded cultural conceptions of what it means to be an educated person in contemporary Dinka society. These meanings consistently confound Western expectations of what schooling is supposed to do for South Sudan’s majority pastoralists, for the country, and indeed for most marginalized children and their families throughout the post-colonial world. As South Sudan navigates is first years as an independent state, understanding the historical influences behind contemporary pastoralist practices around schooling is thus more important then ever for academics and policy makers alike.

2.1 Dinka Communities of Practice and the Introduction of Formal Schooling

Francis Deng (1973) describes the Dinka social system as one comprised of “territorial groups, decent groups, sex groups, age groups, the individual, the ancestors and the spirits, and, now, the educated” (6). Although the influence of this latter group among the Dinka was not consequential until nearly 50 years after the British re-conquered the Sudan in 1898, the ways in which existing groups conceived of and interacted with
educated members and the increasing numbers of children spending their time in schools is essential to understanding contemporary Dinka social practices.

The Dinka have been the subject of study by anthropologists nearly since the field’s modern inception, most notably by Evans-Pritchard (1934), Stubbs and Morison (1938), Lienhardt (1961), F. Deng (1971), Jok (2001), and Beswick (2004). While the subject of formal schooling is included in some of these works, it was the primary focus of studies by Beshir (1969), Sconyers (1978), Sanderson and Sanderson (1981), Marc Sommers (2005), and L.B. Deng (2006). These works build a historical and political account of colonial neglect, missionary proselytizing, cultural intransigence, state oppression, organized resistance, and most prominently, war as they related to the provision, perversion, destruction, and reconstruction of Western forms of education in the South. With the exception of F. Deng (1971), the impact of this history on contemporary Dinka social practices, however, is not addressed. To do this, and to reinterpret F. Deng’s take on schooling and modernization, I shall draw on Lave and Wenger’s (1991) concept of communities of practice to get at the complex and often contradictory meanings of formal schooling in Dinka society.

In contrast to functionalist and Marxist conceptions of schooling and social reproduction, which are more concerned with Western contexts and over-emphasize the school as a “conservatory of inherited tradition” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: 32), Lave and Wenger’s concept of communities of practice fits the Dinka context more productively. Their concept allows for the simultaneous existence of multiple forms of
knowledge acquisition which can be apart from, but also intersect with or nest in each other, by conceiving of learning as that which is situated in social practice and in relations between learners and those with higher degrees of mastery, which they call “situated learning” and “legitimate peripheral participation.” In this schema, everyone engages in producing and exchanging knowledge, moving within and altering the makeup of a community of practice, and in this process of ongoing exchange, knowledge and practice evolve as well. “Learning, transformation, and change are always implicated in one another” (57). Always embedded within conditions and power relations they have neither chosen nor can completely control, communities of practice “produce their own futures” by both conserving and altering the material social practices that define and enable them, producing new contradictions as they go. This conception allows for a dynamic view of culture, where the introduction of new knowledge and skills are met with both resistance and acceptance, but also they are themselves transformed so that the members of a community of practice simultaneously produce and reproduce cultural practices. Under this rubric, externally imposed forms of formal schooling encounter Dinka communities of practice that conserve themselves by integrating or remaking some aspects of formal schooling while rejecting others. Five Dinka cultural practices in particular are relevant to this discussion: acephaly, mobility, the age-set system, the cattle complex, and non-literacy.

2.1.1 Acephaly and Mobility
To most of the historians and anthropologists of South Sudanese and Dinka education, the fierce conservatism of the agro-pastoralist communities in the South who made up—and still do—the majority of its population appeared to present the most significant hurdle to the colonial era introduction of formal schooling. In fact it was many things and it would be more accurate to assert that the Dinka assimilated various forms of external influence on their own terms. The considerable number of Dinka clans and sub-clans who continue to live in the rural areas of Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and Upper Nile are primarily raisers of cattle, subsistence farmers, and fishermen who contrive to live in polygamous family units within extended patrilineal kinship groups by migrating from small islands of high ground homesteads which are not completely flooded in the rainy season to annual cattle camps along limited stretches of riverain pasture that persist throughout the long dry season. In the past, as kinship groups and cattle wealth grew larger through marriage and cattle camps became more crowded, ambitious members would split off with their immediate kin to found new groups and cattle camps (Beswick, 2004). Until recently, the availability of land accommodated these cycles of migration, political reorganization, and adaptation to new social and environmental ecologies so as to make the Dinka adeptly mobile and flexible, while also uninterested in sedentarist and centralized routines.

This cycle of migratory fission and fusion also made for highly atomized political organization and constantly changing leadership figures which in turn frustrated external, highly bureaucratized and centralized forms of power and control. This acephalous political organization of Dinka society consistently confounded external powers of any
kind, whether Arab or European, Muslim or Christian. Although the Dinka have paramount and subordinate chiefs associated with clans and sub-clans, their influence was limited to the extent of a chief’s ability to persuade their members to follow their leadership (Lienhardt, 1961; Deng, 1971) Other more persuasive or spiritual personalities have numerous times in the past moved multiple Dinka communities to act in uncharacteristic unison, often in response to overwhelming external threats, only to politically re-atomize in the aftermath (Beswick, 2004). Throughout their modern history, these spiritual personalities included both Dinka spiritual leaders called Masters of the Fishing Spear, and even church clergy. The lack of central political entities—and the unacknowledged existence of such societies by British colonial administrators—was a major catalyst for the violent subjugation of the Dinka and their pastoralist neighbors, the Nuer, by colonial armies as they misidentified acephaly with belligerence. It was also a source of the inability of these same powers to effectively govern them (Deng, 1971; Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981). This negative relationship came to characterize Dinka attitudes with externally imposed projects of state-making for at least four generations. Unfortunately, many Dinka would become nostalgic for British colonial rule as it paled in comparison to the oppression and hardships they endured after independence with the post-colonial state.

As a statist technology of surveillance and control, formal schooling was

… for a long time lost on the average Dinka. There was no indigenous role that it could improve his capacity to fill; on the contrary, by restricting his opportunities to learn, by observation and experience, the skills of a highly specialized transhumant pastoralist and of a warrior, it dis-educated him from the fundamental roles of an adult male” (Sanderson & Sanderson 1981: 7).
Comparatively, other communities in the South with more centralized political organizations, such as the Shilluk or Baganda, both of whom maintained strong central monarchies and subservient “king’s men,” took to colonial rule and schooling more quickly—and less violently—than their Dinka and Nuer neighbors in large part because they “lacked only literacy to be transformed into a bureaucracy proper” (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981: 5). The products of a literate class could not only be absorbed, but were also seen to directly enhance royal power. These centralized structures of power also afforded them considerably more organized militaries, which likely motivated the British to negotiate for their allegiance rather than send troops on violent punitive patrols to force their subjugation, a policy prosecuted against the Dinka and Nuer for decades. While Dinka chiefs would eventually seek education for their children like the Baganda royals, this was only after spasms of violent repression, fierce resistance, and the promise of colonial clerkships and control of the local courts, part of the broader British imperial framework of “native administration.” Dinka political practices, viewed here as a community of practice, was organized in such a way so as to make the more centralized and bureaucratic characteristics of colonial rule and formal schooling difficult to absorb without considerable misunderstandings and resistance. This would be in part what Missionary and colonial educators would encounter in the 1930s when schooling was more formally organized in the South.
2.1.2 Age-sets

Another community of practice that school administrators and teachers would encounter and which reinforces territorial identification among the Dinka is the age-set cohort that every Dinka child joins on coming of age, usually in the mid-teens, after undergoing an initiation ceremony. Initiation, a painful ordeal that in most communities involves scarring deep lines across the forehead varying in number from seven upward, allows a man to graduate from the status of a boy, and from the role of junior cattle keeper and milkier to warrior and supervisor of uninitiated boys. The ritual, called pel rak, literally means “the cessation of the milking of cows” (Lienhardt, 1958). Until then, the education of children was under the direction of women and involved learning the recitation of their father’s genealogy, identification of various clan divinities and their emblems, cattle life, and the code of Dinka behavior called cieng.6 Age-sets serve a quasi-political and military function in addition to a generational marker, and they compete for power and cattle wealth with rival territorial and generational age-sets, often using violence. The proving of a boy’s warrior prowess is simultaneously aimed at winning the respect of their elders as well the affection of girls as the initiation ritual also confers on young men the readiness for marriage (Deng 1971).

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6 *Cieng*, depending on its usage and context, is a verb that variously means to look after, to order, to inhabit, to treat (e.g. a person), to live together, to live in peace and harmony, and to relate to a person (F. Deng 1971: 391).
A similar coming of age ritual for girls is conducted usually around the onset of menstruation. Adolescent girl age-sets are organized around service to their male counterparts, including child care, fetching water, and cooking at home and at cattle camps. Adolescent girls also tend to young men injured from defending against or perpetrating cattle raids and also commonly accompanied them on these battles to give encouragement and deliver re-armaments. Young women also covered the bodies of the wounded with their own as a strict ethical code forbade the harming of women and children. This practice would sadly change during Sudan’s second civil war in the latter quarter of the 20th century, largely perpetrated by the militias of Western-educated Southern leaders (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999).

Age-setting was correlatively also an institution of intergenerational competition, succession, and historical imagination. On graduation from initiation, male members of the preceding age-set composed and performed mock insult songs against the newly initiated set, provoking them into an institutionalized fight, which was in part a game but can result in serious injuries. This mock fight was not only training for warfare, it was also a manifestation of rivalry between generations both for military dominance and the attention of girls. As a rising generation of eligible young men, the newly initiated warriors are seen by their seniors as a threatening group that must be humbled, if only playfully, to keep them in their place.

While the functions of the generations change with age and status, the age-set system conferred a lifelong corporate and spatial identity, comradeship, and mutual
dependency on its members. Males grow from warriors to family men and gradually age to be tribal elders with an authoritative voice in public affairs through traditional Chief’s courts. Females grow from girls to wives to mothers, moving within the ranks of multiple wives to influence domestic relations and practices. Thus while elders use persuasive strategies and resort to the coercion of divine power to resolve conflicts, youth resort to violent physical coercion as a challenge to the elders’ authority.

The cycle of age-sets forms much of how the Dinka conceive of their historical narrative as well as measure their future prospects. For a family to send a child to school was for a very long time to completely alienate him or her from this community of practice and notion of historical continuity, the identities it conferred, and the status it afforded them in attaining the most coveted of Dinka achievements: cattle wealth, and through it, a large brood of children. Educated members of Dinka communities would for some time endure ridicule and derision as most eventually found themselves alienated from pastoralist childhood and adulthood and among the growing unemployed, politically disaffected, and in many cases, alcoholic urban migrants (Deng, 1971; Sconyers, 1978). Perhaps most consequential, the educated found themselves disconnected from the Dinka cattle complex.

2.1.3 The Cattle Complex

The importance of the cattle complex in Dinka society cannot be understated. The possession of cattle confers both class status as well as security and risk mitigation in times
of scarcity, the regular spasms of which have influenced Dinka cultural practices and coping mechanisms for generations. Despite its decentralized structure and communitarian orientation, Dinka society was and remains stratified between the privileged cattle-owning class, and the non-cattle owning commoner. But the value of cattle transcends the merely economic and represents the web of connections within and between kinship groups, and with ancestors, spirits, and Divinity, and as such, cattle are slaughtered for food only on very rare and special occasions. Cattle are used as reparations in civil disputes and thus are a key element in local justice and keeping the peace. But cattle are also the source of inter-clan and inter-ethnic violence due to the prevalence of cattle raiding and cyclical acts of revenge by age-sets.

In addition to a child’s alienation from the communities of practice around cattle through which they would obtain cattle wealth and its accompanying status, security, and power, the uncertainty as to how formal education could be a viable alternative to obtaining cattle wealth presented perhaps the most formidable obstacle to the integration of schooling in Dinka society and remains as such to this day. “Because they are so important to the attainment of their social and spiritual goals, the Dinka regard cattle as sacred, approximating human beings in value. They are indeed regarded as god’s special gift to the Dinka, and therefore the most noble form of wealth” (F. Deng 2003: 62).

As a form of highly mobile wealth, the exchange of cattle between families in the form of marriage dowries expands the network of relations that is essential for cultural continuity and survival in the harsh conditions of the South. A family’s herd of cattle
enables its sons to marry, which requires a dowry of cattle to be passed to the bride’s family. Consequently, daughters are valued in terms of their ability to increase the family’s herd through marriage. A girls’ dowry value is judged in part by the status and wealth of her family, but also by her reputation for domestic service and chastity. Chastity and extra-marital sex is hardly an issue for males even though the behavior code cieng keeps the prevalence of such acts either manageable or, at the least, somewhat out in the open. This can be seen in the number of out-of wedlock pregnancy and adultery cases Chief’s courts are burdened with and the long precedents of related case law, catalogued in the memories of its elder members, from which the courts draw (Fadlalla, 2009). Violence regularly erupts over pre-marital sex, despite civil court rulings, as the brothers of an offended girl—who rely on her dowry for their own marriages—form vigilante gangs with their age-set mates and hunt the offending male, beating and often killing him should they find him; self-imposed exile among unmarried perpetrators is not uncommon as a result. As schools came to be seen as synonymous with the immoral attributes of the city and sexual predation by male students and teachers—turning their daughters into “prostitutes” despite a no less predatory environment in cattle camps—families were reluctant to send girls to school for fear of decreasing their potential dowry values. This contradiction was explained away by the perception that at least in the cattle camps, perpetrators were more likely to be able to make reparations with cattle, because educated men were assumed to be cattle-less. The increasing value of educated girls in terms of their potential to fetch larger
dowries, which would not become significant until after the turn of the 20th century, proved to be the single most influential factor in the rise of girls enrollment in school.  

2.1.4 Non-literacy

A last element of Dinka culture that is relevant to issues of schooling is the function of its oral traditions, in songs and myths, and in the contemporary persistence of non-literacy, here defined as a lack of reading and writing systems. Contrary to the negative, primitive or backward monikers associated with illiteracy, researchers have begun to consider the positive uses of orality and non-literacy and point to its instrumental dynamism—a shaping of the future by re-fashioning the past—and, in the absence of writing and texts, their ability to provide a freedom from legibility that frustrates state routines (Scott, 2009). Like Scott, I choose here to use the terms orality and non-literacy as important elements in Dinka communities of practice, instead of illiteracy, to frame them as positive mediums of cultural life; mediums which do not imply a lack of an educational history, as much of the journalism about education in the South seem to imply. Not surprisingly, explanations of why the Dinka remained a non-literate society for so long can be found in one of the most widely cited Dinka myths about the origin of their love for

7 I address this issue in more detail in Chapter V.
8 I provide more detail for this assertion in Chapter VI.
cattle. Francis Deng (2003) describes it here, when recounting that at the beginning of things:

God gave the Black Man, by which they mean the Dinka, a choice between the cow and a secret thing called “What.” When the man reached for the cow, God warned him to consider carefully, for there were great things in the secret of “What,” but the Dinka kept eyeing the cow. God then said, “If you insist on having the cow, then I advise you to taste her milk before you decide.” The Dinka tasted the milk and declared, “Let us have the cow and never see the secret of ‘What.’” That secret was later given to the other races and became a source of their inquisitive minds, which eventually led them to scientific and technological inventiveness. The Dinka, on the other hand, have continued an obsession with cattle (62).

Alongside the considerably more prevalent expressions of cultural conservatism and superiority expressed by the bulk of Dinka folklore and song, is a body of oral literature in which the Dinka are depicted as beginning to rationalize their relegated position with regard to education (Lienhardt, 1961). For example, the myth of their original acquisition of cattle as the most noble symbol of wealth was not always seen as an explanation of their scientific and technological backwardness and the source of Arab and European material superiority and power. It has been asserted by Valentino Deng⁹ as well as by many of my research participants that the original telling of the story implied that the Dinka made the correct decision in choosing the cow. He recounts his father saying:

They knew that they would live in peace with the cattle, and that if they helped the cattle eat and drink, the cattle would give man their milk, would multiply every year and keep the monyjang [the Dinka] happy…And God has proven that this was the correct decision. God was testing the man. He was testing the man, to see if he could appreciate what he had been given, if he could take pleasure in the bounty before him, rather than trade it for the unknown (Eggers, 2007: 62).

⁹ His views were expressed in a lecture at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2010 and in personal conversations.
But there remains many references in Dinka song where the singer attributes the hardships of modern labor to the inequitable distribution of resources, with a specific reference to literacy, among the races at the time of creation:

God hates us for the things of the past.
The ancient things he created with us,
When he gave the black man the cow
Leaving behind the Book of his father,
Our curse goes to the elders of the original land;
The man who threw the Book away,
Is it he who gave us into slavery? (214)

F. Deng (1995) also quotes a Dinka elder who commented, “‘That has remained a curse on us. Our father did not show us the ways of our ancestors fully. . . . Otherwise, we would have known more things than we know’” (213). In both of these accounts, it is implied that in fact literacy was something within reach, or even in the possession, of their ancestors but was cast off. While we must accept that these myths and songs may be more allegorical than historical, they are likely to be based on some germs of truth as many oral historians assert (Vansina, 1985; Havelock, 1986; Collins and Blot, 2003). In fact a large body of archeological evidence supports Dinka oral histories that claim their ancestors migrated from the Gezira in Northern Sudan, the stretch of fertile land at the convergence of the White and Blue Niles where present-day Khartoum lies, and perhaps even further north in Egypt. There, they were likely influenced by the succession of ancient Kushite, Egyptian, Meroitic, Nubian, and Funj kingdoms, all of which were state-making empires which had developed their own forms of literacy (Beswick, 2004). Many Dinka claim that the name Khartoum originated from the Dinka language and means “the meeting place of rivers,” that is kir for river and toum for meeting. The causes of their southward migration to the
present day locations, initiated in waves around the 14th and 15th centuries and arriving at their present day locations in Southern Sudan throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, was likely a combination of drought and desertification, the arrival of Muslim slave raiders, and war (Beswick 2004). But it was enabled, according to historians and archeologists, by their acquisition of drought resistant Zebu humped-back cattle from the Ethiopian borderlands around 1000 CE and a hardy variety of Sorghum—both able to withstand spasms of drought and long-distance migrations (Beswick, 2004; Collins, 2008). Accounts of these migrations are embedded in the very long-winded and detailed oral family histories that nearly every Dinka man and woman can recite. As Scott (2008) writes:

The relationship of a people, a kinship group, and a community to its history is diagnostic of its relationship to stateness. All groups have some kind of history, some story they tell themselves about who they are and how they came to be situated where they are. After this common ground, the similarity ends. Peripheral, acephalous groups are likely to emphasize itineraries, defeats, migrations, landscapes. Rank, heroic origins, and claims to territory are, by contrast, the stuff of centralization and (would be) state formation. The form traditions take also varies. Written traditions are of enormous instrumental value to the process of permanent political centralization and administration. Oral traditions on the other hand, have substantial advantages for peoples whose welfare and survival depend on a fleet-footed adjustment to a capricious and menacing political environment (237).

Godfrey Lienhardt (1982) suggests that the Dinka, who had taken their superiority for granted, came to accept a significant degree of inferiority as they endured hundreds of years of slave raiding, multiple foreign conquests, a succession of oppressive state-making regimes, and the pressures of Western modernity. “The Dinka view of age-sets, based on a cyclical notion of local history, begins to be displaced by a dynamic view of history, accompanied by a philosophy of progress, and with teleological overtones” (89-90). Deng
(1995) goes on to argue that the new notion of ‘‘getting ahead’’ is redirected toward some distant, more universal end, defined in modern terms as ‘‘progress;’’ an increasing desire for a society based on foreign models, rather than their own.

Framed in the terms of modernization, where the acquisition of literacy is seen in progressive, evolutionary, or in teleological terms, this attribution makes sense. But seen rather in the terms of communities of practice, one can extrapolate a more complex picture. The ‘‘fleet-footedness’’ of the Dinka in the face of a ‘‘capricious and menacing political environment’’ has at its base the same practices that enabled their resistance to state-making regimes throughout their history: orality and non-literacy, but also acephaly, transhumance, and warrior identities. These characteristics should not be cast solely in the terms of modernization, but seen rather as both assets and liabilities, and as both productive and reproductive forms of power.

Writing is not simply speech ‘‘written down’’ (Harris, 1986, 2000). Bringing preliterate peoples into the world of literacy and formal schooling is a raison d’être of state making (Lévi-Strauss, 1968; Althusser, 1971; Gledhill, Bender, and Larsen, 1988) and it begets both conservation and transformation, resilience from and resistance to its insinuation, conserving and remaking, in this case, pastoralist life worlds (see also Kratli, 2001; Dyer, 2006). Similarly, one must view orality and the history and morality it claims at any given time as both dynamic and agentic, an on-going strategic fashioning of a group’s future by re-working the past (Vansina, 1985; Havelock, 1986; Collins and Blot, 2003). In the changing meaning of the ‘‘what,’’ for example, we see how historic,
economic, and political conditions shape the uses of myth and folklore, and how the absence of writing and texts provides a freedom of maneuver in history, genealogy, and legibility that, while in this case appears to accommodate, also simultaneously frustrates state routines—just as acephaly simultaneously enabled and frustrated bureaucratic control (Scott, 2009).

My argument here is that the oral history of the Dinka suggests that the historically persistent maintenance of non-literacy, perhaps even the casting off of it at some point in the distant past, and the aversion to regimes of formal schooling, should be viewed simultaneously as part and parcel of a “strategic” resistance to statist forms of control, and not an inherent characteristic of pastoralism. This is not unique to the Dinka as similar relationships between non-literate, acephalous societies and the state have been documented among the Turkana and Karamoja (Kratli, 2001) and Samburu in Kenya (Ruto, et. al., 2009), the Karretjie in South Africa (de Jongh and Steyn, 2006), the Akha in Burma (Von Geusau, 2000), the Khamu in Laos (Evrad, 2007), the Bakkarwal in Jammu and Kashmir (Rao, 2006), and the Roma in Europe (Fonseca, 1995), to name a few.

The characteristics of the Dinka communities of practice I have reviewed thus far, namely mobility, acephaly, the age-set system, the cattle complex, and orality and non-literacy together formed the primary challenges Western educators faced in introducing formal schooling regimes in South Sudan. The summative conclusion of my re-examination of Dinka cultural practices around education does not support the argument that pastoralist societies operate according to logics different then state-making societies,
for this explanation alone is not adequate in explaining the diversity of power relations embedded within and between them (Nuijten, 2003), nor does it explain why some forms of the state have been integrated into Dinka family and community life, while others have been transformed or rejected. Rather, the circulation of power throughout the colonial and post-colonial eras transformed the meanings of formal education and the educated person among the Dinka and provoked both their resistance to and integration of formal schooling regimes. I describe this history in the next section.

2.2 Colonial Era Schooling, 1898-1956

Although the provision of any kind of formal schooling did not visit the South until the British re-conquest of the Sudan and the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1898, their numbers were so small that most Southern children didn’t attend schools in any significant numbers until the 1930s and 40s. And while its provision remained very meager and of low quality, it was not inconsequential; in fact it was deeply influential to how Dinka families would eventually come to use schooling 70 years later and explains how an otherwise poor system of schooling came to play a central role in Southern resistance to the post-colonial state and its eventual secession. By the time an adventure obsessed and abolitionist imperial Britain re-took control over the Sudan from the Islamic Mahdi, who under a religious prophetic mandate had revived the 200 year-old slave trade between 1881 and 1898 after a brief respite under British control following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the societies of Southern Sudan were “as difficult and
hazardous a field for Western educational experiment as any in Africa” (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981: 1). In addition to the many challenges reviewed in the previous section—especially the time and blood it took to “pacify” the Dinka and Nuer—the sheer diversity of the region presented significant problems to Western educators as the British registered 157 separate tribes in the South (Sconyers, 1978) and the number of distinct ethnic groups and languages exceeded 50 (Jok, 2007). With the Arabization and Islamization of northern and central Sudan in the 16th and 17th centuries, the considerable ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity of its peoples was not suppressed, but in sharp contrast to Southern Sudan, it was comprehended within a single religious and cultural framework and remains so to this day. With some marginal exceptions, all the Sudanese peoples north of the 13th parallel had by the 19th century had become Muslims – or at least they preferred to pass as Muslims, including the African (non-Arab) peoples of Darfur and Southern Kordofan.

Ottoman and British colonial investments heavily favored the North, where administrative bureaucracies, railroads, river steamers, telegraph networks, a modern army, government schools, and a postal service were developed. The Sudd, a massive swamp into which the Nile disappeared for hundreds of miles into the South, also presented a major geographic barrier to Southward imperial expansion. It did not, however, keep the growing number of explorers, traders, gold diggers, ivory poachers, and slavers from increasing their pillage of Southern resources. Urban population centers in the pastoralist South like Wau, Rumbek, and Malakal have their roots in Northern trader’s and slaver’s forts, called Zaribas, originating during the first colonial conquest of the Sudan by the Ottoman Empire in 1832, which did not control so much as facilitate raids into the South
for slaves, gold and ivory. The resulting gulf between Northerner and Southerner had its origins in a legacy of the slave trade, resource pillage, Northern privilege, and a prolonged failure of the process of Arabization and Islamization to make any headway at all south of the 13th parallel (Collins, 2009; Jok, 2007). Although these conditions existed prior to arrival of the British, the British ended up exacerbating rather then mitigating this divide and its yawning inequalities.

The British public lent broad support to British colonial conquest in Sudan on the tails of two popular trends: travel adventure writing and abolition. “As the Linnaeans had their labeling system, and the Humboltians their poetics of science,” writes Pratt (2008), “the Victorians opted for a brand of verbal painting whose highest calling was to produce for the home audience the peak moments at which geographical ‘discoveries’ were ‘won’ for England” (197). The string of British explorers who spent the 1860s searching for the source of the Nile, such as Richard Burton, John Speke, and Samuel Baker, fed British imaginations of mastering the elements and delivering civilization to the primitives. Baker, who wrote 10 adventure books about the Nile and India between 1853 and 1891, would become a Pasha and Major-General in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt as well as Governor-General of the Equatorial Nile Basin (today's Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda) between 1869 and 1873. British abolitionist groups, whose cause Baker championed, gained political strength through his influence as well as through their public campaigns about collusion between British colonies and the international slave trade. Catholic and Protestant missionary groups took advantage of these sentiments to appeal for financial support from the British public to provide education in Southern Sudan, although most
would have a religious rather than educational purpose (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981; Sconyers, 1978). Nonetheless, mission schools would eventually become the de-facto colonial school system in the South until shortly after independence in 1956.

British colonial education policy in the South was imbricated by a number of uncoordinated, if conflicting aims. First, British “Southern Policy” embodied the goal of halting the spread of Islam and Arab culture further southward and ultimately folding Southern Sudan into British East Africa, which would in turn improve British political footing in their effort to control the Nile. The Closed Districts Ordinance of 1922, for example, closed off the South to any Northern influence, especially from Arab traders called *Jallaba*. Sanderson and Sanderson (1981) assert that in spite of this ordinance, the numbers of *Jallaba* actually increased after 1922. They go on to argue that it demonstrates the failure of Islam in the South was due as much to active resistance by Southerners then it was to British policies.

Language policy for Southern Sudan emerged from the Rejaf Language Conference of 1928, which identified six “vernaculars” (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, Latuko, and Zande) for development as languages of primary education, along with English for advanced study, much to the chagrin of Northern nationalists who saw anything other than the use of Arabic as a threat. And “native administration,” which ceded local control to chiefs in the South, as well as *shaykhs, nazirs,* and *‘umdas* throughout the North, was implemented as the British feared an emerging class of educated nationalists in the North
and saw an opportunity for government on the cheap in the South (Collins, 2008). Although native administration institutionalized the power of Dinka Chief’s courts, it had the effect of weakening them from a local perspective. Called lukikos, Dinka chief’s courts were highly informal mass meetings held under any convenient tree. The legal wisdom was held by the elders in attendance and there was no written record; the legal record and precedents were held only in the memory of the general public and in song (Deng, 1972). Despite native administration, the Dinka court ended up being useful only in so far as it was forced by the British administrators to depart from tradition—by the enforced innovations of a fixed time and meeting place, a fixed membership, formalized procedures, the use of English as the formal language of administration, and a written record (Deng, 1972). Because this implied a need for literacy on the part of the chiefs, they were among the first to send their children to school. But many of these children, as educated young adults, came eventually to be seen as government agents and the courts to be seen as foreign for some time (Sanderson & Sanderson, 1981).

British colonial education policy was also driven by the spatial regulation of the Southern Mission societies which was embodied by the “Sphere System.” This policy, which divvied up the South into bounded territories within which each denomination could proselytize freely and without competition, was in response to bickering between the Italian Catholics, the British Church Mission Society, and American Protestants. This policy ultimately inscribed the denominational differences across the south and codified the Mission monopoly over colonial era Southern schooling and its exclusive use of vernacular, English language and Christian religious modalities. While the Mission
schooling regimes were occasionally scrutinized and its leadership formally and repeatedly reprimanded for neglecting core academics in letters from British administrators, they generally operated with little interference (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981; Sconyers, 1978). Yet, since formal education was not oriented to the Dinka child’s actual living conditions, “the knowledge and skills learned in school was seen by both traditionalists and the educated to be well apart from traditional knowledge and wisdom” (Deng, 1971: 322). The Christianity to which school children were exposed came to be called miith abuun, or “the children’s god,” by initiated Dinka, to be cast off upon adulthood (Nikkel, 1992); many elders today still speak about the relationship between Christianity and schooling using these terms. Despite acknowledged inferiority when it came to technological and medical advancement, most Dinka prior to colonial independence regarded Missionaries like they did all foreigners: as inferior to themselves (Lienhardt 1982).

By the 1940s, however, upon pressure from Egypt and Northern Sudanese nationalists, the British had changed their position with regard to the South and oriented policy toward the eventual unification of North and South Sudan after independence. Education policy goals subsequently shifted from one of apathy to detribalization though education in the hopes that a Southern educated elite would rise to act in equal partnership with their Northern counterparts in crafting a unified state (Sanderson and Sanderson 1981, Sconyers, 1978). After a stream of dismal assessments of Mission education, plans were drawn up to significantly increase overall funding and oversight, especially for teacher education, and to expand the number of government schools in the South, which at the
time enrolled around 3,000 students compared to 13,000 in Mission “bush” schools (Sconyers 1978). The new policies were supposed to make up for the consistent failure of the Missions to produce an educated leadership, much less employable cohort of Southern graduates, by making heavy investments in government schooling. But the Great Depression and WWII significantly drained the British of resources to fully implement their plans, and dueling policy goals left administrators bickering, if not generally lethargic, about doing much of anything in the South. The nearly exclusive and persistent dependence on Mission education by British colonial administration eventually became almost entirely a financial one; it was the cheapest way to fulfill what was already an ambivalent, if not a “too little too late” obligation to provide some sort of schooling in the South; this even after more than a decade of multiple reports citing a persistent failure of mission schools to recruit and train effective teachers, impart basic literacy and numeracy skills and do much of anything other than teach scripture (Sanderson & Sanderson, 1982, Sconyers, 1978). The bulk of the different denominational leaderships remained decidedly apathetic about detribalization, as were most British colonial administrators until 1945 (Sconyers, 1978); in fact, the teaching of respect for Dinka traditions and elders was an overtly expressed part of the Mission curriculum and a common subject of school songs (Sconyers, 1978; F. Deng, 1973).

Enrollment would nonetheless increase dramatically in the South over the next decade as more Mission schools opened and as pastoralist skepticism waned due to the embrace of schooling by local Chiefs. By 1954, “bush” schools had nearly tripled enrollment to over 30,000 students while government schools accounted for just under
5,000 (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981). The growth in Southern schooling, however, also had the effect of further stratifying Dinka society and the South in general. Still seen as risky, Dinka families increasingly sent just one boy-child to school among what were usually very large broods of children. In some cases were forced to do so by local administrative decree as the pressure to address the multiple problems of Southern schooling mounted. But in most cases, these were sons deemed by their families as unable to assume the normal role of a young Dinka male: cattle keeping. This meant the smaller, weaker, or disabled boys—or those who somehow showed uncommon academic acumen—were typically sent to school in hopes that they also would obtain employment or go on to secondary school in Uganda or Khartoum for those who could afford it.

Employment and the wealth it generated was not seen as a road to modernity defined in British terms, but rather as a strategy of diversification so as to strengthen the pastoralist enterprise (Kratli, 2001) and compete with other tribes and clans for power. The following Dinka school song, called *The Tribe has Remained Behind*, features a singer of the Awan clan of the Rek Dinka tribe lamenting about the low number of his age-set mates in school in comparison to rival clan age-sets:

Our group have become few  
I hate to be scorned by other tribes.  
The Governor of Wau asked,  
‘People of Akol Mayouk,’11  
Why has your tribe remained behind?  
Your tribe has remained far behind  
You have been surpassed in learning  
Apuk of Jok have gone ahead,  
And Kuac of Yot have heard the word.’

11 Praise name for Can e Nyal, chief of the Awan clan
Ee—ee—ee
O what shall we do?
Deng Makuei, our master, will teach us to write
Our master will teach us how to write papers and books
In the Great Awan of Can e Nyal.
Let us go sharpen the horns of Great Can at Kwajok (F. Deng, 1973; #136).

Lienhardt (1982) observed that the cattle owning Dinka “saw that they needed enough of their own people capable of thinking in foreign ways, of meeting foreigners on their own ground while remaining Dinka in their loyalties, to understand and circumvent encroachments on their own autonomy” (46). This attitude would condition Dinka educational practices through two civil wars and survives to this day. Conversely, Dinka commoners called toc, who had no cattle wealth sent children to school in more desperate attempts to create alternatives to their low status in Dinka society and consequently their vulnerability to conflict and drought (F. Deng, 1971).

Despite a growing sense that schooling could be useful, at least for some, the number of schools remained extremely low relative to the population for quite some time, families often had to send children very long distances to live with relatives who lived near a school, which favored families with extensive kinship networks and cattle wealth. Furthermore, factors including uneven and unreliable school funding, high rates of teacher truancy and absences, poor health, local and regional conflicts, and food insecurity forced children to attend intermittently and change locations and schools many times. More than half of all children who attended mission schools—still an infinitesimal number compared

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12 A schoolteacher
13 Meaning to make him proud
to the school-age population—dropped out before completing primary school (Sconyers, 1978).

According to Deng (1971), the growing numbers of educated Dinka during this time—while still comparatively small—found themselves caught between the power dynamics of two sets of institutions. On the one hand, their elders and chiefs competed with them for power and influence—not unlike they would with the younger generation age-sets—by criticizing their disregard for tradition but also by sending their own children to school. On the other hand was the emerging Sudanese state, which by the twilight of British rule disqualified educated Southerners from most public sector jobs, including teaching in government schools because of pervasive Northern racism and discrimination toward non-Muslims. Even in this environment, many families sent their children to Khartoum schools which were increasingly seen by the emerging Southern educated class as the best-worst option because they were perceived to be higher quality if not their only choice for secondary and higher education. By 1960 the South had 28% of the total population of the Sudan but it had only 8% of primary school services, 2% of secondary services, no technical secondary schools or universities, and only 5% of university students in Khartoum were from the South (Oduho and Deng, 1963). Many Southerners also saw the Northern dominated military as an opportunity to become educated and gainfully employed. In fact, the bulk of the Southern resistance leaders during the first and second civil wars would come from the ranks of the Sudanese military and most would possess advanced degrees from schools mostly in Khartoum and Egypt, but also the UK and the
US. The bulk wound up pitted against their own brothers and sisters as low-ranking indentured servants and slaves of the Northern military elite (Jok, 2009).

Throughout the colonial era, any provision of Southern schooling was trumped by short-term imperial aims that saw the South either as a wilderness for the pillaging of gold, ivory and slaves in the case of the Ottoman Turks, or as a strategic bulwark to protect British control of the Nile from a southward encroaching Islamic nationalism. Southern policy, including education policy, was radically deficient in that it consisted simply of a set of techniques directed to no clearly defined, long-term objectives. Left functionally unchecked by British colonial apathy, Mission schooling, barely able to maintain a meager presence in the harsh conditions of the South and focused entirely on prostelyzation, produced a small, marginalized, and poorly educated class of young Dinka men, neither entirely converted to Christianity nor entirely detribalized as they sought to use their education for the benefit of their families, but also unable to fully reintegrate into tribal life. Dinka families began to send children in larger numbers in attempts to compete for local control of the courts, increase cattle wealth, and maintain an increasingly vulnerable pastoralist enterprise in the face of deepening cultural and religious oppression. These would unfortunately become the good old days as Southern schooling was effectively to come to a complete halt shortly after independence. But Sanderson and Sanderson (1981) argue that while colonial era schooling was sorely deficient,

The Missions, with the financial help of the [colonial] government, had after all developed an educational system capable of producing a leadership not only acceptable to Southern Sudanese but increasingly able to meet the Northern Sudanese elite on equal terms. The very existence of this leadership compelled Northern leaders to abandon their politically crippling “primitive” stereotype of Southerners…while its growing capacity for
sophisticated dialogue opened the way for a possible negotiated settlement of the conflict (429).

While this is largely true, it should be tempered by the fact that most of the Southern leadership obtained the bulk of their educations in the North, in refugee camps in neighboring countries, and in the West. The vastly expanded spatial character of the decades after independence included the increasing cross-border migrations for education. What could be said about the Mission schools is that they began to reproduce themselves and the church clergy using graduates as teachers and catechists notwithstanding colonial determinations that they were poorly trained. By independence, “bush” school teaching was one of the few occupations for educated young people outside of urban centers, but these jobs were usually poorly compensated if at all. Teachers along with their students would nonetheless become a large source of human resources for the Southern resistance. Until then, the vast majority of school-going Dinka children never finished primary school and those who did were left to pursue urban or migrant labor, or else remain jobless and “hang out” in increasing numbers in village markets as educated Dinka were not considered fit for cattle keeping or cultivation. Thus the first generation of a Dinka educated class also became the first to become politically disaffected, widely un- or underemployed, and to feel most directly the racial and religious discrimination of the North (Deng 1971). But as this period also marked the beginning of decolonization and the emergence of an oppressive post-colonial state dominated by Northern economic and military elites, from this same generation would emerge the leaders of the Southern resistance.
2.3 Schooling and the First Civil War, 1956-1983

As decolonization loomed, northern Sudanese nationalists were eager to dismantle the three British policies that they viewed as having been nationally divisive. The first was the Closed Districts Ordinance of 1922, which had restricted Northern traders and others from entering Southern districts without a permit. The second was the language policy for Southern Sudan that emerged from the Rejaf Language Conference of 1928, which identified the six “vernaculars” for development as languages of primary education, along with English for advanced study. The third was the policy of ceding educational development to Christian missionary organizations, each of which, vested to them by the “sphere system,” had previously enjoyed a virtual monopoly over particular regions to establish churches and schools. It was perceived that these policies had worked to the detriment of Arabic and Islam, and northern Sudanese nationalists resented them deeply (Daly, 1986; Deng 1995; Collins, 1983; Sanderson & Sanderson 1981). The Northern Sudanese linguist, Sayed Hamid A. Hurreiz, went so far as to describe British Southern education policies as a “war on Arabic” which in turn justified the subsequent policy of Arabization (Hurreiz 1968:18).

On 1 January 1956, Sudan gained independence, declaring Arabic its sole official language and Islam its religion of state. In anticipation of this, just a few months prior, in Torit, Southern Sudan, an army mutiny of Southern military officers and their units took place that eventually came to be identified as the start of the first civil war. In 1957,
northern Sudanese politicians announced the nationalization of Christian missionary schools. Also in 1957, a “Southern Federal Party” issued a manifesto calling for recognition of English along with Arabic as an official language; Christianity along with Islam as a state religion; and “the transfer of the Sudan from the Arab world to the African.” The central government responded to the manifesto by sentencing its author to seven years in prison for sedition (Sandell, 1982: 75-6). Later, the Sudan African National Union (SANU) was founded by William Deng Nihal, former Assistant District Commissioner in the Southern state of Eastern Equatoria and educated in both Rumbek and Khartoum; Joseph Oduho, a Latuko and former Catholic mission student and schoolteacher; and Father Satunino Lohuro, Catholic Priest and also a Latuko who was educated in Mission schools near Torit and attended seminary in Uganda. SANU was a political movement attempting to negotiate for Southern semi-autonomy and remained so even after its members were driven into exile. It would eventually be unified with, but somewhat marginalized by, the Southern Anyanya rebel military movement. Sanderson and Sanderson (1981) assert that among the Southern insurgents, “Christian commitment was negligible,” a few even were Muslims, and most “resisted as ‘tribesmen’ rather than as Southerners” even though the bulk had come from the Mission schools and included many local Catechists (430).

Dinka attitudes toward the Missionaries would change dramatically as they experienced increasing Islamizing pressure and as the Churches, whose local and regional leadership was increasingly filled by Africans, moved to fill a deep void of political representation in the Northern dominated independent state. The Mission societies at first
attempted to work within the political realities of the new government, but were soon
demonized as enemies of Islam. The resulting solidarity with Southerners and the Dinka in
particular would be understood within Dinka spiritual and political practices and
characterized more by a shared resistance to Northern cultural imperialism than a shared
religious affinity or even nationalism. For instance, school children sang songs about
popular Missionaries such as Father Umberto Pasina of the Kwajok\textsuperscript{14} Mission (Father
Fazzine) and Bishop Edward Mason, Vicar Apostolic at Wau in which they were depicted
in similar ways to traditional Dinka prophets with supernatural powers to deliver the Dinka
from adversity, defend against hostile Arabs, who were thought to possess Dinka black
magic, and to restore the cosmic order. This Rek Dinka school song about Mason and
Pasina is from around 1958 called, \textit{The Bishop}:

\begin{verbatim}
We shall honor our Lord
We shall honor our Bishop
We shall honor Edward
He is the master at our head
Our master appointed by the creator to keep us
He is given life to keep us…
He has put the land in order
The land is held by the master of the Christians
The great Mason is the master of the Christians of Bahr el Ghazal
And he is the master of the world…
Our big home, the mission of Kwajok
Our mission will go to the big town
The followers of Father Fazzine will bring the cloud…
He is the master to overcome the evil that confronts us
When the evil spirits come
Mohammed\textsuperscript{15} comes to break our divine laws
Mathiang Guk\textsuperscript{16} comes to break our divine laws
Our big Father is the protector (Deng, 1973: #135).
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{14} Kwajok is the county seat in Gogrial East County, Warrap State and was an educational and missionary center. Today, it hosts one of only a handful of secondary schools in Warrap.
\textsuperscript{15} Meaning Muslims
\textsuperscript{16} Traditional Dinka black medicine.
Catching wind of their popularity, the government denied Pasina reentry back into the Sudan after a leave in Italy in 1960, and Mason, under government pressure, was transferred to El Obeid in the Northern state of Kordofan. For a time surprised and confused as to why Southerners rejected Arabization and Islamization, the government directed most of its ire toward the Missions. In 1963, all Christian missionaries were expelled on the grounds that they were standing in the way of national integration and that they were guilty of various infractions including sheltering, supplying, or otherwise abetting “mutineers” and “outlaws.” (Sharkey, 2008). Mission teachers, catechists, and students were by association also suspect of being rebels. As a result, most mission schools closed and the curricula of the few government schools were transformed to focus on Arabic and Islam. Teachers who could not teach in Arabic or refused to teach the Koran were dismissed. The same year also witnessed a strike among Southern Sudanese students, who staged a protest against the government’s policies of Arabization and Islamization. They complained that Muslim Arab teachers from Northern Sudan “engage too much in politics – unity of the Sudan, Islamic history, Arab League – and such other irrelevant subjects that make the children confused and lose interest in the teaching” (Sandell, 1982: 77-9). They also complained that Christian students who refused to attend Koran studies were expelled from school, and described the government’s policy as an attempt “to create a subservient race dwelling in ignorance but embracing Islam and those who preach it” (80).
A (Northern) Sudanese government report from 1964 on Southern employment concludes:

It has been claimed by all authorities that our system of education in the South is at the root of all the problems and should thus be subjected to a searching review and severe reappraisal. Students are offered a standard of living unobtainable outside the school’s walls, along with this they are offered academic education for the most part allowing them little or no future employment opportunities. The result of such education is the production of misfits, making impossible for them to return to the family...to develop their village community and not qualifying them to find jobs in town, a horde of disconnected odd men out for mischief (Sudan Government 1964, quoted in Deng, 1971: 312).

This assessment aptly describes many educational conditions across Africa today where formal schooling has consistently failed to deliver the promised fruits of development and autonomy, creating large populations of educated unemployed with unobtainable lifestyle expectations (Bond, 1982; Serpell, 1993). What emerges instead is a small cadre of externally-oriented elite who drain their country of its resources and potential. The irony here is the above statement was the conclusion of the very cadre of military and economic elites in Northern Sudan who would do just that. The fear of educated “misfits” and “horde of disconnected odd men out for mischief” is in this case borne of racism and the fear of Southern nationalism, state disintegration, and the loss of Southern economic resources rather than any concern for the well being of the Southerner. Northern elites would maintain such a political posture and attitude toward the South fueling a nearly constant state of civil war until it finally disintegrated in 2005.

In the meantime, language of instruction policy, combined with the imposition of Islamic curricula, came to represent an overt field of cultural contestation and external
repression, and punctuated the enduring lack of Southern political representation in Khartoum. Writing in the 1970s, Yusuf al-Khalifa Abu Bakr, directing a Northern government project to Arabicize Southern vernaculars, acknowledged that language politics were helping to fuel the civil war. “Far from the eyes and control of the Government,” he wrote, “the Anyanya were running their schools in the sixties in the jungles of the South according to the old system [vernaculars as media in classes 1 and 2 with English as a subject in these two years and as a medium of instruction from the third year on] ([sic], quoted in Sharkey, 2008: 35-6). The Government of Sudan led by General Ibrahim Abbud violently pursued the 1955 Torit mutineers and Anyanya rebels across the bush, burning villages, fields, and schools, and targeted educated Southerners, automatically suspected of collaboration. This had the effect of driving the southern educated class into the Anyanya rebellion, who first operated in the bush beginning around 1963 and then across international borders in exile. The Anyanya rebels, which comes from the word for a poisonous insect, would eventually found refugee camps primarily in Uganda and Zaire largely based on existing kinship relations and political affinities, colonial era migrant labor routes, and previous refugee flows (Akol, 1994; Bascom, 1998), to where tens of thousands of former school-goers and teachers who fled the South would seek alternatives. Mass exodus due to limited or insufficient educational opportunities was particularly characteristic of the post-independence era in many parts of Africa. This was one of the primary grievances, for example, of black Rhodesians and Namibians in the late

17 Zaire is now the Democratic Republic of Congo.
1960s and 70s, who fled their homes or were interned in the face of resistance to racial discrimination following independence (Jackson, 1994; Makanya, 1994).

While there is very little written about refugee camp schooling during this period, a number of my research participants who had been in exile during this time or knew of others who did described the schooling as mostly by the seat of their pants, organized somewhat organically by groups of teachers and students using whatever materials could be found, donated, or written by hand. As the number of refugees swelled, aid organizations, dominated by Christian aid groups such as the Catholic Relief Organization, Norwegian Church Aid, German Church Aid, Lutheran World Service, the World Council of Churches, the All African Conference of Churches, and the Red Cross, as well as Save the Children and Oxfam, assisted the UNHCR in delivering shelter, food and medicine. Some provided books and school supplies and compensated teachers with bars of soap and sacks of sugar, but most of the makeshift schools were left to fend for themselves as education was still not part of the standard package of aid in humanitarian emergencies and refugee crises (Akol, 1994). In Uganda, many South Sudanese refugees settled with family relations established during colonial era migrant labor to cotton plantations; many would attend Ugandan schools. Much of the activity among the refugees during this time was also dominated by military training, arms smuggling, and avoiding capture by Northern allied militias (Akol, 1994). By this time, the same Rek Dinka school children who sang songs about their Catholic missionary teachers in the 1950’s now sang about exile and resistance:
William,\(^{18}\) feud is the task of man;  
O Deng Nihal,  
The feud, the feud  
The feud of the Southerners with the Mundukuru\(^{19}\)…  
The army of Deng Nihal and Morwel\(^{20}\)  
It is called the Anyanya.  
In the Rek of Mou, we shall shoot  
In Bahr el Ghazal…  
We shall avenge the evils of the past,  
And if we succeed in our vengeance  
We shall be praised by God  
We are the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal  
O feud, O feud (Deng, 1973: #100).

It was also by this time that the Dinka, who previously had shown some contempt for non-Nilotic groups, began to identify as Southerners and expressed some solidarity with the other ethnic groups of the South (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981). Although the Dinka would continue to dominate the ranks of Southern leadership, the cause of Southern autonomy unified, although not without its various and often violent fissures, the diversity of refugees flowing out of the South as the first civil war cost over one million lives, created over 200,000 refugees, and many more internally displaced (Akol, 1994).

Indeed, the amount of cross border migration from Southern Sudan specifically for education was made abundantly clear upon the conclusion of the first civil war in 1972 when the Commission on Return and Reintegration, set up to distribute and prioritize all post-conflict aid and assistance, was forced to alter the Organization of African Unity’s\(^{21}\)

\(^{18}\) William Deng Nihal was one of the Southern Dinka leaders in exile and former Assistant District Commissioner in the Southern state of Eastern Equatoria. He was educated in Rumbek in the South and the Sudan Institute of Public Administration in Khartoum. He later returned to Sudan where he was assassinated in 1968.  
\(^{19}\) A rather contemptuous term used in the South for the Northerners.  
\(^{20}\) An Agar Dinka and Anyanya leader from Rumbek  
\(^{21}\) Now called the African Union.
definition of a refugee. The existing definition, based almost entirely on the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, had proven limited in its ability to recognize the large number of returning Southerners who traveled to neighboring countries to continue their education. The added language recognized “those who, because of political instability in the Southern Sudan, had fled to neighboring countries in search of educational opportunities provided by the various agencies for the refugees” (Government of Sudan, 1972, quoted in Akol 1994: 80). In Sudan as elsewhere in Africa, one of the primary determinants of voluntary repatriation and subsequent social and economic standing back home was level of education, especially that which was obtained while in exile (Akol, 1994; Rogge, 1994; Tapscott, 1994). It would also prove to be a key factor in halting the war, at least for a while.

The mass repatriations of Southerners from the Anyanya refugee camps, about 70% of whom came from Uganda and Zaire, took more then twice as long as expected by the UNHCR and the Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (Akol, 1994). Many had a “wait and see” attitude as there was lasting distrust of the Northern government to negotiate in good faith. The Commission was also severely understaffed or what staff they did have consisted of low-skilled Southerners and so was slow to facilitate the repatriation process. Non-existent or destroyed roads, bridges and transport also slowed returnees progress back to their homes, which was impossible for much of the year during the long rainy season. While Arabic remained the official language of instruction and Islam the state religion, the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972 allowed for some schools in the South to continue teaching in the vernaculars and English as most of the refugee children
who attended schools in exile were taught in either English or French (Akol, 1994). Partly for this reason, the number of schools in the South jumped during the inter-war period, but most new schools were located outside the pastoralist areas (Sesnan, 1998), and those that remained within them continued to use Arabic as the language of instruction, likely because of their proximity to Northern garrisons and Arab enclaves in the South, especially in Wau (Fully, 1987).

Most Dinka families in these areas remained skeptical of education, but these attitudes continued to change with the rise in prestige of educated war leaders. Those who were interested in sending a child to school would continue to resist Northern cultural and religious oppression by preferring primary schools in the South where English and Christianity were the principal modalities and they would also continue to send some children north to pursue secondary and higher education, which was still considered a better investment. Northern elites hoped that attending Islamic universities would indoctrinate Southern elites with a more sympathetic attitude toward eventual Arabization and Islamization (Deng, 1995; Jok, 2007; Collins, 2008). In the meantime, Southern schooling remained sorely insufficient as the government continued to heavily favor investment and development in North. A huge percentage of Southerners fit for teaching had given their lives to the resistance, placing a strain on the ability of Southern English-pattern schools to meet demand.

The Southern leadership at this time continued to be dominated by members of the educated and/or military class such as Joseph Lagu, a former Sudanese military officer
educated at the Omdurman Military College near Khartoum who took over leadership of the Anyanya from Lohuro after his assassination in Uganda by colluding troops of Prime Minister Milton Obote (who had allied himself with the North); and Abel Alier, who was educated in Rumbek and obtained a law degree from the University of Khartoum. Both would play key roles in waging and ending the first civil war in 1972. In fact it would take quite a bit of convincing by the latter of the former, along with the help of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, to put down their arms and sign the Addis Ababa Agreement. Many felt, however, that they made too many concessions and did not secure adequate Northern assurances. Existing inequalities ultimately deepened between the North and South during the 11 years in between civil wars and which contributed to the breakout of the second civil war in 1983 (Duffield et, al, 2000). But inequities within the South yawned as well. Notwithstanding continued Northern political domination and cultural oppression, the political institutions of a new semi-autonomous South were eventually seen by many as corrupt, if not ineffective, and cronyism was rife.

But this should not be understood as a product of pastoral clientalism or inexperience in running western style government institutions, or a clash of two different logics, one Western statist and the other African pastoralist. In fact, there was much hope that the new institutions would bring peace, prosperity, equality, and modern amenities such as roads, hospitals and schools to the deeply impoverished and war ravaged communities of the South (Akol, 1996). Statist institutions are by their very nature controlled by those with the most effective political networks, just as the Dinka relied on extended kinship networks for their very survival. These networks also tend to reproduce
themselves and their mechanisms of rule just as the new Northern bureaucratic elites who inherited power from their colonial counterparts replicated their power, wealth, and racism (Jok, 2007). Dominated by an newly empowered, educated, and mostly Dinka elite who solidified their power by catering to and strengthening their networks (which included their families, clans, and closest associates in the Southern resistance), the culture of the state began to grow throughout the South. The end of the first civil war in Sudan is thus also the beginning of a very powerful transformation in the historical relationship between the Dinka and the state, because for a time, the state would represent both oppression and hope, rather than mostly the former.

It was estimated that by 1976, 90% of the Southern population had still never attended school (Save the Children UK, 2002). Even though southern schooling during the first civil war was for all intents and purposes non-existent, the closure of Mission schools as a result of the increasingly brutal Northern project of Arabization and Islamization had the effect of politicizing what was otherwise a weak institution under British colonial rule. The Southern educated class, demonized for supporting rebellion, was transformed from a relatively small, marginalized, and atomized population into the leaders of a formidable military and diplomatic force. Christianity, blamed for creating a bifurcated post-colonial state, was elevated from a foreign, irrelevant, schoolchild’s pastime to a set of leaders whose fused spiritual and political identities equaled the Dinka spiritual and warrior leaders of the past. And English, once seen as merely necessary to score a colonial clerkship now became the anti-Arabic. The meanings of education to the bulk of Dinka communities took on new political and spatial characteristics, but remained understood
within Dinka communities of practice. This meant that educated war leaders and civil servants were seen less as harbingers of modern lifestyles, and more as guardians of pastoralist institutions and wealth, and as diversified assets to their families and clans by nature of their access to the emerging Southern power structure. Although families had already been used to sending children long distances to attend primary school, and to Khartoum to access secondary and post-secondary education, the first civil war era expanded the scope of these practices to include alternative sources of schooling across international borders in refugee camps increasingly supported by international humanitarian aid institutions. And as it would happen during the second civil war, a refugee camp school would become the preferred form of formal education.

2.4 Schooling and the Second Civil War, 1983-2005

In 1983, the military dictator Jaafar Nemeiri, who had seized power from Abbud in a coup in 1969 and who had negotiated the end to the first civil war, abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement, declared an end to Southern autonomy, and imposed Sharia or strict Islamic law over the entirety of the country, much of this in an attempt to pacify the growing opposition of Islamic fundamentalists in the North to his rule. In response, Southern educated elites, many of whom were junior officers in the Anyanya movement, were instrumental in organizing the Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing, the Southern People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which together became leading organ of Southern resistance to intensifying political, economic and
cultural oppression by the North. Many of the leaders who rose to prominence in the SPLA, such as John Garang, Rieck Machar, and Lam Akol had obtained academic and military training in Khartoum and graduate degrees in the United States and Britain. The government also revived the policy of Arabization and Islamization of the South, including schools. However, over the course of the second civil war, from 1983 – 2005, education indicators at the height of the war years (1999/2000) compared with pre-war figures (1980/1981) show a significant increase in access to education in the South. For example, the number of pupils enrolled in primary school more than doubled from 143,000 to 319,000, the number of primary schools increased from 809 to around 1,500 and the primary gross enrollment rate increased from 12% to 30% (UNESCO, 2003). This increase occurred during a brutal and destructive war period when there were limited government resources for education and a complete absence of the kind of policy guidance and institutional support deemed necessary today for post-conflict reconstruction of the education sector.

Little has been written to account for this seeming paradox, other than to warn that mere attendance does not a quality education make (Sommers, 2005; L.B. Deng, 2006). Indeed the quality of the schools inside Southern Sudan during this time was extremely low by most measures, including high drop-out rates, poorly trained and consistently truant teachers, lack of school curriculum and supplies, and lack of school feeding and proximity to clean drinking water. Most teachers left their classrooms to be soldiers at one point or another, schools and villages were deliberately bombed by Northern jets, and a severe, politically-induced famine struck the Bahr el Ghazal in the late 80’s sending families into
the bush to live off nuts, berries, and tree bark for months. All of this conspired to deny opportunities to obtain formal education during this extremely brutal 25 years of war. But it didn’t. In fact two things happened instead.

The first is that the legacy of schooling in the South, as I have argued, had become one infused with the symbolism of resistance and with the potential for families facing down severe poverty and starvation to diversify their sources of wealth generation. Given that war perpetrated by the long-time Northern oppressors had descended upon them once again, and in turn threatened the viability of the pastoralist enterprise, these two attitudes toward schooling became more pertinent than ever. Community supported schools, as well as those set up by INGOS who gained negotiated humanitarian access to famine-affected areas of the South, recruited students and teachers and coordinated with each other though clan, kinship, and reputation, and most were conducted under any tree or shelter. They were started first as alternatives to the Arabic-pattern schools and run in fits and starts throughout the second civil war whenever possible, sometimes without teachers; older students would take over the teaching of their younger peers. The fact of their low quality by international standards was nothing new, and as nearly all of my research participants who attended or taught in Southern schools during this time told me repeatedly, “any education was better than none.” Those who were unable to travel to a refugee camp but remained determined to obtain an education credential attended multiple schools all over the South during the second civil war as they struggled to find sanctuary from war and earn a primary school certificate.
The second thing that happened is that families with the means or connections sent their children abroad to refugee camps for schooling. What enabled this practice was not only historical precedent—for the practice of sending children long distances to school and in some cases to refugee camps abroad had been firmly established by the end of the first civil war—but by the arrival of the largest humanitarian aid operation in the world at the time. In 1989, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was set up as a tripartite agreement between the (Northern) government of Sudan, the SPLA, and the United Nations in response to the disastrous famine that had engulfed the Bahr El Ghazal. It would be the first time that such “negotiated access” was made to deliver aid in a “complex emergency” within areas controlled by either side of an unresolved conflict. Under the OLS umbrella, the UN specialized agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP), UNICEF and their partner NGOs, were to provide a basic level of assistance—food, drinking water, and basic health and hygiene supplies—to areas under both SPLA and government control. For the South, OLS was to become in the eyes of many a de-facto government (Minear, 1991).

OLS faced huge obstacles to its ability to serve all those in need however. Perhaps the two largest involved funding and transportation. Faced with not enough food donations and limited ways to deliver it, efforts to identify the most vulnerable to food insecurity were instituted to prioritize the aid. Seemingly technical questions about who is the most vulnerable ultimately became political questions because the OLS leadership and the SPLA were at odds concerning how and to whom aid should be delivered. Accusations of corruption and the manipulation of aid were leveled at the SPLA as reports that soldiers were surviving on food aid spread throughout the war. OLS’s decision to bypass local
chiefs in the organization of aid commodity distribution in turn was roundly criticized for
creating the perceived need for subterfuge and cover-ups in the first place (Minear, 1991;
Deng, 1999, Duffield et. al. 2000). Further complicating things was the North’s perception
of a militarized aid regime and their response of sporadically bombing aid convoys.

The politicization of humanitarian aid that OLS confronted came to characterize
many facets of the humanitarian aid industry around the world at this time, which began to
see itself as an instrumental player in the internal affairs of weak, failed, or rogue states,
and as harbingers of peace and democracy even while simultaneously claiming neutrality
(Barnett, 2001; Hoffman and Weiss, 2006). The aid industry would face the complexities
and dire consequences of such a qualified neutrality in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former
Yugoslavia. Authors such as Duffield (1998) and Macrea (1998) responded with charges
that the interventionist vision of conflict management and liberal democratic reform by
international institutions was transforming aid into a cover for narrow political objectives.
Indeed I argue in Chapter III that external political objectives were a large part of the
motivation behind international refugee camp education and repatriation policy. But the
focus on state-level political origins provoked attention away from the potential role local
pastoralist institutions could play in mitigating the worst effects of the famine, which had
effectively dealt with regular spasms of food insecurity for generations. Agencies like the
WFP discounted the local pastoralist kinship and clan distribution networks which formed
the bulwark of risk mitigation and food security—seeing these as corrupt—as well as local
estimates of the population in need (Harragin, 2004). It took 8 months before international
aid estimates finally came to be aligned with the local—and incidentally more accurate—
estimates of need.22 Because the famine was seen as a political tactic by the North, donor governments were also reluctant to support the operation in full fearing this would enable the Government of Sudan to continue to manipulate Southern access to food.

Eventually millions of people were saved from starvation and malnutrition by the efforts of OLS agencies and aid workers. Its most lasting legacy, however, may be found in the communication and distribution systems set up to navigate the roadless terrain, including an agreed upon set of “corridors of tranquility:” aid caravan routes, air strips, communication systems, and distribution points, through which not only food and supplies were delivered, but also aid workers, nutrition monitors, project evaluators, and journalists. Headquartered in Lokichogio, adjacent to the Kakuma Refugee Camp just across the border in Kenya, the OLS trucks and airplanes that would otherwise return empty after delivering their aid cargo came to be used by families to send their relations, especially children, into asylum. These were not official mass air lifts of people organized by an international coalition force, it was a few kids here, a few kids there, on the back of trucks, in their mother’s arms, with a hired pilot and a paid off government official, whose boss is your uncle. Air routes were variously regulated by the Southern Sudan Relief and Reconstruction Commission (SSRRC) set up by the SPLM to act as the primary liaison with OLS. Notwithstanding its alleged role in diverting aid from OLS-designated populations, local SSRRC officials also regulated who got a ride to Kenya in the caravans,

\footnote{22 For example, just over 140 tons of food were delivered in January of 1998, but by August, the monthly delivery had increased to 14,937 tons, closer to the estimate originally suggested by Dinka and militia leaders (Harrigan, 2004).}
according to my research participants. Travel and identity papers had to be procured, usually purchased, to board these trucks and enter the refugee camp, as well as a good deal of cash to support the long journey to Kakuma. The SSRRC officials and local militia officers assisted their extended family members and neighbors, and many others who could pay for the papers and the trip. Although some of my participants insisted that these were corrupt officials, all agreed that they were likely doing what was expected of them by the local population. This system enabled tens of thousands of children to cross multiple facets of the aid distribution network, but in reverse flow, to escape the war and access refugee camp aid, especially formal schooling.

While the existing political and spatial meanings of schooling to Dinka institutions transformed dramatically during the second civil war, it was not always in a positive sense. Jok and Hutchinson (1999) describe the militarization of Dinka and Nuer identities, influenced in large part by the violent split in the SPLA in 1991 between its two top leaders, John Garang and Riek Machar—“the two doctors”—the Dinka and Nuer SPLA leaders,23 as the cause of what many Southerners came to call the “war of the educated.” They quote a renowned Western Nuer chief lamenting:

They used to tell us that the reason why Nuer and Dinka fight each other was because we are ignorant. We don't know anything because we are not educated. But now look at all this killing! This war between the Nuer and Dinka is much worse than anything we experienced in the past. And it is the war of educated [elite]. It is not our war at all!” (Jok and Hutchinson 1999: 131).

23 John Garang obtained his PhD in economics from Iowa State University (USA) in 1980, and Riek Machar received his PhD in mechanical engineering from the University of Bradford (UK) in 1984.
Previously limited to cattle raiding with spears and governed by a strict set of ethical rules, the resulting fratricidal and indiscriminate killing and destruction of property between the deeply adversarial political factions would eventually surpass the causalities caused directly by the Northern military and threaten to unravel important Southern military gains. “Whereas before this war and, indeed, up until the SPLA split in 1991, Dinka and Nuer fighters would not intentionally kill women, children, or the elderly, these vulnerable segments of the population became the primary victims in "the war of the educated" (Jok & Hutchinson 1999; 131). Previous “wars” between the Nuer and Dinka were characterized by their interviewees as the “real” wars where “manhood” was proven but were short lived because the conflicts were eventually settled by chief’s courts. But educated war leaders mixed political and ideological differences with economic competition to appeal to the ethnic loyalty of their rural constituents (Jok & Hutchinson, 1999). Brutal attacks and counter-attacks on civilians ensued between Dinka and Nuer dominated factions, and much of the violence came to be perpetrated by bands of youth who were previously organized around age-set competition and the protection of cattle, but who were armed now with semi-automatic rifles.

The SPLA split, which had managed to mend itself by the end of the 1990s and ultimately force a Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the North in 2005, was also characterized by a competition as to who represented “government authority.” Government authority was equated by the leaders of the Southern factions with national security, representation, and cattle wealth (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999). But much like Bayart’s (2009) “politics of the belly,” authority was also seen as networked nepotism. By claiming
to represent government authority, any faction of the resistance leadership could claim that threats to such authority was a threat to the very existence of the Southern nation. It was also seen as a threat to the strength of their political and cultural networks of power—in this case, the Nuer were threatened by their lack of representation in the Dinka dominated SPLA leadership. Finally, under the banner of government authority, cattle could be commandeered from local communities in the name of the war effort. While this was a common practice among the various militia units travelling throughout the bush during the war, and which was to varying degrees begrudgingly tolerated by civilians, commanders would also confiscate cattle suspected of being seized in rustling perpetrated by rival clans or ethnic groups, and then claim it as government property, whereupon it would be redistributed to their followers and closest associates, whose loyalty depended on such payments in cattle wealth. “The ultimate result was a steady siphoning of civilian resources into the hands of opposed military units through tit-for-tat cattle raids carried out under the banner of "protecting" civilian assets” (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999: 133).

The tragedy of the “war of the educated” and the increasingly fervent claims of government authority by the Southern educated elite places in relief the deep contradictions that emerged by the end of the second civil war concerning schooling in the South. An enduring pastoralist skepticism of formal schooling stood in contrast to the increasing presence of international actors pedaling totalizing projects such as Education for All, even while the procurement of education credentials by just a few children,
particularly that obtained in refugee camps, had begun to be seen by Dinka families as indispensible to pastoralist livelihoods on the brink of destruction.\textsuperscript{24} Schooling was also seen as a way to compete for power with rivals and to control local resources, which had become fused with government resources. The culture of the state had in this way been integrated into the pastoral circuit, both maintaining and transforming its institutions, but at a steep cost to lives as intergenerational, inter-clan, and inter-ethnic rivalries became militarized. Extended networks of kinship relations expanded to include military loyalists, ranking government appointees and civil servants, and increasingly, the national staffs of humanitarian aid and development institutions. These institutions had by the end of the second civil war hosted over 400,000 South Sudanese refugees, and saturated the South itself with a host of emergency aid projects which were employing camp-educated former refugee children who had returned home as adults. It is on this latter phenomenon to which I turn in the next two chapters.

What I have attempted to do in this chapter is present a more nuanced interpretation of the cultural and political history of education in South Sudan. For the most part, this history has been dominated by the foregrounding of war, oppression, and underdevelopment, shaping our understanding of the pastoralist peoples of South Sudan in terms of deficits and need, as peoples without an educational history. My aim is to argue that in fact formal schooling, meager as it was for most of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, has played a deeply influential role in shaping the contemporary cultural and political practices not only

\textsuperscript{24} See Chapter 5 for a more detailed account of this phenomenon.
of all of the peoples of South Sudan, but even for those who were among the most marginalized. For the Dinka, formal schooling in South Sudan turned from a weak and irrelevant Missionary project into a deeply complex and contradictory set of meanings; as an alternative source of wealth for the maintenance of pastoralist institutions made vulnerable by decades of war and as a symbol of resistance and Southern nationalism, but also as a source of competition for power, extreme intra-Southern violence, and lingering cultural skepticism of the emerging educated elite. These meanings have a transformative consequence on South Sudanese and international education policy and practice today. In the following chapters, I provide an ethnographic account of these consequences.
III. The Pedagogical Camp: Education and Repatriation in the Kakuma Refugee Camp

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the purposes, practices, and outcomes of refugee camp education in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in northern Kenya by examining a variety of discourses, processes, texts, roles, and spaces through which they are expressed. Drawing from neo-institutionalist theory and its critics, I argue that international refugee education policy and practice reflects a set of value-laden projects undertaken by multiple institutional actors which are constrained by the scripts, processes, and rationalities of international legitimacy. As they are de-linked from the actual lives and values of refugees themselves, educational policy and practice is oriented around the recalibration of their social and cultural norms rather than congruent with them so that refugee children can eventually be taken up as educated young adults by the broader international (re)construction of the refugee producing state, undertaken in many cases by the very same institutions that manage refugee camps. I use the concepts of the official and unofficial curriculum to organize the multiplex of education objectives carried out by these actors and their many layers of professionals, sub-contractors, bureaucracies, experts, and boards of directors. These many actors seldom make for an ideological monolith (Robertson, 1992, 1995; Hart, 2002), and by their very diversity and competition with each other, contribute to the relative autonomy of the refugee camp education system (Bernstein, 2000; Apple, 2003). My aim however is not to analyze the curricular content of Kakuma
schools per se—as this content was not developed specifically for refugees, but is the Kenyan school curriculum—but rather to identify and analyze the broader messages, skills, and attitudes that are broadcast to refugee youth in the multiple educative spaces of the camp.

Taking inspiration Bernstein’s “pedagogic device” (2000) and Kaplan’s (2006) “Pedagogical State,” and with an eye to the subtle ways in which dominant international political and economic discourses are chosen, distributed, recontextualized, and transformed by their intended beneficiaries, I will in the following sections endeavor to describe what I call the pedagogical camp. I will do this by first describing the refugee education policy multiplex, its history, and the many sources from which education for encamped refugees is legitimized. Then I will introduce the Kakuma Refugee Camp as a case study in the ways this multiplex manifests itself. Specifically, I examine educative spaces in and beyond the school yard, including the many extracurricular activities, service distribution points and processes, institutional apparatuses, economic and cultural allowances and restrictions, and the spatial organization and thoroughfares of the camp to understand how multiple cultural scripts and institutional practices—originating from global, international, and national venues—interact with each other to form a unique and relatively autonomous system. Finally, in analyzing these particular scripts and practices, including the ways they interact with each other and with refugees in the space of the camp, I argue that despite their diversity and at times contradictory stances, the education policy multiplex in the Kakuma Refugee Camp ultimately amounts to a system that has as its primary objective the creation of recalibrated children upon whom international hopes
of institutional and cultural reform in the refugee producing state are projected. Purporting to reflect the global values and moral aims of its caretakers, the camp is in fact an enactment of a multiplex of problem-oriented policy prescriptions which attempt to contain, discipline, and normalize refugees (Foucault, 1979; Malkki, 1995; Chimni, 1999), and to ultimately transform them into agents of repair: of themselves, of the “national order of things” and the ruptured state from whence they came.

3.1 The Refugee Education Policy Multiplex

The refugee camp education policy multiplex is the cumulative result of what are otherwise a multiplex of projects, some aimed at healing and repair, some aimed at protecting refugee children from further harm, some aimed at transforming them into agents of change, and some that reflect the interests of actors threatened by refugee communities. International refugee education policy emerges from the shifting and sometimes contradictory discourses about human rights and humanitarian aid, children and childhood, and war and displacement. Recontextualized in the camp, these discourses become embedded within regulating frameworks around encampment which have at their moral centers an attendant sedentarism, institutional logic, bureaucratic rationality, rights regimes, and neoliberal political economy. They are expressed not only in the provision of schooling and other forms of aid, but also in and through the spatial organization, institutional cultures, aid provision processes, and socioeconomic allowances and restrictions of the camp. The camp is thus a site where these discourses become
transformed both by each other and by refugees; they are appropriated, relocated, refocused, and related to other discourses and practices—if not downright resisted at times—to constitute their own order (Bernstein, 2000). In this way, the refugee camp education system can be seen to have considerable autonomy from the actors or contexts from which it has been recontextualized.

The refugee education policy multiplex emerges from two overlapping policy frameworks: institutional frameworks and normative frameworks. These frameworks influence each other and the form and function of education in the camp, including formal schooling. Because they intersect with each other as well as with the life worlds of refugees, they together constitute a field of power relations which can alter or block the intentions of policy makers. I should note that my particular organization of the refugee education policy multiplex here is done mainly for ease of explanation, and does not reflect a naturally occurring categorization; in practice, these frameworks interact and overlap in complex ways and I attempt to describe them as such in the later sections of this chapter.

3.1.1 Institutional Frameworks

The use of refugee camps by multilateral organizations emerged in response to the 11 million displaced persons in Europe after the second world war, when the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established. The UNHCR’s
mission was to protect refugees from forcible repatriation, arbitrary deportation, hunger, disease, and lack of shelter, as well as to arbitrate the negotiation of tripartite agreements for voluntary repatriation or resettlement. Cold war politics at the time made the repatriation of refugees politically unconscionable since most refugees were from Communist bloc countries, and most recipient countries were aligned with the West (Chimni, 1999).

But new wars in Africa and South Asia in the 1960s and 70s created millions of new refugees. This subsequently expanded the UNHCR’s mandate to protect masses of asylum seekers from persecution by hostile regimes and refoulement by host countries threatened by and/or unable to accommodate their presence, rendering the agency in one assessment a “pseudo-state” (Waters and Leblanc, 2005). By the 1990s, a perceived link between refugee flows and international peace and security moved the agency to legitimate its involvement in the internal affairs of states producing refugees (Barnett, 2001). The subsequent focus on coordinated post-conflict reconstruction, peace-building, and democratization by the international political and humanitarian community sowed an environment in the UNHCR bureaucracy where repatriation was possible under less than ideal post-conflict situations (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Chimni, 2004). The instability, insecurity, and hopelessness of camp life was contrasted with the promise of reconstruction, reconciliation, and democratization in the refugee producing state, however fragile the situation. Repatriation became framed, over time, as tantamount to protection and synonymous with reconstruction and peace building (Barnett, 2001); it remains the preferred “durable” solution to refugee crises.
The repatriation culture of the UNHCR and its international partners had an indelible influence on the form and function of refugee education policy. In 1993, for example, UNESCO created the Program for Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction (PEER). The project began in Somalia in 1993, and established similar programs in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Angola, Mozambique, Haiti, Yemen, Afghanistan and Iraq. In the absence of standardized curricula, school infrastructure, teachers and educational administrators, and the need for peace, tolerance and reconciliation, and teacher training, PEER identified several principles and policies for the establishment of refugee and IDP education systems. They include

- re-establishing basic education;
- providing remedial training in the areas of teacher training, vocational training and secondary education;
- building local capacity though skills training, with the aim of ensuring the long-term continuation of education programs;
- community participation and ownership, through the establishment of Community School Committees and administrative coordination and supervision;
- ensuring sustainability by establishing adequate salary scales, low-cost production of curricular materials and increasing levels of community support to schools;
- coordinating efforts with other organizations in the field-level; and
- ensuring repatriation-oriented education in the refugee camps, in order to better support refugee repatriation.

According to PEER policy, “rehabilitation of the educational sector in-country cannot be complete without ensuring simultaneous provision of repatriation-oriented education in the refugee camps.”

The UNHCR, knowing that refugees seek asylum often to take advantage of camp schools along with other aid provisions, commonly referred to as “pull factors,” moved to end its provision of schooling in camps containing refugees from states seen to be
transitioning from crisis, including the Kakuma Refugee Camp. Indeed, the UNHCR explicitly linked the provision of refugee schooling to “frequent political demands for voluntary repatriation and the smooth operation of refugee camps. A result is that this rights-based approach was compromised by political demands…” (Waters & Leblanc, 2005, 137). A 1995 UNHCR policy defined the purpose of education as the following:

The content of schooling should follow the principle of education for voluntary repatriation, with refugee teachers providing a familiar type of education, using familiar languages of instruction. The content should follow the basic curriculum of the country or areas of origin. If repatriation is delayed, there should be discussions between refugee and host government educationists, regarding the possible introduction of “mixed curriculum” which “faces both ways,” incorporating elements of the host country curriculum, where this is substantially different. If return is further delayed or there is considerable local settlement, the host country curriculum may be adopted by mutual consent…. A primary reason for supporting refugee education programmes, and supporting them as soon as possible[,] is thus psychosocial. Children regain emotional balance by coming together for games and study…. [Thus,] education and training can contribute to the durable solution of “voluntary repatriation,” through giving children the knowledge, skills and emotional stability to successfully re-enter the education system in their home country (reprinted in Waters & Leblanc, 2005, 137).

As camp schooling shifted from a spontaneous creation of refugee communities to a formal and standardized provision by the UNHCR at the turn of the century, and as repatriation became central to the solution of refugee crises, the ideological uses of refugees in the geopolitical arena shifted once again: as potential agents of institutional transformation in the state from whence they came. The schooling of refugee children is integral to this goal:

In a context where families and communities are often divided or dispersed by the upheaval of conflict, schools are seen as key institutions that will play the major role in rebuilding core values, in instilling new democratic principles, and in helping children recover a lost childhood (World Bank, 2005: 16).
Refugees under institutional frameworks are thus constructed as uprooted from the territorialized nation, and disconnected from the proper function of formal schooling—the production of the nation and its constituent citizens, workers, and consumers—and its proper provider: the state. In this case, the UNHCR and its partners are said to assume the role of a “pseudo-state” as the provider not only of education, but also of food, shelter, and health care (Waters and LeBlanc, 2005). This was especially true of the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya where refugees were generally not permitted to live outside the camp nor engage in subsistence farming or cattle keeping, the livelihood strategies of 70% of its residents. The aim of this policy framework was to prepare children to return home with the capabilities to build a functioning state in the image of its promoters.

Indeed, much of what young refugees learned about the “proper” functioning and practices of modern state institutions arose from the institutional architectures and bureaucracies of the UNHCR and its main partners such as the World Food Program who
manage the camp.

The billboard in the photo above was erected at a busy intersection of the camp and displayed an organogram of the structure of GoSS, including the names and formal titles of office holders and the variety of ministries in charge of governance and service provision. These institutional architectures and rationalities exerted a powerful influence over a broad swath of refugee and humanitarian aid policy as they both enabled and constrained them. As I demonstrate below, the institutional practices and conformities of the many actors in the camp constituted a powerful educative influence on the general refugee population, but particularly on refugees enrolled in formal schools. These educative spaces included aid distribution points and processes, institutional procedures and governance, economic and cultural allowances and restrictions, and the spatial organization and thoroughfares of the camp. It is into this institutional environment that the normative frameworks around refugee children and their needs became embedded in the refugee camp.
3.1.2 Normative Frameworks

The quote above from a World Bank report on Children and Conflict demonstrates the intimate link between the international political and institutional agenda behind education for refugees—“instilling new democratic principles” for example—and universalized and normalized constructions of displaced children. The latter derives from Western notions of the child who is in formation of, or in transition to cultural competence (Cheney, 2007), and from what Liisa Malkki (1997) calls the metaphysics of sedentarism, which “actively territorializes our identities, whether cultural or national…[and] directly enables a vision of territorial displacement as pathological” (42). Children, under international conventions and declarations, are defined as under 18, naturally vulnerable, incomplete and non-competent, non-agentic, and in need of education and protection. “The children of the world are innocent, vulnerable, and dependent,” cites the World Declaration on the Survival, Protection, and Development of Children in 1990. “They are also curious, active, and full of hope. Their time should be one of joy and peace, of playing, learning, and growing.” War, disaster, and displacement are seen to lead to a “lost childhood” and are the causes of a host of psychosocial pathologies, including the perversion of morals and values.

The normative frameworks around education for refugee children have been intended not only as a shield from further harm engendered by their age, vulnerability, and
homelessness, but also to commence a path back to normalcy by repair from within: repair of the refugee child’s physical and psychosocial health (Ahearn, 2000; Sinclair, 2002), repair of his or her culture turned violent (Sommers, 2001), and repair of the caretaker state (Mosse & Lewis, 2005; World Bank, 2005). It is not a restoration of normality, however, but the creation of a new normal; one that adheres to universal constructions of children and childhood, the “national order of things,” as well as one that serves the political uses of refugee children.

The institutional provision of refugee camp education gained international legitimacy at nearly the same time as repatriation, in the 90s, even though in 1951 both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees identified the right to an education. Children under the age of 18 constituted 56% of all refugees in Africa by 2002 (Clover, 2002). The need for education in conflict situations was highlighted by Graça Machel’s Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (1996) and reiterated at the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000 and subsequent reports by Machel. Indeed, children and youth living in refugee camps were, and still are, more likely to be affected by food shortages and disease and are particularly susceptible to military recruitment, sexual abuse, and prostitution. “The sudden and violent onset of emergencies, the disruption of families and community structures … deeply affect the physical and psychological wellbeing of refugee children” (UNHCR, 1994: 5–6).

Education was, and also remains, invoked for students, their families and communities as a way to begin the trauma healing process and to learn the skills and values needed for a more peaceful and prosperous future.
The coordinated development and implementation of education policy and formal schooling for refugees is a relatively recent project. It’s development was deeply influenced by the repatriation culture of the UNHCR, the larger peace-building and democratization agendas of humanitarian aid institutions, and discourses in international development education. Chabbott (2003) traces the evolution of discourses in education development beginning with the modernization agendas in the 50’s and 60’s, and moving toward poverty reduction strategies in the 70’s, 80’s and 90’s. In the 1950’s, when the UNHCR was created, education was considered part of a larger set of practices that were supposed to help states with economic and human capital planning; as it would be until the 90’s, education policy was considered a responsibility of the state in the context of development, and not of international or humanitarian aid institutions. The 60’s saw the rise of human capital theory, which used population econometrics to justify investments in technical and vocational training, as well as secondary and higher education (s.f. Schultz, 1961; Psacharapolous, 1972).

By the 70’s, the discourse shifted toward an attention to basic human needs and strategies to combat poverty. However, the next decade saw structural adjustment programs and neoliberal discourses of efficiency, accountability, decentralization, and participation pull the responsibility for schooling away from the state and toward direct relationships between local communities and international economic development actors and their subcontractors. Neoliberal conceptions of economic development remain central to this day in international development as well as humanitarian aid, and many of its central tenets can be found in the day-to-day institutional functioning of the refugee camp.
In the 90’s, education was elevated as a human rights concern with the World Conference on Education for All (EFA). The EFA movement mainstreamed the notions that all children should be in school and had the right to go to school; this movement transformed the education sector’s engagement with refugee children. It was only in this decade that uniform assistance standards for refugee education were created and intermittently revised in attempts to ensure that refugees’ education rights were consistently protected across geographic and cultural contexts.

In 1997, the SPHERE project, an effort by a consortium of humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross to develop minimum standards in disaster response, initiated the development of standards to meet the physiological needs of refugees. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia also saw the rise of a focus on “psycho-social wellness.” Recognizing the trauma, stress, depression, and psychological adaptation of those who experienced war and flight, the provision of psychological, psychiatric, and social services were added to the basic physiological services (Ahearn, 2000). In addition to its newfound status as a human right, education was further justified within this framework because of its role in normalizing refugee children’s lives and as an access point to children by other aid sectors such as child protection, nutrition, water and sanitation, health and hygiene, and HIV/AIDS programs. The alternative, it was argued, was idleness, vulnerability, depression, and anti-social behavior, including militarization, prostitution, criminality, indentured servitude and slavery.

25 www.sphereproject.org
"Providing education, providing safe places for children to go during conflict and after emergencies helps normalize the experience for children. They are in a safe place. The teachers who are trained to deal with psychosocial issues during conflicts can better support these children, and less long-term damage is suffered by these children," asserts the senior director of the Department of Education and Child Development of Save the Children in an interview with the PBS News Hour (Epatco, 2011). Acknowledging that some forms of education can fan the flames of conflict, she adds that education which “reinforce social divisions, intolerance and prejudices” should be avoided. Recoiling from education that reinforces ethnic and national identities, the cultural values of international institutions such as the gender of teachers and how this affects girl’s access to education should be taken into account, she argues.

In December 2004, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), a coalition of U.N. agencies, NGOs, governments and consultants, introduced a handbook on the subject of interagency educational coordination. The guidelines highlighted issues that aid agencies need to address when initiating emergency education programs. These were the first-ever global standards for education in crisis situations. The handbook, Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies (MSEE), was intended to facilitate coordination among education partners and provided a “universal framework for ensuring the right to education for people affected by crisis. It was a tool for raising the quality of education in emergency situations and a lever for improving the accountability

26 The handbook can be found at www.ineesite.org
of the humanitarian actors who provide it.” The minimum standards covered five categories: Community participation; Access and learning environment; Teaching and learning; Teachers and other education personnel; Education policy and coordination. The MSEE stressed the importance that “Education cannot be considered in isolation from other sectors, or in isolation from economics, religious and traditional beliefs, social practices, political and security factors, coping mechanisms or anticipated future developments” (INEE, 2010).

Recognizing the trauma, stress, depression, and psychological adaptation of children who experienced war and flight, the provision of psychological, psychiatric, and social services in addition to the basic physiological services are provided in refugee camps to recover a “normal” childhood (Ahearn, 2000; Machel, 2001; Sinclair, 2002). Camp schools are seen as intersections where such services can be delivered, and are often seen as synonymous with them. As places where children are gather—in camps but also in other emergency and crisis settings—schools have been enlisted to provide shelter, food, and clean water as well as health, sanitation, and mine safety information. They are seen as a defense against sexual, criminal, or military exploitation and an opportunity to regain a sense of normalcy, play, and social bonds. School are seen as a conduit through which children learn the universal values of human rights, acquire the skills to mitigate conflict, and sow the seeds of peace and democracy all in preparation to be healthy and productive citizens upon the end of the crisis and their return home (Sinclair, 2002; Sommers, 2001). These provisions are now considered synonymous with the provision of schooling in many emergency and post-conflict environments (INEE, 2010). In addition to formal schooling,
refugee camps like Kakuma that serve protracted refugee crises also offer extracurricular, vocational, political, economic, and religious activities for youth, which together with schooling may indeed have benefits, but are far from normalizing. In fact, much of the former life-worlds of refugees are deemed incompatible with international values, and in some cases framed as the root causes of war and poverty, and so refugee children in particular are disciplined through education to be agents of change. “Normality” and “childhood” in the context of refugee camp education are firmly drawn from Western contexts, and decidedly not from those of refugee communities.

What emerges in the refugee camp, as I will show below in the case of Kakuma, is a multiplex of policies and practices drawn from the institutional and normative frameworks outlined above. These frameworks operate sometimes in concert and sometimes independently of each other and are enacted through the provision of formal schooling, but also in and through the many camp spaces, rituals, processes, discourses, rules, and restrictions under which refugee children live and grow up. Refugee schooling and the larger encampment and repatriation responses to mass displacement crises ultimately play a central role in the political democratization, economic liberalization, and state institution-building agendas of international post-conflict reconstruction actors. The actual practices and resources of children who grow up in the midst of chronic war and displacement, and their uses of education, are consistently obscured from view. This can be seen in the case of South Sudanese Dinka refugees in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya.
3.2 The Kakuma Refugee Camp

The Kakuma Refugee Camp is located in the Turkana District of North Western Kenya, 95 kilometers south of the Sudanese border and approximately 1000 kilometers from Nairobi. It was established by the UNHCR in 1992 after the initial arrival of 12,000 “Lost Boys/Girls of Sudan,” a group of children originally estimated at over 20,000 (UNICEF, 1996) who undertook a hazardous five-year odyssey fleeing the civil war in Sudan to Kenya via Ethiopia. When war erupted in Ethiopia they fled back to an insecure Sudan before finally reaching the Kenyan border point of Lokichogio (Loki) in 1992. The other 8,000 or so children were either conscripted into the military, starved, or killed along the way. The same year, large groups of Ethiopian refugees who had fled their country following the fall of the Ethiopian government added to the refugee population. During the course of subsequent years, the population in Kakuma, referred to by the UNHCR as its “caseload” (UNHCR, 2007), increased with inclusions of Ugandan, Somali, Eritrean, Burundian, Congolese, Tanzanian, Rwandan, Namibian and Darfurian refugees, many recently relocated from other camps around Kenya. Between 2000 and 2005, the population in the Kakuma camps was estimated to fluctuate between 90,000 and 110,000, roughly 80% of whom were from Southern Sudan. In October of 2006, the registered population was estimated by the World Food Program at 92,702, 60% of whom were of school age, between the ages of 6 and 25.
The host community, dominated by Turkana nomadic pastoralists, was already a severely marginalized community lacking many of the Kenyan state infrastructure and development projects enjoyed by other parts of the country. In fact, Kakuma refugees had better access to basic services than the Turkana, and this caused considerable friction, often fatal, between camp and host residents. With the increasing number of firearms in the region, cattle rustling and armed banditry was rampant and affected security in the refugee camp as well as along the North Western Corridor highway to Loki and on to South Sudan. Refugees have been killed or injured by bandits attempting to rob them, women have been raped while gathering firewood outside the borders of the camp, and along the highway unescorted vehicles have been ambushed and the occupants either injured or killed. Based on my interviews with camp administrators and NGO workers, the vast majority of violence in the camp is perceived to have arisen from resource scarcity, manifesting itself in nighttime banditry both inside and outside the camp, gender-based violence, carjackings, and local cattle rustling. In response, the UNHCR provided the Kenyan Government with security vehicles to provide constant security patrols in the camps as well as armed escorts for all official convoy movements along the main highway.

Responsibility for everything from safety to schooling was provided by a host of international and national actors. The main implementing partners of the UNHCR in Kakuma at the time of my visit were as follows:

1. **The Government of Kenya** was responsible for the provision of protection and security to refugees and humanitarian workers in and around Kakuma.
2. **Lutheran World Federation (LWF)** was the main Implementing Partner handling camp management, food distribution, education (pre-school, primary and secondary), peace education, water, and community services.
3. **International Rescue Committee (IRC)** was responsible for health, sanitation, nutrition, adult literacy and rehabilitation of physically/mentally disabled as well as the elderly.

4. **German Development Co-operation (GTZ)** was responsible for firewood distribution, awareness on alternative sources of energy and energy saving stoves production and environmental conservation.

5. **International Organization for Migration (IOM)** facilitated documentation and movement of refugees for resettlement to third countries and manages the airlift movements of Sudanese refugees to Sudan.

6. **Don Bosco** was responsible for vocational skills training and income generating activities (IGA).

7. **Handicap International (HI)** implemented the mine risk education which raises awareness to returnees on mines and unexploded ordinances (UXO).

8. **Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS)** was involved in providing counseling services and an educational scholarship program including a distance learning program from the University of South Africa (UNISA).

9. **Windle Trust Kenya (WTK)** offered English Language courses for Adults and ran a scholarship program attached to the World University Service of Canada (WUSC).

10. **Film Aid International (FAI)** used film/video to enforce all aspects of the refugee programme through the use of the “power of the film.” In addition, FAI disseminates mass information about voluntary repatriation and documents all the stages of the repatriation process for current and future mass information use.

11. **National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK)** offered reproductive health and HIV/AIDS awareness projects

12. **Kenyan Red Cross Society (KRCS)** undertook tracing and reunification of separated and unaccompanied minors with their families outside of Kakuma (South Sudan)

13. **World Food Program (WFP)** provided the general food basket and managed food distribution.

In the following sections, I will describe in detail the day-to-day lives of refugees through the lens of what I call the pedagogical camp. I describe the educative spaces in and beyond the school yard, in the many extracurricular activities, aid distribution points and processes, institutional procedures, economic and cultural allowances and restrictions, and the spatial organization and thoroughfares of the camp. I organize the pedagogical camp into the official and unofficial curricula in order to present a comprehensive picture of the many knowledges, skills, and attitudes “taught” to refugee children, most of whom in the case of Kakuma have spent the majority of their lives encamped.
3.2.1 *The Unofficial Curriculum*

The Kakuma refugee camp was—and still is—organized into four sections, each added as the refugee population grew in both numbers and national origins, and then further divided into ethno-national enclaves separated by fences and gates, the latter locked or unlocked depending on the time of day. It appeared at first that this spatial division arose as a natural process of self organization into communities of similarity, but also enforced by the UNHCR to mitigate potential violent conflicts between the different ethnic communities and with the host Turkana community. In actuality, the spatial organization of the camp is a result of institutional efficiency measures. Flows of refugees from the Horn and Great Lakes regions had been arriving in Kenya for many decades prior to the establishment of Kakuma, however. Kenyan government ministries used to process these refugees as they arrived and many, especially those with means, had settled in the larger cities of Mombassa and Nairobi, where they relied on established networks of relations across East Africa and all over the world (Horst, 2005). Others settled in many smaller camps throughout the country such as at Walda (North East Kenya) and Thika (Central Kenya).

As the flow of refugees from South Sudan and Somalia increased in the 80s, the Kenyan government sought the assistance of the UNHCR which, citing the need for increased efficiency of aid provision, consolidated the many smaller camps into two large ones: the Dadaab camps in the northeast near the border with Somalia, and Kakuma
UNHCR, 2007). Kakuma was particularly suitable for such a consolidation due to its proximity to Lokichoggio (Loki), already the staging site for Operation Lifeline Sudan, organized in 1989 in response to the severe famine in the Bahr el Ghazal of South Sudan and the largest humanitarian aid effort in the world at the time. Loki had become a town of roughly 35 NGO compounds, some of them quite large, next to a small Turkana village. Logistics for Kakuma and Darfur were coordinated in Loki as well. The airstrip is dominated by WFP and UN planes and helicopters, but commercial jets from Nairobi began to stop there to facilitate the increasing number of journalists, consultants, aid workers, entrepreneurs, and former refugees resettled abroad who were returning to visit relations still in the camps and in South Sudan. Kakuma was readied for the national consolidation of refugee communities through the creation of sub-camp sites, each designated as particular relocation sites of the different camps around the country. The spatial organization of the camp should be seen thus as one borne of a particular model institutional consolidation and efficiency. The fact of its organization into ethno-national enclaves should not be seen as a natural occurrence, but rather as an imposed order.

Kakuma is a closed camp, meaning that refugees are not permitted to leave or enter the camp without permission—even though refugees come and go nearly at will all the time—and are not provided any land of their own to cultivate. While most refugee camps around the world operate in this way—mostly due to the host government’s animosity toward the presence of refugees—South Sudanese refugees in Uganda by contrast were given small plots of land to cultivate and in many cases allowed to attend local Ugandan schools (Bützer, 2007). This quite different situation is in part the result of a long history
of circular migration on both sides of the South Sudan-Uganda border dating back to colonial era cotton plantations and established kinship relations (Bascom, 1998).

Because of the massive numbers of asylum seekers from the South fleeing an internationally recognized humanitarian disaster and combined with the UNHCR’s inability to fully screen all of them, Sudanese refugees were given *prima facie* status, which fast-tracked the process for granting asylum to nearly anyone who could prove they were from South Sudan. This in turn made it significantly easier for Southerners to establish networks of relations—and access to benefits—inside the camp. These networks allowed for the regular circulation of South Sudanese between their home communities, Kakuma, and urban areas in Kenya and Uganda. I interviewed many former refugees who told me about their strategies for going between camp schools and army units in Sudan; between the camp and Nairobi to purchase goods such as electronics, cooking equipment, lanterns, shower curtains, clothing and fashion accessories, generators, and food and beverages to sell in camp markets; and to points in South Sudan to look for jobs and to investigate the security situation to help in deciding when it was safe to return.27

Those in circulation tended to be male heads of households, leaving families in Kakuma increasingly led by women, according to aid workers. Many of these men stayed outside the camp, away from their families for many years. Some eventually returned to Kakuma while others established themselves well enough to either repatriate their families as well or have their families join them in Nairobi, Kampala, Australia, the UK, or the US.  

27 I profile two these former refugees in Chapter IV.
Those who had returned to South Sudan generally kept their absence quiet or else it would mean the forfeiture of their ration cards or a reduction in aid. Camp managers were quite aware of these comings and goings but generally did not prosecute violations of the terms of asylum for these kinds of subversions. When asked why, most responded that it was difficult to completely seal off the camp, but some acknowledged that enforcing a closed camp policy presented a bit of a conundrum because camp managers also actively supported practices that might speed voluntary repatriation. For instance, the closed camp policy was meant to keep refugees from permanently settling in Kenya, but given the international preference for voluntary repatriation as a durable solution to refugee crises, refugees could not be kept from going home. “You never really know what they’re up to,” an administrator told me.

The purpose of my visit to Kakuma between May and August of 2007 was to observe the primary and secondary schools there, and given my credentials as a high school English teacher and principal in the US, do some “guest teaching” in a junior and senior level English class. In order for me to enter Kakuma, I first obtained sponsorship from three NGOs: the World Food Program (WFP) on whose compound I stayed and with whom I observed food distribution; the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) which is subcontracted by the UNHCR to run schools in the camp and for whom I volunteered as a guest teacher and observer; and FilmAid, which showed movies and ran a participatory video production project with young refugees, something I had done with “at-risk” high school students in the US. With the sponsorship letters in hand, I obtained an entrance visa
to Kakuma from the Kenyan Ministry for Refugees after camping out in their office for three days before the officer in charge of camp visas showed up.

Three FilmAid staff met me at the Loki airport to pick me up. Along with vehicles from WFP, International Rescue Committee, UNHCR, LWF, and the Kenyan military, we drove in a convoy along the paved road to Kakuma. The mountains above Loki, carpeted with green thorny scrub, gave way to stretches of flat arid valleys cut through by dry river beds. Along the way, we passed small Turkana villages dotted with round, thatched huts made of thorn branches and mud overtop of which were fastened blue tarps and plastic grocery sacks. In between the villages, men and boys tended flocks of goats and cattle, and women, adorned with skirts and brightly colored, beaded necklaces walked along the roadside balancing 5 gallon water jugs on their heads or cultivating small plots of sorghum. As we got closer, groups of Turkana women carried large bundles of tree branches on their way to sell them as fuel for refugees in the camp.

After the hour and a half journey, the convoy turned off the tarmac onto a dirt track that led to the main camp gate. Wooden billboards adorned the sides of the road advertising the variety of INGOs and their projects on behalf of the refugees. I was dropped off in front of the WFP compound gate where I met Ken, a security guard, who escorted me to the main office inside. Ken is a Turkana whom I eventually got to know well over the course of my stay. Until recently, there was regular violence perpetrated by Turkana against refugees, in large part because refugees had become comparatively better off than the local population due to their greater access to food, education and health in the
camp. Now that some of the camp resources had been opened to the locals, one could find Turkana doing business in the camp as well as accessing many of its basic services. Ken, for example, obtained his primary school certificate in this manner from an accelerated adult education program in the camp. He came to hold political aspirations on behalf of the plight of his Turkana community and had recently attempted an unsuccessful bid to be his region’s representative in the Kenyan National Assembly. He lost, he told me, because he had no money to bribe his constituents, something his long-time incumbent opponent had in spades.

The WFP compound was well fortified with concrete walls and razor wire. As Ken and I walked to the office, we passed three large tents called Rupp Halls in front of which were trucks unloading sacks of flour and lentils and cans of cooking oil. Beyond the tents were staff offices and the residence area, both of which had recently been renovated. The residence area comprised of small white concrete bungalows with tin roofs painted the standard UN blue, encircling a well-manicured dirt courtyard dotted with fruit trees and flowering shrubs. A volleyball net stood in the center. Ken informed me that Drew Barrymore, one of a few celebrity spokespeople for WFP, had just stayed in the same bungalow as the one in which I was staying. She had been visiting with Angelina Jolie who recently opened an all-girls boarding school in the camp.

Refugee families, upon being granted asylum, are officially settled in small mud-brick houses with tin roofs, roughly 7 by 12 feet, built with the assistance of the UNHCR. Many more, however, settle in spontaneously constructed huts of tin scraps, wood planks,
tarps, plastic bags, and burlap sacks. Some had constructed small porches and garden trellises out of tree branches. The shelters, many of which were fenced in by thorn bushes, lined the maze of narrow dirt tracks that snaked around the camp and which became nearly impassable lakes of mud after it rained. The Ethiopian and Somali sections of the camp were occasionally broken by small business areas of restaurants, grocery stands, hardware and house ware stores, wood and tin scrap sellers, electronics shops, bicycle dealers and repair shops, cyber cafes, and video halls. Goods were brought into the camp by refugees who had the means and connections to travel outside the camp. Many operated at night for a few hours using diesel generators to power lights, stereos, refrigerators, and televisions. In the video halls, Chuck Norris and Kung Fu movies were particularly popular. I was stopped at least two or three times a day and asked if I was Chuck Norris thanks to my dirty blond hair, beard and aviator glasses.

By far, the largest aid project in the camp was food distribution. The World Food Program estimated in 2005 that nearly 1 in 5 refugees in Kakuma were malnourished. Food was distributed in three ways: through food distribution centers where approximately 770 metric tons of food were distributed every 14 days (a fortnight); in the camp schools where a mid-morning meal of porridge was distributed to the camp’s 20,000 students; and selective feeding programs targeted about 2,600 refugee children under 5 and pregnant women per month. The amount of food provided fluctuated wildly, however, depending on funding and road conditions. The basket of food included wheat flour, soy meal, yellow

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28 The following statistics were collected from the WFP lead coordinator in Kakuma
split peas, maize meal and cooking oil. Many families used these rations to barter for other foods such as fruits and vegetables when they were available in camp markets, and some sold a portion because much of the items are not part of many refugees’ typical diets. The varying availability of firewood and charcoal often inhibited the preparation of these foods for consumption. The WFP linked all of these food aid challenges to increases in malnutrition, stress, and violence in the camp.

At the food distribution centers, refugees were directed into different corrals based on family size. Family size was determined by UNHCR and WFP technical staff and was primarily based on who was present at the time. Families were issued ration cards with this information. This turned out to be problematic as families were often dispersed in the chaos of war and displacement and so many family members arrived at different times, failed to arrive at all, or left the camp for any number of reasons. While camp staff attempted to compensate for this, refugees were generally suspected of abusing aid. Conversely, the refugees I interviewed expressed resentment at being seen always as potential thieves. “You cannot imagine what my children and I went through to get here. I was seen as a threat in my own country and now I feel like a threat here too,” a refugee mother of 7 told me. “I have four children, but the other two were the children of my husband’s brother, who is dead. And then my sister was able to send one of her sons here. They [the UNHCR] just don’t seem to understand. They think I’m lying to get more food.”

Once corralled by family size, they formed lines, separated by gender, and weaved through a series of narrow, fenced corridors. Refugee employees and volunteers of the
WFP, stationed behind more fencing, weighed each scoop of food, and then deposited it through a window into small bags held out by each beneficiary. They continued to move along the corridors, stopped at each food station before reaching the end where there is a large scale. The entire food basket was then weighed again and adjusted according to whatever the proper amounts were determined for that week, sometimes adding, sometimes removing food. Other food distribution staff, all refugees, carried large sacks of the commodities from an adjacent storage barn to the lines. Some drove fork lifts. Others carried clipboards. Many of them were covered head-to-toe in flour, making some of them look like ghosts.

The United States was the largest donor to refugee food aid in Kakuma, providing about 80% of the funding to date. Japan, the EU, and Canada also support food aid in Kakuma. Yet while the WFP attempted to diversify its donor base, the pressure to create an environment where voluntary repatriation increased caused many donors to focus on projects in South Sudan, reasoning that decreased support in Kenya and increased activities in Sudan would create a so-called “push factor” to repatriate and counter “pull factors” in the camp. Providing enough food in Kakuma had been becoming increasingly difficult. Support for camp schooling was being affected in a very similar way.

In addition to food distribution tasks, refugees were employed in a number of capacities around the camp, mostly paid in incentive stipends designed to create the impression that refugees were “earning” their aid. While the employed formed a relatively small fraction of the overall refugee population—many cannot work because they are
children, elderly, or sick—refugees also assisted with water and sanitation, shelter, and latrine construction. “They really don’t make a lot of money,” one aid worker told me, “but they are learning valuable skills they can use to get jobs when they go home.” Completing an education gained one access to more lucrative employment in the camp. Educated refugees had access to formal employment as teachers, administrators, program coordinators, bureaucrats, drivers, mechanics, security guards, or many other support roles with camp NGOs. There were also youth entrepreneurship projects that usually involved training in skills such as latrine construction or tree planting which were used to “sell” their services to camp institutions and other local clients such as churches and small businesses.

Refugee and ex-pat staff from the various partners of the UNHCR regularly visited classrooms to promote their projects or disseminate information on proper health and hygiene practices, HIV/AIDS awareness, mine and unexploded ordinance safety, and gender equity. Students were regularly recruited to join camp sports clubs, drama clubs, the Boy Scouts and other secular and non-secular youth organizations, tree and shrub planting projects, youth entrepreneurship projects, and camp participatory governance roles. Camp participatory governance efforts involved being elected a community representative of one’s ethno-national community on the Kakuma Camp Management Council. The council met once a month where representatives from the various ethnic and national groups in the camp aired grievances and made requests to the leadership of the UNHCR and their main partners such as the WFP and LWF.
Otherwise, there was not a whole lot to do on a day-to-day basis in Kakuma. Idleness was cited by a number of camp managers and workers as a condition that led to trouble. For the most part, people walked or biked along paths and dirt roads (the only tarmac is the road to Loki) on their way to different parts of the camp to trade, buy goods, go to the church or mosque, school or hospital, fetch water, or line up at food distribution centers. According to most of the aid workers I spoke with, one could not roam the camp after dark alone without risking a mugging or worse. UN and NGO staff, a majority of whom were Kenyans, were not permitted outside their compounds after 6 pm. One of the few exceptions to this rule was granted to health and emergency related vehicles, and to FilmAid, which shows movies in the camp after dark.

I spent some time with Film Aid staff and students during my stay in Kakuma. At the time, the staff was made up of a few Kenyan film producers and editors and one Ugandan refugee who had recently completed an electrician training program through the Don Bosco vocational training program in the camp. Don Bosco also offers training in truck driving and maintenance and water and sanitation management. One evening, about six of us hopped into a Land Cruiser and headed to one of about three different screening areas in the camp, this one in a clearing about two miles from the offices. The road getting there was astonishingly rough, and we nearly got stuck in the mud in a river bed and then nearly rolled off an escarpment trying get out of it. On one side of the clearing, mounted to the top of a truck, was a large theater size movie screen. About 75 adult refugees stood in a ring around the screen with about twice that many children and adolescents sitting in front of them. Behind the screen, a diesel generator blared while the FilmAid staff ate their
dinner of cabbage, chapatti, and goat stew. I tried to ask questions over the blare of the generator.

The film program included a few cartoons, a short film made in the camp in 2005 about gender-based violence, sexual harassment, and how to report it, and a feature length film from Ugandan about teen pregnancy and the difficult life that follows. According to the FilmAid staff, film selection and production was driven by a council of refugees representing all the different nationalities in the camp. Most of the films they showed addressed in some way issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, peace building and conflict resolution, health and hygiene, and repatriation. John, a young FilmAid outreach coordinator and Turkana who just finished his undergraduate studies in Social Work (a rare feat for a Turkana, he told me), commented that it’s hard to get the Somalis to attend because they often object to the subject matter of the films. They refused to participate in the film selection council, he said, “because they are Muslims.” He also said that the number of people attending screenings were dwindling because increasing numbers of Sudanese are repatriating.

The whole screening lasted about two and a half hours. As we prepared to head back to the FilmAid office, the driver offered to take a few of the volunteers home. Snaking our way through the narrow and bumpy passages of the camp, we encountered locked gates between the different sections of the camp, generally organized by nationality. There had recently been violent raids by bandits from one group on another and then reprisal raids. This prompted the UNHCR to construct gates between the sections that were
locked after 6PM. Although the gates were supposed to be guarded at all times by a designated refugee living in that section, it took an hour to finally reach the guard by radio to unlock the gate to the Congolese section. Lucky we weren’t an ambulance.

A few weeks later, I observed the screening of a few short videos produced by young refugees, most in their teens, who participated in FilmAid’s Participatory Video Project (PVP). The goal of this project was to teach young refugees how to produce video, including pre- and post-production skills using digital video camcorders and computer video editing software, and then to provide them with the tools to produce their own video projects. “It’s a way to give a voice to the refugee youth, who are among the most marginalized here in Kakuma. At the same time, they also learn skills that will help them eventually find jobs.” one of the producers explained. This particular screening was for the benefit of a group of girls who attend the St. Asisi Girls’ Boarding School located outside the camp. Most are Turkana, but a few are refugees who live in the camp; the group appears to range from pre-teen to early 20’s in age. They arrived in the meeting hall in blue skirts and white button-down blouses, and sat in rows in front of a long black board and large television set. Two young FilmAid presenters, refugees and graduates of the PVP courses, shock me as they come alive before the group. Charismatic and engaging, they lead the group through introductions to the staff and PVP. Then they introduce the two videos to be screened. The first is about polygamy, a common tradition among many of the communities in and around the camp, especially the Turkana and the Dinka. The second video addresses the issue of HIV/AIDS infection and stigma.
Written, acted, filmed and edited by its young refugee participants, the first video told the story of a child caught in the middle of a jealous confrontation between two wives. Returning home one day drunk from consuming Chana, a locally brewed gin, the girl’s biological mother is thrown out of the house by her father, leaving her in a kind of Cinderella situation. In this case, however, the constant barking of orders to clean, cook and serve by her remaining “mother” drives the girl ultimately to suicide. In the second video, a young man’s friends reject him once they learn he is HIV positive. They refuse to touch him; one even subjects himself to a comical showering, scrubbing, and brushing after accidentally shaking his friend’s hand. A health counselor meets with the group and educates them about HIV transmission and implores them to have compassion for their friend. This one has a happy ending as the friends reconcile at the end. After each screening, the two FilmAid students lead the group through a discussion of the issues raised, educating and correcting them as various misconceptions and disagreements about polygamy and HIV/AIDS arise within the group of schoolgirls.

The activities of Film Aid, along with the spatial organization, aid delivery procedures, extracurricular activities and clubs, camp administration practices, refugee employment opportunities, and entertainment choices are a part of the larger unofficial curriculum in Kakuma. While they are not a cohesive set of policies and programs aimed at any one outcome, together they form a multiplex of discourses and practices that grow out of the larger repair and repatriation goals of the international refugee regime. Although spatially organized into ethno-national enclaves, camp discourses, procedures, and policies conspicuously ignore or forgo if not prohibit activities that formally advocate connections
to particular cultural identities and practices, and instead promote and condition the rights discourses, bureaucratic rationalities and statist governmentalities necessary for (re)building and administering the institutions of the modern state. These discourses and practices embedded in the pedagogical spaces of the camp draw from western notions of childhood and human rights, and the in vogue political uses of refugees. They look toward the eventual repatriation of refugees and produce the endogenous human capital necessary to support the state reconstruction projects funded and administered by the very same institutions that run the camp. Formal camp schooling is embedded in these regulating and sometimes contradictory discourses and forms the recontextualizing environment within which the official curriculum is enacted and transformed.

3.2.2 The Official Curriculum

In the summer of 2007, Camp Secondary School was comprised of three long, narrow, single story, mud and brick buildings each with two classrooms and a small storage area in between. The roofs were constructed of wood rafters and metal sheeting. There was also an administrative building with three small offices and a small kitchen building. Termites had eaten away at the wooden window frames and so empty rectangles

29 This refers to the changing political uses of refugees outlined earlier in the institutional frameworks section of this chapter
30 Names have been changed to protect the identities of research participants
stood where screens or shutters would be. I counted about ten hammocks draped with mosquito nets hanging in a few trees. Some of the students live on the school grounds, I was told. There was no electricity or generator. A group of women were preparing a lunch of maize porridge in four giant calabashes. A few students came and went to collect water at a bore hole about a quarter mile away, quite close compared to the distances typical for the local community or in most parts of Southern Sudan.

About 900 students attended Camp Secondary at the time; about 100 had left since the beginning of the year according to the headmaster. Some had repatriated to Sudan, some had resettled in the US, Australia, or the UK, and a few, through remittances from relatives abroad or scholarship programs run by NGOs in the camp, had transferred to boarding schools in Kenya. There were roughly 2,500 secondary students among three secondary schools in Kakuma, of which only 200 were girls. LWF also ran 21 primary schools, which in Kenya and Sudan go up through 8th grade, accommodating over 18,000 pupils, 27% of whom are girls. There were also 7 pre-schools with about 3,700 children. The camp schools were funded entirely by international donors and were open to both refugee and local Turkana children.

The primary schools in Kakuma were not financially supported by Kenya. Many of the teachers in Kakuma primary and secondary schools were Kenyan teachers however, contracted by LWF to teach the subjects that require the most training like English, Swahili, and science; they were recruited with the help of the Kenyan Ministry of Education which chooses and places the teachers, many begrudgingly, in Kakuma. Based
on my interviews, most of these teachers saw a placement in the camp as unfortunate but temporary, and left when a better opportunity arose. The rest of the teachers were either previously educated refugees—some were teachers or school administrators prior to their exile—or camp-educated refugees who completed secondary school and a three-week teacher training regiment from LWF. Many of the refugee teachers, however, had yet to start or complete the training. This was because funding for the training, according to LWF staff, was quickly disappearing and the need for teachers to fill classrooms was increasing. According to the school director, there is one textbook for every five students, a vastly better ratio than one would find in South Sudan.

In practice though, as also in South Sudan, the official enrollment and resource numbers masked the reality of daily schooling experience. I found in my school and classroom observations far fewer students in attendance on a day-to-day basis and far fewer textbooks per student. Nearly all the teachers I observed spent a considerable amount of class time copying text from a textbook onto the board so that students could in turn copy it into their notebooks. Many of the school children whom I observed outside of class regularly passed a coveted textbook amongst each other; they copied passages into notebooks in impressive detail, including illustrations and maps.

As stated earlier, Kakuma schools used the Kenyan national curriculum, the core of which included English, Swahili, math, science, and social studies, the latter of which focused on Kenyan national history and geography. In other refugee camps, the curricula of the refugees’ home country was commonly in use; in the case of South Sudan, however,
there did not yet exist national curriculum. Instead, those of its southern neighbors, particularly Uganda and Kenya were, and are still, used in many parts of South Sudan. These curricula were considered by all my research participants in both South Sudan and Kakuma as the educational gold standard. As a result, the UNHCR tripartite agreement cited these curricula and their credentialing systems as those that should be recognized by Sudan as equivalent to Sudanese credential. This, of course, is despite the fact that the curriculum in Kakuma, for example, focuses on Kenyan history and civics, and Swahili language in addition to English, the mastery of which is required for a Kenyan educational credential. There is also a Christian or Islamic religious class, the latter attended primarily by the few Somali refugees who utilized the camp school system. The schools administer the battery of exams used throughout Kenya to determine eligibility for primary school promotion and entrance to and graduation from secondary school even though the.

Impressively, even though exams were in English and Swahili, over 5000 primary students in Kakuma qualified for secondary school, according to the LWF. But there are less than 500 secondary school spots available each year and these are decreasing as the UNHCR and donors turn their attention to development projects in South Sudan.

During my stay in Kakuma I followed a group of former teachers and headmasters hired by LWF to serve as Quality Assurance and Standards Officers, or QuASOs. Their task was to provide constructive feedback to teachers on pedagogical matters by observing them in the classroom and analyzing their syllabi and lesson plans. They also observed and interviewed school administrators, reviewed administrative records, and surveyed the school grounds and facilities. The head QuASO, Girma, was a university-educated
Ethiopian man and former state Ministry of Education official in Ethiopia with years of teaching and administrative experience. He fled the country in 1994 after he was accused of being a supporter of the deposed communist military dictator, Mengitsu Haile Mariam, which threatened to land him in prison. When I met him, he had lived in the camp for 13 years; he had married and had children there.

One day, I visited Camp Primary School with the QuASO team. Four classroom buildings, again each with two classrooms and a center storage area or office, surrounded a rectangular courtyard within which a small play area was enclosed by stones. Students played soccer in this area during breaks with what amounted to a knitted sack filled with pebbles. Most played barefoot. Student ages ranged from 6 to 18 years old; this range was quite normal given the variable access to schooling both in their home countries and in the camp. A pre-school was nearby and the familiar shouts of 3, 4, and 5 year-olds at play mixed with those of the soccer players. LWF reported that 30% of primary school enrollment in Kakuma are girls. Indeed, there had been a 3-fold increase in girls’ primary school enrollment over the last 7 years, much of which was attributed by LWF administrative staff to the gender equity campaigns of many of the NGOs in the camp, especially LWF. It is possible that the changing gender practices around education that I would observe in Dinka communities in South Sudan a year and a half later contributed to increased enrollment as well. But I actually observed very few girls in Camp Primary School. Many of the class sizes appeared reasonable, around 25 students on average after doing a rough head count in a few of the classrooms, although later I found out that more than 400 students were absent that day, which was around the daily average according to
the headmaster. The total enrollment is just over 1000. Apparently, attendance improved around exam time.

We watched a seventh grade math class where a young teacher hurried through a geometry lesson. I counted two girls in a class of 27. The teacher reviewed the concept of volume, which he had introduced previously, by drawing three, three-dimensional shapes on the board and labeling each with its length, width and height. He then asked for volunteers to explain how to solve each of them. Only a few hands went up, all boys. One approached the board and wrote the formula, “L x W x H.” One by one, he erased each letter and replaced it with the corresponding number from the shape. The teacher said, “Very good. Who will do the next one?” The next student who volunteered was sitting next to the wall of the classroom and had to step over five students to reach the center aisle of the classroom. “Please hurry up,” the teacher says. The student repeated the exact same process as the first, but drew his numbers slowly and meticulously, which elicited more “hurry up”-s from the teacher. Rather than calling on a third student to address the third figure, he hastily erased the board and then copied a word problem from his textbook:

A construction worker must determine how much concrete he needs to pour the foundation of a house. The house is 15 meters by 25 meters. The foundation must be ½ meter wide and two meters deep. How many square meters of concrete does he need?

The teacher began to draw squares, explaining quickly what each represented as he labeled them with numbers; first the 15 x 25, then 15 x 2 and 25 x 2, and finally ½ x 15 and ½ x 25. “Everyone understand” he asked. “Yes,” most responded in chorus. This last exchange between teacher and class came to be a mantra connecting nearly every
classroom I observed over the course of three years in Kenya and Sudan. Hardly ever did a teacher press students as to the honesty of their answer to this question, even when it was clear from my observations that many students did not understand and/or kept silent when asked. Expressed in a number of ways, such as “You follow me,” or “Everyone get this,” it came to resemble a command rather than a question, requiring the choral affirmative irrespective of individual variation. Given the commonality of this exchange in the classrooms I describe throughout this paper, I will call it a “command to understand” as an abbreviation.

The teacher worked quickly through the process of solving the problem, ably drawing a step-by-step outline on the board, issuing a few more commands to understand along the way, ignoring a diminishing number of those yelling out “yes!” in response. He then instructed students to copy from the 3 textbooks that circulated around the class the word problems on a particular page, and then to set about solving them. For most of the rest of the class period, three or four students huddled over a textbook copying the required problems into their notebooks while other students waited to do the same. A few appeared to already have copied the problems into their notebooks, confirming what I had been observing school children doing outside of class, passing the few available textbooks from family to family.

As students began working on the problems, some sought assistance by looking at the notebooks of their peers, but generally without speaking to each other. I observed only two students seeking the assistance of the teacher, each raising their hand and then upon
being recognized, approached the front of the classroom where the teacher sat completing what I later confirmed were his lesson plans. These were required to completed by teachers in advance by the QuASO as part of their evaluation of “professional documents.” The teacher’s rushed demeanor was likely the result of our presence and subsequent evaluation of his job performance. Over the last few minutes of class, I wandered around the classroom to observe how students were doing with the word problems, and about a third of the students were working through them successfully. Most of the students, however, were still waiting to see a textbook by the time a bell rang faintly across the courtyard, where a tall and gangly student shook it with a big smile on his face.

Next, we observed an 8th grade Christian Religious Education (CRE) class; the topic of the day was “Faith & Work.” The CRE class is a core curricular attribute of the Kenyan national curriculum throughout primary and secondary school. Islamic and Hindu education programs are offered as alternatives. The teacher, who was considerably older than the math teacher we just observed, started by reviewing the concept of the “neighbor,” reminding the students that this does not refer to a physical relationship, “not the next door kind” he wrote on the board, but rather a “spiritual one in which anyone in need, no matter who they are, is a neighbor.” The teacher misspelled “spiritual” and “matter” but then corrected them after consulting his textbook. The students politely repeated what he wrote on the black board in unison upon the teacher’s cue. This class was one of the rare instances where I observed a teacher attempt to lead a discussion with students. He asked for examples of this concept of the neighbor but was at first met with blank stares from the class of 19 students, 5 of whom were girls. He continued to prod by repeating the question
and waited. Finally a student raised his hand and said, “Sometimes the people who have no
food come over to my house and we share it.”

“Are they part of your family,” the teacher asked.

“Sometimes,” the student responded.

“So we should share,” said the teacher, “even when they are not our family.”

Another student raised his hand and related a story where refugees in the camp sell
their extra food to others. “This is not being a neighbor,” the teacher replied. “They must
share the extra food with the needy or give it back.” More students began speaking about
what they considered un-neighborly behavior including theft, lying, and charging too much
money for an item in the camp markets. After erasing the board, the teacher introduced the
concept of being a good neighbor at work.

“When the boss is not there, who is watching you,” the teacher asked.

“God,” most of the class replied in unison.

Girma motions to me that we needed to move on, and we thanked the teacher and
students as we departed the classroom. In the courtyard, a group of Turkana women,
brightly colored beaded necklaces adorning their entire neckline, sat together weaving each
other’s hair. They had carried a large stack of thick branches on their backs to sell to the
school. These were used for fuel to cook the school lunch, which until today had not been
prepared for a week, according to one of the teachers. “They are waiting to be paid,” he
said to me.
In the shade, next to one of the classroom buildings, Girma and I sat with the math teacher we observed for his review. He is 20 years old and has yet to go through any sort of teacher training even though he had already been teaching at Camp Primary for two years. This reflects LWF’s desperation for teachers and dwindling budget for training, hiring many as soon as they finish secondary school. Indeed, there were a few classes that had no teachers at times throughout the day. Girma explains that while some have returned to Sudan, he believes that more leave for NGO jobs in the camp that require less work and pay more.

Fumbling with multiple sheets of carbon paper flapping in the breeze, Girma slid them in between duplicates of the teacher evaluation form and began providing oral feedback to the math teacher. He occasionally paused to write next to each item on the form. Child-centered teaching, knowledge of subject matter, preparation, and professional documents are the primary measures of the evaluation, each with own heading on the form. This teacher, lacking formal training and clearly overwhelmed, received a compassionate but stern mouthful from Girma. The teacher explains to Girma that he was having trouble teaching all the required units before exams, that he had little time to prepare all of his lesson plans, and that he was still waiting for the training. “I need a certificate,” he kept saying. The CRE teacher, whose formal training was very apparent during our observation, was next. He explained right from the start that he had just taken over his classes from a previous teacher who recently returned to Sudan. Already severely behind in the syllabus, he was doing all he could to catch up.
At the end of the day, we met the other QuASO’s in a storage room and each gave a report on their findings. The group of eight men represented a mix of nationalities and ages. About half were in or near their 50’s and most had lived in the camp for 10 years or more. One of them was the designated secretary for this meeting and the others craned their necks over his notebook and argued over wording. Cell phones rang, teachers requested assistance, students had crises, members of the team excused themselves and returned, it all felt very familiar to me as a former school teacher, except for the fact that it was nearly 110F degrees and the dirt and dust had, among other things, made my push button pen all but useless.

In the final stage of the inspection, we gathered in the main office with the entire staff and faculty. There were fourteen teachers, including the head teacher. Doing the math in my head, that made roughly a 70:1 teacher-pupil ratio when all are in attendance. The QuASO team members gave their reports, detailing aspects of the school—teaching, administration, and grounds—that met their standards and those that needed improvement. The lead teacher took notes while the rest sat quietly. Despite the severe challenges this faculty faced, and this went for the staff at Camp Secondary as well, they appeared able to accomplish quite a lot with very little. Resilience and perseverance in face of scarcity and insecurity were not characteristics of the few here; they were—and have been for quite some time—the everyday tools of existence.

The perseverance of donors to support aid operations in Kakuma, however, had begun to wane as the perceived conditions in South Sudan for repatriation increased.
Despite the significantly slower than projected rate of return, the tens of thousands of non-South Sudanese refugees who remained, and increasing refugee flows from Somalia and Darfur, many projects were being moved to South Sudan. Many were vocational and teacher training programs—which were cited in my interviews with camp administrators as wildly successful in repatriating refugees because of the demands for camp-credentialed skills back in South Sudan. They explained to me that successful programs such as these, along with formal schooling, food distribution, and health services, were simultaneously seen as so-called “pull factors” by donors who feared they drew people with bogus asylum claims to the camp. Indeed, food donations were decreasing and camp schooling was being phased out. At a monthly camp management council meeting I attended, it was announced that the pre-school program was ending the following year even though 4000 students were currently enrolled. The longer-term plan was to phase out one more subsequent grade each year until the formal provision of camp schooling would come to an end. In its place, assistance would be provided to self-organized groups of refugees to provide for their own education.

The many NGO compounds, hotels, and restaurants in Loki that served the hordes of aid workers serving South Sudan, Darfur, and Kakuma began to empty out after 2005, and the busy airport went from nearly 10 flights a day in 2003 to a handful a week by the time I visited in 2007, according to my flight attendant. While I waited in Loki for the plane to take me back to Nairobi, I sat in the main UN compound in an elaborately decorated, open-air bar with a kind of desert-meets-the-jungle décor. The compound was huge, having once accommodated over 1000 aid workers at the height of OLS. The bar
area was designed for nearly all these staff to be drinking, dancing, relaxing, coupling, or just shaking off the dust after working in the very hot and harsh environments of the region. Music still blared from loudspeakers designed to rise above the din of a crowd. But now one bartender and I were the only ones there. When I finished my beer, and got up to catch my plane, an old REO Speedwagon song was playing: I’m All Out of Love.

### 3.3 The Pedagogical Camp

The pedagogical camp can be found in and beyond the schoolyard, in the many extracurricular activities, service distribution points and processes, institutional apparatuses and procedures, economic and cultural allowances and restrictions, and the spatial organization and thoroughfares of the camp. While there are important variations from camp to camp around the world—in the particular school curricula to which refugee children are exposed, the regional history, culture, and politics that frame cross border relationships around each camp—the institutional relays through which dominant knowledge and privileged practices are reproduced in other refugee camps around the world have become standardized and enacted by similar, if not the same, institutions which are enabled and constrained by international refugee law, in-vogue policy frameworks, and rights-based discourses and conventions. And while there are likely to be important consequences of different curricula and cross-border relationships on the identities and futures of refugee children, I contend here that statist governmentalities—not particular
national or ethnic identities—form a common thread through what are otherwise a multiplex of policies and practices enacted in the pedagogic spaces of the refugee camp. Their sedentary, statist, rights-based, and secular commonalities enable and constrain education policy and regulate the movement of displaced children.

Indeed, the provision of formal schooling for refugees in the context of the camp presents a unique conundrum. Most camps are typically populated by peoples from many places, some of whom have no interest in “going home” at all, whose very refugee-ness is defined by their severance from, rejection by, or reimagining of the state, who on average spend nearly two decades encamped, and whose future is defined by geographic uncertainty. The intra-state negotiation and political maneuvering around the familiar range of edu-cultural values—language of instruction, appropriate national stories, examples used to illustrate numeracy issues, the role of religion in society, the nature of gender, the presentation of history, the types of science taught, and preferred teaching methods—are subsumed within a swirl of contradictory, in-vogue humanitarian and development principles (participation but also prescription), trumped by international and regional political interests (human rights but also state’s rights), and enabled and constrained by the institutional culture of encampment. The form and function camp schooling arises not from a monolithic comportment of actors; it is rather a multiplex of objectives and designs promoted by boards of directors, experts, consultants, and exp-pat and national staff promoting a camp schooling system that is legitimate in eyes of their donor benefactors.
Furthermore, there is little evidence that Kakuma Refugee Camp education practices have managed to integrate the “religious and traditional beliefs” and “social practices” of refugee communities as reflected in international standards and conventions around education in emergencies and refugee children. One might make an exception for refugee camp schooling given that accounting for all the “religious and traditional beliefs” in a camp like Kakuma would be prohibitive. More importantly, many so-called traditional practices—polygamy or FGM for example—are overtly frowned upon as affronts to human rights and Western gender values, and economic “beliefs” such as transhumance and the cattle complex are affronts to both the host community, with whom refugees would compete for grazing land, and the neoliberal economic order, which prizes individual entrepreneurship over communal loyalties. Except in some cases where refugees provide their own schooling, the normative assumptions behind the international provision of refugee schooling are decidedly absent of loyalties to “culture” or “nation” despite rhetoric to the contrary. Much effort is put into de-emphasizing and de-fusing the contentious issues of racial, ethnic, or cultural identities in the space of the refugee camp, and focusing rather on the rehabilitation and disciplining of the individual.

In the space of the refugee camp and the larger conflict setting that is its progenitor, the nation is re-imagined as not only displaced from the state, but it is seen as antithetical to its healthy rebirth: from the institutional practices, rights protections, bureaucratic rationalities, participatory governance, market orientation, and bounded territory of its

31 See for instance, Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the 1980’s or Rwandan refugees in Congo in the 1990’s (Waters and LeBlanc, 2005)
proper place on the globe. Camp schooling is envisaged as an engine to transform vulnerable refugee young people into civil servants, aid and development workers, teachers, and entrepreneurs to repair, to “help themselves,” and (re)make the weak or failed state from whence they came. This delinking of the nation from the state can also be seen in the provision of, and desire for, the Kenyan state education curriculum for nearly all school-going refugees from South Sudan.

While I highlighted some interesting facets of the formal curriculum that appear to promote modern life styles such as building and living in large concrete houses, and condemn the subversion of aid such as the when the CRS teacher criticized the selling of food rations, my intention was not to analyze the specific content of the Kenyan curriculum. A more thorough curriculum discourse analysis would be a useful exercise for examining the impact of schooling on refugee cosmopolitan identity formation, or perhaps an East African identity, especially as it intersects with camp media flows. Such an analysis might highlight the content-related impacts of the camp curriculum. What I have demonstrated in this chapter, rather, are some of the ways the camp educational policy multiplex regulates movement and defines belonging in a global milieu.

For instance, the imagination of Kenya as a model state and a model education system—and not Kenyan national identity or culture—combined with the knowledge that such credentials are preferred by the emerging South Sudanese state apparatus and its international and NGO partner institutions underpins the desire for its national curriculum by refugees and their families. There are no modifications to the curriculum for the benefit
of Sudanese or Ethiopian or Somali refugees for a number of reasons, but two in particular are important here. One is that the Kenyan curriculum, like most throughout Africa, is ordered by high-stakes tests which regulate promotion and graduation. Any curricular substitution, say with Amharic instead of Swahili, or South Sudanese instead of Kenyan history, would handicap students from passing exams and being promoted.

Secondly, and much related, the Kenyan curriculum is not only considered the East African gold standard among South Sudanese refugees, but it is rightly perceived by students and their families to open access to desired forms of employment in the government, education, and NGO sectors both in the camp and in South Sudan. Kenyan aid workers abound both in the camp and in South Sudan and there is no shortage of high ranking government officials educated abroad. This is not the case for jobs in Kenya; as refugees, they are not permitted to licitly live or work in Kenya outside of the camp without proper immigration papers. What is of primary importance to both the UNHCR and Dinka refugees is the mobility of the Kenyan educational credential. Its value lies in its negotiated recognition between state and international institutions as an accepted educational credential and in its regulation of space, belonging, and movement; it is a decidedly unidirectional mobility at least in theory, and serves both he UNHCR which stresses repatriation, and Dinka families, who are desperately diversifying their sources of wealth.

The refugee education policy multiplex which I describe sets in motion its own push factor—a catalyst for reversing refugee flows and supplying post-conflict
reconstruction projects with credentialed human capital; a projection of hope for repairing the refugee-producing state. The multiplex supports a highly conditional, uni-directional mobility that stands in stark contrast to the contemporary valorization of globalization, its circulation of people around the world and the cosmopolitan identities it celebrates.

Contrary to popular understandings of schooling as a globalizing project, refugee camp schooling and the rights-based frameworks and attendant constructions of children and global space it purports to reflect, reproduce rather than mitigate global inequalities, as they decidedly re-territorialize refugee children as subservient to the reinscription and repartitioning of global space by political and economic elites. But this state of affairs is not entirely the making of some dominant institutional “machine,” for it is also Dinka families who value camp education credentials for a few children—but not all children—and value the supra-local access to the cash (non-pastoral) economy and the emerging state power structure such credentials obtain. Having a camp-educated family member serves the purpose of maintaining pastoral institutions made vulnerable by the very same inequalities responsible for their marginalization from the Western narratives of modernity, through the diversification of sources of wealth and through these children’s school-acquired membership in national, international, and global collectivities.

I have also demonstrated that within the pedagogical spaces outside the school yard lay an unofficial curriculum as well. The residents in Kakuma are not permitted to leave the camp without official permission, primarily out of Kenyan government fears that refugees will permanently settle in unacknowledged but large and well established refugee communities in and around Nairobi, Mombassa, and other urban areas. But certain
unsanctioned comings and goings were, while acknowledged to be difficult to control, openly tolerated—leaving the camp to collect firewood or conduct business in the local town market, sneaking back and forth to areas of South Sudan to investigate conditions for return, visiting relations in Nairobi, Mombassa, or Kampala and to bring back goods to sell in the camp markets—because they ultimately support two overt policy aims: structuring camp life to be isolated and aid dependent by tolerating market-based livelihoods and prohibiting pastoralism; and voluntary repatriation by tolerating comings and goings between Kakuma and South Sudan even while aid is subverted by refugees to do so.

I have shown that refugees are divided within the camp into ethno-national enclaves separated by fences, walls, and gates, and are restricted to these enclaves after dark. This spatial regulation reflects not only the policy of both the Kenyan government and UNHCR—which see refugees as threats to camp security and stability—but also the larger culture-place isomorphism deeply embedded in the policies and practices of the international refugee regime, state institutions, and their attendant regulation of movement and belonging (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). Under this statist vision of space and power, Kenya has a sovereign right to control its borders and exercises this right like any other state under international law. It could be believed that the distinct spatialization of the camp is the result of an organic process of peoples organizing into like-minded communities with similar cultural and national backgrounds and attempting to maintain some connection to a sense of “home” while in exile; this would not be unlike what one might find in the “ethnic” neighborhoods of the world’s largest cities. And given the source region’s long history of conflict, refugees are naturally suspected of bringing with
them the perceived divisive threats of such histories. But as I have shown, the ethno-
national ghettoization of the camp was born from international practices of institutional
efficiency rather than primordial coagulations of sameness. I have also shown, as have
others (s.f. Beswick, 2000), that camp violence—both ethnic and gender based—has
largely arisen not from conflicts brought from outside the camp, but rather from the
geospatial and institutional circumstances of encampment itself. Refugee children thus
grow up in an environment where the spatial separation of difference is naturalized, and
which reflects the global order of borders and states—and its ruptures—in miniature.

The pedagogical spaces of the camp can also be seen in the institutional processes
of aid distribution and its attendant bureaucratized efficiency and accountability measures.
Food distribution, for example, is organized into highly techno-rationalized and
medicalized routines where refugees are divided into groups by nuclear family size as
determined by the UNHCR and codified on their food ration cards, threaded through
dehumanizing corrals and fenced corridors along which they are allocated just enough
foodstuffs to fluctuate between actual food donations and international dietary standards.
The rations are then weighed, measured, re-weighed and re-measured to ensure compliance
and prevent abuse. Refugees employed by camp institutions are trained in these efficiency
and accountability practices, and it is refugees themselves—especially those with at least a
few years of schooling or formal training—that carry out much of the food distribution
processes, water and sanitation projects, teacher supervision and evaluation, housing
construction, medicine and mosquito net allocation, and latrine digging; all of which are
governed by a set of standards, developed and evaluated by experts, which are documented
in triplicate forms and evaluated by independent monitoring consultants hired by the UNHCR and its many NGO partners. This is often labeled as “participation,” “capacity building,” or “sustainability,” but is also modeling the bureaucratic rationalities and institutional logics of the culture of the “modern” state. Sometimes these services are run as youth entrepreneurship projects by NGOs, where young refugees are provided with skills training and then “sell” their services to the camp and host communities. Embedded in these jobs for refugees are also the expectations of western work habits: showing up for work and leaving at the assigned times, completing assigned tasks and required paperwork on schedule, enacting proper supervisor-supervisee relationships, and the routinized work-for-cash exchange relationships. And it comes as no surprise, indeed it is deemed only natural by food distribution managers that I interviewed, that the ration card system is subverted by refugees for use as a way to trade and sell aid rations, and also as an insurance card allowing kinship relations—including child soldiers—to come and go between South Sudan and Kakuma. It is seen as simultaneously subversive but also a sign of desired repatriation and economic practices.

The pedagogic spaces can be found in the variety of clubs and activities in which refugee children in Kakuma participate, both as extracurricular extensions of their schooling such as the journalism or drama club and non-school organizations such as the Boy Scouts or Film Aid’s video production courses. There are also organized sports leagues—soccer and volleyball are the most popular—which tout their role as normalizing children’s lives and promoting cross cultural understanding. Churches and mosques were present in the camp, but the religious and spiritual lives of the majority pastoralist
communities were disallowed by nature of the prohibitions on the cattle complex. One can see here that cultural and religious activities are limited to those that are either ties to sedentarist practices,—as contained in religious buildings—national identities,—as expressed through “friendly” sports competitions—or else distinct from political and economic spheres, further de-linking the cultural practices of Kakuma’s majority Southern Sudanese residents, for whom such distinctions are arbitrary.32

Camp representative governance procedures and “participation” modeled Western democratic ideals through the monthly camp leadership meetings. In practice, the camp UN and INGO leadership sit on an elevated stage in the front of the room and attempt to model proper power relations by insisting that refugee grievances be aired through the proper channels; those that have are distributed in multi-page packets adorned with excel spreadsheets of the grievances triaged into their proper sectors (Incidentally, the Dinka representative regularly boycotted their meetings). While the concerns of refugees were taken seriously by camp administrators, this seriousness manifested itself through technorational processes and pseudo-parliamentary procedure; requests for changes in aid or the improvement of camp living conditions were commonly evaluated as not possible, citing lack of funding.

The pedagogic camp could also be found in the promotion of a credentialing society reflecting that of the professionals managing the camp and its aid systems. A

32 It should be noted that many Southern Sudanese also associated with one of the Christian denominations, a legacy of colonial era schooling, and suggests a neo-colonial orientation to religious allowances in the camp. See also Mitchell, 2006).
secondary school certificate was the goal of most of the young refugees I met, and many were obtaining specialized training in aid and development trades—borehole drilling, masonry, and truck driving and maintenance training programs were popular—the certificates from which were often coveted more than cash, and smartly laminated and inserted along with others into three-ring binders. These skills were in high demand in the camp, but particularly back in South Sudan, where camp-educated and -trained returnees enjoyed a booming aid and development industry made possible by the very same constellation of institutional actors that make up the international refugee protection regime.

Indeed the refugee camp has been described as a kind of “pseudo-state,” especially when examining the purposes of camp schooling (Waters and LeBlanc, 2005). In this and other similar analyses, formal schooling is imagined under “normal” circumstances as serving the interests of a territorialized and unified nation—the production of a common citizenry and the reproduction of the imagined “nation,” a viable civil service, a productive workforce, the provision of which is overseen by a highly technocratic and bureaucratic government ministry in the business of an internationally sanctioned campaign of educational equity and access for all citizens. Notwithstanding both the loosened definition of “voluntary” repatriation and the persistent instabilities that remain in Sudan, the ultimate return home of the educated refugee child, as a rehabilitated and indoctrinated young adult, is filled with international hopes of political and economic reform in the weak or

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33 The average time a refugee spends in a refugee camp in Kenya and Uganda is 25-34 years (USCRI 2009).
failed state from whence they came. They are seen to be the next—and improved—
generation of an educated class, like the colonial era, first civil war, and second civil war
generations before them,\textsuperscript{34} to inherit the state-making projects of external—and now
increasingly internal—regimes. Yet because they are simultaneously cosmopolitan and
global in their perspectives by nature of their camp educations but limited in movement by
international encampment and repatriation policy, they are in many ways cognitively
mobile yet spatially incarcerated.

The imagined history and spatial teleology of the refugee lifeworld—displacement,
encampment, and repatriation—illustrates how mass displacement crises have come to
represent simultaneously a perversion of, a threat to, and a hope for repairing a national
order of things (Malkki, 1997). Even within and among the many institutions that make up
the international refugee protection regime, these seemingly contradictory representations
of and responses to state rupture are enacted through international agreements,
conventions, goals, and laws legitimated through participatory procedures, universalized
via instruments of standardization and accountability, and implemented through the value-
laden scripts of aid and development professionals. While neo-institutionalists would point
to these very same characteristics as those which produce isomorphism in world schooling,
even in the context of schooling in emergencies, what I have sought to show through the
pedagogic camp is that in fact it produces both conversion and diversion.

\textsuperscript{34} See chapter II.
When examining the official camp curriculum, for example, one finds that Western progressive pedagogies are promoted—pupil-centered instruction, formal lesson planning, gender balanced participation—through standards and regular evaluations conducted by trained and credentialed refugees, but one also finds adaptation not only to a resource poor environment but to one that begs a completely different set of pedagogies—multi-grade, muti-lingual, multi-age, and severely overcrowded classrooms. Despite the fact that most aid workers in the camp as well as in other emergency contexts acknowledge such conditions, to promote the training of teachers to manage such environments is antithetical to the cultural scripts and international standards of education in emergencies. Thus when teachers are seen to be copying the only textbook in the classroom word-for-word and diagram-for-diagram onto the chalkboard and then ask students to orally recite and copy them into their notebooks, this is not seen as an adaptation to a lack of textbooks, but rather a lack of proper teaching technique by the INGO responsible for teacher training. The lack of textbooks is the job of another. In these contexts, de-linking thus can be observed between institutions and schools, between one institution and another, as well as within an institution itself.

The actual life worlds of refugees also converge and diverge from the standard refugee teleology in countless ways. Multiple expectations of formal schooling accompany the displaced as they arrive in camps, each with particular cultural and political histories that organize space in ways that do not fully conform to the global spatial order embodied by the camp (see also Kibreab, 1993; Bisharat 1997; Bascom 1998; Hammond 2004; Horst 2006). Drawn from a sedentarist metaphysics, international constructions of child refugee
vulnerability are located in the child refugee body and in a relationship of difference—as incomplete, uprooted, and traumatized victims in need of protection and repair—as well as in the cultural and political failings of the state that produced them. Many Rek Dinka families in South Sudan, however, expect a return on their investment in refugee camp education for a child primarily as a way to preserve pastoral institutions made vulnerable by decades of oppression and civil war—the very institutions often blamed for political and economic insecurity (Krätli, 2001). Their practices both support and subvert the intentions of the refugee camp policy multiplex. In the following chapter, I will present an ethnographic case study of such support and subversion among educated Dinka returnees and contrast them with non-educated Dinka as well as those educated in South Sudan.
Chapter IV: Refugee Repatriation and the (Re)Making of the State

In this chapter, I will again draw from a critical neo-institutionalist understanding of the state, as well as from contemporary Dinka communities of practice described in Chapter II, to investigate the process of repatriation and reintegration in South Sudan by returnees educated in refugee camps. This process involves a delicate negotiation of competing moral frameworks: those of their Dinka family and clan networks hoping to rehabilitate a deeply vulnerable pastoralist enterprise, and those of the institutions of international humanitarian aid and development institutions and the emerging South Sudanese state, all of which intersect in important ways. In particular, these moral frameworks have at their center competing notions of loyalty and obligation, one foregrounding the family and clan, the other advocating loyalty to the values of human rights, and another demanding loyalty the state above all else. These frameworks are not mutually exclusive, but rather interact with each other in ways that both transform and reproduce each institution. I illustrate this interaction by first describing how a combination of schooling and class factored into refugee decisions on when and how to return to South Sudan from the Kakuma Refugee Camp. I measure these decision processes against some of the institutional practices associated with UNHCR repatriation

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35 While I acknowledge that notions of “class” can vary from context to another, I define it here in the classic Marxist sense, allowing for class to be determined by multiple assets, including formal educational credentials and cattle.
policy.\textsuperscript{36} I then describe the experiences of two Dinka men, each representative of different but common experiences of schooling during and after wartime, in order to compare the way different experiences have shaped their (re)integration in contemporary Dinka society—as educated persons and as representatives of the state.

In the process, I intend to explore the ways camp educated refugees act as relays in the traveling of institutional knowledge, practices, and cultural scripts, and the ways these are preserved and transformed by refugees, returnees, and the many actors involved along the way. In this case, the camp education and training credential is a key mobile asset that attests to an ability to perform the statist governmentalities preferred by the international and national post-conflict reconstruction institutions looking to hire national staff. These include showing up for work and leaving at the assigned times, completing assigned tasks and required paperwork on schedule, enacting proper supervisor-supervisee relationships, and routinized work-for-cash exchange relationships. In turn, these staff are seen as those who will build the institutional capacities and model the “good governance” practices of the “modern” state.\textsuperscript{37} Onto them are projected the variety of visions of a post-conflict South Sudanese state by international political and aid regimes, who as a consequence are seen as the future (re)makers of the state. They are seen as such not only because of the acquired state-making practices coveted by these institutions, but also because they represent the next generation’s agents of successive external state making regimes, which have a very long history among the peoples of South Sudan dating back to the 13\textsuperscript{th} and 14\textsuperscript{th} century.

\textsuperscript{36} A more thorough description of repatriation policy and its history is provided in Chapter III.

\textsuperscript{37} I define the “modern” state in critical neo-instituionalist terms which I describe in Chapter I.
centuries (Beswick, 2004). But as I will demonstrate below, the value of the camp education credential, the uses of education, and the role of the educated person in contemporary Dinka society mediates the ways in which camp-acquired knowledge and practices are reproduced, resisted, and transformed during and after repatriation.

### 4.1 Assisted Versus Spontaneous Return

Starting in mid-2004, when the prospects for peace in South Sudan were perceived to be more promising than ever before, the UNHCR carried out a detailed registration of the Sudanese refugee population in Kakuma “by capturing variables essential for the planning and implementation of the eventual voluntary repatriation to South Sudan” (UNHCR, 2007). On 17 December 2005, the UNHCR began assisting Sudanese refugees to repatriate. The legal basis for the repatriation was the 9 January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) signed between the Sudanese government and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The UNHCR’s presence in South Sudan had “determined that while conditions on the ground are in transition, many areas are safe for return” (UNHCR, 2007). Given the CPA and the UN’s commitment to support its implementation, the UNHCR and the Government of Sudan established legal frameworks by concluding a Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of
Kenya and Sudan and the UNHCR in January 2006, which included among other things formal recognition of educational and training credentials obtained in exile.

As donor support began to shift away from Kakuma and toward South Sudan in response to the CPA, camp schooling began to be phased out. The camp leadership had predicted that refugees would begin repatriating in large numbers, decreasing the need for schooling, and the remaining populations, especially the Somali and Ethiopian communities—who were perceived by the many aid workers I spoke with to be more entrepreneurial and industrious than the Dinka—would organize their own schooling. The Ethiopian refugees I interviewed saw this phase-out as a kind of collateral damage brought about by the increasing repatriation of South Sudanese refugees, and predicted that such “community schools” would be sorely insufficient. This phase-out process and its justification was expressed by the leaders of the UNHCR and WFP to the various national and ethnic representatives of the Kakuma camp communities during a monthly camp management council meeting I attended in July of 2007.

But the South Sudanese refugee population did not repatriate in the manner or numbers predicted. The assumed refugee teleology—displacement-encampment-repatriation—was only one of many ways that children and adults navigated war-induced migrations. Their history, class, and gender had great influence on how they arrived and departed the camp, as well as their subsequent social and economic success upon return. The UNHCR estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 refugees would repatriate from Kakuma every year after the signing of the CPA. But between December 2005 and April
2007, just before my arrival in Kakuma, only 4,613 Sudanese refugees were known to have repatriated from Kakuma. In fact, according to the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, in the 4 years between 2006 and 2009 about 15,584 people in total repatriated to South Sudan from Kenya (SSCCSE, 2009). This likely includes urban refugee communities from Nairobi and Mombassa so the number repatriated from Kakuma is considerably lower, a third the UNHCR estimate. Asked why the planning figures up until then had been so sorely misestimated, both the directors of the WFP and UNHCR in Kakuma told me in interviews that it was due to multiple and mutually reinforcing factors, including funding and absorption capacity in the areas of return, inadequate road and transportation infrastructure, and hesitation by refugees who perceived that their home areas were still not safe. Equally as significant, there were also a large number of refugees who “spontaneously” returned without registering with the UNHCR, which made official numbers lower then the actual, they argued. At the time of my visit, the registration rate for assisted repatriation was 40 people a day- totaling about 800 people per month. They expected this number to rise as “momentum” increased.

Indeed, interest in repatriation by the Sudanese community in Kakuma was very high based on my interviews, but despite international rhetoric describing repatriation as a “preferred durable solution,” the program faced limitations. Limited funding resulted in starts and stops to transportation assistance, creating long delays and subsequent mistrust on the part of the refugees as to the operation’s intention to fully assist in their repatriation. Reports spread throughout the camp that many who had chosen assisted repatriation were
returning to the camp because the busses had broken down or their home areas were worse off than conditions in the camp.

During this time, donor support for schools in Kakuma was quickly dwindling in favor of supporting the development of schools and other infrastructure in South Sudan. The combination of repatriation monitoring and preparation activities and the phase out of schooling was understood by most aid workers and administrators as reversing the “pull factor” of camp education, compelling refugees to seek educational opportunities in South Sudan instead. They argued that the conditions in South Sudan that created the “legitimate” claims for asylum no longer existed, that new and ongoing asylum claims from South Sudan were designed to take advantage of refugee aid, and that to maintain such a level of service provision would in effect compete for resources with the home country. Now that an official declaration of peace had been signed by representatives of the globe’s main bi- and multi-lateral institutions, the obligation to provide such resources should repatriate as well.

Most of my aid worker interviewees cited the migration of donor support to South Sudan and the reverse flow of refugees as the source of financial and human resource stress on camp schools. Students, teachers, and school administrators, in contrast pointed out that schools had been stressed for resources since they were set up in Kakuma. Teachers were indeed leaving the classroom, but many were moving to other INGO jobs in the camp for better pay. Those who were able to secure a teaching job in South Sudan, which were becoming more numerous by the month, could begin the process of raising the
capital to move segments of their family and kin out of Kakuma. Still, in 2007, Kakuma school system enrollment records provided by LWF showed that demand for schooling among refugees remained robust. The schools that were slated for closure in tandem with repatriation efforts had full enrollments. Furthermore, a successful teacher training program in Kakuma was closed just before my arrival, relocating to Sudan after only one year of operation.

It was and remains difficult to assess the rates of “spontaneous repatriation” as opposed to “assisted repatriation.” By registering for repatriation assistance, refugees officially surrender their ration cards and give up the protections lawfully granted to them as refugees. In return, they receive transport back to their home areas and basic materials like blankets and jerry cans for collecting water. Based on my interviews with refugees in Kakuma and returnees in Sudan, those who chose assisted repatriation did so only because they did not have the resources to return “spontaneously.” This revealed both a class and gender element to repatriation choices. Especially once it became clear that the UNHCR was experiencing assistance delays of up to a year or more, and word began to spread that busses were not reaching their intended destinations, those who had a combination of means, support networks, and livelihood possibilities—the latter of which meant in most cases that some kind of education, training credential, and/or aid and development-related work experience obtained in the camp—began to make their own arrangements to return to South Sudan. The assisted repatriation efforts, hobbled as they were by logistical barriers and waning resources, also meant that many refugees who chose this path ended up in IDP camps that were beginning to emerge around the larger urban centers such as Wau and
Juba, a function of their lower class status and/or weaker ties to the communities they left, of which many had only faint memory because they left as children. Past studies of return migration—both from refugee camps as well as urban-to-rural migration—have shown, and it was certainly the case in Kakuma among Dinka refugees, that the decision to return and subsequent social and economic success once back home is deeply dependent on two factors related to exile: 1) education and/or wealth, and 2) the successful maintenance of kinship and extended support networks in the home areas (Akol, 1994; Rogge, 1994; Tapscott, 1994; Ferguson, 1999; Bützer, 2007). Between South Sudan and Kakuma, patterns of flight mirrored patterns of return.

As I showed in Chapters II and III, Dinka boys who were successful in camp schools were likely to be from families who had the means and connections to send them as children to the camp. Education was among the most compelling reasons to send a child to Kakuma; those who could successfully “spontaneously repatriate” turned out be the same group—now as young men. Although very few girls were being sent to school in this manner, a girl living in Kakuma was much more likely to go to school then if they remained in South Sudan. The much higher percentage of girls in refugee camp schools than those in South Sudan is likely due to a few factors, including overt campaigns to encourage families to enroll girls in school, such as the Angelina Jolie Girls Boarding School was one of many examples—the stress on rights-based gender values promoted by refugee camp aid organizations, such as the anti-polygamy video produced by a young refugee—or there was simply not much else to do in the camp. Changing social trends among the cattle-owning class back in South Sudan certainly played a role as well;
educated girls were beginning to fetch higher dowries because of their assumed knowledge of modern childrearing and health and hygiene practices. Educated girls certainly had an advantage in the aid and government employment sectors, but their ranks remained very few. Wealthy Dinka men with many wives were purposefully marrying at least one educated wife. This did not immediately create a groundswell of female school enrollment, or the perseverance to graduate, since the vast majority of girls in the county I surveyed were not making it much past the 5th grade; even just a few years of school was enough to elevate a dowry and the desperation of most pastoralist families continued the pressure to marry off girls as early as 13 and 14 years old.

Forgoing the registration process of assisted repatriation meant that returnees did not have to immediately give up the much coveted family ration card, allowing their family relations—usually women and children—to stay in the camp and continue to benefit from camp aid while they scouted the conditions for return back in South Sudan; given the familial obligations and networks of camp-educated returnees, many were able to formally reconnect with family, reestablish extended support networks, and secure employment. This also meant that an increasing number of households in Kakuma were led by women, according to a demographer from WFP. Even though children would face fewer and fewer opportunities for an education as it began to be phased out, nearly all the students I interviewed and school classes with whom I interacted told me in no uncertain terms that they would not repatriate until they finished high school, no matter the increasingly crowded schools.
Many of the aid workers I interviewed felt the phasing out of educational opportunities in the camp was compromising the UNHCR's legal mandate to make repatriation voluntary. It did make the camp less accommodating, but this approach was taken in an international environment where education had come to be classified as a human right. These same aid workers usually admitted some empathy with donors whose funding patterns steered increasingly away from Kakuma. Such patterns uphold the assumed temporariness of refugee camp life and the benefits of repatriation. However this UNHCR ideal stands in contrast to the fact that world wide, refugees spend on average nearly 20 years encamped (USCRI, 2009; UNHCR, 2010). The 2005 CPA struck most aid workers and administrators I interviewed, despite their reservations, as a reasonable point at which to begin a shift of resources toward reconstruction and development initiatives in South Sudan and away from refugee protection and assistance. Reflecting on my conversations with aid workers, refugee camp education policy is constrained by a telemetry of contradictory aims: first as a manifestation of refugee rights, then as an orientation toward refugee repatriation and state making, and finally as a necessary reflection of finite aid. A policy movement in both time and space along the refugee spatial sequence of displacement, encampment, and finally repatriation, the “preferred durable solution.” The UNHCR has termed this policy tension, “voluntariness.”

Voluntariness means not only the absence of measures which push the refugee to repatriate, but also means that he or she should not be prevented from returning, for example by dissemination of wrong information or false promises of continued assistance (UNHCR, 1996).
In my interviews and during the monthly camp management meeting I attended, camp administrators expressed a deep sensitivity about who was disseminating information about the conditions back in South Sudan. “Untrustworthy” and “biased” sources of information were roundly criticized by camp administrators in interviews and public meetings for jeopardizing the “voluntariness” of repatriation. It was never clarified, however, what counted as trustworthy or unbiased, and although official UN situation reports were cited as those from which administrators drew their information, it was not clear how these reports represented unbiased or trustworthy information. When asked if the phase-out of camp schooling impacted “voluntariness,” many aid workers responded by citing budgets and explained that schooling was not an essential service; that the realities of dwindling donor support forced them to prioritize aid. A Kenyan driver for the WFP told me: “The refugees should not just be a part of reconstruction in Sudan, it should be their project, and they should be the leaders. But they have become dependent on aid. This is why so many are still here. You have free food, free health care, good education. Why leave?”

Individuals who had “spontaneously” left the camp were returning with very mixed descriptions of the conditions for return. The UNHCR had commissioned FilmAid to produce a video about the conditions back in the Nuba Mountains region, but just before the video was finished, violence broke out there and the project was scrapped. A student in one of my 10th grade classes told me his father had just returned from investigating conditions in his home area near Aweil in Western Bahr el Ghazal state and described them as both good and bad. “The fighting has stopped, but food and water was still a
problem and there wasn’t any place for me to finish high school.” There was also an effort by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) to encourage refugee repatriation in anticipation of the 2008 census that would have a direct impact on the Southern independence referendum of 2011.

According to my interviews with refugee young people in Kakuma and returnees in South Sudan, young refugees were attempting to maximize the mobile benefits of exile in preparation for (re)connecting with their families in new ways. These strategies included attempts to be resettled in third countries in addition to obtaining education and employment credentials. In fact I would meet many Dinka a few years later in South Sudan who had been resettled in the US or UK, and who had subsequently moved back permanently to the South or split their time between both countries. Returnees used the education and work experience credentials—and in a few cases the wealth—acquired abroad to obtain county- and state-level positions with the government or its INGO partners; those who also had connections to the SPLA or SPLM were nearly guaranteed a job with the government. Those who lacked the connections to obtain government positions sought jobs with INGOs. Teaching was also a viable option for educated returnees and most of the upper elementary teachers in the rural areas had obtained at least a secondary school certificate from a refugee camp; but in a very overburdened and under-resourced education system, teaching did not always pay well, nor pay regularly, and so many teachers also had other jobs. In turn, educated returnees relied on these positions not only to reintegrate into, but to establish credibility and influence within, their extended kinship networks through their access to state power and the cash economy.
While security and access to basic services in their home regions figured into repatriation decisions, they were often imbricated by larger social and economic factors. While schooling was cited as both a means to reverse a camp “pull-factor” and as an unavoidable step in the shift from an aid paradigm to a development one, it was quite clear to me, even after only four months of working in Kakuma, that the completion of a camp education not only made it likely that repatriation would follow, but that it was easing what was already a difficult process of refugee reintegration and political and economic stability back in South Sudan.

### 4.2 Educated Returnees and Employment

Once back in Sudan, the manner in which an education was obtained mattered little to Dinka families so long as it led to employment and the diversification of sources of pastoralist wealth and security. To potential employers, an education obtained abroad was preferred. Those who had the credentials of a refugee camp or foreign education had greater access to employment opportunities, particularly those supported in one way or another by foreign assistance and humanitarian aid. The perception among internationally-linked institutions was that the schooling one obtained abroad was far superior to that provided in South Sudan. This perception was well founded based on my

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39 There were some similar characteristics for the many returnees who had been internally displaced in Khartoum, but they also had a different set of issues and challenges, such as reasons for returning and language ability. IDPs deserve a equally robust examination of the sort I am attempting here for refugees, but this is outside the scope of this thesis.
interviews and observations. Most who went to school abroad had far superior literacy, numeracy, and technology skills then those with the same years of schooling in Sudan; but of equal consequence was the increased likelihood that many educated former refugees had accessed post-primary vocational training, highly oriented toward state reconstruction trades like lorry mechanic, bore hole drilling, and accounting. Also of consequence was the wide-spread perception that refugee camps had a “westernizing” influence in terms of work habits, bureaucratic procedures, and shared human rights ideals and development goals. It was common for camp secondary school students and graduates to have worked in some capacity for an INGO in the camp.

The constellation of post-conflict reconstruction actors operating in South Sudan for whom many returnees eventually worked were mainly of two kinds: pseudo-allochthonous and pseudo-autochthonous employers. I use these terms instead of “internal” or “external” to emphasize that although each has an internal or external locus of policy dissemination, both employ national40 and expatriate41 staff, making internal/external distinctions problematic. The pseudo-allochthonous employers are those which are managed by external bodies such as other governments, multi-laterals, or non-governmental organizations operating mostly with international humanitarian or development objectives, but who hire national staff to build “capacity” and “ownership” of

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40 “National” staff refers to individuals who are citizens of South Sudan (or formerly Sudan) who work in South Sudan for bi- or multi-lateral organizations or INGOs.
41 “Expatriate” staff refers to individuals who are citizens of counties other than South Sudan but who work there for bi- or multi-lateral organizations or INGOs.
these objectives. Many have been operating in Sudan since the late 1980’s as part of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). These include the WFP, UNICEF, World Vision, Save the Children, IRC, and others conducting water and sanitation, health and hygiene, agriculture and veterinary health projects, child protection advocacy efforts, and support of both the formal and alternative education systems. The bi-lateral organizations, dominated by the US, UK, Canada, the European Union, and Japan have increased their presence since the CPA and primarily fund government capacity building from their well fortified compounds in the capital, Juba.

The formal education sector remains dominated by USAID which funnels foreign aid moneys to private subcontractors such as the Educational Development Center, FHI360, Creative Associates, and Management Systems International. These actors provide policy assistance to the US embassy as well as to national and state ministries of education, and support institutional capacity building and oversight as well as pre- and in-service teacher training and an interactive radio instruction project. Except for cooks, security guards, and custodians, secondary school credentials and a few years of post-secondary training was a prerequisite for a position among the national staff of most INGOs. The modest numbers who went college or university in Khartoum, Egypt, the UK, or the US are returning to take up posts in these employers as demographers, accountants, computer techs, and secretaries. Even most of the drivers and mechanics I spoke with were

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42 Formerly called Academy for Educational Development (AED)
43 Although officially part of the alternative education system, the South Sudan Interactive Radio Instruction (SSIRI) program is implemented mostly in formal primary schools.
former refugees who had finished primary school in a camp and then a driver’s or mechanic’s training program in Nairobi or Kampala. Although very few women were in these positions, reflecting an enduring dearth of female school graduates, both the pseudo-allochthonous and pseudo-autochthonous institutions appeared to make concerted efforts to find qualified female staff, reflecting a shared adoption of global gender equity values. There remains, however, more dependence on cliental and military relationships in the process of filling positions in the pseudo-autochthonous institutions, especially the emerging South Sudanese government.

The pseudo-autochthonous employers—the South Sudanese nationalist and governmental bodies—are outgrowths of the Southern political and military entities operating in opposition to Northern cultural, religious and political oppression—and for a time in opposition to each other. The internationally recognized government bodies are exclusively staffed by Nationals, but many are led by Nationals educated abroad who routinely hire international experts and receive financial and technical assistance from the pseudo-allochthonous employers.

The current iteration of Southern governance structures is an outgrowth of the SPLA’s reorganization after 1994—following reconciliation with its main breakaway rivals—which created the Sudan’s Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 1996. Judicial, legislative, and executive branches of government and their corresponding ministries were established, and SPLM-appointed administrators took up posts at the

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45 See Chapter II
national, state, and county levels. Most staff were current or former military personnel and their loyalists or family members. There were also a considerable number of ranking appointees who had obtained college and graduate degrees abroad, especially during the first civil war. Prior to the CPA in 2005, most worked without salary and had few actual services to provide except helping to manage and mobilize resources for the war effort, keeping local security and resolving military-civilian disputes—especially conflicts erupting from the looting and occupation of local communities by “friendly” SPLA military units under the banner of shared sacrifice—and helping in the distribution of relief resources, which earned them international accusations of the diversion of aid for military or political purposes.

Most educated returnees interacted in some combination with this constellation of state-building actors either as permanent or temporary employees or as unpaid volunteers hoping eventually to land a job. For rural pastoralist families, the importance of having a family member who is a government bureaucrat or appointee, a teacher, or a staff member of an INGO continued to gain importance as a necessary accessory to the larger pastoralist enterprise. This meant an increasing premium was being placed on formal schooling among Dinka families attempting to maintain established wealth, but also among those who were relatively low or had fallen on the pastoralist socio-economic ladder. Below, I profile a rural village and the narratives of two Dinka men, each with a different, but also common experience of war-induced migration, exhilaric schooling, and return, in order to illustrate the similarities and differences in the manner in which they reintegrated back into rural pastoralist life. They serve as ethnographic accounts of the many strategies that are
employed by young people and their families to navigate the spatial and social terrains of war-time South Sudan making and remaking contemporary pastoralism.

4.3 Resettlement: Malou

The two young Dinka men I profile below, Bol and Kuot, grew up in or near the small village of Malou\(^{46}\) in Gogrial East County (GEC), Warrap State, South Sudan. This was the site where I was based while conducting the bulk of my ethnographic research.\(^{47}\) They both returned to this area around 2007, two years after the CPA. The Southern Sudan Center for Census Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE) estimated the population of GEC in 2009 as just over 100,000 people, more than half of whom are under the age of 16 (SSCCSE, 2009). Most identify their ethnicity as Rek Dinka but there also a few Bongo communities. At roughly 21 people per square mile, it is among the more densely populated counties in South Sudan, although there is increasing rural to urban migration, to nearby Wau, the South’s second largest urban area, but also to the market centers of mid-size villages where many IDPs have taken refuge from inter-clan and inter-ethnic conflict.\(^{48}\) Most communities in GEC are nonetheless quite spread out and the rural areas very remote. When I arrived in Malou in March of 2009, there were no roads, no running

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\(^{46}\) A Pseudonym

\(^{47}\) I describe in detail my research methods and timeline in Chapter I.

\(^{48}\) While these conflicts are typically driven by cattle rustling, dry season grazing rights, and unresolved civil disputes, their prosecution and severity is equally influenced by the widespread circulation of small arms and light weapons by political and economic actors who benefit from instability in the South, namely the North and Southern opposition groups.
water, no cell phone reception (but lots of cell phones), and electricity was produced by the occasional diesel generator, mostly on the compounds of the few INGOs stationed there. Satellite internet was available on two of the INGO compounds for a few hours a day. A compacted gravel and dirt road from Wau stopped about halfway to Malou, its construction caught up in legal battles over land and compensation, making a 65 mile journey take about 3 hours. Today, the road has come through, and cut the travel time in half. The twice-a-week Matatu ride to Wau has turned into twice a day.

4.3.1 Warrap State

The statistical and econometric portrait of GEC and Warrap State is by most international standards grim. According to the World Bank, most residents in GEC live on less than 75 cents a day, although this reflects the fact that the cattle complex remains central to Dinka social and economic life. Most people are subsistence farmers, fishermen, and cattle keepers for whom cash is an occasional opportunity to buy tea, sugar, soap, jeans, or maybe a bicycle. Warrap State has among the highest infant\(^{49}\) and maternal\(^{50}\) mortality rates in a country that ranks among the worst in the world (SSCCSE, 2006). A severe lack of access to clean water, sanitation, and basic health care are among the

\(^{49}\) 139 deaths per 1,000 live births. Comparatively, the United States’ infant mortality rate in 2005 was just under 7 deaths per 1,000 live births.

\(^{50}\) XXXX
primary causes of these high rates. Less than 2% of the population in Warrap uses “sanitary means of excreta disposal.” Food insecurity is, and has been for quite some time, a perennial challenge for residents and aid organizations alike. As described earlier in this thesis, most pastoralist communities have well-established coping strategies for dealing with cyclical spasms of scarcity and even famine, but the more recent severity of famines, with their political origins, have overwhelmed such strategies.

In terms of schooling, Warrap state had among the lowest primary net intake rates in South Sudan by the end of the war at 2% of the total population of 6-year olds enrolling in first grade in 2006. Less than 8% of the entire primary school age population in the state—10% of boys and 6% of girls—were enrolled in primary school in 2006 (Sudan Household Health Survey, 2006). Less than one-half of one percent of the secondary school-age population were enrolled in secondary school, and of these, 90% are male. In a state of a half million people, there were 1,300 high school students, according to the 2009 education census. Among the 15 primary schools I visited in or around the area where I conducted my research, completion rates were very low; based on my survey of these 15 schools, on average about 1 out of every 15 boys and 1 out of every 50 girls completed primary 8—in fact only 3 of the 15 schools even had a primary 8 class. Visitors to almost any primary school in the region will find hundreds of students packed into 1st grade classrooms, while classrooms for 5th graders and above are either nonexistent or have only a handful of students, likely none of them girls. The lack of upper level primary classes has as much to do with a lack of qualified teachers, and high teacher truancy rates, as it does with low enrollment and drop out rates.
While enrollment rates have improved significantly over the last 4-5 years due to the cessation of war and national and international campaigns promoting primary schooling, they still remain very low relative to the rest of Southern Sudan and near the bottom compared to the rest of the world. Moreover, primary school completion rates have not improved in step with enrollment however. Colonial era neglect and civil war are commonly cited as the root causes of these statistics (s.f. Hewison, 2009, Sommers 2005; LB Deng, 2006; Pagen, 2010), but as described in Chapter II, this narrative is only part of the story. Combined with a severe lack of basic infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, schools, and communication systems, Pastoralist communities, which make up more than 60% of the Southern population, have historically integrated some aspects of formal schooling while resisting others, sending only a few of many children to school. This reflects an enduring skepticism toward the role of schooling in the maintenance of pastoral institutions as well as a form of resistance to an institution viewed as part of a larger system with a long history of attempting to assert external control and oppression.

4.3.2 Wau

The nearby city of Wau, which is in neighboring Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, is the location of most of the INGO and UN agencies’ regional headquarters operating in GEC. Wau is relatively small but densely populated, with an official population of about 150,000, not including the very large IDP and migrant labor encampments that ring the
city outskirts. The city center is marked by the impressive dome of the large Catholic cathedral, home of the Catholic Apostolic since the late 19th century and central to the spread of Catholic mission schooling in GEC. It is a diverse city, with Arabs and Dinka living and working in close proximity. In fact, Wau was held up by John Garang, the late SPLA leader, as a symbol of the potential for peaceful unity between North and South, even though it was a northern military garrison and used to stage both aerial bombings and ground attacks on SPLA-held areas of the surrounding countryside, including the areas where I conducted much of my research (Garang, 1987). The city did not see nearly as much bombing and fighting as most of the other urban areas in the South and thus retains quite a bit of its history and architecture.

A large number of international non-governmental, multi-lateral, and bi-lateral organizations have regional headquarters in Wau, in addition to state and county ministries, and their compounds and employees. This in turn supports a quickly growing aid-dependent economy of hotels and restaurants, most of which are owned by Kenyan and Ethiopian entrepreneurs. There is even a public zoo. The only tarmac in the city is a road that leads from the airport to the state Governor’s house. Storefronts sporting pharmaceuticals, beauty and hygiene products, electronics and cell phones, groceries, bed frames, calabashes and cooking equipment, and Middle-eastern and Western style clothing, most of which are owned by Arab businessmen, line the grid of dirt roads that cut through the center of town. There are also two Arab-style souks with narrow passageways and small vendors—mostly owned by Arabs but there are few owned by Dinka—selling much of the same, as well as locally forged iron gardening equipment, flip flops and leather dress
shoes, bicycles and motorcycles imported from China, grain staples, butchered meats, and fresh fruit and vegetables imported from northern Sudan and Egypt. There is a noticeable presence of soldiers, police, and traffic cops. The very first traffic light in Wau was installed in 2010, but is seldom working. At one of the more popular hotel bars frequented by “expats,” one could find bush pilots, sappers, aid workers, national and international dignitaries and ministers of one sort or another, researchers like myself, and members of the international Southern Sudanese diaspora visiting family in the region. Most who visit GEC travel through Wau.

4.3.3 Malou

The rural market town of Malou where I lived and conducted the bulk of my research is about 65 miles northeast of Wau and one of about 5 rural market centers in the county. Population statistics are hard to come by in rural areas, but I estimated roughly 750 people live in the immediate vicinity of the market while another 1,200 or so are widely spread out in rural areas that could more or less be considered vicinities of Malou. The Malou market itself forms a narrow triangle between two crisscrossing dirt tracks. More dirt tracks headed off in many directions from there. Most of my research participants described Malou as a place through which all roads in the region led, bringing both

51 The importation of food stuffs from the North has since come to a halt following Southern independence, causing the prices of most commodities and services to nearly triple.
welcome and unwelcome attention. One of the elders I interviewed explained that the late paramount chief from Malou forbade Northern railroad developers in the 1950’s from laying track in the area for fear it would overrun the town with Arabs. Others spoke about the consistent presence of SPLA infantry units travelling in the area during the war. They would typically occupy groups of homesteads and commandeer food and supplies if there were any, earning the restrained ire of the civilian population. GEC was a well known stronghold of the SPLA during the war, but it was not far from the shifting territories of opposition groups and so was the site of numerous intra-Southern battles. The legacy of these conflicts remain as Malou hosts hundreds of internally displaced people from nearby areas.

The Malou market consisted of a confusing, seemingly random set of wide dirt paths at all angles to each other along which shelters of tree branches, thatch, and tarp-covered stores offered cigarettes, lighters, pens, small packages of shortbread cookies and cakes, school uniforms, second hand t-shirts and dresses, various hair products for women, canned tomato paste, compressed cones of locally grown tobacco, and bottled water, soda, beer, mango juice, and little plastic packets of Russian vodka, all kept in coolers that usually ran from sun down to midnight. About 9 or 10 at night was when one could get a truly cold beverage, something about which I thought a lot working in the dry 110F daytime heat. Another side of the market was reserved for foodstuffs such as groundnuts, sesame, durum and sorghum flour, dried fish, dried okra, and occasionally garlic, arugula, tomatoes, and mangos, most grown locally but others were imported from around the region through Wau. A few shops sold petrol in used plastic beverage bottles to the many
motorcycles in the area. A bicycle and motorcycle repair shop was stationed under a tree next to the animal auction area where residents from the countryside came to sell their cows, goats, sheep, and chickens. At the center of the market was a small open air slaughterhouse where one could have a cow prepared for consumption, usually done for special occasions like a wedding, a special guest, or the opening of a new health clinic. At the sharp end of the triangle, which faced southwest, was a matatu stop where small groups of people waited for a twice weekly ride to or from Wau. A video hall was tucked into the back of a nearby beverage store and charged a few Sudanese Pounds to watch martial arts and SPLA propaganda movies in the evenings. Chuck Norris movies were particularly popular.

There were about 3 INGOs with large compounds just beyond the central market area and a WFP food distribution center where two large Rupp Halls stood alongside an air strip built in the late 1980s. All of these organizations arrived on the heels of a cholera epidemic in the area in 1997. The compounds were fenced by grass or thorn bush perimeters, reflecting an enduring state of emergency. Together, the INGOs employed a handful of expats as technical experts in the areas of water and sanitation, civil engineering, health, hygiene and disease prevention, veterinary medicine, agriculture, project management, and in one case, Christian proselytizing. The bulk of the staff, however, were mostly former refugees who had returned over the last few years from camps in Kenya and Uganda, most of whom had obtained some form of formal education or training while abroad. All of the expat staff I interviewed, for whom the local staff were assistants or subordinates, expressed a preference for the employment of nationals
educated in refugee camps due to the perceived superiority of camp schooling, their westernized work habits, better English skills, and their understanding of international human rights and economic development principles. These jobs were highly sought after by educated Dinka men, many of whom would volunteer or simply hang out at the NGO compounds, each ready to produce a notebook full of smartly laminated certificates touting their education and training credentials should a job opportunity become available. The many drivers and mechanics employed by the INGOs also had obtained training abroad, and most had completed at least a primary education. Compound guards were the only jobs obtainable by non-educated men and cooks and custodians by non-educated women. As mentioned earlier, I did meet the occasional young woman working for an INGO, but this was very rare. Ironically, shortly before my arrival in Malou, a Dinka woman who had obtained her post-secondary education in Egypt was appointed the first female State Education Minister in South Sudan. I describe the changing Dinka attitudes toward girls and schooling in more detail in Chapter V.

I generally found a mix of hope and skepticism about schooling and the educated among the much larger numbers of non-educated Dinka in Malou. While there were expectations of the educated to produce both cattle wealth and access to state power, there remained scarce opportunities to find employment that would fulfill such expectations. The bulk of educated men remain unemployed. Some hung out at NGO compounds, occasionally volunteering to help with their projects. Many waited for a computer to become available during the few hours a day when a generator was running to work on a resume, browse a software tutorial, or check their on-line email accounts and Facebook
pages. Many took regular trips into Wau searching for work or to connect with friends and relatives. Others hung out daily in the central market playing cards, dominoes, or chess. I counted about 25 men on average grouped together under a tree huddled around two or three tables between the late morning and evening hours. Based on my casual conversations with them over many months, most had completed their primary schooling and about three quarters of them had done so in refugee camps. This group also included many employed men as well, seeming to take liberties with their work time. These included teachers, government bureaucrats, and INGO staff. I spent time with this group every few days playing cards and dominoes with them. Although I consider myself an above-average chess player, the level of the game in the market was far above my ability; it was much more interesting—and less embarrassing—to just watch. In addition to the games, the topics of conversation ranged from the latest cattle raid, state and national politics, eligible girls, new marriage engagements, the latest adultery scandals, meager or unreliable salaries, working conditions, and job supervisors—many of whom were foreign expats—and who was hiring. When I asked those who were employed why they weren’t at work, most responded that they were taking a break. The teachers, many of whom were also employed by an INGO in addition to their teaching duties, usually responded by saying that they had to attend to their INGO duties sometime that day, or that they were unable to get a ride to school, which for some was a considerable distance away, sometimes 10 miles or more.

Groups of non-educated men also hung out near the market but not in it, separate from the educated men, also playing dominoes and a game called Aweet, a popular game in
many parts of Africa where groups of stones are moved along four rows of twelve small holes in the ground. All of these men concerned themselves with the more common roles for contemporary pastoralist men: caring for cattle, goats, sheep, and chickens, patrolling the dry season cattle camps with rifles to protect from cattle raids, subsistence cultivation and fishing, and building and repairing tukuls and cattle byres. Although they generally stayed separate from educated men, who were by nature of the time they spent in school considered unsuited to cattle keeping and cultivation, there remained little animosity between them and families did not appear to value one over the other. The only frustration was expressed by citing the combination of the death toll from many decades of war and increasing rural to urban labor migration which decreased the population of men in rural villages and increased the domestic and livelihood burden on women. A few of the women expressed frustration with the educated unemployed who lingered in the market, contributing little to a deeply threatened pastoralist enterprise.

The acquisition and care of cattle, the cultivation of large plots of land, and the bearing of large broods of children remained the primary indicators of prosperity for most Dinka families, which in turn required the labor of most of their youngest members. Despite the numbers of unemployed, educating a few children remained a strategy of diversification in times of stress on the pastoral enterprise. But it was also increasingly seen as a extension of family and clan networks of power and security through the placement of a member in a government or INGO position, including teaching. This was increasingly seen as a necessary accessory to pastoralism in order to ensure access to the power and resources of the fast growing state and its INGO partners. But because most
educated men—especially those educated in South Sudan—had trouble finding employment, more and more men spent time away from their homesteads, hanging out in the market, or migrating to urban areas in search of work. In order to illustrate how these roles for the educated worked within pastoralist constructions of wealth and power in a rural community like Malou, I profile two young Dinka men with different, but common experiences of schooling during and after war-time in order to illustrate how they negotiate between the expectations of Dinka family life and those of the emerging South Sudanese state and its international interlocutors.

4.3.4 Bol

I met Bol in April of 2009 at Jur Academy, a primary school in Malou where I was working as a teacher trainer. He was the science and social studies teacher for the 4th and 5th grade classes and had a very good command of English; most of the upper primary teachers at this school had very good English skills as all of them had attended refugee camp schools and earned their high school diplomas there. A high school diploma was generally required to teach upper primary grades in South Sudan, contributing to the more than half of the schools in the county without staff to teach the 4th through 8th grades, based on my own survey of 15 schools in the county. Given their comparatively small numbers
and large demand for educated Southerners across many sectors of the public and private economy, upper primary and secondary teachers were tough to recruit.

Bol was 22 years old when I met him and had three brothers and four sisters. His mother was the second of his father’s two wives and lived on about 5 acres of cultivatable land dotted with tall palm trees. His father, having moved the family to Malou from an area about 150 miles south when Bol was a baby, was relatively isolated from his kinship network, and although he was highly regarded in the local community, his small herd of cattle made them relatively poor compared to many families in the area. The fact that his father sold some of his cattle to fund Bol’s education in Kakuma represented a substantial investment and sacrifice, although one that he came to understand as something he had little choice but to do. “We do not have a lot of cattle and must rely on my extra sorghum and goats to sell in the market. I do not have enough for my sons to marry well. My daughters will be married soon, they are good daughters, and I will not accept a poor offer. I have no choice but to hope that Bol can help us with his education.” Bol told me later that his father feared he would not get a good dowry of cattle for his daughters since he is not originally from the area around Malou.

Throughout the time I worked with him, Bol was single-mindedly determined to make good on his father’s investment. In addition to his teaching duties he also worked for an INGO as an agricultural project manager. In this role, he set up trainings for local subsistence farmers on how to maximize the yields on their sorghum, maize, and sesame crops. After spending some time with him, I eventually hired him as my interpreter and
research assistant. His journey to this point reflects a very typical narrative of childhood in war-time South Sudan, and many versions of essentially the same story were related to me in particular by those who were now employed by the government, INGOs, and schools, often all three at once.

Back in early 2001 when he was 15 years old, Bol sat in a scorched field about 60 km from his home with three other boys. The field, formerly planted with sorghum and sesame, had been the site of a battle a few months earlier, one of many constant reminders of the civil war that had been raging there since before Bol was born. They had been sitting there in the shade of a giant mahogany tree, faces arched toward the sky, for over three weeks waiting for an airplane. They ate very little during this time, one meal every other day, even though their pockets were stuffed with cash raised by multiple members of their extended family, proceeds from the sale of a few precious cows. There was a small village nearby where they could buy a little food, but this was not what the money was for, and each time they ate, it meant decreasing the possibility that they would achieve what they had come there for. The plane, assuming it would come, was to take them nearly 1000 km across the Kenyan border to the Kakuma Refugee Camp where they would go to school.

Bol’s uncle, a civilian official in the SPLM, knew about his nephew’s desire to continue his schooling. He had served as a liaison between the SPLM, the political wing of the SPLA, and the large number of humanitarian aid groups serving the region during the
war, and visited Kakuma regularly—his wife and children were there—and knew many of the aid pilots. Using a radio owned and rented by Somali refugees in the camp, he convinced Bol’s very skeptical father to sell the cows, and arranged for the flight. He was able to make similar arrangements for at least 50 children to come to Kakuma in this way. These children were not necessarily the most vulnerable in the area. Indeed, they were from families who wanted to enroll a child in school and had the means or connections. Most were the children of his friends or extended family, or those who were able to compensate his family in some way, mostly by paying cows. This latter arrangement was less common, he told me, but this was how things worked. And he wasn’t the only one doing it.

By the time these arrangements were made, Bol had managed to finish the equivalent of 4th grade, but spread over 6 years starting around age 9, and in multiple sites across South Sudan. Southern schools generally followed the British system—8 years of primary school, 4 years of secondary, and 4 years of university. Although he had repeated primary 4, the grade in which English became the primary language of instruction in South Sudan, it was not due to any lack of academic success. Over the course of many decades of war, school buildings were commandeered for military uses and often bombed, and although most schools operated under trees when the weather permitted, teachers consistently left their posts to fight. Bol remembers many semesters when he and a few more advanced students used old books to continue their studies on their own and teach the

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53 This was the first time humanitarian aid groups were granted permission to deliver aid in the middle of an on-going civil war (Harrigan, 2004)
lower grades themselves. His father moved multiple times around the South, both urban and rural, to stay with relatives or find access to food and functioning schools. This was the reason why Bol and his family ended up in Malou.

Bol remembers his Primary 1 and 2 teacher, Bul, well, and often talked about him as the one who convinced Bol that his future was in education. Stricken with polio as a child in the early 60’s and unable to tend the family’s cattle with his brothers, Bul was sent to school instead. Over roughly 20 years, Bul managed to earn his secondary diploma by attending schools seven different locations in the South and in a refugee camp school in Uganda run by educated Anyanya rebels during the first civil war. Bul is now an influential county government official and sends his children to the same Ugandan camp he attended for school. Bol was about repeat nearly the same trajectory as his first school teacher.

But it would not be before a brief stint as a soldier. While tending his family’s small heard of cattle in the dry season cattle camp in late 1997 and with a major famine looming, Bol and his friends heard about attacks on Dinka villages near his home being waged by a rival Dinka, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, who had defected from the mainstream SPLA to a breakaway Southern faction. The resulting fratricidal violence in the South would prove even more deadly and destructive than that waged directly by the Northern Sudanese military, although the Northern leadership exploited this split with dire consequences (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999). Starved for food and looking to prove their skills as warriors—traditionally accomplished by defending their cattle from rustlers or
rustling themselves—Bol and his friends left the care of their cattle to friends and found the SPLA army units charged with repelling Kerubino’s troops. They were each given one rifle, about 10 bullets, and told to use them sparingly; it was all they would get. They stayed in Dinka family homesteads commandeered by SPLA officers and took whatever food was available. But he encountered Kerubino’s troops only once, he told me. Having been in his unit only a few months, they finally snuck up on a Kerubino encampment early in the morning and opened fire as their targets were making tea. Bol told me he aimed right at a guy not 10 meters away and pulled the trigger. As the kickback of the rifle exploded him backward, the weapon crumbled in his hands. He turned and ran.

He fled back to his father’s homestead where he would intermittently attend school, cultivate, stay at relatives’ homes where there was food, flee into the bush for weeks or months at a time, or look after his family’s dwindling herd of cattle and goats. Two years later, following the arrival of OLS, he was sitting under a giant Mohagany tree waiting for a plane. And that plane did eventually come. Many of the friends and school mates he met in Kakuma came to the camp in this manner; many others were able to hop on the lorries of aid caravans returning to Lokichoggio, Kenya after delivering their cargos. Either way, these journeys required papers issued by SPLM officials. I was told by numerous research participants and two former SPLM officials that these papers could be bought or the official made to sympathize with a family member or neighbor. Most described that the manner in which they handed out these papers, including what would appear to western aid officials as bribery, was in fact obligatory within the larger system of kinship and support networks that supported life under the conditions of war and famine.
In mid 2007, nearly seven years after reaching Kakuma and enrolling in school, joining the Boy Scouts, performing AIDS awareness skits in drama club, making videos about the drawbacks of polygamy and alcoholism in film club, working in a video hall where tickets were sold to view screenings of Chuck Norris movies, and being elected as a youth representative to the camp management council, Bol, now 22 years old and with a high school diploma in hand, began his journey home. Bol’s father paid for the return journey by selling two cows and wiring him money through a Somali wire service in the camp, totaling about $750. With it, Bol caught a bus to Nairobi from Kakuma town. Bol told me many refugees attempted the journey directly back to Sudan in Matatus, the 15 seat minivan-bus common to East Africa. But these were risky because many either broke down or were hijacked along the way, its occupants robbed and even killed.

In Nairobi, Bol delivered some of the cash to an uncle who was undergoing cataracts surgery. He caught a second bus to Kampala, Uganda where he delivered part of the cash to his younger brother who was in school there. He then caught a third bus from Kampala to Juba, where he finally hitched a ride on a construction lorry to Wau. Using a satellite phone borrowed from a cousin who worked for an INGO there, he called a friend who also worked for an INGO near his village and, a few days later, caught a ride in a Land Cruiser from Wau back to Malou. Bol’s father’s willingness to part with his cows so far paid has off: he returned with a high school diploma in hand and employment experience with an INGO. The fact that he was male, and the spatial and class nature of the network that enabled him to get to Kakuma, not only enabled him to return in this manner, but also to immediately begin servicing his debt to it.
Bol quickly found a job as a primary school teacher at Jur Academy, a primary school supported by a well educated former neighbor who splits his time between the United States and South Sudan, and as an agricultural project manager with an INGO. Bol lived once again in a tukul with one of his older brothers, as he had when he was younger. He brought back a small stereo and a solar battery he bought in Kampala, and I could usually tell if he was home when I visited his homestead because I could hear the Congolese Lingala and American rap music blaring in the distance. Bol owned one pair of leather dress shoes, two t-shirts, one button-down shirt, and two pairs of identical jeans, all of which he and his sisters kept meticulously clean and pressed despite the considerable wear and dust. He also kept a few English school books, novels, and a TOEFL study guide. He showed me one of the textbooks he used with school children back before his Kakuma days when there no teachers in the school he attended in Malou. A I saw in nearly every Tukul in which I sat, a set of fancy suitcases were stacked against the wall, adjacent to his bed, awaiting their next assignment. These were the extent of his personal belongings. The money he made from his three jobs was given entirely to his mother to buy soap, sugar, tea, and other items from the market, to his father to purchase cattle, and the rest saved until his next trip to Wau, where he would wire it to his youngest brother in Kampala. When he was not working, he was helping his older brother and sisters with cultivation, tending their small herd of cattle and goats, and occasionally walking about the countryside looking for a lost cow. He shook his head every time we passed the large group of educated young men playing cards in the market. “I can’t afford to hang out like
them,” he said. “We don’t have much cattle, but we have land; if I don’t help cultivate, we don’t eat.”

Bol’s many responsibilities and debts to his family, and the long distances he had to travel on foot to get from one job site to another and back home, made him consistently late for just about everything, especially for the classes he taught at Jur Academy. Occasionally he would disappear for a few days, either spontaneously hopping on an INGO Land Cruiser to Wau or on a search for a lost cow. Teacher truancy was a problem at Jur Academy, but the students at Jur were considerably better off than most of the other primary schools in the county. I visited about 15 primary schools spread out over a roughly 30 mile radius, and not a single one had more than half of their teachers present at the time of my visit. Many had only one or two teachers present for anywhere from 300 to 600 students. It was common for most classes to go without a teacher for the majority of the school day. According to my interviews with headmasters, many teachers were sick, many lived great distances away, many were juggling other responsibilities including working for INGOs, cultivation, and looking after cattle. Some had traveled to Wau or Nairobi with a sick family member. Others were likely hanging out in the market centers being leisurely with their time. All were frustrated by the regular interruptions in their pay schedules, as most staff in the school system often went without pay for many months at a time, caused by the unreliable dependence of the Southern school system on oil revenue sharing from the North. Jur Academy had a reputation in the region for being the best school and many students travelled over 10 miles each way, passing other primary schools, to go to Jur. The teachers were paid better than most, their incomes supplemented by the remittances of its
Dinka-American benefactor; this enabled the school to be considerably more selective in its hiring practices. Most of the teachers had obtained their high school diplomas in refugee camps. Most of them also had other jobs with INGOs in the region as well.

While Bol’s family was not especially well off compared with those possessing more cattle wealth, he did earn a decent salary between his three jobs. I asked Bol why he didn’t buy himself a motorcycle, or even a bicycle, so he could get around more easily. Or why didn’t he buy himself more clothes or a nicer mattress. Or a better backpack then the one that was falling apart or better teaching aids like a class roster to keep track of his student’s attendance and grades; I noticed they were sold in Wau. I asked similar questions of many of the teachers with whom I worked, and the answer was uniformly the same: the debts they had to their immediate families and extended kinship networks was of primary importance; the bulk of their income was converted into cattle wealth. He described to me a Dinka folktale his mother used to tell him as a child that embodied for him the ethical/moral code of *cieng*, which governs how he uses his earnings:

Every afternoon, when the children came home from tending the cattle, mother would prepare their favorite sweet pastry. Their neighbor, an older man who usually kept to himself and never helped anyone, could smell the delicious cakes, and would always wander over right as she served them to the children. Being polite, she served him some of the pastries as well, but secretly, she resented him for this. They were poor and this was one their few treats and here was this man who never helped anyone eating her food. This went on for a long time. Finally out of frustration, mother decided to do something about it. She began cooking the pastries much earlier one day, and poisoned one of them. As expected, smelling the sweet aroma, the man came over and she gave him the poisoned pastry. On his way home, he saw the children on their way back from the pastures. They saw that he had a pastry and they begged him for a bite. They ate the pastry together there on the road, and shortly thereafter, all were dead. Mother grieved for her children, for it was her resentment of giving without receiving that killed them.
I gave the motorcycle that I used to get around the countryside to Bol shortly before I left Malou, hoping this would help him get to school on time. Three months later, in a Skype conversation, I asked about the motorcycle; he sold it. He used the proceeds to buy his father a cow and send money to his younger brother in Kampala.

4.3.2 Kuot

Kuot was a former child-soldier, science teacher, and lab technician in one of the few health clinics in the region. He started his schooling about 20 miles from Malou where he grew up, but bombings of the large SPLA garrison that was located there in the early 80’s caused him to flee. Separated from his parents, he made his way to Ethiopia along with many thousands of other unaccompanied children. His father was primarily a farmer and they didn’t have a whole lot of cattle, he told me, but they had good land and grew enough surplus maize and sesame to trade with both Dinka locally and with Arab merchants in Wau and Aweil. In Ethiopia, he received military training by the SPLA starting around age 12 while continuing his education through an American INGO there. In 1991, they were violently driven out of Ethiopia following the fall of Ethiopia’s communist president and SPLA sympathizer, Mengitsu. Many were shot dead or drowned in the Nile as they fled. Shortly thereafter, in camps near Torit that received food aid from the UN, Kuot was assigned to the unit charged with protecting the SPLA leader John Garang, an extremely prestigious assignment owing both to his good military skills and
“first-in-my-class” education compared to other youth his age, he said. This was during a period when the SPLA was coming under international pressure to stop recruiting children and manipulating food aid for military purposes. Kuot was eventually stationed in Eastern Equatoria, where he made the first of many back-and-forth trips to the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya to attend school, encouraged to do so by his commanding officers. He told me he and other young soldiers made the journey to Kakuma and back so many times they could do it in the dark. There he finished the 6th grade.

A few years later, stationed near Yei, he crossed the border into Uganda and joined a malaria prevention training project for refugees. He also enrolled in a school run by former rebels from the first civil war, the Anyanya, who were provided books and blackboards by the UN and paid in bars of soap and sacks of sugar to teach under trees. I interviewed a former teacher from one of these schools who confirmed Kuot’s description. Kuot finished the last two years of primary school there while also obtaining a Laboratory Technician training certificate from the Malaria project, all while maintaining some connection to his army unit, mostly through the comings and goings of refugees and soldiers. The SPLA officers in his unit considered Kuot and others who joined him too young at the time to accuse them of army desertion, he told me, and encouraged them to go to school when they could. Although being a child-soldier “you see and do many bad things,” he managed to finish eight years of primary school and a lab tech training program between schools in four countries. This was a typical educational trajectory for the youth of his generation, and not unlike that of the generation before him.
Kuot was recently married, but not yet living with his wife. Having no cattle to pay her dowry, his wife’s family kept her at home until Kuot could produce a few head of cattle, a small fraction of the dowry as a down payment. He was trying to save enough of his salary as a teacher and lab technician. His education and family background was enough for her father to agree to let her marry him, a common hope among eligible bachelors who were educated but cattle-poor. Kuot said he was close to having enough cattle that would satisfy his in-laws for the time being so that his wife could come live with him, but the cows were spread out between relatives in different parts of the county. His jobs currently kept him from taking the two weeks needed to fetch all the cattle. He hoped he could find the time before the rainy season made travel virtually impossible.

When Kuot returned from Uganda after the war, he said he was struck by how many more schools had opened in the area. There was a new secondary school in the village where he grew up, the only one in the county. Most of the students I interviewed in Malou did not consider this high school to be of the same quality as those in Wau, which were considerably farther away.\(^{54}\) A small bank had been built in 2006 in his hometown by an INGO that was subsequently campaigning among the local population to convert their cattle into cash for safe keeping and which would bear interest. I did not meet anyone who used this bank nor had any intention of converting cattle into cash; in fact the very opposite

\[^{54}\] I believe that this attitude was equally a function of the fact that many students who both qualified for and could afford secondary school had family in Wau where it would be easier to live and more likely to find gainful employment both during and after graduation.
was the norm. More then a few times, a common Dinka proverb was cited to me, which basically translated into: Money falls through your fingers but cattle are forever.

His hometown had also become the site of county government offices, having been a former SPLA garrison. Payam (sub-county) and Boma (sub-payam) offices were coordinated there and staff were stationed throughout the county, including Malou. This web of government entities represented to Kuot the way the emerging South Sudanese state was making itself known in the region. The county offices were housed mostly in a group of mud and thatch Tukuls, except for the county commissioner’s office, which was housed in the rehabilitated brick and mortar former army barracks. The county commissioner was a very highly regarded and powerful position and known to be a well compensated one. What little government funds existed outside those earmarked for civil service salaries made it’s way through the state governor’s office and was distributed to the county commissioners who asserted a high degree of control over how these funds were spent. In fact, when I asked school children what they wanted to do after they finished school, by far the most popular answer was to be a county commissioner. Riding my motorbike one day on my way to observe an education census training for the county’s head teachers, I passed a large and well cultivated homestead which hosted an enormous herd of cattle, far more than I had yet seen since arriving in GEC. I was giving the Jur Academy headmaster a ride to the training and I asked whose home that was. It was the county commissioner’s. He, like many high ranking and elected officials in the South, converted much of their cash earnings into cattle wealth.
“But do you see all the people” he pointed out. I stopped the motorcycle to get a better look from the dirt and sand road. Indeed a large crowd of people were milling about the central group of tukuls, while others were tilling the fields. “They are the commissioner’s family,” he said. “They are there to require his help.” As a comparatively wealthy Dinka man, his extended relations came to rely on him to help contribute to dowries, pay court fines, buy their cattle at generous prices, till his land in return for food and beer, and share his crops when theirs don’t sufficiently provide. Educated relations ask for jobs. One Dinka-American man I interviewed, who was comfortable but by no means wealthy by American standards, told me that when he visited his homestead in GEC for a few months each summer, a long queue of relatives lined up with their requests for him to fulfill his familial obligations. This most commonly meant buying one of their cows at exorbitant prices or contributing to dowries. “They are annoyingly persistent and simply won’t take no for an answer,” he told me. “I try, but there’s little I can do. They won’t leave me alone.”

Kuot credits the government ministries, the former soldiers who largely staff them, and the local representatives who make up the state and national legislatures, for the myriad road construction, health facilities, and school projects that have begun since before his return. He credits the regional and local government with the recent increase in the number and variety of goods one can purchase in the local markets. Indeed, less than a year prior to my arrival according to an aid worker that had lived in Malou for the last 5 years, one could not get half the things one can get now. Kuot insists that the local
communities in his home town and in Malou where he now lives and works are “pleased.”

“No,” he said. “Pleased that their children are part of the new government.” He knew they were pleased, he said, because of the traditional ceremonies of thanks they performed whenever a “new thing” came to Malou. I observed the sacrifice of a cow in honor of the opening of a maternal health clinic in the Malou Health Center where Kuot worked. The local spiritual leader, the Spearmaster, conducted the ceremony in the presence of about 75 local residents and elders. As he knelt down to slash the cow’s throat with his spear, he spoke to the cow, asking it to bring messages of thanks to the Dinka Divinity, and asking to continue to support the presence of INGOs “who bring health and drugs to the community.”

“They know that these things would never have come had the youth not pushed back the Arabs.” Kuot told me as we watched. “They know their destiny is in the hands of the youth.”

Along with most of the other educated returnees I interviewed, Kuot simultaneously faults local and national government officials for corruption, the slow pace of development, and the lingering violence between clans and ethnic neighbors that continued as it did prior to and throughout the war. Cattle rustling between Dinka and Nuer communities had become increasingly deadly as the dry season cattle camps were saturated with automatic rifles, a result of the militarization of ethnic and clan rivalries throughout the civil war (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999). Inter-clan warfare had erupted in GEC only a
year prior to my arrival, between the Apuk and Agok Dinka. According to local INGO
reports, hundreds were killed and a number of villages were burned as a result of escalating
retaliations over cattle rustling made more fatal by the replacement of spears with guns
(Otto, 2008). The local health clinic where Kuot worked was visited by groups of young
men with gunshot wounds on a weekly basis, the result of defending against or
perpetrating cattle rustling. When I asked Kuot why he thought this fighting remained, he
replied, “There is a clear reason: no individualism.” He explained:

> When one is commissioner, he employs his family. When someone is appointed in
the government sector to become, say, Minister of Roads and Transport, he
employs his family. Sometimes he employs the soldiers from his unit if he fought
in the war. In all aspects of employment, one will find that who ever is employed,
they are there because of family, not because of their qualifications. So now where
do you think they get all the ammunition for their guns?

He cited the SPLA split in 1991 and the arming of civilians by both the SPLA and
Northern supported rival militias as the root beginnings of what he believed morphed after
the war into a direct connection between government employment of former soldiers,
access to weapons and ammunition, and inter-clan and inter-ethnic violence in the South.
Indeed it was still about cattle wealth, he explained, but now the clans remain armed
through their connections to members in the SPLA-dominated government. The Northern
government, for its part, is widely suspected to continue to foment division between rival
militias, most of which were heavily divided along ethnic or clan identities, by maintaining
an illicit North-South arms trade.
Claims of corruption by rival families and clans of a sitting government official are also common, and according to multiple research participants including Kuot, prosecuted for the purposes of advocating for someone perceived to be more loyal to their clan as their replacement. This, Kuot insisted, accounts for the constant accusations of corruption and the high turnover in county commissioners and other local officials. This description added an important dimension to Kuot’s assertion that the local community was “pleased” to have relations employed by the government. It also corroborates what Jok and Hutchinson (1999) describe as the militarization of Dinka and Nuer identities and what began in the early 1990s as, in the words of a Nuer elder, “the war of the educated.” This moniker has taken on new relevance now that the increasing population of educated returnees are competing with established networks of local and regional loyalists for jobs and influence in the Southern government, and as the emerging South Sudanese state is publically pushed by their international partners to become less corrupt and more meritocratic and democratic. As such, having an educated family member takes on important political meaning, and is deeply embedded within the social and economic circuits of contemporary Dinka pastoralism, rather than replacing it.

4.4 Educated Returnees and (Re)Making the State

As I argued in the previous chapter, rehabilitated and educated refugees are seen as state-makers by the constellation of institutional actors that make up the international post-conflict state-building regimes—the pseudo-allochthonous and pseudo-autochthonous
employers. Both are populated with staff who might be considered members of one or a combination of local, national, international, or global collectivities; as each type of employer represents their own field of power relations as well as between them, these collectivities vie for control over aid and development and state-making discourse, policy, and resources, including the structure of schooling, the meaning of educational credentials, and the role of educated people in society. Thus, even in what is considered among the most remote, isolated, and underdeveloped regions of the world, local-global binary distinctions are too problematic to be analytically useful. State makers cannot be seen in such terms—as local representatives of a global order of space, for instance. Rather, the refugee child is imagined as a potential relay for the travel of in-vogue, externally legitimized knowledges, practices, and cultural scripts to the weak or failed, refugee-producing state. The hopes of rehabilitating such states in the image of dominant state-making discourses, such as the free market, democracy, human rights, institutional culture, bureaucratic rationality, and territorial sovereignty—what one might call statist governmentality—are projected onto them. The educated returnee state-maker does not simply reproduce these multiplex, changing, and often competing interests, but also transforms, resists, and produces new practices as the statist governmentalities that dominate the pedagogical camp—recontextualized from international and global contexts—are recontextualized once again in post-CPA South Sudan.

Educated returnee state makers might be called “comprador state-makers;” a deliberate take on Marx’s concept of the comprador capitalist. Fundamentally this term concerns what sort of capitalism may be expected to develop in peripheral regions of the
world economy. Marxist theories of imperialism, originating in the works of Lenin and Hilferding, see few prospects for the emergence of genuine, independent capitalists in former colonies transitioning to independence. Rather than seeking to promote an indigenous national development, emerging “comprador capitalists” serve the interests of an international capitalist class (Sklair and Robbins, 2002:81-82). The notion of comprador capitalism, for example, underpins the powerful metaphor used by Archbishop Desmond Tutu about South Africa’s post-Apartheid leaders “shining,” rather than breaking, the “chains of 21st-century global Apartheid” (Bond, 2003:xi). Furthermore, for Marx the comprador capitalist (class) is one that cannot function entirely on its own (hence “servitors”), but is dependent on the resources of established capitalists.

My intention is to draw from a similar perspective in my formulation of educated returnee state-makers, but in this case, I acknowledge both their agency and the circulation of power between a constellation of actors, not just capitalists and the educated, vying for control of the institutions of the state. Marxist perspectives do not overtly recognize the way power circulates between these groups and with the institutions of Dinka pastoralism, linked through the national staff, soldiers, and beneficiaries of the pseudo-allochthonous and pseudo-autochthonous employers. While I demonstrated in Chapter III how select knowledge, practice, and cultural scripts flow through the relays of international refugee camp education systems and repatriation processes—a decidedly neo-Marxist or neo-imperialist vision of a unidirectional flow of power—I have attempted to show in this chapter that privileged and privileging knowledge flow in multiple directions. Dinka communities of practice around schooling have been intimately linked to refugee camp
education systems, humanitarian aid institutions, and geopolitical circles of power since the 1960’s. They exert a counter-flow of knowledge and practice, the result of which is that educated returnee state-makers navigate the competing expectations and moralities of pastoralist, state, and international institutions, which sometimes converge and sometimes diverge. They are the inheritors of the symbolic power and culture of the state from earlier generations of state-makers; it is only now that they are inheriting an actual, internationally recognized state.55

The multi-directional-flow of knowledges and practices can be seen in the spatial practices of potential and realized returnees, in their comings and goings across borders and frontiers, sometimes conforming to, sometimes manipulating, and sometimes wholly external to official routes and carriers. A multi-directional flow can also be seen in who and why camp educational credentials were obtained. According to camp aid workers, refugees, and returnees, a majority of refugee youth who completed primary and secondary schooling did not fit the international refugee child stereo-type—the traumatized, vulnerable, and dependent victim of conflict and uprootedness. Rather they were those who already had the means and connections to access a camp education. While few including myself deny that the very dire and destructive conditions of civil war and famine are real, these conditions also must be measured against the fact that they have existed in South Sudan for over a century. The spatio-educational practices of contemporary South Sudanese pastoralists are thus a reflection of the strategies and coping mechanisms such a

55 Beyond its symbolic importance, this may not make much difference to what was already a largely autonomous set of state-like institutions, at least in the short term.
history has demanded. Furthermore, the use of camp education credentials served multiple interests, sometimes mutual, sometimes competing; the pseudo-autochthanous employers who represented aid and development regimes, the pseudo-allochthanous employers who represented the symbolic power of the state, and the families and extended kinship networks of camp-educated returnees who represented the legacy and future of the pastoralist enterprise.

The administrative processes, bureaucratic structures, and financial mechanisms of the constellation of international actors facilitating repatriation proved to be either insufficient or unprepared for—and manipulated by refugees to meet—the realities of return migration in the region. Despite the regulating discourses of “temporariness” and “voluntariness,” and the deliberate effort to exploit “push” and “pull” factors—closing camp schools, relocating training programs to South Sudan, tightening control of information, dwindling food stores, and the shifting of donor support away from the camp—the spatial practices of refugees were deeply conditioned by class, gender, and cross-border relationships, mitigating the degree of independence a refugee had from regimes of institutional control. Indeed this independence did not always mean separation, but also the utilization of the many routes, relays, and resources—the international aid infrastructures that were laid and transformed over many decades of war and famine.

As I have begun to show, and will continue to do so in the next chapter, the pastoral political economy in Malou has adapted to, but has not been replaced by, the culture of the institutional state. Most who obtained a refugee camp education ultimately enabled their
larger pastoral kinship and clan networks to access forms of state power. But like making local-global distinctions, it would also be fallacious to make a binary distinction between pastoralism and the state; in fact, in rural pastoralist communities like Malou, they have become intimately linked. In the past, educated Dinka were commonly alienated from both the pastoralist enterprise, which saw them as antithetical to tradition, and the Sudanese state, which actively excluded them from government employment by nature of their cultural, linguistic, or religious affiliations. Today, Dinka educated in Western contexts have become both a necessary accessory to contemporary pastoralist livelihoods and the people onto which the hopes for the emergence of a modern state are projected by the international institutions who provide it. It is not a confrontation of opposite aims, but rather one with both commonalities and conflicts.

As such, an educated Dinka young person must navigate an uncertain terrain of competing expectations. Both the pastoral enterprise and the emerging South Sudanese state remain extremely fragile, each with particular designs on a still relatively small class of educated state-makers, growing in numbers and in influence, and the role it is imagined they must play in (re)constructing their various institutions, be it the cattle complex or the formal school system. Each institution, through its variety of communities of practice, maintains practices associated with the past while also transforming other practices so as to be saved and maintained under a rapidly changing social, economic, and political future. Families in places like Malou utilize educated members to maintain pastoralist institutions and grow the reach and power of kinship networks. State institutions utilize educated returnees to earn international legitimacy, for example through the hiring of national staff.
to demonstrate the in-vogue aid and development principles of “participation,” “capacity building,” and “sustainability.” While these are not mutually exclusive projects, they appear as such by the institutional practices of state-building which privilege some practices—like going to school, and keeping wealth in the form of bank accounts—and demonizing others, like “out-of-school” youth and the cattle complex. These practices are constrained by universalized constructions of rights and economic development paradigms which dictate that formal schooling should be obtained by all children, and that through its production of human capital, membership in the system of global capitalism will be obtained.

It is not that pastoralism is antithetical to formal schooling, it is that statist values such as Education for All in their current form, require the destruction of pastoralist livelihoods to be fully realized, and this has been shown to be true among pastoralist societies elsewhere (Devereux 2006; Krätli 2001; Ruto et. al. 2009; Dyer 2006). As I demonstrated in Chapter II, the Dinka have been adept at resisting and transforming the forces of state-making, and formal schooling in particular, over the last 150 years. At the current juncture, where cycles of war, exile, and return have contributed—unfortunately at the expense of millions of lives—to a significant shift in Dinka attitudes toward schooling and the educated person, it would be a repeat of a sordid history should the emerging state and its international partners fail to make room for the representation and moral constructs of the pastoralist enterprise. Indeed the structure of schooling in South Sudan today—fed as it has been by the multiplex of international policies pertaining to education in emergencies and post-conflict reconstruction—and how it is being reproduced and
transformed by the changing and competing practices of Dinka families, is the subject of the next chapter of this dissertation.
This final chapter discusses the reconstruction and expansion of state-run formal schooling in and around the village of Malou, a conflict-affected community of Dinka agro-pastoralists in South Sudan, and the ways that both refugee camp-educated young adults and adolescent school children are engaged in simultaneously reproducing, transforming, and producing new cultural practices around education. It has been argued that state schools are modernizing institutions that have the power to transform indigenous life. Because this is a literature that assumes a particular model of linear modernity, and “modernity” in opposition to “indigeneity,” research among pastoralists in East Africa have documented a history of resistance to formal education and considerable cultural resilience in the face of fast changing political and economic landscapes (Krätli, 2001; Devereux, 2006; Dyer, 2006; Ruto, et. al. 2009). This resilience, however, manifests itself not only in resistance to change, but in the adaptive development of new social practices and gender relations that both transform and preserve the pastoralist enterprise.

In the previous chapters, I recounted the Dinka’s long history of such preserving and transforming practices. Here, I intend to focus on these practices in the context of the post-conflict expansion of formal schooling, especially into the more remote rural regions of South Sudan. This expansion parallels similar trends across the most remote and marginalized regions of the developing world, often where nomadic and pastoralist peoples typically make their livelihoods. Formal schooling in these geographies have typically
arrived on the heels of international humanitarian aid interventions in response to natural disasters and war, and is highly driven by the recent international legitimation of education as a human right and the standardization of education sector responses in emergencies and post-conflict environments (Andina, 2007). Little account, however, has been taken of the existing educational practices of communities where there has historically been no access to education—it is assumed that they are people without an educational history.

I argue that regimes of formal schooling that arrive in historically marginalized communities on the heels of humanitarian aid does not arrive into an educational vacuum, but rather into communities with historically, politically and culturally conditioned educational practices, and that historically limited access to formal schooling may reflect as much forms of resistance as it does marginalization. This is largely lost on policy makers who, limited by what I call the culture of formal schooling, entrench rather than mitigate inequalities and cycles of poverty by legitimizing some forms of schooling while marginalizing or de-emphasizing others. I show what the culture of formal schooling and its attendant pedagogical and institutional cultures looks like in a rural community, and I then present two contemporary case studies of Dinka families that illustrate how they and their children weigh decisions about education in post-CPA South Sudan.

5.1 The Culture of Formal Schooling in Humanitarian Crises
It is only over the last decade that education has come to be included among the standard responses to humanitarian emergencies, and little is known about its longer term impact or consequences. There are very few ethnographies of schooling in refugee camps or conflict-affected communities—and none that compare them as I do here; those that do exist have a decidedly problem-oriented perspective, examining the success or failure of particular policies or approaches pertaining to education in emergencies (s.f. Davies, 2004; Sommers, 2002; Mundy & Dryden-Petersen, 2011; Paulson, 2011). From these works as well as from my own observations of schools in both North and South Sudan, what is known is that effective formal schools built in response to humanitarian crises are extremely difficult to establish given the weakness of state institutions, the insecurities of their surroundings, and the unavailability of safe school buildings, qualified teachers, relevant curriculum, or the finances to cover the recurrent costs of (re)building and maintaining a school system. When formal schools do emerge in these geographies, they tend to have extremely high rates of grade repetition, dropouts (especially girls), and teacher truancy (UNESCO, 2010). These schools typically have overcrowded, multi-age, and multi-lingual classrooms serving students who are likely former soldiers, malnourished, deeply impoverished, displaced, or orphaned. They are likely to be from mobile transhumant or nomadic societies, communities where neither the children nor their parents have ever attended school, or families that see schools as oppressive, irrelevant, or even dangerous places especially for girls (Kirk, 2008). Despite this, the widespread faith among aid institutions in formal schooling to bring the most marginalized communities into the fold of capitalist modernity, interrupt chronic insecurities and inequalities, and lift
entire societies out of poverty is pervasive no matter where one looks around the globe (Boli and Ramirez, 1992; Chabbott and Ramirez, 2006). It is a culture of formal schooling fraught with contradictions, unrealistic and often competing practices, and expectations of schooling as it should be rather than acknowledging its possibilities, needs, and limitations. As such, the culture of formal schooling forms a field of contestation and shifting power relations.

For example state schooling is expected to be decentralized for local control and cultural context, but also standardized state-wide so as to hold schools and teachers accountable; teachers are to be professional and autonomous but also mandated to teach highly scripted curricula and meet strict national content standards; pedagogy is to be pupil-centered, participatory, and experiential, but also content-centered, test-driven, and teacher-centric; and the products of formal schooling—the graduates—are supposed to serve the internal-facing needs of their local communities as leaders, organizers, and critical thinkers, and fluent in their own culture and language, but also serve the needs of the external-facing state as loyal citizens, workers, and consumers and knowledgeable of the cultures and languages that enable membership in the global capitalist economy (Anderson-Levitt, 2003; Pannu, 1996; Tabulawa, 2003). As communities recover from disaster or conflict, few of these ideals are possible, not only because they are contradictory, but because they ignore the lasting realities of conditions in or after crisis.

Yet the faith in formal schooling is also deeply present among teachers, students, and their families, who often prefer it over more viable alternatives such as mobile schools
or informal education because it represents the international gold standard, even when its iteration in their communities leaves a great deal to be desired. Formal schooling forms a powerful part of what Monique Nuijten (2003) calls “administered hope,” a view of the state and its manifest bureaucracies as that which can make anything possible, “that things will be different from now on” (197). This faith in the transformative potential of formal schooling should be seen, however, as distinct from the state education bureaucracy, where the former can be strongly present among families and communities even when the latter is weak and seen by the very same population as corrupt or ineffective.

The institutional uniformity of the culture of formal schooling is also organized around gaining external legitimacy by orienting its functions toward achieving the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and Education for All, as well as growing the human capital for economic development and foreign investment (Chabbott 2003; Sommers 2002). Yet formal schooling has consistently failed to deliver the promised fruits of development and autonomy throughout Africa, often creating large populations of unemployed graduates with unobtainable lifestyle expectations (Serpell, 1993; Bajaj, 2010). What emerges instead is a small cadre of externally-oriented elite who drain their country of its resources and potential. The internationally sanctioned pedagogic discourses and practices that have made their way from multiple sources—from universalizing conceptions of the child and child rights, dominant economic and human capital development paradigms, and international standards for education in emergencies and post-conflict reconstruction—and through multiple relays via refugee camps, aid infrastructures, institutional relationships, and sociopolitical networks, manifest themselves
in the lurch of state institutions toward the international standard. Most schools remain far below international standards of quality and face severe shortages of qualified staff and resources. But it is also the practices of teachers, students, and their families that transform school institutions.

The students and teachers who populate these schools employ multiple practices to cope with such a wide difference between expectations and what is possible. Indeed, marginalized communities are not inert in the face of yawning educational inequalities however, and while they often desire formal schooling, also engage in resisting and transforming practices around education, conceptions of the educated person, and the meaning of education credentials. These practices are not short-term reactions to disaster or conflict, but rather based on coping mechanisms and cultural adaptations conditioned by regular spasms of scarcity and insecurity throughout their history (s.f. deWaal 1989, Horst 2006).

5.2 Schooling in Post-CPA South Sudan

The post-CPA South Sudanese education system divides into the formal and alternative systems, and this dualism reflects not only the standard educational development paradigm throughout the third world, it also reflects the hegemony of the culture of formal schooling. The formal education ladder is overseen by the GoSS Ministry of Education, supported entirely by oil revenue, and is based on eight years of primary,
four years of secondary, and four years of higher (post-secondary) and tertiary education. The primary curriculum commonly includes classes in math, social studies, science, agriculture, English, and Christian Religious Education, and is textualized in a series of stapled booklets for each subject and grade. Many Dinka families prefer schools that have refugee-camp educated teachers using the Kenyan curriculum. Dinka is the language of instruction until 4th grade when it is replaced with English. In the sub-county region, called a payam, where I lived, there were 26 primary schools run by the government and 2 privately funded schools, more than twice as many schools since the beginning of the second civil war in 1982. Most of these schools however, cannot offer an education much beyond the 4th or 5th grade because of a lack of qualified teachers. There is a South Sudan primary school curriculum, but this curriculum is only one of many used throughout the south. The Kenyan and Ugandan curricula are also used, and generally more desired by families—along with refugee camp-educated teachers—in part because they are considered better quality and closer to an international standard, “more like what they learn in the UK and the US,” a teacher told me. One student I interviewed held up the South Sudanese Primary 4 Social Studies booklet, a thin, black and white stapled volume of about 70 pages, next to the Kenyan textbook, nearly 4 times as thick with color diagrams, charts, and maps, and a hardcover professional binding and asked rhetorically, “Which do you think is the best?”

The alternative education system is primarily implemented by INGOs with foreign donor funds and overseen by an isolated section of the national Ministry of Education. The alternative system is comprised of a number components generally offering flexible entry
and exit points for over-age youth, adults, active and demobilized soldiers, low-skilled government bureaucrats, and “nomads.” The latter refers to the Pastoralist Education Program (PEP) which is supposed to serve the vast majority of children and youth who are non-school attending cattle keepers. The PEP is described as a mobile school that attempts to engage cattle keepers in literacy activities. Notwithstanding the fact that cattle camps actually don’t move—they are more like second homes—I did not encounter a single cattle keeper among the many I interviewed who participated in a PEP project or knew of one in or near their cattle camp. In GEC, the PEP is a very small project which reflects the limited funds of the alternative system, temporary nature of such projects, and the internationally sanctioned goal of eventually tracking all students in such programs into formal schools (Broch-Utne, 2000). The fact that formal schooling was generally seen by all my research participants as distinct lifestyle trajectory from cattle keeping raises some questions such as to why, given that the vast majority of youth in pastoralist communities are cattle keepers, the PEP is the “alternative” form of schooling. The contemporary organization of South Sudanese schooling, such as it mimics Western educational institutions and bureaucratic rationalities—what I am calling the culture of formal schooling—exacerbates rather than addresses the challenge of educating all of South Sudan’s children. Today’s generation of Dinka school children thus confront similar challenges to the previous generations of school children, but also face new challenges as Dinka pastoralist educational practices continue to adapt to the changing realities and increasing pressures of capitalist modernity and the needs of the emerging South Sudanese state.
5.2.1 Schooling in Malou

Shortly after my arrival in Malou in April of 2009, the new Warrap State Minister of Education, the only woman holding this position in South Sudan and the highest ranking woman in the Government of Southern Sudan—she would eventually go on to become governor—arrived in Malou with a few of her subordinates to conduct an open forum on the condition of schools in the county. This was one of many stops the Minister was making throughout the state in order to gauge the local condition of schools. Travelling with the Minister in a caravan of brand new white SUVs were the Director of Primary Education, the Director of Administration and Finance, the President of the state teacher’s trade union, and the executive assistant to the Minister. Most ranking members of the government travelled in this manner, and projected an enduring symbol of government authority and prosperity. I had a very brief moment to sit with them just before the forum.

They all agreed that the biggest challenge for the Warrap State education ministry was financing. Nearly all of it came from oil revenue disbursed by the North and there was widespread mistrust of the manner in which it was sharing oil revenue, a requirement of the 2005 CPA. Information about oil production, refinement, and sales were not shared with the South, according to the Minister. They are told simply that fluctuations in oil prices mediates decisions about when and how much oil is sold which in turn determines how much oil money is distributed and when. This made it difficult to pay salaries on any

56 Malou is a pseudonym. A detailed portrait of Malou is provided in Chapter IV.
regular basis, they told me. Salaries account for more than 80% of the Ministry’s limited budget, and teachers and ministry staff often went 2-3 months without pay. Nearly half of the teachers in any government school were unpaid volunteers hoping eventually to land a paid position. Indeed, teacher turnover was very high given both the public and private sector demand for educated South Sudanese. Few of the ministry staff had computers or internet, much less reliable periods of electricity, and administrative records were still kept by hand in log books.

One of the few exceptions was the national educational management and information system (EMIS) and education census, which was supported by a US government contractor. “Advisors” were placed in state education ministry offices and given computers and cellular internet connections, where they managed the EMIS and, to varying degrees, trained Ministry staff on computerized information management and communication. Most state ministries of education, however, had little operating funds beyond salaries, and could hardly maintain any ability to visit schools, train teachers, buy and distribute classroom materials, or meaningfully engage in any number of important schooling initiatives promoted by external funders like girls’ education, interactive radio instruction, adult education, English language training, or school construction.

The State Education Minister’s forum was held under a huge shea nut tree. About 150 people stood in an arc around the front of a long table behind which the ministry representatives sat in plastic chairs, leaving a large space directly in front of the table for presenters. I was invited by the Minister to sit to the side of the table next to the Minister’s
assistant, who translated the entire proceeding for me. The participants were head teachers
from schools around the county, PTA representatives, and a few local activists there to
promote education. Policemen in blue and brown fatigues, automatic rifles slung over their
shoulders, were observing the meeting as well. Most who attended had just come to watch.

One by one, teachers of the many schools in the area presented their case to the
minister in the eloquent and long-winded style of Dinka oratory. They complained about a
severe lack of resources in their schools including books, stationary, chalk and chalk
boards, and adequate facilities. UNCEF “school-in-a-box” supplies were regularly
delivered throughout the region, but with the combination of a lack of storage, weather,
and poor distribution, most the supplies did not last very long. The vast majority of schools
in the area have just a few semi-permanent shelters, and most classes meet under trees.
School structures that were destroyed during the war or even more recently in inter-ethnic
fighting have yet to be rebuilt. Almost all complained about teacher pay. According to the
minister, teachers are paid a little over $100 per month, depending on their education and
years of service. A recent project to remove unqualified teachers from payrolls and finance
formal training has not been successful, the assistant explained, because these teachers
were either unwilling or unable to travel the long distances to the training sites. Many
working teachers are still relied upon by their families to cultivate and look after cattle; the
prospect of leaving their families for training is thus very difficult for most. Others worked
additional jobs with INGOs to supplement their pay.
One gentleman spoke at length about how everywhere he went he saw brick kilns but no school construction, and wondered what all the bricks were for if they were not for schools. The ministry in partnership with a variety of INGOs commonly negotiated with local communities to fire bricks and assist with school construction as a form of community “participation” which was supposed to lead to “ownership” of the school, and by association, schooling. He complained that many of the local Chiefs were taking the bricks for themselves to use on their own projects or enriching themselves by selling the bricks. More than one person complained that families still felt schools were places where girls got pregnant, accounting for the lack of girls in school. This caused a heated argument about whether this was actually true, some arguing that male teachers were still a problem. Others countered that school boys were the problem because they did not follow traditional customs. Still others argued that both views were based on the past, and schools today are safe for girls. Another complained that as some of the village markets got bigger and more diverse, boys were made to work in the market instead of go to school. Indeed, in Malou there were many children working in the variety of stores, some of whom I also saw every now and then in the schools I visited.

A woman who lives in Malou and, as I later learned, was active in local and national politics on behalf of women’s rights, spoke passionately about the need to educate and empower girls. She said, “America is rich because the women are educated. Southern Sudan is just throwing them away.” She complained that Dinka culture is all about cows and girls. “Teachers produce doctors and lawyers,” she said, “but no lawyers produce doctors.” She also argued that girls need women teachers to succeed, and advocated the
need for a compulsory school law for all children. She said, “educated girls take care of both their father and mother, but educated boys only take care of their father and father in law.” She also added her opinion about the safety of schools for girls, reminding her audience that girls got pregnant in the cattle camps all the time, and asked why this was different from getting pregnant in schools. She accused them of using this argument to maintain male dominance in pastoral affairs.

The last gentleman to speak was the county school supervisor. He complained that there were problems with accounting and teacher pay, saying that many working teachers, even those who had been working for years were not being paid because their names did not appear on the accounting roles at the state level. Most schools still do not serve lunch because they do not qualify for WFP food aid, he added, which requires the schools to have a basic kitchen, adequate food storage, and reasonable proximity to clean drinking water. This excluded more than 75% of the schools in GEC from the school feeding program. Most teachers and students spent the entire school day without eating, he said, and students spent a great deal of time fetching water from boreholes, sometimes taking two hours round trip. He also suggested that WFP should not wait for schools to obtain these assets and instead use food aid to support school construction workers. He reminded the attendees that most teachers did not have the education and training to teach beyond the 4th grade because the curriculum materials are too difficult for them. This left the vast majority of schools without the ability provide upper primary education. He suggested that because communities were resistant to sending teachers away for training especially in times when food is scarce, the training must come to them.
A few of the teachers working in the 15 schools I visited in GEC had completed one or more of a host of different training regimes, from attending the teacher training college in Maridi, the South Sudan 6-week “Fast Track” training program, or other refresher courses and English classes designed for in-service teachers and provided by a few INGOs working in different regions of the South. Most, however, had no formal training at all; this included refugee-camp educated teachers who were in high demand by schools as well as INGOs and state and county government ministries. My review of the Fast Track Teacher Education and Training Program syllabus, the Teacher Training college program, and two different teacher training programs provided INGOs, revealed that all stressed the importance of class preparation and management in the form of pre-written structured lesson plans, the maintenance of student information rosters, school timetables, and non-corporal discipline. They also equally stressed the importance of pupil-centered pedagogy in the form of class discussion, critical analysis of information, student-generated class materials, and the monitoring of individual student strengths and weaknesses. Over the course of 6 months observing teachers and classrooms in GEC, none of these techniques were used by either trained or untrained teachers. In my ongoing interviews, interactions, and observance of teachers, all of them were quite aware of these techniques and could give me examples of what they might look like in a classroom. The reason these techniques were not in use was because of the conditions in GEC schools.

57 These were part of the Health, Education, and Reconciliation (HEAR) Project in the “Three Areas,” and the South Sudan Interactive Radio Instruction Project, both funded in their entirety by USAID.
Most of the lower primary classrooms I visited had over 100 students and one teacher. Most classes had a teacher present for half the school day or less on average. The upper primary classrooms, in contrast, usually had less than 10 students per teacher, but these classes, when offered, did not see a teacher sometimes for days. These conditions exposed how misleading state and national pupil:teacher ratios were, which in 2010 was cited as 45:1 by the GoSS Education Management Information System for Warrap State (GoSS, 2011). As mentioned above, most of the schools used the South Sudan primary school curriculum, but some, when the teachers were able and materials were available, used parts of the Kenyan and Ugandan curricula. These schools were most often cited by students and parents and those they considered better quality. But curriculum materials were extremely scarce in most schools. Teachers were often the only ones to have textbooks. I visited one primary school in the county seat which had a storage room stacked floor to ceiling with hundreds of curriculum books and teaching aids, molded and rotting from the dense moisture of the rainy season. These were supposed to have been distributed to schools throughout the county, the head teacher told me, but means of transportation were not available. Some school headmasters were able come pick up some materials before the rains made travel by road impossible.

Pedagogical practices were usually a response to this state affairs; nearly all the students in the classrooms I visited spent a considerable amount of time copying text from a shard of blackboard upon which the teacher had copied in exact detail the text, illustrations, diagrams, and maps from their only text book. The teacher would read back the text from the board, and then ask the students to repeat it, whereupon the teacher would
ask, “Everyone understand,” whereupon all would respond with a resounding “yes” even though it was clear to me as an observer and professional teacher that a majority of students did not understand. In chapter III, I called this question, the “command to understand.” In some cases, a teacher would ignore or simply not notice that only a fraction of the class would answer “yes,” but those who did yelled it with such gusto so as to give the impression that there was general understanding. In many classes, nearly all responded in the positive to this question whether they understood or not. This was observable in many math classes where math problems were copied from the board, and following time to work on them, the command to understand was issued and students would emphatically answer in the affirmative when I could see that many clearly did not. Nearly without exception, pedagogy was essentially a process of textbook transference, choral response, and commands to understand, whether under trees, semi-permanent shelters, or brick and mortar classrooms.

Very few teachers had pre-prepared lesson plans even though many could cite the specific parts of a good lesson plan, repeated back to me in the manner one might do after memorizing facts for an exam. Even though most of the headmasters at each school I visited could produce a detailed class timetable, classes seldom started and ended on schedule. This was not only due to a high rate of teacher tardiness and truancy—primarily a function of the long distances many had to travel by foot, chronic illness especially malaria, and the juggling of multiple jobs—but also because teachers tended to teach until they felt the lesson was finished, regardless of how long it took. The uses and conceptions of time diverged sometimes drastically from that expected by the education ministries and
their international partners. For instance, students were also consistently late not only to the start of school, which itself varied from day-to-day, but also late to the official first day of school. School information was usually communicated by word of mouth and through some of the local churches and INGOs. This disadvantaged many families who did not have connections to this network. At the most popular school in the area, the school year began with about 50 students on the first day, and 10 weeks later, had 600. This also reflected the gradual return of younger children from the dry season cattle camps, the gradual opening of roads and trails previously under water, and the uses of children for child care and cultivation.

Corporal punishment was the norm at most primary schools in GEC rather than the exception, although this tended to differ between teachers more than between schools. These differences however were not entirely based on education or training, as many of the camp-educated teachers instituted among the most brutal forms of punishment. Rather a good deal of the use of corporal punishment relates to Dinka communities of practice around age-sets and generational competition. Corporal disciplinary practices ranged from using thin tree branches as whips on the palms of students’ hands or in some cases on the backs of students’ thighs while they laid face down on the ground. I observed teachers forcing students to hold bricks in each hand with arms outstretched above their shoulders. Should they lower their arms as the difficulty and pain increased, they would be whipped across the knees. Even in schools where corporal punishment was overtly outlawed, sticks were commonly used to threaten groups of students who might be disturbing another class or a teacher meeting; a teacher for instance might approach the group, raise his stick, and
cause the students to flee. But this usually became a game as the students, often laughing, would return to their undesirable activity until again scattered by the threat of a raised stick. Most of the teachers I interviewed on the subject of corporal punishment said that they did not prefer to use these methods, but justified them by saying that students would not behave without them, or that parents required teachers to use these methods on their children should they want to avoid being criticized. My interviews with parents confirmed these fears, although it was not a uniform attitude among them. I should note here that I suspected that teachers and parents likely perceived me, as a westerner and representative of the western pedagogies promoted by their various training regimes, to be disapproving of corporal punishment, and so may have tempered their behavior and answers to my questions.

In general, students who were able to retain the information needed to pass exams on a yearly basis—generally the auditory learners and those who could memorize facts and textbook passages quickly—were the students who succeeded. School completion rates in the 15 schools I observed, based on their existing records and my own head counts and observations ranged from less than 1% to 10%. Primary 1 classes typically had 3 or 4 sections each with over 100 students, but dwindling each year as students dropped out; girls had a drop out rate much higher then boys. The last class offered, for many of which was the 4th or 5th grade, often dwindled to 10 students or less. The culture of formal schooling, despite these conditions, was alive and well in Malou. Enrollments were swelling as more and more families sent a child or two to school, and as many more began to send their girl children. Below, I use two case studies of school children and their
families to explore how contemporary rural Dinka families and school children navigated decisions about schooling, and in the process, are both preserving and transforming contemporary Dinka pastoralism.

5.2.2 Case Study #1: Wol

Wol was in 4th grade when I met him in 2009 while I was working at Jur Academy, a highly regarded primary school about 5 miles from his homestead. The school was started by an accomplished Dinka man living in the US who grew up in the area. Although he was 17 years old, Wol had managed to complete just a few years of schooling during the war. He had a 15 year old brother and 3 sisters of around 13, 10 and 5. Wol’s brother was also in 4th grade, but in a public school much closer to their homestead. The family was comparatively well off with a large herd of cattle and plenty of fertile land. Wol’s father, an educated SPLA officer, was killed in the war when he was around 10. His sisters and mother, Abuol, now married to Wol’s uncle which is customary for a Dinka widow, managed most of the family’s affairs, including child care, cattle keeping, cooking, fetching water, and cultivation because both of her sons were in school.

Abuol’s parents had arranged for her to be married to Wol’s father when she was young, “before I had breasts” she told me. She was the first of four other wives. Aboul remembers her younger brother being sent to school and her father desiring her to marry an educated man. She made a point of explaining to me that marrying Wol’s father had been
her best chance to live a good life even though she was quite young. She spent most of the worst parts of the war living in the bush with her children, surviving off wild nuts and berries, as bombs from Northern Antonov jets rained down in the area and as Southern militias massacred each other. “During the war, all the educated men had to hide in their bases or run to Wau [the nearest urban center] or Khartoum,” she said “because they don’t know how to live in the bush.” She held deep ambivalence about the war and the SPLA. On one hand, she supported the war against the “Arabs” and her husband’s role in it. On the other, “the SPLA soldiers would come and take everything and leave us nothing.” This attitude was common among women throughout the pastoralist South (Jok and Hutchinson 1999). About education and the future, she told me:

> When I look at my body and I feel strong, I want to send more of my children to school. But when I see that I am old and weak, I know that I need help. I think that in the future, life will be in books and the pen. Only families with children who go to school will survive. They will have jobs, nice clothes, mattresses, cars, and they will send us money. They will build a road nearby with parts that come by my house. It is children who are bringing these things, and the families who won’t send any children to school are suffering. 

As the oldest boy, Wol would traditionally have been expected to tend the family’s cattle but he refused, he told me. He wanted to be a “big man” like his father and go to school. Wol started school three times during the war but was never able to finish out a full term because of raids, bombing, and food insecurity. “This why I’m not the best at school” he said. But unlike many children in the region, Abuol did not send Wol to a refugee camp because, she told me, she did not know anyone in the camps to take care of him. Asked

58 All quotes are either things said directly to me in English or in Dinka said directly to my translator.
what he would do with his education, Wol told me that he wanted to be a county commissioner and end conflict between the North and South as well as between Dinka clans. It was well known that the local county commissioners became relatively wealthy and respected and thus was one of the more popular career aspirations among the Dinka school children I knew. Their homesteads were large and crowded with cattle. When I asked how he would end the conflicts, he explained that clans would be “put in their place” and proposed the use of fences and roads to mark territories. The cattle camp areas called *toj* would be made into public areas, he continued, the government would grant grazing permits and special police would patrol the area to prevent rustling. His other idea was to turn the *toj* into giant rice paddies which would help the county feed itself in hard times.

Wol had gotten married just a few months before I met him. His ability to marry so young reflected the wealth of his family and the fact that he was the first born son. Wol’s wife, Atong, did not go to school and didn’t know her age, but I guessed she was around 14 or 15. Wol’s family and friends helped him pay 60 cows and 6 bulls to Atong’s family as bride wealth. This is about average for an uneducated girl without children who still lives with her family, according to multiple sources. Unmarried girls with children fetch far smaller dowries as do “town girls,” both of whom were pejoratively referred to in numerous interviews with both men and women as simultaneously prostitutes but also a reasonable choice of spouse for “commoners” or men with few or no cows. Attitudes toward educated girls are changing quickly as they are now fetching larger and larger dowries. This is tied to growing perceptions that educated wives contribute knowledge of modern family health and hygiene practices making for healthier children as well as
potential cash earnings should they choose to work. Many of the elders I interviewed had recently married an educated wife for these reasons. Most of the educated girls and young women I interviewed expressed firm support of polygamy because it would enable them to leave much of the hardships of domestic life to non-educated wives and work instead. Had Atong completed primary 8, for example, she likely would have fetched 100 cows. A secondary school certificate would have upped that to 150 cows and college educated Dinka women will fetch 200 or more at the time. Atong explained her view of the future of education and polygamous family life:

In the future, when there are more educated boys, they will live in the cities, and send money to their mothers and sisters in the country to take care of their cattle. Some girls will go to school only if there are plenty of other children to stay home. Wol will fall in love with an educated girl in school and they will live in the city. Me and the other wives will live here and take care of the children and the cattle.

Wol, for all his “modern” ideas and earnest desires to be educated like his father, was up against stiff odds. Being 17 set him apart from most of his other 4th grade classmates. He was behind in his English skills, and given that 4th is the first grade where English is the primary language of instruction—the mother tongue is used until then where English is a separate class—he had a harder time understanding his teachers. When I visited Jur Academy a year later in 2010, Wol had dropped out of school and was overseeing the family’s growing herd of cattle. His oldest sister, now 14, had gotten married and expanded their herd considerably through her dowry. His younger brother was doing well in school and was planning to attend high school in Wau. The combination of their growing cattle wealth, his aging mother, the cost of sending his brother to high
school, and his own academic challenges were all part of the decision to have him take
over care of the family’s cattle rather than continue his formal education.

The comparable success of Wol’s family’s pastoral enterprise, despite its
occasional spasms of war-induced scarcity, contributed to his departure from school. Had I
known Wol solely through his interactions at school, I may have surmised that Wol’s
departure was influenced by his deficiencies—being an older student, his poor English
skills, the trauma of war and his “lost childhood,” his geographic disadvantage, or cultural
misunderstanding of the benefits of formal education. My policy prescriptions would likely
have been oriented toward remedial support or alternative programs aimed at
mainstreaming him back into the formal system, which I would also have assessed as
deficient in proper pedagogical and disciplinary techniques, overcrowded, and lacking in
capital and institutional infrastructure. It is assumed that if formal schooling does not
succeed in meeting its objectives—perhaps the most self-serving of which is for all
children to be in the formal school system—it is the system, the teachers, the children, or
their families which must be deficient, and seldom the objectives.

5.2.3 Case Study #2: Thiik

Wol’s 4th grade classmate and neighbor, Thiik, came from a family with
considerably fewer resources. The pressures to stay in school were much different than
Wol’s. The first thing I noticed about Thiik was that his English was much better than most
in the class. His school marks, however, were average. Thiik’s homestead it was not only considerably smaller then Wol’s, his mother Atem had to do nearly all the cultivating work by herself. Thiik was 14 and had one older and one younger sister; a younger brother died of meningitis as a baby. Atem told me that the death of her son foretold a hard and shortened life for herself. The youngest sister helped her mom at home while the oldest sister took care of the cattle since Thiik was in school. He regularly missed school, however, to help his mother with cultivation and his sister with the cattle, particularly when one got lost, which seemed to happen a lot. Atem’s mother, disabled and blind, lived with them as well and was usually reclining in the shade of her tukul smoking locally grown tobacco and listening to a wind-up radio. The neighbor’s children were often there variously helping with grinding maize, cooking, or looking after a few goats and sheep who, if not watched properly, would begin eating any seedlings that had sprouted. The family’s cattle herd was quite small compared to Wol’s. But what was more striking was the lack of help Atem had from her extended family.

Like Wol’s mother, Atem was also a widow now married to her late husband’s brother who lives and works in Wau as an accountant for a government ministry. Her husband died in a cholera epidemic in the late 90s. She is one of seven siblings none of whom went to school. Her father used to cultivate a much larger garden, even larger than Wol’s land she told me, and they had lots of help with seven children plus the means to offer beer and food to relations and neighbors who came over to help. Atem did not have the means to reproduce this relationship, and having a lower status among her current husband’s wives, receives little help from his extended family. The size of the family’s
cattle herd had suffered a number of setbacks over the last few years, with a few lost and others dying from disease. During one visit, Thiik told me that eight head of cattle had been lost recently and Atem was deeply grieved by this. Thiik later admitted that this was nearly a quarter of their entire herd.

During one of my interviews with Atem, she kneeled by herself in the deep red soil and drove a hoe into the cracked ground, at once loosening and turning and repeating, over two acres of untilled land spread before her. “We will not have enough food,” she lamented. The large muscles on her arms, shoulders, and back revealed a strength and resilience in the present that stood in stark contrast to a deep worry and skepticism she expressed about the future.

Putting a child in school is like planting a seed. You have to wait for the fruit. And so what will we eat while we wait? Maybe Thiik will not be successful in school. Maybe I will be dead before he finishes. You see all the educated men in the market? They sit and wait for the government to give them jobs. Boys who go to school lose their desire to work in the fields or look after cattle. And then you see other men who don’t have an education sitting around in the market too. They are just acting educated.

On the way home from school one day, Thiik, Wol and some of their school friends sang a popular school song for me:

Have you seen the nation?
It does not make itself
Even if we get finished (from the struggle)
One person will remain
We will need the pen to promote it

The song is about encouraging education as the weapon in the next war now that the war of guns has been fought, a teacher explained. I asked Thiik about his dual roles of helping his
sister look after the family’s cattle and going to school at the same time. Thiik would go through periods of three to four day absences every few weeks when a cow would get lost. “When you are little,” he said, “you can do both and it’s not bad. But when you grow up, the paths split and slowly grow apart. Once you have been in school for a few years, you can never go back to cattle keeping.” He desired to be a lawyer or county commissioner some day. He wanted to help shape the new country “now that we are free of the Arabs.”

My interviews and conversations with both Wol and Thiik’s family members as well as with their neighbors described relations between cattle keepers and the educated within the same family as unproblematic and non-hierarchical, in the sense that one vocation was not more highly valued than the other. The two groups infrequently mixed outside the homestead however, and many school children swore off traditional Dinka practices, especially initiation scarring. “Most of my school friends won’t do it because we see that most of our teachers didn’t do it either. I’d feel strange if I went to college.”

Most members of one group reported that they would not consider marriage with a person from the other in my interviews, even though in practice this was not always the case. During my discussion with a group of upper elementary school girls for example, one remarked, and the rest vehemently concurred, “I will never marry a barefoot man,” making reference to their expression for an non-educated man. Now that education is associated with increased knowledge of proper child health and hygiene practices which in turn has elevated bride prices for educated girls, many of the school girls I interviewed said that they stood up to their fathers and demanded to go to school, an attitude traditionally unacceptable for girls. Girls still rarely finish much beyond primary school, bowing to the
pressures of marriage and the cattle wealth it would generate for her family. Thiik’s eldest sister expressed a nuanced consideration of cattle keepers versus educated boys as potential husbands.

The cattle camp girls don’t believe that an educated man will want them. But really it’s because they want an initiated man and most educated men have no cows so they don’t believe their fathers will approve. But I would consider an educated man because he can always make money and buy cows later. I’ve seen many times where cattle keepers will pay almost their entire herd of cattle to marry a good girl, and then what she gets is a poor man.

Thiik desired to have an educated wife, but said he wanted a non-educated one first who would be more oriented to cattle keeping and having lots of children. “[Educated girls] make a nicer home. They know about keeping clean, making tea, sleeping on mattresses, and keeping the children healthy” he said. But he likely will not be able to afford an educated wife at first. When I checked up on Thiik and his family a year later in the fall of 2010, Thiik had moved to Wau to live with his uncle, and enrolled in school there. Atem said he had not been doing well at Jur Academy. The demands of country life, she explained, and how much she and her daughters needed his help at home, interfered with his studies. But unlike Wol who dropped out of school because of his family’s increasing cattle wealth, Thiik instead was sent to the city. “Thiik must finish school,” Atem said. “It is our only hope to survive.” His removal from pastoral life in order to complete his schooling would likely be hailed as a brave and correct decision by his family from an international point of view. But it also meant the likely destruction of their pastoralist livelihood and destitution for Thiik’s immediate family.
Over the last five chapters, I have attempted to describe the many practices around formal schooling that have converged on the rural Dinka community of Malou, some originating in the changing Dinka communities of practice around schooling, some from the multiplex of policies pertaining to refugees, education in emergencies, and state building, and still others carried and transformed by South Sudanese individuals educated abroad. While it is often assumed that formal schooling always functions to meet the demands of state formation, I have shown instead, by highlighting the intersections of history, culture, and the global flow of ideas, that this formulation denies the relative autonomy of the “education system,” and overlooks the possibility that schools themselves might generate profound effects that may block or modify the course of state formation and the intentions of its international interlocutors. Furthermore, I have shown how dominant international economic and ideological influences around education are mediated and partly transformed by institutional bureaucracies, aid workers, teachers, and students. As such, the apparatus of the State itself remains a field of contestation, and not separate from or antagonistic to pastoralism as many studies assert (s.f. Kratli, XXXX; Dyer, 2006; Rival, 1996). Rather, in the case of the Dinka of South Sudan, they adeptly compete for its control through a combination of adaptation and resistance. Pastoralism, along with nomadism and hunter-gatherer societies, are seldom described as “contemporary,” denying these societies a history or a future, when in fact, most of my research subjects have a very sophisticated idea about what contemporary pastoralism will be like in the future.
In this last chapter, I turned my narrative back to contemporary Dinka school children and youth, many of whom are students of the camp-educated refugees portrayed in this thesis. Adding to the history of Dinka cultural practices around education I reviewed in Chapter II, I have shown that historic patterns of both socio-cultural transformation and resistance to externally imposed forms of formal schooling continue today. The bifurcation of youth age-sets into school-goers and cattle keepers, for example, is a result of the sedentary and centralized modalities of the culture of formal schooling but is also a strategy to maintain pastoralist institutions in the face externally imposed and destructive technologies of state-making. The notion of “Education for All” is another example: the idea that all children should be in school is rejected, but education for a few children is embraced and has even become a necessity. Dinka families today go to great lengths and expenses to send a child to a refugee camp or city school, or enrolling them in one 7 miles away with refugee camp educated teachers rather than one nearby with teachers trained by the state. School children are choosing to emulate their more cosmopolitan camp-educated teachers by forgoing traditional initiation rituals but also maintaining their Dinka loyalties by reinvesting their cash earnings in their family’s cattle wealth. Adolescent girls, at much risk to their relationships and reputations, have become more emboldened to demand at least a few years of formal schooling and withstand pressure from their fathers and brothers to marry early. While schooling is seen by educated young women as way to escape the confines of pastoralist gender roles, educated girls and young women also remain deeply supportive of polygamy, as it enables them to cede many of the hardships of domestic life to non-educated wives. The cattle complex
remains a vital part of Dinka life, even for those who live abroad. Educated family members are increasingly relied upon to maintain and grow herds of cattle. It remains at the center of local justice, and remains the signifier of wealth, kinship, history, Divinity, and identity.

Even though the culture of formal schooling marginalizes alternative forms of education, there is not a clamoring for them among the Dinka despite the very low quality of most formal schools: not for better mobile schools for cattle keepers or vocational education for older students or for the acquisition of multi-grade or multi-age teaching techniques or how to manage huge class sizes or a lack of curricular materials. It remains a paradox that although close to 75% of school-age children remain cattle-keepers and not in school (GoSS, 2011), the Pastoralist Education Program which targets them is part of the INGO-dependent alternative education system, which is generally oriented toward tracking students into the formal system—a system which is itself severely under resourced and unable to meet the needs of most students. Here, we find that the institutional and normative frameworks around education have been double recontextualized—first in the camp through the constellation of international refugee protection institutions, and then back in South Sudan though educated returnees. The institutions of the school system, the state, and contemporary pastoralism have in the process become deeply transformed in the very process of preserving their core moralities across space and time. But rather than acknowledging such transformations, it was usually assessed by both INGOs and the state that a severe lack of school quality meant that the moralities of its own institutions had not fully taken hold, and that more training and capacity-building was what is needed (s. f.
SSIRI, 2012; HEAR, 2010). What I have observed, however, is that the pseudo-conformist practices of teachers in and around Malou, and in communities like it throughout the South, were not the result of a lack of proper training, but were adaptations to a resource-poor environment and a lack of viable alternatives.

What both Wol and Thiik’s experience illustrates is that in many ways, the growth of formal schooling in the form promoted by the post-conflict state and its international aid and development partners depends on the destruction of pastoralist livelihoods, the breakdown of traditional security and risk mitigation networks, and deepening vulnerability to destitution in the short-term, and rising numbers of educated, unemployed, and disaffected young people in the longer term. In the past, this population became the leaders of rebellion against the North. Today, they are seen as inheritors of the emerging state institutions. While families in conflict-effected communities already confront very challenging circumstances, what I and others have witnessed in pastoralist and other marginalized communities, is that their resistance to the culture of formal schooling is not an intrinsic characteristic of pastoralism, but rather the result of a history of political, cultural, and structural violence perpetrated by oppressive state-making regimes and the subsequent ahistorical and apolitical policy making of international aid and development institutions that arrive as salve to the weakness or failure of these same regimes (Escobar 1995, Ferguson 1994, DeWaal 1989, Dyer 2006, Harragin 2004). In fact, it was and remains the responses and adaptations of school children to these conditions that have influenced the changing educational practices of Dinka pastoralists in South Sudan.
VI: Conclusion

With few exceptions, just about anywhere one reads about South Sudan today, one would find a uniformly dire description of the land and it’s people. For instance, on the heels of the January 2011 independence referendum where close to 90% of registered voters cast ballots and 99% of those voted for independence, the following refrains inevitably followed the referendum reporting:

From the NYT 1/13/2011:

In a poor, underdeveloped society where only 15 percent of adults can read and write… The roads disappear during the rainy season. Electricity comes from diesel generators. Offices and hotels are pieced together like Lego blocks of prefabricated container units, imported from abroad. More than half the population lives on less than 75 cents a day, and nearly half of the people here are “food deprived,” according to the United Nations…The U.S.A.I.D. study says the new country would require decades of foreign aid “intervention,” including hundreds of millions of dollars, along with thousands of expatriates to staff government offices. One Western diplomat said southern Sudan was set to become “the world’s next aid darling.”

From the Economist 2/5/2011:

South Sudan occupies one of the least developed and most remote parts of Africa. Many of its 8m -14m inhabitants-nobody knows the exact number-live in unmapped lands…A Southern Sudanese girl is more likely to die in childbirth than learn to read and write…Farmers could grow grain, sugar, cane, coffee, tea and tropical fruits for canning. Few do. Most concentrate on raising cows, and not even for slaughter. Some 11m head of cattle wander the south, possibly more numerous than people, but beef sold in markets is usually imported.
Similarly, if one were to look at the country rankings compiled by various international aid and development organizations such as the UN or World Bank, one will find Sudan at or near the bottom of these lists—an independent South Sudan will surely go even lower—whether they be progress on the Millennium Development Goals, the Human Development Index, or the Bank’s Doing Business rankings. Combined with the dominant narratives of war, famine, displacement, neglect, and oppression, and now, state-making, this is how most of us have to come to know South Sudan. This use of population econometrics and quantitative comparisons to other countries—to define the state in contrast to whether it is higher or lower than other states—in turn influences the form and function of international foreign policy, economic development, and humanitarian aid objectives, and this especially goes for the uses and expansion of formal schooling.

Taking a cue from anthropologist Eric Wolf (1982), it is this modality of knowing, through deficits, need and an exclusion from the typical Western narratives of progress and literacy, that the peoples of South Sudan have come to be seen as peoples without an educational history. Today, while South Sudanese children crowd into extremely poor quality schools—and a vast majority do not finish primary school—policy makers continue prescribe institutional models of schooling that reflect those of nations with vastly different conditions in the communities served by these schools. And when these models fail to meet their objectives, it is not the model that is reconsidered, but rather the people of South Sudan; they need more training, more infrastructure, more entrepreneurial spirit, more understanding of the benefits of an education, more adherence to international human rights ideals, or else they are too mobile, too corrupt, too violent, or too primitive.
Pastoralism in particular is contrasted with modernity and the institutions of the modern state. While this serves to explain why more aid, more development, and more intervention is legitimated, this understanding of the pastoralist peoples of South Sudan not only neglects their vast diversity, but also the degree to which modernity and the state have become irreducible aspects of contemporary pastoralism.

Policy making in this context cannot be seen as either a technical, linear, top-down operation or a process pre-determined by dominant “machines,” but rather as embedded practices. I have attempted to show throughout this thesis that the pastoralist peoples of South Sudan have a long history of practices around formal schooling, and these practices should be understood as the context into which the succession of external state-making projects became embedded and subsequently transformed. I began in Chapter II by examining the colonial and post-colonial history of schooling in the pastoralist areas of South Sudan. I demonstrated that while the provision of any form of schooling in the South throughout the colonial era was very small—trumped by short-term imperial aims, the pillaging of gold, ivory and slaves, or as a strategic bulwark to protect colonists’ control of the Nile from a southward encroaching Islam—its provision was not inconsequential. Although British Southern policy, including education policy, was radically deficient in that it consisted simply of a set of techniques directed to no clearly defined, long-term objectives, Mission “bush” schools multiplied while government schools stalled. And even though Mission schooling, left functionally unchecked by British colonial apathy, focused almost entirely on reciting scripture, it did manage to produce a small, marginalized, and poorly educated class of young Dinka men, neither entirely converted to Christianity nor
entirely detribalized as they sought to use their education for the benefit of their families. By the onset of colonial independence in 1956, educated Dinka found themselves exiled from the pastoralist enterprise but also marginalized by a racist post-colonial state.

The onset of the first civil war and the immediate post-colonial era saw a steady but slight increase in the numbers of pastoralist children enrolling in school. More significantly, the radical shift in the meanings of schooling and the educated person in Dinka society was accompanied by a coagulation of Southern power, albeit into a multi-headed hydra. Although the movement toward political centralization was anathema to the highly atomized political organization of the majority of Southern communities, it also has precedents: especially among Dinka and Nuer communities, a rally en masse around a political or religious figure has historically been a response to external threats and goes back generations to at least the 12\textsuperscript{th} and 13\textsuperscript{th} centuries (Beswick, 2004; Leonhardt, 1956; Sanderson & Sanderson 1981; Hutchinson, 1996). The closure of Mission schools by the increasingly brutal Northern project of Arabization and Islamization had the effect of politicizing what was otherwise a weak system of schooling under British colonial rule. The Southern educated class, unemployed and demonized for supporting rebellion, was transformed from a relatively small, marginalized, and atomized population into the leaders of a formidable military and diplomatic force. Christianity, blamed for both educational neglect and the birth of a bifurcated post-colonial state, was elevated from a foreign, irrelevant, schoolchild’s pastime to an accomplice in resistance; its fused spiritual and political identity rose to a stature equal to the Dinka leaders of the past. And English,
once seen as merely necessary to score a colonial clerkship, became the anti-Arabic and an act of defiance.

The meanings of education to the bulk of Dinka communities took on new political and spatial characteristics. An important theme throughout this thesis however, has been to assert that educated Dinka persons were seen less as harbingers of modern lifestyles—even while modern amenities such as bicycles, bed frames and mattresses, tea and sugar, western clothing, and medicine were undoubtedly symbols of wealth—but more as diversified assets to their families and clans by nature of their access to the emerging Southern power structure. Although families had already been used to sending children long distances to attend primary school, and to Khartoum to access secondary and post-secondary education, the first civil war era expanded the scope of these practices to include refugee camps increasingly supported by international humanitarian aid institutions. By the end of the second civil war in 2005, an education obtained in camps and abroad had become the preferred credential by cattle-owning Dinka families but also by the international humanitarian actors which had saturated the South and were looking to hire national staff for their variety of peace- and state-building projects. This included the expansion and formalization of the Southern school system. Although this system remained extremely weak through the decades of war, it managed to become increasingly important to Dinka families, not only for a few of their children, but for their graduates to have jobs as teachers. While the numbers of educated Southerners grew exponentially over the course of the second civil war, it remained very small relative to the population,
especially in pastoralist areas. For instance, when I began my fieldwork in 2007, only 2% of school-age children in Warrap State were enrolled in school (SSCCSE, 2009).

The tragedy of the “war of the educated,” as the Southern rebel in-fighting came to be known by many Southerners (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999), and the increasingly fervent claims of government authority by militarized Southern factions and their educated leaders placed in relief the deep contradictions that emerged by the end of the second civil war concerning schooling in the South. While the procurement of education credentials by a child, particularly that obtained in refugee camps, was seen by Dinka families as a way to diversify sources of wealth generation, especially after more than four decades of war that brought pastoralist livelihoods to the brink of destruction, it remained in a very skeptical light by most families, who tended to send only one or two children of many to school. It had also become a source of violent competition for power with rivals and to control state resources and the cattle complex, and thus was associated with both survival and violence. The culture of the state had in this way become integrated into the pastoral circuit, both maintaining and transforming its institutions, but at a steep cost to lives as clan and ethnic rivalries became militarized and considerably more deadly. Extended networks of kinship relations, which continued to be established and maintained through the exchange of cattle, expanded to include military loyalists, ranking government appointees and civil servants, school teachers, and the national staffs of international and bi-lateral humanitarian aid and development institutions.
The history of educational practices among Dinka pastoralists in South Sudan demonstrates that it is necessary to draw attention away from the typical construction of children affected by war as vulnerable victims, as persons knowable only through their need, which dehumanizes and dehistoricizes the refugee (Malkki 1997: 224). By constructing war-induced displacement rather, as a “normal” part of a child’s lived experience in places like Sudan, this approach makes visible a set of practices, adaptations, and coping mechanisms conditioned by a history of displacement and return that influence and are influenced by educational interventions mobilized by international institutions intended to protect displaced children and regulate their movement. Education has only recently become a standard tool among these interventions, but it has for a long time been a motivating factor in the movement of people around the globe (Castles 2009). This meeting of historically and politically conditioned practices of movement with new international policy responses to displacement crises raises questions about distinctions that are made between voluntary and involuntary movement, between the various socio-cultural and economic conditions that give rise to child migration, and how we define home and vulnerability in a milieu of global interconnectedness and interdependence.

Within the context of the very dire consequences of war and displacement on children and youth, we also find that there are many who manage—through historically established practices as well as means and connections—to navigate its varied arteries of asylum, intersections with aid, veins of return, and access an education not otherwise available. In important ways, the generation of young people at the heart of this thesis are both producing and reproducing practices that have been a part of Dinka social and
political landscapes since before colonial-era mission education was introduced in the 1930s, and which continue to be conditioned by a history of crisis, cultural adaptation, political resistance, and a lack of access not only to an education, but an education of the desired kind and quality. The relationship between childhood and education thus holds very particular cultural, economic, and political meaning for Dinka young people and their families, but these meanings are seldom acknowledged much less congruent with the intentions of international institutions who direct the provision of education for the displaced and who are now dependent on the return of camp-educated refugees to sustain their post-conflict reconstruction agendas.

I do not suggest, however, that these children and youth be deemed a distinct category of refugee or migrant; like both of these categories, the countless variety of meanings across displacement experiences around the world obliterates its analytical usefulness (Malkki 1995). Rather, I seek to bring attention to the increasingly common practices of education-driven migration—especially during crisis—and the ways these practices challenge contemporary notions of normalcy and vulnerability, home and displacement, and the politics of culture in a world of interconnected and interdependent spaces. Accounting for the actual educational practices of displaced children and measuring them against international emergency education discourse opens a number of opportunities to examine the socio-cultural, economic, and political agendas behind exilic education, whether for Sudanese refugees in Kenya, the children of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand, or upper middle-class boarding school students from inner-city Detroit. Separating the practices of these young people in terms of their voluntariness and
socio-economic privilege is to deny the resources, capabilities, and views of forced and poor migrants.

With this analytic model in mind, I next explored in Chapter III how the growing culture of the state in South Sudan was carried on from its colonial and post-colonial state building projects through the pedagogical spaces of the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya. Outlining the institutional and normative policy frameworks around education for displaced children and describing the constellation of institutional actors that implement and transform these frameworks, I described the refugee education policy multiplex, its institutional logics, bureaucratic rationalities, and cultural scripts, and how it could be read in the pedagogical spaces of the refugee camp. The pedagogical camp could be found in schools as well as the many extracurricular activities, service distribution points and processes, institutional procedures and bureaucracies, employment opportunities, economic and cultural allowances and restrictions, and spatial organization of the camp. Taken together, these spaces constituted an official and unofficial curriculum that cumulatively promoted statist governmentality among refugees. It was also a decidedly de-nationalized imagination of the state, censorious to most expressions of national or cultural identities of the varied refugee communities encamped in Kakuma. Expressions of Dinka culture were legitimate only in the space of democratic, bureaucratic, and free-market practices—such as being the Dinka representative on the camp management council or the participatory production of films about the evils of cultural practices antithetical to international human rights and gender norms. But pastoralist spirituality and livelihood—embodied by the cattle complex and subsistence farming—were repressed.
The ultimate return home of the educated refugee child, as a rehabilitated and indoctrinated young adult, is filled with international hopes of institutional and economic reform in the weak or failed state from whence they came. In this way, they are seen in essence as “comprador state-makers;” the latest generation of an educated class—like the colonial era, first civil war, and second civil war generations before them—^59—to inherit, but also resist and remake, the state-making projects of external regimes. Yet because they are simultaneously cosmopolitan and global in their perspectives by nature of their exilic educations, but limited in movement by international encampment and repatriation policy, they are in many ways cognitively mobile yet spatially incarcerated.

In Chapter IV, I compared the repatriation practices of educated and non-educated refugees from the Kakuma Refugee Camp and the challenges many faced returning to the rural village in which they were born nearly 15 years earlier. The manner in which refugees repatriated depended greatly on existing pastoralist class differences and the degree to which connections to kinship and clan relations were maintained over the course of encampment. Upon return, camp-educated refugees were highly sought after as national staff by the constellation of international institutions orchestrating aid and development projects as well as by the national, state and local governmental bodies of the emerging South Sudanese state apparatus, the pseudo-allochthonous and pseudo-autochthonous employers. Through these employment opportunities, returnees were able to maintain membership in national, international, or global collectivities while also reintegrating into

^59 See chapter II.
the pastoralist political economy. The communities of practice that constitute the pastoralist enterprise—the cattle complex, transhumance, polygamy, subsistence farming and fishing—have survived largely because of the practices of educated persons; these practices were both productive and reproductive, transforming and preserving.

Today’s inheritors of the South Sudan state apparatus are not merely local representatives of a global order of space. I emphasized how the refugee child is imagined as a vessel—repaired and remade in the space of the camp—for the travel of prescribed knowledge, practices, and cultural scripts to the weak or failed, refugee-producing state. The hopes of rehabilitating such states in the image of dominant state-making practices, such as the democracy, capitalism, human rights, institutional culture, and territorial sovereignty—what one might call statist governmentality—are projected onto them. Educated returnees do not simply reproduce these multiplex, changing, and often competing interests, but also transform, resist, and produce new practices as the statist governmentalities that dominate the pedagogic camp—recontextualized from international and global contexts—are recontextualized once again in post-conflict South Sudan.

The pastoral political economy in Malou has adapted to, but has not been replaced by these educated returnee state-makers and their acquired scripts and rituals of the state. Those who can perform these practices have enabled their larger pastoral kinship and clan networks to adapt to new power relations and access the institutional legitimacy of the emerging state without entirely adopting its morality, largely for the purpose of rehabilitating a deeply vulnerable pastoral enterprise. This includes access to the cash
economy, influence in the implementation of aid and development projects, and armaments for the defense and prosecution of local and regional conflict. Many would characterize this state of affairs as a perversion or corruption of the state, largely by clientalism and cronyism, and indeed these practices plague many South Sudan government ministries at all levels. But it would be fallacious to make a binary distinction between pastoralism and the state; in fact, in rural pastoralist communities like Malou, they are intimately linked. What is masked by the pastoralism-state culture binary, is how the institutional models and morality of each culture are directed by local, national and international politics and by negotiations and networks the cross-cut formal institutional boundaries. My intention in this Chapter was thus not to compare and contrast, but rather to focus on how institutional realities are produced, reproduced, and transformed through the process of interaction and enactment.

In Chapter V, I attempted to describe the ways in which the culture of formal schooling—as a particular institutional expression of the state—converges and diverges from the institutions of contemporary pastoralism. What I found is that pastoralism is not antithetical to schooling, but the exclusive focus on formal schooling—to the detriment of alternative forms—which derive from global models of the school institution and totalizing values such as Education for All and the Millennium Development Goals—are fused with the morality of the state. I have shown that these policies can be deeply destructive to pastoralist livelihoods, throwing families deeper into poverty, and this has been shown to be true among pastoralist societies elsewhere (Devereux 2006; Krätli 2001; Ruto et. al. 2009; Dyer 2006). The eschatological goals of EFA and the state institutions that preach
it—projected futures as rallying cries for educational planning that allow for the critical evaluation of performance from year to year—reflect the flaws of unacknowledged disjuncture (van den Berg and Quarels van Ufford, 2005).

Dinka communities have responded to these all too often destructive forces of state-making as both transforming and preserving of their pastoralist enterprise. The bifurcation of the age-set system into school goers and cattle keepers, the transformation of gender relations amidst the staunch defense of polygamy, and the integration of the cattle complex into the circulation of state power, all demonstrate the resiliencies and coping strategies of the pastoral enterprise through long periods of enormous and tragic upheaval while at the same time prove that it is not the static, history-less, and primitive pursuit of a rapidly disappearing world. Any insinuation that pastoralism and the state form an irreconcilable binary is a denial of any pastoralist agency or history; at the current juncture, where cycles of war, exile, and return have contributed—unfortunately at the expense of millions of lives—to a significant shift in Dinka attitudes toward schooling and the educated person, it would be a repeat of a sordid history should the emerging state and its international partners fail to make room for the rationalities, moralities, and self-determination of the pastoralist peoples of South Sudan.
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